At least 1,000 Japanese troops are set to take part in April’s Balikatan exercises alongside forces from the Philippines and the U.S., in a move that carries historical weight but is increasingly viewed through the lens of evolving regional security dynamics.

The South China Sea has become one of Asia’s most contested strategic flashpoints in recent years, with overlapping territorial claims and frequent maritime confrontations. China’s use of so-called “grey zone” tactics – coercive actions that fall short of open conflict – has added pressure on smaller Southeast Asian states, pushing them to strengthen external security ties.

(Jam Sta Rosa/AFP)

“Japan’s involvement in Balikatan and the wider move toward minilateral cooperation do suggest a gradual shift towards a more networked security system in the Indo-Pacific,” Joseph Kristanto, a research analyst at Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, told RFA.

That shift is visible in how exercises themselves have evolved. Balikatan began in the 1990s as a relatively small-scale bilateral training exercise focused on counterinsurgency and disaster response.

But now it involves thousands of troops and it simulates large scale conflict scenarios, including amphibious operations, missile defense and critical infrastructure protection.

The exercise has also grown beyond its original U.S.-Philippines format.

In recent iterations, countries such as Japan and Australia have taken on more active roles, with Japan participating as an observer since 2012, and last year sending a single frigate and about 150 non-combat personnel.

The increased participation from multiple countries reflects a broader push to build interoperability among like-minded partners.

New domains such as cyber, space and information warfare have been incorporated, mirroring how regional planners now view potential conflict as spanning multiple fronts rather than being confined to conventional naval or territorial disputes.

Regional anxiety

Still, the emergence of these overlapping partnerships does not signal a post-American security order.

“This does not replace the traditional U.S.-led ‘hub-and-spoke’ system. Instead, it adds another layer to it,” Kristanto said.

The “hub-and-spoke” model – under which the U.S. maintains bilateral alliances with countries such as Japan, South Korea and the Philippines – has underpinned Asia’s security architecture for decades.

What is changing, according to experts, is the growing number of links between those “spokes,” as countries deepen cooperation with each other through joint exercises, intelligence sharing and defense agreements.

(Jam Sta Rosa/AFP)

That layering is partly driven by uncertainty over Washington’s long-term bandwidth in the region, even as it remains the central security guarantor.

U.S. security commitments in Europe and the Middle East, alongside domestic political debates over defence spending, have prompted some regional governments to hedge by strengthening ties with other partners.

“The latest move comes amid rising regional anxiety about U.S. defense commitment and capacity in the Indo-Pacific region,” William Yang, a Northeast Asia analyst at the International Crisis Group, told RFA.

Countries such as Japan are therefore stepping up – not to replace the United States, but to reinforce deterrence and share the burden.

“These moves are certainly not intended to take over the central role that the U.S. takes in terms of regional deterrence,” Yang added.

In practical terms, that shift is translating into deeper operational integration. Exercises are no longer just about presence or signalling, but about testing how forces coordinate across multiple domains and contingencies, Yang said.

“Having more partners such as Japan involved could lead to real operational changes over time, not just symbolic ones,” Kristanto said, noting that drills are becoming “more integrated and more multilateral.”

Japan’s participation also builds on a steady expansion of defence ties with the Philippines, including joint maritime exercises and the provision of coastal radar systems.

These capabilities are designed to improve Manila’s ability to monitor its waters, particularly in contested areas where Chinese vessels have maintained a persistent presence.

(Jam Sta Rosa/AFP)

“Japan’s more proactive participation in bilateral military drills and patrols as well as multilateral military exercises could help strengthen regional coordination and capacity building in areas such as countering Chinese gray zone operations and strengthening Southeast Asian states’ maritime domain awareness,” Yang explained.

‘More connected network’

What would be the first deployment of Japanese combat troops in the Philippines since World War II–when Imperial Japan occupied what was then a U.S. territory–is not lost in public opinion.

Protesters in the Philippines say Tokyo has unresolved wartime grievances with Manila, while protesters in Japan fear the move is part of a larger trend of increased militarism counter to the spirit of their pacifist constitution.

Experts told RFA that Japan’s participation reflects a broader effort to connect security arrangements across the Indo-Pacific into a more cohesive framework.

For Shen Ming-Shih, a research fellow at Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research, this is most clearly seen along the so-called First Island Chain – a strategic arc stretching from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines.

(AFP)

“Japan now participates with ground troops in addition to warships this year, indicating a rising possibility of joint U.S.-Japan-Philippines responses to South China Sea conflicts,” Shen told RFA, pointing to “a growing likelihood of alliance-based joint operations and defense industry cooperation.”

Although no formal multilateral alliance exists, these overlapping partnerships are beginning to resemble a more connected network.

“Through the alliances between the U.S. and these countries, a network of alliances centered on the U.S. will be formed,” Shen said.

For Beijing, that growing coordination is likely to be viewed with concern, particularly as exercises become more frequent and more operationally substantive.

“The expansion of these minilateral groupings will likely be viewed with concern,” Kristanto said, warning that it “does increase the risk of misperception and sharper responses in contested areas.”

Edited by Eugene Whong.

Port Moresby, PAPUA NEW GUINEA – Six months after Papua New Guinea and Australia signed a bilateral defense treaty, public opinion in PNG remains divided, with some telling Radio Free Asia that they like that the pact creates opportunities for youth, and others saying that they worry about potentially being drawn into a larger conflict between the West and China.

Unofficially named the Pukpuk Treaty, after the Tok Pisin word for “crocodile,” it is Port Moresby’s first mutual defense pact and it draws the two regional allies closer together in an era of increasing Chinese influence in the Pacific.

Beyond the nuts and bolts of coordination and cooperation during crises, the pact also allows 10,000 Papua New Guineans to join the Australian Defense Force, or ADF, and become eligible for Aussie citizenship.

Supporters of the treaty say that in a country where 58% of the people are under 25 and, according to World Bank data 3.8% youth unemployment, the opportunity is too great to ignore.

“I agree with the Pukpuk Pact. It is an employment opportunity for our ever increasing youths who can’t be employed after leaving school,” John Kau, a former colonel in the Papua New Guinea Defense Force, or PNGDF, told RFA. “Our country’s leaders have no idea on how to mitigate the lack of jobs for the school leavers.”

Kau said that it would be good for young Papua New Guineans to take on Australian citizenship because earning an Australian salary would enable them to take care of their extended families.

But he also understood that the treaty means that Papua New Guineans could be called on by Australia in the event of war.

“I have no problem as long as it is a just cause,” said Kau.

(David Gray/AFP)

The citizenship for service agreement was a major selling point of the Pukpuk pact. Shortly after the treaty was announced in August 2025, Papua New Guinea’s Defense Minister Billy Joseph told Australian media that there was “a very big pool” of young Papua New Guineans “and Australia can have as many as they want.”

He added that recruitment would take place at regional centers and in the capital Port Moresby.

Divided opinion

But on the streets of Port Moresby, not everyone is lining up to enlist. Chris Pole, a young Papua New Guinean, told RFA that he found it hard to believe that the treaty would allow 10,000 Papua New Guineans to join the Australian military, especially when the PNGDF has only 4,000 personnel.

“The Pukpuk recruitment alone will outnumber the PNGDF size, so if there is a war, definitely Australia will use Papua New Guineans as pawns,” he said, noting that pawns in a game of chess are often sacrificed to protect more valuable pieces. “Papua New Guineans will be sought out first when there is a war and put on the front line if Australia decides to support the United States in a war against China.”

Australia also has a mutual defense agreement with the U.S. and New Zealand through the 1951 ANZUS Treaty, and Washington entered into a defense cooperation agreement with Port Moresby in 2023.

Pole called on the country to remain in its traditional neutral foreign policy stance of being “friends to all, enemies to none.”

But Bosco Bothoa, another young Papua New Guinean, told RFA he would love to serve if it meant he would become an Australian.

“I definitely would want to be a citizen of Australia as stated in the pact, of course,” he said. “In Australia there is better standard of living than in PNG and the salary would be higher.”

But Bothoa also understood the responsibilities that could come with enlisting and acquiring a new citizenship. When asked if he would be prepared to fight if war erupts in the Pacific, he said, “War is not the ultimate solution,” but if it happens, “then we will have to serve our country as citizens of Australia.”

Bothoa and others who want to enlist might have to wait though. In a Facebook post on Jan. 4, the PNG Ministry of Defense advised that the first phase of recruitment under the plan would only be open to Papua New Guinean citizens who have permanent residency status in Australia. Phase two would start at a later date and include applicants living in Papua New Guinea.

The PNGDF told RFA that the recruitment process has not yet been finalized, and it remains under consultation.

Mutually beneficial

The Pukpuk treaty is a win-win, according to the Washington-based Center for Strategic & International Studies. In an article published shortly after the treaty was signed, the think tank said that the treaty deepens the relationship between the two countries, and that enlisting Papua New Guineans into the ADF would be good for both sides.

“Given the ADF’s recruitment challenges and PNG’s undermanned defense forces, the arrangement offers clear benefits for both nations,” the article said. “As a mutual defense treaty, the Pukpuk Treaty stands as both a continuation of previous aspects of the Australian-PNG relationship but also constitutes a fundamental change in the depth of that relationship.”

But the treaty might be at odds with Papua New Guinea’s constitution, Jerry Singirok, a Papua New Guinean former two-star general who is now a defense strategist, told RFA.

(Will Burgess/Reuters)

“Regardless of how best the Papua New Guinea government want to justify the integration of a foreign force, our constitution does not provide for military integration with a foreign power,” He said. “The PNG Defence Force is mandated to serve the sovereign interest of PNG and any arrangement that embeds PNGDF with the Australia’s Defence Force or aligns PNG’s military doctrine with Australia,’s could be seen as undermining PNG’s national sovereignty, violating the principle of non alignment which PNG had historically upheld.”

He said that barring an amendment to the constitution, the legality of the Pukpuk Treaty could be challenged in court.

Prior to the treaty’s signing, a spokesperson for the Chinese Embassy in Papua New Guinea said that China “adheres to the principle of non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs,” adding that the treaty should not prevent Port Moresby from cooperating with a third party nor should the treaty target a third party or undermine its “legitimate interests.”

The treaty does not mention China by name.

Edited by Eugene Whong.

Update corrects the given name of Col. Kau.

TAMUNING, Guam - A U.S. plan to potentially mine an area of Pacific seabed roughly the size of Nevada near two U.S. territories is the latest example of increasing competition in the region between the United States and China, a local government official told Radio Free Asia.

The zones of seabed marked off for potential development total 69 million acres (280,000 square kilometers) in two distinct geographical areas east and west of the Northern Mariana Islands and Guam.

“In both areas, the primary minerals for commercial development include potential commercially viable quantities of cobalt, nickel, copper, manganese, zinc, rare earth elements, along with other minerals that may prove economically viable to extract and process in the future,” Douglas Boren, the Pacific regional director for the U.S. The Department of Interior’s Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, or BOEM, stated in a March 13 memo detailing the plan.

(BOEM)

In the same memo, Boren said that the Trump administration recognizes an “overreliance” on foreign-sourced minerals and the products that use them, potentially jeopardizing “U.S. defense capabilities, infrastructure development and technological innovation.”

Boren cited executive orders that direct the Department of Interior to expedite mineral development in the region, including one signed by the president on April 24, 2025, which emphasized “strengthening partnerships with allies and industry to counter China’s growing influence over seabed mineral resources.”

The memo specified that the areas identified would be subject to “environmental analyses conducted for the proposed lease offering.” meaning that parts of the two tracts might be omitted from the area to be leased. It also acknowledged concerns from those opposed to the undersea mining proposal, including potential harms to fisheries, tourism and the environment.

Geopolitics at play

Sen. William Parkinson of the Guam legislature noted that the race to explore the ocean floor is driven by a broader strategic contest unfolding across the Indo-Pacific.

“Guam is very much on the front line of it,” Parkinson told RFA. “There are environmental concerns about deep-sea mining, and those are real.”

Parkinson said the concern over China’s increasing influence in the Pacific goes beyond mining.

(Mar-Vic Cagurangan/RFA)

“When vessels tied to the Chinese state are repeatedly surveying waters near Guam and other strategic corridors, we have to ask not only what minerals they are interested in, but what military advantage they may be seeking,” he said, adding that competition between Washington and Beijing carries echoes of World War II, when Guam was part of the Pacific Theater campaign.

Reuters and other news outlets reported this week that in addition to surveying for minerals, China is mapping the seabed, and the data has military applications, according to naval experts.

Beyond being one variable in the larger arena of strategic competition with China, undersea mining is also big bucks. The emerging industry has a potential valuation as high as US$20 trillion according to the Belgium-based management consulting firm Arthur D. Little.

Local opposition

But people living in Guam and the Northern Marianas feel like their concerns are not being heard, Guam’s Governor Lou Leon Guerrero said in response to the March 13 memo.

“We are disappointed that, in all our attempts to engage with BOEM throughout this process, they have not considered and have ignored the very people who are most affected by their actions,” she said. “We will show up on every front to make sure that our concerns are heard and that our oceans are protected.”

(Mar-Vic Cagurangan/RFA)

Last year, the Guam and Northern Marianas legislatures separately adopted resolutions calling for a moratorium on deep-sea mining in the waters around the islands. Federal decisions, however, supersede local legislative actions.

To speed up the leasing of marked areas, the BOEM streamlined the permitting process and removed territorial governments from the decision-making process.

Guerrero said the plan was “driven by industry interest” at the expense of “environment, biodiversity, fisheries, tourism, public health, national security and regional relations.”

The proposal ignores the people and governments of nearby areas, Angelo Villagomez, a researcher at the Center for American Progress in Washington, told RFA. He criticized pushing forward “an industrial experiment in one of the most biodiverse and culturally significant ocean regions on Earth.”

“This decision to advance the largest seabed mining proposal in U.S. history ignores the overwhelming concerns voiced by the people and local governments. Deep-sea mining poses irreversible risks to fragile ecosystems, fisheries that sustain our communities, and the cultural heritage of the Chamorro and Refaluwasch peoples,” he said, referring to two ethnic groups living in the Marianas.

Beyond the Northern Marianas and Guam, Washington has begun engaging with the governments of the Cook Islands, Tonga and Nauru to forge seabed mining partnerships. Though no commercial mining has begun, the International Seabed Authority has issued several contracts in the Clarion-Clipperton zone, an area between Hawaii and Mexico which is known to host the world’s largest polymetallic deposits, but also an abundance of biodiverse sea life. Most awarded contracts in the zone are sponsored by Nauru and Tonga.

(William West/AFP)

Meanwhile in an area of seabed near American Samoa, another U.S. Pacific territory, mining exploration activities are already underway.

Deposits there contain an estimated 10 billion tons of high-grade ore, offering a significant, strategically located U.S. offshore source of nickel, cobalt, manganese, and copper, according to John Wasko, executive director of the American Samoa Development Council.

“China has a monopoly on terrestrial refining. Why bother?” Wasko told RFA, explaining that the U.S. has the potential to produce rare earth elements in a more sustainable way than by using the “old and dirty” technology in Chinese rare earth refineries.

Chinese monopoly

According to the Canadian government, China mines 69% of the global total of rare earths annually, with the U.S. a distant second at 12%. China also has a 90% monopoly on refining, where rare earth elements used in everyday items like cellular phones, cars, and solar panels are separated from the mined ore.

Though most of China’s rare earth production comes from terrestrial mines, it is also trying to increase its rare earth mining capabilities in the seas to possibly expand on its dominance of the rare earths market.

Parkinson expressed concern that the increasing competition between large powers was turning the Pacific into “a chessboard where island communities are pushed aside.”

“The Pacific must remain in the hands of Pacific Islanders,” he said. “We cannot allow the blue continent to be treated as a warehouse of raw materials or a covert battlespace. Our people, our environment, and our security all demand better than that.”

Edited by Eugene Whong.

Update corrects American Samoa as the U.S. territory where deep-sea mining exploration activities are underway.

Airane revealed to RFA Korean’s Jaewoo Park that after interacting with mysterious figures online, he found himself in a videocall with an East Asian man going by the name “Benjamin,” who promised him big bucks.

The deal? “Benjamin,” would pose as Airane in remote job interviews and once hired, the two would split the job’s salary.

Screenshots of “Benjamin’s” face taken by Airane closely match those of a man identified as a North Korean hacker by California-based security firm DTEX.

North Korean hackers are increasingly using the identity borrowing tactic as a way to avoid detection as they engage in illicit activities to earn money for their cash-strapped government.

While lending an identity might seem like easy money, those who go along with such a scheme should be aware that they could be charged as accomplices to cybercrime.

Edited by Eugene Whong.

But any cooperation between China and the Philippines to explore undersea oil reserves in disputed waters would be in preparation for the next energy crisis, not a solution to the current one, the experts said.

Talks this week between the two sides have shown “positive progress,” Beijing’s embassy in Manila said in a statement Thursday, urging both sides to “set aside differences and pursue joint development.”

Philippine officials, meanwhile, confirmed that no joint activity has started, but could in the future should negotiations be successful.

The renewed engagement comes amid disruptions to the Strait of Hormuz, a major shipping conduit through which one-fifth of global oil and gas flows.

The disruptions have heightened concerns over energy security in Asia, where many economies rely heavily on imports from the Middle East.

Out of gas

The Philippines is under pressure to secure new energy sources brought on by declining output from its Malampaya gas field, which supplies a significant share of the country’s electricity.

For Manila, the South China Sea has long been seen as a potential alternative source of energy.

The U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates the region holds about 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.

But Beijing claims almost the entire South China Sea and any energy supplies that lie within, including in the areas also claimed by Manila. Parts of the sea are also claimed by Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan and Indonesia.

(RFA)

At times, the competing claims can lead to violent clashes, such as in June 2024, when Chinese Coast Guard ships, according to Philippine officials, rammed supply ships near the Second Thomas Shoal, a reef that had become a flashpoint in the area claimed by both countries.

One Philippine sailor lost a finger in the incident, and at least seven others were injured, the officials said.

The turmoil and instability in the region is a major reason why its energy resources remain untapped.

While analysts say the Iran war is likely to increase attention on those resources, it will not necessarily accelerate their development.

Delayed gratification

“Disruptions to Hormuz are already pushing attention toward the South China Sea, but as a strategic hedge rather than a practical substitute,” Sylwia M. Gorska, a PhD candidate in international relations at the University of Lancashire in the United Kingdom, told RFA.

She said because of the importance of the strait to global gas supply, disruption can create enough volatility to force governments to do what they can to reopen it rather than look for gas elsewhere.

“The key issue is not whether the strait is formally open, but whether energy can move through it reliably and at acceptable cost,” she said.

(Omar Kamal/AFP)

Gorska said that the loss of supply cannot simply be replaced by new sources of oil in the South China Sea, because development there would require years of stable operating conditions and large amounts of capital investment.

“The real constraint is not whether resources exist, but whether they can be turned into supply,” Gorska said, highlighting legal uncertainty, operational risks and the absence of stable investment conditions in the South China Sea region.

The significant oil reserves in the sea are unlikely to provide the short term relief needed to deal with the shocks to the system brought on by Hormuz, Taipei-based independent analyst and a former visiting scholar at the National Chengchi University, Aadil Brar, told RFA.

“Hormuz was moving 20 million barrels a day of oil,” he said. But in the South China Sea, “turning gas fields into actual supply? That’s 5–10 years of drilling, pipelines, and US$10 billion in investments.”

“It’s a hedge for the next crisis, not a fix for this one.”

Competition remains fierce

“While incentives to cooperate increase on paper, behavior remains competitive,” Gorska said, referring to previous attempts at cooperation between Manila and Beijing that faced significant obstacles.

(Adrian Portugal/Reuters)

A 2018 agreement between the Philippines and China on joint exploration did not result in any joint projects and was later terminated, while constitutional limits on foreign participation – reinforced by a 2023 Philippine Supreme Court ruling – remain a key constraint.

International law does, however, provide for joint development arrangements, Brar said, but he acknowledged that implementation remains difficult in practice.

“Trust is thin and power’s uneven,” he said, noting that previous cooperative efforts have not been smooth. “It’s been more shoving than pushing together.”

Edited by Eugene Whong.

Vietnam has condemned China’s land reclamation activities at Antelope reef in the disputed Paracel Islands, following reports of accelerated dredging, landfill and construction operations there that, according to a U.S.-based think tank, could make it “China’s largest feature” in the South China Sea.

“Any foreign activities conducted in Hoang Sa, including Hai Sam reef, without Vietnam’s permission are completely illegal and invalid,” Vietnamese foreign ministry spokeswoman Pham Thu Hang said on Saturday, referring to the archipelago and the reef claimed by Hanoi and Beijing, as well as Taiwan, by their Vietnamese names. “Vietnam resolutely opposes such activities.”

Last week, the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, or AMTI, a project of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, or CSIS, in Washington, published an analysis of satellite imagery that said vast land reclamation efforts underway at Antelope Reef over the past month could make the reef suitable to construct a 9,000-foot (2700-meter) runway.

According to new @AsiaMTI analysis, Antelope Reef is set to become China’s largest feature in the Paracels and potentially in the entire South China Sea.

Read more: https://t.co/PT2ZYGKIoe pic.twitter.com/tw4YmeofVq

— CSIS (@CSIS) March 20, 2026

Beijing has constructed several airstrips of that size on other islands in the South China Sea including in the Spratly Islands, another disputed archipelago, the AMTI report said.

China’s foreign ministry during a press conference Monday asserted its position that the Paracels were Beijing’s territory.

“Xisha Qundao is China’s inherent territory, over which there is no dispute,” the ministry’s spokesperson Lin Jian said, referring to the archipelago by its name in Mandarin Chinese. “Necessary construction on our own territory is aimed at improving living and working conditions on the islands and growing the local economy.”

Territorial flashpoint

Though sovereignty over the Paracels is disputed, China took effective control of the archipelago after a 1974 naval clash with South Vietnam, which lost the Vietnam War to North Vietnam the following year.

The island chain is now one of several flashpoints in the South China Sea, where multiple countries assert overlapping territorial and maritime claims.

Media reports in early 2026 highlighted new Chinese dredging and landfill activity at Antelope Reef. Previously it had been one of China’s smallest outposts in the area.

Beijing began major dredging there in October 2025 and has started what appears to be preliminary construction for an airstrip in recent weeks, including more than 50 small grey-roofed structures and a helipad near the lagoon entrance, as well as foundations for larger buildings and several jetties, the report said.

AMTI estimated that the reclaimed land at Antelope Reef measures roughly 1,490 acres (6.02 square kilometers), close to the 1,504 acres (6.09 square kilometers) of Mischief Reef, China’s largest outpost in the South China Sea. By comparison, Woody Island – the largest Chinese-held feature in the Paracels – measures about 890 acres (3.60 square kilometers).

“If construction proceeds at the pace seen in satellite imagery, Antelope Reef is set to become China’s largest feature in the Paracels and potentially in the entire South China Sea, equaling or even surpassing the size of Mischief Reef in the Spratlys,” the report said.

The lagoon at Antelope Reef could also support a larger maritime presence.

“This could allow more coastguard along with large numbers of maritime militia to maintain a presence at the reef, as has been common in recent years at Mischief Reef,” AMTI said.

Antelope reef is located about 162 nautical miles (300 kilometers) from Sanya Port in China’s Hainan province and 216 nautical miles (400 kilometers) from Da Nang, Vietnam. Sanya is a major base for Chinese naval and air forces overseeing the South China Sea, underscoring the location’s strategic importance.

The Law of the Sea

China’s expansion of the reef does not necessarily bolster its claims to the Paracels from a legal perspective, according to Josue Raphael J. Cortez, the Faculty and Practicum Coordinator at the School of Diplomacy and Governance at De La Salle-College of Saint Benilde in the Philippines.

“This is because if we will be utilizing UNCLOS as the basis of a country’s maritime entitlements, the basis is and will always be the natural conditions of these features,” he told Radio Free Asia, referring to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

(Photo credit: Planet Labs Inc.)

Adopted in 1982 and in effect since 1994, UNCLOS is the primary international legal framework governing maritime rights. Because it heavily relies on “naturally formed” land features to define each country’s exclusive economic zone and territorial seas, artificial expansion does not automatically create new legal rights.

Cortez also said that regional reactions would be closely watched, particularly given the reef’s proximity to Vietnam.

“Given that the reef is proximate in Vietnam’s portion of the South China Sea, it will be an interesting opportunity for the region to have an idea of how such a move will be perceived,” he said.

The development also comes amid renewed tensions elsewhere in the South China Sea, particularly between China and the Philippines over competing sovereignty claims.

Manila recently rejected Beijing’s claims over disputed territory, including Scarborough Shoal, insisting the Philippines’ claims are grounded in international law. China, meanwhile, has pushed back against what it calls “misrepresentations” of its position.

The shoal is a triangular chain of reefs and lagoons located off the western coast of the Philippines which China has maintained control of since a standoff in 2012.

Manila continues to assert its rights under international law, including a 2016 arbitral ruling that found Beijing’s claims in much of the South China Sea have no legal basis.

Edited by Eugene Whong.

The story was updated to include the response from China’s foreign ministry.

Smith, who leads research teams at ANU that focus on Chinese investment, migration, military engagement, and aid in the Pacific region, told RFA’s Eugene Whong in an interview that Pacific countries must walk a “delicate tightrope” in the midst of the competing interests of Beijing and its rivals.

But he also said that at times, the tug-of-war geopolitics that permeate regional diplomatic forums can seem like a distraction when these countries are faced with more local “bread and butter issues.” The interview has been edited for length and clarity.

(RFA)

RFA: Let’s start off with the Solomon Islands where China has normalized a police presence in Honiara following the passage of a security pact in 2022. Do you think it could be said that the Solomons are China’s most important strategic partner in the Pacific right now?

Smith: I think they’re getting a lot of payoff for not an awful lot of investment in Solomons. Certainly, they’re really getting bang for buck. Even their police presence — it’s only a dozen or so policemen — but in terms of the propaganda value, it’s immense. To be fair, the police there have been pretty well received because they focus on community policing rather than sort of the traditional policing you might see in somewhere like Australia. So in some ways, their approach works a bit better with the local conditions.

RFA: So you would classify that police presence as propaganda?

Smith: Obviously, these days China’s all about selling models and the model of policing that they’re selling is of concern, but in terms of the number of boots on the ground that they’ve got there, it really is a very token presence. Tellingly though, all of the people there are kind of ex-peacekeepers, so they’re not really police. They’re more people on the internal security side of things.

RFA: Beijing has been putting pressure on the Pacific countries to stop recognizing Taipei in favor of Beijing, which the Solomons have done. How important is the status of Taiwan vis-a-vis Beijing’s One China Principle in the Pacific region?

Smith: Well, it’s a pretty big part of what drives China’s behavior in the region. They still are very, very focused on limiting Taiwan’s diplomatic space. So even if a country recognizes Beijing, they’ll then be pressured to take extra steps to limit any Taiwanese presence in the country. So even commercial offices, they’ll be pressured to close those down. It still remains a big focus of China in the region, and Taiwan has gone from being a very significant presence in the Pacific to having just three allies. Interestingly though, one of them will be hosting the Pacific Islands Forum this year, so that’ll be Palau, and that could make for some very interesting theatrics.

RFA: Let’s move on then to Fiji, which appears to be in a situation where it must balance a defense partnership with Australia while also receiving investment from China.

Smith: It’s been interesting because with the previous prime minister, Frank Bainimarama, they had a very loyal ally and someone who was quite dependent on Chinese diaspora funding to stay in power. With current Prime Minister Rabuka, initially he took some steps to increase Taiwan’s voice in the country. He changed the name of their representative office there in Suva, but he’s sort of slowly backtracked a little bit. And I think in many ways just had to address the reality of, you know, China is a much bigger trading partner than Taiwan with Fiji. And that’s the reality throughout the region.

(Andres Martinez Casares/Reuters)

RFA: Then, how difficult is it for countries in this situation to maintain the balance between China and Western countries as they compete for influence in the region?

Smith: Fiji carries that balance a bit better than most countries, and partly because it’s not as dependent on China for trade as other countries are. Its major trading partner unusually is not China, it’s the United States, and China often comes in at number three or even number four as its most significant trading partners. So that allows it to be somewhat immune to the sort of economic coercion or economic threats that other Pacific Islands are vulnerable to—the most extreme case being Solomon Islands, which has, usually, two-thirds of its exports going to China.

RFA: Let’s move on, then, to Papua New Guinea, which similarly maintains security ties with the U.S. and Australia, but recently entered into an economic partnership with China in November of 2025 to boost exports of agricultural products and fisheries.

Smith: PNG’s got an election year on the horizon, so that does change the equation there. It means that the politicians are going to look for propaganda victories. PNG’s been interesting in that they, in terms of their defensive cooperation, pushed for a treaty with Australia. So this was an initiative that came from the PNG side, not from the Australian side, and got that across the line.

So in terms of security partnerships, they’re much more integrated with Australia and the U.S. than any other Pacific country outside of the Northern Pacific. Meanwhile, in many ways, the trade deal was kind of, “Yeah, we’re sorry, we still want to trade with you.” And they do. They export a huge amount of Liquefied Natural Gas not just to China, but also to Taiwan. So they have to walk a pretty delicate tightrope. And in an election year next year, Prime Minister Marape will be keen to get some infrastructure projects underway. So certainly he’ll be looking to China to bankroll some of those before he goes to the next election.

RFA: So then is maintaining the balance between China and Taiwan just as difficult? Or is it just that money is so important that it makes these kinds of problems go away?

Smith: In terms of the formal diplomatic space, really, Taiwan doesn’t have a lot of wiggle room there, even less than what it has in Fiji, and that’s kind of the quid pro quo. On the other hand, if you look back to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum that was held in Papua New Guinea in 2018, Taiwan was there.

As long as it’s just economics, I think Taiwan is still given a little bit of leeway. It’s when it comes into actual diplomacy that China is a little bit uneasy, because, to be honest, a lot of China’s economic prosperity comes from Taiwan. The two countries economically are very tightly integrated, and this is something that China is not at all unhappy about. They like tight integration because it enhances their argument for unification much more strongly than anything else.

RFA: Let’s pivot to the countries that have entered into the Compact of Free Association with the U.S., which are Palau, the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia, which signed an economic framework agreement with China in late 2025.

Smith: FSM is the one of those that recognizes Beijing, and they switched to Beijing some time ago. There was some noise from the outgoing president that he would like to switch to Taiwan, but that of course did not happen. In doing so, he sort of flagged a lot of interference that had been going on from China within FSM. But a lot of the drama has been around getting the compact negotiated. That seems to have largely gone through. Aid cuts that have affected a lot of the Pacific haven’t really hit the compact states because a lot of their money comes through the U.S. Department of the Interior, not through the State Department. So they’ve been largely unaffected.

(Taiwan Presidential Office via AFP)

But the leadership of all countries is quite different. In Palau President Surangel Whipps Jr., you have a very pro-, almost Trumpian type figure. He quotes Ronald Reagan in his speeches, but his term is up after this electoral term. So what happens after that will be of interest and concern to the U.S. In the Marshall Islands, it’s always a little bit unstable, but certainly they’re still very much in the U.S.-Taiwan camp. And the FSM, yeah, they’re always interesting to watch because you have these independence movements within the FSM, and you’re never sure when they’re going to bubble to the surface.

RFA: The 2026 Pacific Islands Forum will be in Palau, and we’re about five and a half months out from that. Should we expect that China and U.S. competition will be a major theme of the event? And if not, what other key issues would you say would dominate the discussions at this forum?

Smith: Most of the Pacific Island Forum members are kind of a bit annoyed by the distraction of geopolitics. They want to talk about the bread-and-butter issues of poverty, of climate change, of things that actually affect their daily lives. So this Punch and Judy act over who sits where and who gets recognized really ticks them off. The Solomon’s ended up inviting neither China nor Taiwan to the last one, or America for that matter.

It’s unlikely Palau will follow suit. They’ll definitely want to have Taiwan in the room in some form. How China reacts to that will be really interesting to watch. But from the point of view of the member countries, this is just an annoying distraction to them because they’re facing existential threats. They’re looking in many cases to migrate in the face of current climate change or the prospect of future climate change. So they’ve got some pretty big issues to discuss, and Taiwan-China is from their perspective not one of them.

RFA: So these issues would be more important than worrying about which power you’re aligned with militarily or economically, correct?

It varies among the member states. Obviously, if you’re sitting in the Northern Pacific, it’s more of an existential question to you than if you’re sitting in Solomon Islands, well away from any prospective fighting over Taiwan. Certainly for Guam and countries like this that aren’t full PIF members, if you have a missile called the “Guam Killer,” obviously it focuses your mind in a way that it doesn’t for Tonga or Samoa or these other places that are well out of the firing line. So there is division within the PIF over how much they care about this. But by and large, the South Pacific nations see it as a somewhat annoying distraction.

(Andy Wong/AFP)

RFA: Why is competing influence in the Pacific so important in a global sense?

Smith: The geopolitics matter in the sense that if there is a conflict over Taiwan it is quite an important region. The U.S. Navy would have to sail through that region to retake Taiwan should they choose to do so, which I have to say doesn’t look terribly likely under the current administration.

And it is important in the sense that in these countries, the extreme case in the Pacific would be Kiribati where China’s influence actually starts to corrode the polity … where you have a government that has been adopting very restrictive measures, often at the encouragement and certainly at the inspiration of China.

You can’t take a photo in front of the government building in Kiribati without someone coming up to you and saying “Hey, don’t do that.” And that certainly would never have happened 10-15 years ago. So it can have a corrosive effect. Solomon Islands would be another example where you’d see it having a slightly corrosive effect on politics. Politics has never been terribly clean in Solomon’s anyway, to be frank, but it certainly hasn’t had a terribly positive impact there either.

Edited by Charlie Dharapak.

Due to funding uncertainty, RFA will pause its editorial operations on Oct. 31, 2025.

These video testimonials for the series “We are RFA” were recorded in March 2025, in the days following the termination of RFA’s funding grant. Since then, more than 90% of the editorial staff was furloughed or laid off.

Truong Son, RFA Vietnamese

Truong Son, director of RFA Vietnamese, has not been able to return home since he began working at RFA. For him, this is not only a job but also a duty.

“We bear the responsibility to tell the truth and break the censorship and propaganda the Vietnamese authorities impose on the entire society,” he said, adding that some people have been imprisoned in Vietnam for writing for RFA.

Losing RFA would mean the communist regime in Vietnam gains total control over information for 100 million people, he said.

Hye Jun Seo and Jamin Anderson, RFA Korean

For decades, Radio Free Asia has been a critical source of uncensored news for North Koreans living under an authoritarian regime with extremely limited access to information.

“RFA’s mission is to protect the North Korean people’s right to know and their right to freedom of speech,” said RFA Korean reporter Jamin Anderson, who along with her colleague Hye Jun Seo have interviewed many North Korean escapees.

“We want our audience to hear their stories.”

Mamatjan Juma, RFA Uyghur

RFA Uyghur journalists and their families have faced ongoing intimidation tactics from the Chinese government for years.

“China arrested and sentenced at least 50 of our colleagues’ relatives and loved ones in an attempt to stop us from what we are doing,” said RFA Uyghur’s Mamatjan Juma.

Their job has been reporting on China’s treatment of the Uyghur people, which the United States government has designated as genocide and crimes against humanity.

Aye Aye Mon, RFA Burmese

RFA Burmese journalist Aye Aye Mon was forced to flee Myanmar after the military coup in 2021. She has risked her life and her freedom to return and report on the civil war and its impact on the people of Myanmar.

“It’s an honor to provide a voice for those who need it most,” she said.

Eugene Whong, RFA English

RFA podcast host and editor Eugene Whong has been the voice behind many video reports. In 2021, he reported on Mya Thwe Thwe Khaing, the first peaceful protester killed by the Myanmar junta following the coup in 2021.

“I realized that at that moment these were not just words that I was reading into a microphone,” he said. “It’s an actual account of events that happened to real people.”

Kitty Wang, RFA Mandarin

RFA Mandarin journalist Kitty Wang said that the Chinese government’s suppression of information about the Tiananmen Square massacre shaped her as a journalist, forging her commitment to protecting and upholding freedom of information.

“Without it [information], there can be no freedom of thought. Without it, people live in darkness. Through my work at RFA, I hope to bring them light,” Kitty said.

Win Ei San, RFA Burmese

Win Ei San arrived in the U.S. as a refugee and has been working as a graphic designer for RFA Burmese for a year and a half.

“I have learned so many things in such a short time,” said San, who has worked on projects related to the ongoing civil war in Myanmar and its casualties.

“I have so much more I want to do.”

Vuthy Huot, RFA Khmer

“If we don’t keep fighting, we won’t survive,” said RFA journalist Vuthy Huot who survived a genocide by the Khmer Rouge. As a journalist with RFA Khmer, he tells stories that matter to local people.

“The information is not filtered, not controlled, by the government. The information that helps them make the right decisions.”

RFA Cantonese journalist

“I have to hide my identity because all Hong Kong people are under the threat of the National Security Law,” said this RFA Cantonese journalist.

Threatened by China’s transnational repression, he had to leave his home in pursuit of a safe space to practice independent journalism.

“If I stay in Hong Kong and bow to the government, we have to sacrifice our principles as independent journalists.”

Tashi Wangchuk, RFA Tibetan

Radio Free Asia’s Tibetan Service has served as a bridge connecting people living under Chinese rule in Tibet with the outside world. However, this role comes with significant risks, said Tashi Wangchuk, a journalist for RFA Tibetan Service.

“For me personally, I have received threats from the Chinese government throughout my journalism career, and these have progressively gotten worse,” he said, adding that such intimidation will not deter him from delivering truthful reporting to his audience.

Souphatta, RFA Lao

RFA Lao journalist Souphatta has been reporting on human trafficking stories for three years. She began after a mother contacted her asking for help in rescuing her daughter.

In the years since, parents and younger people trapped in scam centers have told Souphatta that “without RFA, they would not have a future.”

Khet Mar, RFA Burmese

The ongoing civil war in Myanmar, which started after the 2021 coup, has killed tens of thousands of people. During that time, RFA journalists have shed light on the human cost of the war and brought global attention to the fight for democracy.

“While our voice has been diminished, our fight for human rights, press freedom, and a just future for Myanmar continues,” said Khet Mar, an RFA Burmese journalist.

Alim Seytoff, RFA Uyghur

For the past 26 years, Radio Free Asia’s Uyghur Service has exposed China’s atrocities against the Uyghur people in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. This includes mass detentions, the establishment of concentration camps, and the horrific treatment of Uyghur women, according to Alim Seytoff, the director of RFA Uyghur Service.

“As a result of our groundbreaking reports, the first Trump administration determined that China is committing genocide and crimes against humanity against the Uyghur people,” he said.

Thiri Min Zin, RFA Burmese

Thiri Min Zin, an anchor for RFA Burmese, was forced to leave Myanmar after a 2021 coup installed a ruling junta that has targeted journalists. Despite the hardships she has encountered, she remains committed to her work.

“It is my superpower—to tell the truth and help my people,” she said. “What I can do to help my country is to share true information.”

Ounkeo Souksavanh, RFA Lao

For RFA Lao journalist Ounkeo Souksavanh, leaving his home country wasn’t a choice — he was blacklisted by the communist government for his radio show. “In Laos, the truth is not often shared. Anyone who criticizes the government faces arrest.”

Ounkeo joined RFA to report accurate news to the people in his home country. “RFA was a lifeline to keep telling the truth,” he said.

Kim Ji Eun, RFA Korean

As a North Korean escapee, RFA Korean journalist Kim Ji Eun has used her reporting to reach residents still inside the country, where Kim Jong Un’s dictatorship tightly controls all access to information.

“RFA is truly a beacon of hope for those who are in deep despair,” Kim Ji Eun said, adding that she had talked to people who decided to escape North Korea after listening to RFA broadcasts.

RFA Tibetan journalist

Radio Free Asia has long been a lifeline for audiences in Tibet, according to an RFA journalist of two decades whose identity is being withheld for safety.

“RFA sheds light on the darkest corner of Tibet,” he said, “and serves as a window for Tibetans inside the region to see the world outside.”

He remains resolute, even though his work has come at a cost.

“My family members who remain in Tibet are constantly surveilled,” he said. “I am determined to continue to tell these stories that counter China’s false narratives.”

Zin Mar Win, RFA Burmese

RFA Burmese’s Zin Mar Win became a journalist after growing up listening to the radio for news. She fled Myanmar after realizing that the ruling junta was targeting journalists, herself included. She has continued to tell her country’s stories.

“While I have a voice, I will tell the truth. This story is not just mine. It’s the story of millions of Myanmar people who refuse to be silenced,” she said.

Chih-Te Lee, Asia Fact Check Lab

Chih-Te Lee is the Director of the Asia Fact Check Lab at Radio Free Asia, where he fact-checks false and misleading narratives, including comments from officials in totalitarian states like China.

“We believe that facts are the most powerful antidote to extremism, conspiracy theory and hearsay,” he said, adding that “fact-based free speech is the foundation of democracy.”

Vuthy Tha, RFA Khmer

Vuthy Tha worked for RFA Khmer’s newsroom in Cambodia before it was closed by Prime Minister Hun Sen’s authoritarian regime in 2017.

Vuthy knew he had to leave Cambodia because the government monitored his movements.

It took him seven years to obtain a work visa and rejoin RFA.

“On my flight to America with my two children, all I could think about was how America was a safe place for us,” he said.

Wai Mar Htun, RFA Burmese

In war-torn Myanmar, “access to information is as important as food,” RFA Burmese journalist Wai Mar Htun said.

“Access to credible information allows people to make vital decisions,” she said. With news sources and VPNs restricted by the ruling junta, RFA serves a critical role.

Mekong reporter, RFA Lao

For the past 10 years, this Lao reporter has been covering the Mekong River, which is a vital source of food, drinking water, and livelihoods for more than 60 million people.

The river is under significant pressure due to the impact of hydropower dams, which are affecting both the local communities and wildlife, he said.

“It has meant everything to me to bring these stories of the Mekong to you,” he said.

RFA Tibetan journalist

Persecution. Harassment. Loss of contact with family members.

This RFA Tibetan journalist has risked it all to report accurate, independent news about the atrocities faced by Tibetans in Tibet. “My family members in Tibet were persecuted on account of my work. … They are still – to this day – being harassed by the Chinese government,” he said.

How has RFA’s journalism impacted Tibetans? “From the widespread Tibet protests of 2008 to the wave of self-immolations and China’s systemic efforts to erase Tibetan identity, RFA has been instrumental in providing a rare window into Tibet,” he said.

July Myo, RFA Burmese

Reliable news can be hard to come by for many in Myanmar, where internet access is often restricted and a civil war has claimed thousands of lives. Young people are being forcibly conscripted into the military, making independent reporting more crucial than ever.

“I am proud to share their stories, to give them a voice,” says July Myo, an RFA Burmese reporter from a town hit by airstrikes.

WHYNOT journalist

What would Chinese-language journalism look like in an open and free environment?

WHYNOT, a digital news magazine affiliated with Radio Free Asia, has an answer.

“Our uncensored reports not only inform our audience of events that are happening now, but also document our time so that history and the truth cannot be erased by the Chinese government,” a WHYNOT journalist said.

Ye Kaung Myint Maung, RFA Burmese

Ye Kaung Myint Maung, a journalist for RFA Burmese, has dedicated years to reporting on Myanmar and remains committed to uncovering the truth.

“Journalism doesn’t stop. The truth doesn’t disappear,” he said.

Due to uncertain funding, Radio Free Asia is not delivering news to our audiences for the first time in our history.

For RFA journalists who sacrificed so much in defying powerful and malignant forces, it’s an excruciating moment. And make no mistake, authoritarian regimes are already celebrating RFA’s potential demise.

When RFA Uyghur journalists first exposed the violent repression and mass detainment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, China harassed and arrested their family members. Still, our journalists bravely continued the work of uncovering atrocities. With the world’s only independent Uyghur-language news service shuttered, China’s propaganda will fester without a potent and effective accountability check.

Without RFA Tibetan journalists, China’s campaign of forced assimilation and erasure of Tibetan culture and language will be underreported. As will China’s regime of intimidation and suppression of pro-democracy activism in Hong Kong, which RFA Cantonese journalists regularly exposed at great risk to their own personal safety. Without RFA Mandarin, WHYNOT and Asia Fact Check Lab, independent reporting and fact-checking in the most widely spoken of all Chinese dialects is severely diminished.

Without RFA journalism in Vietnam, where at least four RFA contributors remain imprisoned, the communist regime has a total monopoly on information disseminated to more than 100 million people.

In Myanmar, where later this year the military government is staging long-promised elections largely condemned as a sham, there will be no RFA Burmese journalists scrutinizing the junta’s promise of a free and fair vote. Those journalists were honored this month with two national Murrow Awards for their excellent reporting.

Without RFA Korean, 26 million North Koreans isolated by the repressive regime’s war on free speech and a free press will lack a critical link to independent information. RFA Korean journalists were celebrated earlier this year at the 50th annual Gracie Awards for their report on North Korean escapees.

RFA Lao journalists exposed the perils of the rush to dam the Mekong River. They also reported on the alarming rise of teenagers trafficked into scam centers in Myanmar, which the United Nations described as a human rights epidemic of exploitation, forced labor and torture. The absence of RFA journalism amputates that fearless reporting in Laos, where criticism of authorities can result in long prison sentences.

It was RFA’s Investigative Unit that laid bare the forced labor scam compounds perpetrated by the Prince Group. Just this month, the United States and the United Kingdom imposed sweeping sanctions against the Cambodian conglomerate, designating it a transnational criminal organization. Without our investigative journalists, the schemes that authoritarian regimes and corrupt organizations work so hard to conceal will likely remain hidden.

The journalists of RFA Khmer, including those who told heartbreaking stories of surviving the Cambodian genocide, worked tirelessly to expose the persistent corruption and cronyism within Cambodia’s authoritarian government. In response, the regime declared two of our journalists as “hostile to the state,” a broad legal designation used to suppress dissent, and deployed their online troll army to harass our journalists on social media. Even in the face of coordinated intimidation, RFA Khmer journalists never capitulated. Without their reporting, Cambodians lose an important spotlight on flagrant violations of basic human rights by the ruling Cambodian People’s Party.

When the initial funding disruption earlier this year forced RFA to furlough the majority of our editorial staff, the handful of journalists who remained launched RFA Perspectives, determined to fulfill RFA’s congressionally mandated mission to provide uncensored, accurate news and information in regions across Asia hostile to a free press. That program, too, will end.

Independent journalism is at the core of RFA. For the first time since RFA’s inception almost 30 years ago, that voice is at risk.

We still believe in the urgency of that mission — and in the resilience of our extraordinary journalists. Once our funding returns, so will we.

Stay tuned.

Rosa Hwang

Executive Editor

WASHINGTON - With the government shutdown and delay in receiving funding for the new fiscal year, effective Oct. 31, Radio Free Asia (RFA) will halt all production of news content for the time being. The move is part of a plan for the Congressionally-funded private corporation to implement cost-saving measures that can help sustain the organization should appropriated funding streams resume. President and CEO Bay Fang issued the following statement:

“Because of the fiscal reality and uncertainty about our budgetary future, RFA has been forced to suspend all remaining news content production - for the first time in its 29 years of existence. In an effort to conserve limited resources on hand and preserve the possibility of restarting operations should consistent funding become available, RFA is taking further steps to responsibly shrink its already reduced footprint.

“This means initiating a process of closing down overseas bureaus and formally laying off furloughed staff and paying their severance - many of whom have been on unpaid leave since March, when the U.S. Agency for Global Media unlawfully terminated RFA’s Congressionally appropriated grant.

“However drastic these measures may seem, they position RFA, a private corporation, for a future in which it would be possible to scale up and resume providing accurate, uncensored news for people living in some of the world’s most closed places.”

During its tenure, RFA’s groundbreaking reporting on the Uyghur genocide in Xinjiang, the CCP’s cover-up of COVID-19 fatalities, the unfolding crisis in Myanmar since the 2021coup, Chinese hydropower projects in the Tibetan regions, and the journeys of North Korean defectors has built a public record of transparency in some of the world’s most repressive places, holding autocrats and elites accountable to their people and internationally. Other measures to conserve resources on hand include ending leases of overseas offices and bureaus in Dharamsala, Taipei, Seoul, Istanbul, Bangkok, and Yangon.

In the last five years, RFA created new editorial units focused on China’s malign influence in the Indo-Pacific region and globally, investigating PRC secret police stations in the United States and Europe, election interference by the Chinese Communist Party in Taiwan and other Asian countries, and PRC influence operations in Pacific island countries. RFA’s incisive brand of journalism has made it and its journalists a constant target, with its reporters facing pressure and threats since its inaugural report in Mandarin was heard in China on Sept. 29, 1996. Authorities in China, Vietnam, Myanmar, and Cambodia have detained family members, sources, reporters, and contributors. Listeners in North Korea have been severely punished and reportedly executed for accessing RFA’s reports. Nevertheless, RFA’s journalistic operations have until now withstood government intimidation and attacks.

In the months since the USAGM illegally terminated its Congressionally appropriated grant to RFA, and despite layoffs and furloughs that diminished editorial staff by more than 90%, the private grantee has continued to fulfill its Congressional mandate to provide accurate, timely news to people living in some of the most closed media environments in Asia thanks to a preliminary injunction issued by the United States Federal District Court for the District of Columbia, which USAGM has appealed. RFA has also continued to win awards for its reporting, including two national Edward R. Murrow awards in August and a Gracie Award in March. While many services, including RFA Uyghur and Tibetan, have already gone dark, others have continued to produce limited output, including RFA Burmese, Khmer, Korean, Mandarin Chinese, and Vietnamese. But these will cease on Oct. 31.

Myanmar government media The Global New Light of Myanmar said the military “conducted operations in KK Park near Myanmar-Thai border” and had “seized 30 sets of Starlink receivers and accessories,” according to the AFP news agency.

AFP said that number is only a fraction of the Starlink devices they identified using satellite imagery and drone photography. On the roof of one building alone in KK Park, images showed nearly 80 of the internet dishes.

(Lillian Suwanrumpha/AFP)

The Global New Light of Myanmar also said junta troops had occupied around 200 buildings and found nearly 2,200 workers at the site, while 15 “Chinese scammers” had been arrested for involvement in “online gambling, online fraud and other criminal activities” around KK Park.

A crackdown by Thai, Chinese and Myanmar authorities starting in February saw thousands of suspected scammers repatriated, with experts saying some in the scam industry participate willingly while others are forced to by organized criminal groups.

(Lillian Suwanrumpha/AFP)

The U.S. Congress’ Joint Economic Committee told the AFP news agency they have begun an investigation into Starlink’s involvement with the centers. While it can call owner Elon Musk to a hearing, it cannot compel him to testify.

Starlink parent company SpaceX did not immediately respond to a request for comment on Monday.

(Lillian Suwanrumpha/AFP)

Online scamming centers have proliferated across Southeast Asia in recent years, especially in some of the more lawless parts of Myanmar, as well as in neighboring Laos and Cambodia.

The centers are often run by Chinese gangs and are notorious for luring unsuspecting people into jobs that entail going online to contact and defraud people, many in China.

Chinese authorities are keen to get the rackets based over the border in Myanmar shut down, and so action against them has become a key factor for rival factions in Myanmar, from the junta to its insurgent enemies and other militias, as they vie for China’s favor.

(Yin Gang, Xinhua via Getty Images)

With reporting by AFP.

It follows Myanmar junta chief Min Aung Hlaing admitting on Wednesday that the military-backed administration will be unable to conduct an upcoming general election across the entire country, as a civil war triggered by a 2021 coup rages on.

(Ye Aung Thu/AFP)

Critics - including many Western nations - have described the election scheduled for late December as a sham exercise aimed at legitimizing the Myanmar junta’s rule after it overthrew a civilian democratic government in 2021.

“I would call them regime-sponsored elections. And if they’re regime-sponsored, they can only lead to one outcome,” Ollogren told reporters in Kuala Lumpur.

The remarks by Min Aung Hlaing were his first public admission that the polls cannot be fully inclusive.

“We can’t hold the election everywhere 100%,” Min Aung Hlaing said in a speech broadcast on state TV from the capital Naypyidaw on Wednesday, adding that by-elections would follow in some areas after a new government is formed.

Myanmar’s last multi-party elections were held on November 8, 2020, with Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) party winning in a landslide victory. The results were not honored and a military coup took place in February 2021.

(Myanmar Ministry of Information via AFP)

The military doesn’t control all of Myanmar. Vast swaths are administered by a range of armed militias, ethnic groups and pro-democracy fighters, some in open, armed conflict with the ruling junta.

The junta has invited ASEAN countries to send observers for the election, due to start on December 28 and to continue in phases into January.

With reporting by Reuters

More than 1,000 South Koreans are believed to be among about 200,000 people of various nationalities involved in the scam compounds in Cambodia, South Korea’s National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac told reporters.

RFA Korean’s Jaewoo Park reports for RFA Perspectives: Why has Southeast Asia — especially Cambodia and Myanmar — become a “scam haven”?

It’s not just about crime. It’s the result of corruption, lawlessness, and economic desperation.

Across the region, hundreds of thousands of people are trapped inside cyber scam compounds.

They are lured by fake job ads, kidnapped, and forced to commit online fraud under brutal conditions.

Earlier this year, Chinese actor Wang Xing made international headlines after being rescued from Myanmar’s notorious KK Park.

He had flown to Thailand for an acting job — but was kidnapped and sold into a scam operation.

His rescue was extremely rare.

In August, a South Korean college student was tortured to death in Cambodia after being deceived by a fake job offer.

The case shocked the Korean public — but it’s only one part of a much larger criminal network.

Recently released footage even showed a man believed to be that student, forced to inhale drugs and explain to his captors how he ended up in Cambodia.

So why Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar?

Because they sit where lawlessness and capital meet.

A decade ago, Cambodia became an early hotspot for Chinese and Taiwanese phone scams, thanks to cheap internet and loose regulations.

When China banned online gambling in 2019, those same networks didn’t vanish — they simply moved their operations to Cambodia’s casinos.

Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in countries like Laos have become hotbeds of criminal activity due to lax regulations, while in Myanmar, a coup and civil war have made enforcement virtually impossible

Add corrupt officials, weak law enforcement, and accessible internet, and you get a perfect breeding ground for organized crime.

The United Nations estimates that over 100,000 people have been trafficked into Cambodia for cyber scam operations — victims from China, Korea, Kenya, and across the world.

As crackdowns intensify in Myanmar and Laos, more of these criminal networks are shifting into Cambodia.

This isn’t just about online scams. It’s a new form of human trafficking — hidden behind a screen.

The U.S. Treasury Department said it had targeted 146 people in the Prince Group, a multibillion-dollar Cambodian conglomerate, including its 38-year-old leader Chen Zhi.

“The rapid rise of transnational fraud has cost American citizens billions of dollars, with life savings wiped out in minutes,” U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said in a statement. U.S. citizens lost $10 billion to Southeast Asian scammers in 2024 alone, the statement said.

Chen was charged with wire fraud conspiracy and money laundering in an indictment unsealed Tuesday in a federal court in Brooklyn. The U.S. seized around $15 billion in bitcoin allegedly used in money laundering operations. In a statement, the U.S. Justice Department called the move its largest-ever forfeiture action.

British officials say they have frozen Prince Group assets that include a mansion, an office building and other properties in London, with a goal of “locking Chen and his network out of the UK’s financial system,” the U.K.’s foreign office said in a statement.

“The masterminds behind these horrific scam centres are ruining the lives of vulnerable people and buying up London homes to store their money,” U.K. Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper said.

An email sent to the Prince Group’s press inbox requesting comment was returned as undeliverable.

An RFA investigation last year detailed allegations of brutal treatment of workers at the Golden Fortune Science and Technology Park, a Prince Group-linked compound in Chrey Thom, a border town in southeast Cambodia.

Employees and former employees described workers enticed with promises of high-paying jobs who were allegedly confined and beaten if they underperformed or tried to escape.

RFA reporters charted the rise of Chen from his emigration from China to Cambodia, his founding of the Prince Group in 2015, its role in growing the coastal city of Sihanoukville into a haven for Chinese casinos, its deepening political connections and allegations of criminality.

The investigation also found that Prince Group moved millions of dollars around the world in a way that experts said bears hallmarks of money laundering.

Golden Fortune Resorts World is among the companies that were impacted by the U.S. and U.K. sanctions Tuesday. Also impacted were the Jin Bei Group, an entertainment and hospitality business that owns a casino in Sihanoukville and is alleged to also operate scam centers, and Byex Exchange, a cryptocurrency platform.

Includes reporting from Reuters.

Jin Mingri, who founded Zion Church, a house of worship not sanctioned by the Chinese government, was arrested at his home in the city of Beihai in the southern region of Guangxi on Friday evening, his daughter, Grace Jin, and a church spokesperson, Sean Long, told reporters.

Grace Jin said she was concerned for her 56-year-old father’s health and his access to legal representation.

“He’s been hospitalized in the past for diabetes. We’re worried since he requires medication,” she told Reuters. “I’ve also been notified that lawyers are not allowed to meet the pastors, so that is very concerning to us.”

Jin was detained on “suspicion of the illegal use of information networks,” according to a detention notice viewed by Agence France-Presse. Since Thursday, police have arrested church leaders and members in Shanghai, Beijing, Zhejiang, Guangxi, Shandong, Sichuan and Henan, according to a list compiled by church members that was seen by AFP.

(Thomas Peter/Reuters)

“House” churches like Zion Church generally operate without official registration documents and without the involvement of local religious affairs bureaus. Zion Church has about 5,000 regular worshippers across nearly 50 cities who attend sermons on Zoom and in small in-person gatherings, Long told Reuters.

The arrests come a month after Beijing’s top religion regulator issued new rules banning unauthorized online preaching, as well as a broader crackdown on online content that expresses views contrary to the Chinese Communist Party’s goals. Supporters fear the pastors could soon be indicted under these new rules.

In a statement released Sunday, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio condemned the arrests and called on Beijing to release the pastors.

“This crackdown further demonstrates how the CCP exercises hostility towards Christians who reject Party interference in their faith and choose to worship at unregistered house churches,” Rubio said.

House churches have long drawn Beijing’s scrutiny. In 2009, RFA spoke with pastors including Jin Mingri about signs then that the government was looking to better understand the role of underground houses of worship. In the years since, Beijing has cracked down on house churches and has put pastors at some Protestant churches through intensive training sessions as part of a “sinicization” campaign. According to the U.S. State Department, China continues to arrest thousands of people per year for worshipping in ways not approved by the CCP.

Includes reporting by Agence France-Presse and Reuters.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un oversaw the large military parade displaying its new intercontinental ballistic missile in front of visiting international dignitaries.

(KCNA via Reuters)

The parade, which began late on Friday, marked the 80th anniversary of the foundation of its ruling Workers’ Party.

The Hwasong series of ICBMs has given North Korea the capacity to target anywhere on the U.S. mainland, but questions remain over the sophistication of its guidance system to reach a target, and the ability of a warhead it carries to withstand atmospheric re-entry, according to the Reuters news agency.

(KCNA via Reuters)

Chinese Premier Li Qiang, Russia’s former President Dmitry Medvedev, as well as Vietnam’s Communist Party chief To Lam were seen at Kim’s side at the parade.

“The Hwasong-20 represents, for the moment, the apotheosis of North Korea’s ambitions for long-range nuclear delivery capabilities. We should expect to see the system tested before the end of this year,” Ankit Panda of the U.S.-based Carnegie Endowment for International Peace told the Reuters news agency.

“The system is likely designed for the delivery of multiple warheads... Multiple warheads will increase stresses on existing U.S. missile defense systems and augment what Kim sees as necessary to achieve meaningful deterrence effects against Washington.”

(KCNA via Reuters)

(KCNA via Reuters)

(KCNA via Reuters)

Reporting by Reuters

The soldiers marched to the Russian patriotic song “To Serve Russia,” a rare and symbolic display of solidarity between Pyongyang and Moscow.

According to estimates, around 2,000 North Korean soldiers were killed while supporting Russia’s war in Ukraine.

And reports say that under a new deployment plan, North Korea recently sent another 1,000 combat engineers to Russia.

Although the event marked the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Workers’ Party, it was also a display of military cooperation between the two countries.

Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, attended the celebrations in Pyongyang.

(KCNA via Reuters)

He thanked North Korea for what he called its “steadfast support” for Russia’s ongoing military operation in Ukraine.

At Pyongyang’s May Day stadium Russian singer Shaman performed a tribute to the soldiers who fought in Kursk.

Kim Jong Un and the audience rose from their seats to honor the soldiers.

The parade highlighted the partnership between Moscow and Pyongyang.

As the song “To Serve Russia” played across the square, the message was clear: an old alliance is being reshaped for today.

(Huang Jingwen, Xinhua via Getty Images)

(Shen Hong, Xinhua via Getty Images)

In a new edition of a report released every two years, the defense ministry said that Beijing is sharpening its ability to stage a surprise attack against the democratically governed island, which China claims as its territory.

The report cited seven rounds of major Chinese war games around the island since 2022 and other non-combat operations — known as grey zone tactics — as forms of military pressure on Taiwan.

“The Chinese communists have adopted grey zone harassment tactics, combined with joint combat readiness patrols, targeted military exercises and cognitive warfare, posing a comprehensive threat to us,” the report said.

Among the Chinese operations reported earlier this year were a live-fire exercise off the coast of the Taiwanese port city of Kaohsiung, amphibious landing exercises in the South China Sea, and a series of sorties in the Taiwan Strait.

Online, China is using artificial intelligence tools to search for security vulnerabilities and employing a “professional cyber army” to spread disinformation and sow discord, the report said.

Earlier this year, RFA’s Asia Fact Check Lab reported on Chinese digital influence campaigns in Taiwan and groups that communicated through online polls, influencers and cross-strait collaborations.

(Chris McGrath/Getty Images)

For its part, Taiwan has toughened its language about China this year, with President Lai Ching-te in March calling Beijing a “foreign hostile force” intent on “absorbing” the island. Taiwan’s own military exercises were broadened this year and included simulating a response to an amphibious invasion of the Penghu Islands.

Includes reporting by Reuters.

The attack killed at least 20 people, according to a Reuters report that cited an eyewitness, the human rights group Amnesty International, and members of the shadow National Unity Government and an armed resistance group in the area. An event organizer told Agence France-Press that 40 people were killed, including children, while 80 others were wounded.

Screams for help could be heard in bystander video taken at nighttime after the attack, which also showed a burning fire. Another video, recorded in daylight, shows a building that was destroyed and a young man who said he was collecting body parts in the attack’s aftermath.

Hundreds of people had been gathered for the event when the bombs struck after 7 p.m., a member of the committee that organized the event said. She was not at the scene, but she attended funerals on Tuesday.

“The committee alerted people and one-third of the crowd managed to flee,” she told AFP. “But immediately, one motor-powered paraglider flew right over the crowd,” dropping two bombs in the middle of the gathering.

“Children were completely torn apart,” she said.

(Yebaw Hlyat Cee, Facebook via AFP)

Paramotors, or motor-powered paragliders, are used by one or two soldiers to drop explosives, to fire weapons, or to conduct low-altitude surveillance, according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project. The junta has expanded their use this year, the group said.

Amnesty International said that Myanmar’s ruling junta is taking advantage of reduced international scrutiny “to carry out war crimes with impunity.”

“As the military attempts to solidify power with a stage-managed election later this year, it is intensifying an already brutal campaign against pockets of resistance,” Joe Freeman, Myanmar researcher for Amnesty International, said in a statement.

Myanmar’s military leaders, who have ruled the country since the 2021 coup that overthrew the last elected government and kicked off a brutal civil war against rebel groups, have framed the upcoming election, set for Dec. 28, as a transition point. Critics say the election is a sham aimed to keep the military in power.

Before it was shuttered in May, RFA’s Burmese Service reported daily on a steady drumbeat of bombings by the junta. Among the service’s final stories in English were bombings of a rebel-controlled village in western Myanmar that killed more than a dozen people; a school in central Myanmar, killing at least 20 students; four insurgent-controlled villages in northern Myanmar; and a strike on villages in southeast Myanmar that destroyed a hospital and forced 8,000 people to flee their homes.

Includes reporting from Agence France-Presse and Reuters.

Commuters pushed motorbikes through calf-deep water in some areas. Several schools closed or moved classes online. Some flights from Noi Bai International Airport have been rescheduled or delayed.

For many, it’s an unpleasant return to the flooding just last week from Typhoon Bualoi, which killed at least 51 people in Vietnam and caused around $600 million in damage.

(THINH TIEN NGUYEN/Reuters)

“It’s a loop — rains come, streets flood and people desperately try to get by," Hanoi resident Nguyen Ngoc Long told Reuters. “I fear this will soon become a norm for us.”

Meanwhile, local media reported that a storm-swelled section of the Bac Khe 1 hydropower dam burst in northern Vietnam in mid-afternoon Tuesday, raising flood potential for nearby villages.

Includes reporting from Reuters.

Lim Kimya, 74, a former legislator and member of the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) as well as an outspoken critic of veteran Cambodian leader Hun Sen, was shot dead by Aekaluck Paenoi, a former Thai Marine, in footage captured on closed circuit television in the afternoon of Jan. 7 on a busy street in Bangkok.

Two Cambodian suspects remain wanted by Thai authorities for their alleged involvement. Arrest warrants and Interpol “red notices” were issued in January.

(RFA)

Cambodian opposition figures have accused the country’s powerful former leader Hun Sen of ordering the shooting, and Lim Kimya’s widow called this week for a full accounting of who was behind it.

Aekaluck faced a potential death sentence in Thailand for premeditated murder, but a judge said Friday that the Bangkok court reduced his sentence to life imprisonment since he confessed. A man who provided Aekaluck with transportation during the escape was acquitted.

Lim Kimya’s widow Anne-Marie Lim, also known as Lim Ani, who was called as a witness at the trial opening on Tuesday, was not present at the verdict. The judges also ruled that the Aekaluck pay 1.7 million baht (US$52,452) compensation to Lim Kimya’s family.

“Anne-Marie is probably satisfied with today’s verdict, but she is still questioning who ordered the crime,” her lawyer Nadhthasiri Bergman told reporters outside the court on Friday. “She wants authorities to get to the bottom of it.”

Thai police in January identified two Cambodian suspects they believe to be involved in the killing: Ly Ratanakrasksmey, accused of having recruited the gunman, and Pich Kimsrin, the alleged lookout who local media has reported was on the bus alongside the victim and his wife.

(Pich Kimsrin via Facebook, inset, and Amarin TV)

Days after the killing, following media reports that Ratanakrasksmey was a former adviser to Hun Sen, Cambodia’s ruling party released a statement saying he was dismissed from the role in March 2024.

Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet, who is the eldest son of Hun Sen, and other government officials have denied any official involvement.

(Pimuk Rakkanam/RFA)

“I still also feel that there is something the police could do in investigating and try to get the additional two people that (are) already identified into a justice process,” Bergman told reporters.

In February, Lim Ani told RFA Khmer that her husband’s killing was “definitely political.”

“He exposed the injustices that happened in Cambodia,” she said.

Thai officials earlier this year issued arrest warrants for two suspected Cambodian accomplices in the shooting. A Ministry of Interior spokesman told RFA Khmer that the Cambodian constitution doesn’t allow for the extradition of Cambodian nationals.

Am Sam Ath, operations director of Cambodian rights group Licadho, told the AFP news agency that the life sentence for the Thai gunman offered partial justice for Lim Kimya, who was a dual French and Cambodian citizen.

“Since Lim Kimya is also a Cambodian, we want to see that Thai authorities and the Thai court conduct further investigations in order to render full justice for him,” Am Sam Ath said.

“We want to see an investigation into people involved (in the killing).”

With reporting by AFP and Reuters.

A web of around 4,000 closed-circuit television cameras already scans Hong Kong, part of a police crime-fighting program. And the city already uses artificial intelligence to monitor crowds and read license plates.

Photo Gallery: 2019 Hong Kong protesters vs. surveillance cameras

(Billy H.C. Kwok/Getty Images)

(Anthony Kwan/Getty Images)

(Billy H.C. Kwok/Getty Images)

(Billy H.C. Kwok/Getty Images)

(Anthony Kwan/Getty Images)

(Anthony Kwan/Getty Images)

(Billy H.C. Kwok/Getty Images)

(Billy H.C. Kwok/Getty Images)

(Anthony Kwan/Getty Images)

(Billy H.C. Kwok/Getty Images)

Under the city’s new plan, the number of cameras will balloon to 60,000 by 2028, according to documents submitted to the legislature. And AI technology “will naturally be applied to people, such as tracking a criminal suspect,” Hong Kong security chief Chris Tang told lawmakers.

The exact timing of these upgrades is unclear, and Tang said that authorities are still considering issues such as which technology to use and how to allocate resources. The South China Morning Post reported in July that police could begin using real-time facial recognition as early as the end of this year.

Police say the surveillance network has helped to hasten arrests and solve cases. Critics say such networks allow the government to invade privacy and target dissidents — and that false matches can lead to wrongful arrests.

The increase in surveillance mirrors similar efforts in mainland Chinese cities. Areas like the northwest Xinjiang region, home to ethnic Uyghurs, have experienced even tighter surveillance.

Surveillance has been a flashpoint in Hong Kong for years. In 2019, protesters damaged some of the camera-bedecked “smart lampposts” that had been newly installed. In 2023, police said cameras should be installed in classrooms to enhance safety, which critics said would allow the government to monitor the content of teacher instruction and student conversations.

Hong Kong residents’ digital lives are also being more aggressively monitored, according to RFA Mandarin reporting from March.

Includes reporting from Agence France-Presse.

Lim Kimya’s widow, Lim Ani, told reporters outside the courthouse that she wanted to know why her husband was murdered.

“I want to know the story behind the case. Who the masterminds were. I believe the judicial system here could help,” she said through a translator.

“His death has turned everything upside down in my daily life,” she said.

(Tang Chhin Sothy/AFP)

Lim Kimya, 74, a former legislator and member of the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party as well as an outspoken critic of veteran Cambodian leader Hun Sen, was shot in the afternoon of Jan. 7 on a busy street in Bangkok’s old quarter. He died at the scene.

Authorities arrested Aekaluck Paenoi, a former Thai marine who worked as a motorcycle taxi driver, in Cambodia’s Battabang province the following day. He was extradited to Thailand three days later and charged with premeditated murder. He later confessed to the crime.

One of Lim Ani’s lawyers, Nadthasiri Bergman, said outside the courthouse Tuesday that she believed the alleged gunman would be convicted because he had already confessed. “But our concern is that we might not get to the bottom of why the assassination happened, and we hope to find that answer today during the witness examination.”

In February, Lim Ani told RFA Khmer that her husband’s killing was “definitely political.”

“He exposed the injustices that happened in Cambodia,” she said.

In February, Thai officials issued arrest warrants for two suspected Cambodian accomplices in the shooting. A Ministry of Interior spokesman told RFA Khmer that the Cambodian constitution doesn’t allow for the extradition of Cambodian nationals.

Cambodian opposition figures have accused Hun Sen of ordering the shooting. Cambodian leader Hun Manet has denied that his government or Hun Sen, his father, were involved in the killing. Other officials have also denied allegations of involvement.

The trial is expected to conclude in March.

Includes reporting by Pimuk Rakkanam in Bangkok and Agence France-Presse.

Recently, South Korea’s cybersecurity firm Genians revealed that a North Korean hacking group used AI-generated deepfake military IDs to impersonate defense agencies and launch phishing attacks.

Their targets? Officials, journalists, human-rights activists, and researchers.

This isn’t new.

North Korean IT workers have long used AI and deepfakes to build fake identities—sometimes even stealing U.S. identities to apply for jobs.

They appear in video interviews with AI-made faces and voices.

Cybersecurity expert Dawid Moczadło, co-founder of Vidoc, shared a video on LinkedIn that experts believe shows these workers in action.

At first glance it looks real, but if you watch closely—something feels off.

If these workers get hired, they don’t just collect a paycheck.

They can plant malware, steal company data, and funnel money back to North Korea’s weapons programs—helping the regime dodge sanctions.

AI can make life easier for everyone.

But in North Korea’s hands, it becomes a weapon—one that threatens your personal data, private companies, and even national security.

For more on North Korea hackers, watch RFA Korean’s three-part series “Whack a Mole”:

Part One: Kim Jong Un’s secret soldiers — the hackers

Part Two: Cryptocurrency heist

Part 3: Are you a North Korean worker?

“Despite challenges and uncertainty besetting our organization this year, one thing remains clear: RFA is committed to its Congressionally mandated mission and work,” Fang said. “RFA’s incisive brand of journalism, shining a light into the darkest corners of the world, is needed more than ever as the Chinese Communist Party and other autocrats race to cement the global narrative to suit their own ends.

“It is RFA’s job to rise above obstacles, exposing propaganda and lies, in pursuit of freedom and courage in reporting.”

In the months since the U.S. Agency for Global Media terminated its Congressionally appropriated grant to RFA, and despite layoffs and furloughs that diminished editorial staff by more than 90%, RFA has continued to fulfill its Congressional mandate of providing accurate, timely news to people living in some of the most closed media environments in Asia. It has also won several awards, including two national Edward R. Murrow awards in August, and a Gracie Award in March. While many services, including RFA Uyghur and Tibetan, have gone dark, some continue, including Burmese, Khmer, Korean, Mandarin Chinese, and Vietnamese.

New content, formats drive growth

Although USAGM ended radio broadcasts, RFA continues to reach millions online: on the web, through mobile apps, and on platforms like Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, and X. Even some shuttered language services continue to see millions of views of archived content. Meanwhile new kinds of programming have been added to utilize resources and talent on hand. Some highlights include:

• RFA Perspectives | With limited staffing, RFA editors have focused on bringing RFA’s decades of expertise to video-first content like explainers that unpack a news event and interviews with experts to provide analysis and chart where a story might go next. 
• China’s crackdown on dissent | A human rights lawyer imprisoned for seven years for criticizing the government. A Xinjiang history buff who was tortured for speaking out on a livestream. These men told RFA Mandarin their stories this summer, adding to our essential reporting on Beijing’s brutality.
• The Thailand/Cambodia border clash | Long-simmering tensions catalyzed into armed conflict between Thailand and Cambodia over a disputed border in July, killing dozens and displacing more than 300,000. RFA had reporters on both sides, with stories in Khmer for locals and in English for the world.
• The deadly Myanmar earthquake | In March, a devastating 7.7-magnitude earthquake hit civil-war-torn Myanmar, an impoverished country of rickety structures. More than 3,300 people died; millions are food insecure. RFA’s on-site coverage told citizens’ stories, showcasing where aid was needed.
• Remaking Vietnam’s government | Vietnamese leader To Lam is reinforcing his power: consolidating 63 provinces to 34, appointing relatives to key posts, and crafting policies to benefit select private firms. Local media faces state censorship. RFA’s unvarnished reports provide an unobstructed view.

# # #

Authorities urged residents to stay in their homes, where people taped up windows to protect against high winds. Supermarket shelves emptied in some areas as panicked residents stocked up on supplies.

(Tyrone Siu/Reuters)

Packing winds of up to 220 km per hour, or 137 miles per hour, Ragasa is expected to pass around 100 km to the south of Hong Kong on Wednesday, the Hong Kong Observatory reported just before 1 a.m. local time.

Residents should prepare for “heavy squally showers and thunderstorms” and “overtopping waves over the shoreline,” particularly on the eastern and southern coasts, the Observatory said.

A reporter for Agence France-Presse saw waves nearly five meters high crash into the seaside promenade of the city’s Heng Fa Chuen residential district around nightfall.

The storm is expected to make landfall from midday to late Wednesday along the coast of Guangdong, where authorities evacuated more than 770,000 people, according to state broadcaster CCTV.

On Monday, Ragasa tore through the northern Philippines, where thousands sought shelter in schools and evacuation centers. In Taiwan, officials said that 30 people were missing in the eastern county of Hualien, where a barrier lake in the mountains burst as Ragasa stormed through.

Includes reporting from Agence France-Presse and Reuters.

Video from state TV showed dozens of dancing, flower-waving celebrants on the airport tarmac as Xi disembarked. State media reports say he met with representatives of ethnic groups and “expressed the hope that everyone would join forces and move forward together to build a beautiful Xinjiang.”

The friendly tableau stood in stark contrast to widespread allegations of abuses against ethnic Uyghurs in Xinjiang carried out by Beijing.

In 2021, the U.S. State Department labeled as genocide what it called a “systematic attempt to destroy Uyghurs by the Chinese party-state.” It alleged the Chinese Communist Party had arbitrarily imprisoned more than a million civilians, created a regime of torture and forced sterilization and drastically curtailed freedoms of speech, religion and movement among Uyghurs.

(Shen Hong/Xinhua via Getty Images)

In June, a human rights group reported that major producers of Chinese minerals were using state-backed forced-labor programs to meet increasing demand.

RFA teams earlier this year reported on increasing online censorship in the Xinjiang region, building on the already tight restrictions on digital expression across China.

Earlier this month, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the latest version of a bipartisan bill that would direct the State Department to oversee policies to protect Uyghur human rights and preserve Uyghur language and customs. The measure is awaiting consideration by the U.S. Senate.

Includes reporting by Agence France-Presse.

Photo Gallery: Xi Jinping visits Urumqi, Xinjiang Autonomous Region

(Xinhua News Agency/Xinhua News Agency via Getty Images)

(Xinhua News Agency/Xinhua News Agency via Getty Images)

(Xinhua News Agency/Xinhua News Agency via Getty Images)

(Xinhua News Agency/Xinhua News Agency via Getty Images)

(Xinhua News Agency/Xinhua News Agency via Getty Images)

(Xinhua News Agency/Xinhua News Agency via Getty Images)

(Xinhua News Agency/Xinhua News Agency via Getty Images)

(Xinhua News Agency/Xinhua News Agency via Getty Images)

Kim made the remarks during a recent session of the Supreme People’s Assembly, state-run Korean Central Television (KCTV) reported Monday. He said he has “good memories” of President Trump from their previous summits and would consider talking if the United States changes its stance.

The statement marked Kim’s first public response to Trump’s recent overtures and underscored the gulf between the two sides. Dropping the U.S. goal of North Korean denuclearization would represent a major shift in American policy and a significant concession to Pyongyang.

Photo Gallery: Trump meets Kim

(Handout/Getty Images)

(Handout/Getty Images)

(Handout/Getty Images)

(Handout/Getty Images)

(Handout/Getty Images)

(Handout/Getty Images)

(Handout/Getty Images)

(Handout/Getty Images)

(Linh Pham/Getty Images)

(Linh Pham/Getty Images)

Trump has continued to tout his personal rapport with Kim, but the White House told Reuters in July that the ultimate objective of U.S. policy remains the complete denuclearization of North Korea.

The two leaders surprised the world with an impromptu meeting at the Demilitarized Zone in 2019, when Trump briefly stepped across the border into North Korea to shake Kim’s hand — a symbolic moment that underscored their unconventional diplomacy.

Kim also stressed he has no intention of resuming dialogue with South Korea, a key U.S. ally that helped arrange the earlier Trump-Kim summits during Trump’s first term. Tensions on the peninsula have deepened as Kim accelerates weapons development and strengthens ties with Russia amid the war in Ukraine.

In a separate interview with the BBC, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung said he would support a deal in which North Korea freezes production of its nuclear weapons rather than fully dismantling them, if such an agreement could be reached between Trump and Kim.

Monday’s notice from the Cyberspace Administration of China did not specify when the content crackdown would begin. It follows an announcement on Saturday saying the CAC would would take “disciplinary and punitive measures” against Weibo, a micro-blogging platform, and Kuaishou, a short-form video service — and a similar action taken on Sept. 11 against Xiaohongshu, the Instagram-like social-media service known in English as Rednote. The CAC hasn’t specified what those disciplinary measures are.

The CAC said that it would target posts that include rumors about China’s economy — which has struggled this year — as well as fabricated information and “sensational conspiracy theories.”

China’s restrictions on social media are typically much tighter than the moderation methods common on Western social platforms. Last year, the CAC began a crackdown on slang and abbreviations on social media, on top of the database of “sensitive words” censors already ban from use on the internet.

Officials in Xinjiang last year banned ethnic Uyghurs from using social media apps. Censors tightened restrictions on posts by Tibetans ahead of the Dalai Lama’s birthday last year. Pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong say scrutiny of social media and police action based on social posts have intensified since the Article 23 national security law went into effect.

Includes reporting from Agence France-Presse and Reuters.

On July 5, Zhang Yadi, 22, who has been studying in France, returned to Changsha, Hunan province, to visit family. On July 30, she disappeared in Shangri-La, Yunnan province.

Zhang is an editor for the digital platform Chinese Youth Stand for Tibet (CYST) that emerged after the “white paper protests” in 2022. According to the group, it aims to “share the hidden truth about Tibet among the Chinese-speaking community.”

CYST says Zhang may have been taken by state security on suspicion of “endangering national security.”

🚨【URGENT】22-year-old Chinese student Zhang Yadi missing for 47 days after returning home, suspected of “endangering national security” 🚨

📌 Zhang Yadi (22, online name Tara @TaraFreesoul), from Changsha, Hunan, had long studied and lived in France. In 2025, she was awarded… https://t.co/q4T0y6ypXm

— 华语青年挺藏会 ChineseYouthStand4Tibet (@CYS4T) September 16, 2025

Also known as Tara and online as @TaraFreesoul, Zhang focused on promoting dialogue between ethnic groups in China, particularly between Han and Tibetan communities. In September, she was scheduled to begin her studies at the School of Oriental and Asian Studies in London.

“This is a case of transnational repression,” Maya Wang, associate Asia director at Human Rights Watch, told RFA. “The fear is that students’ activism abroad is being closely watched. The impact here is to make everyone very worried about everything they say and do, including outside of China.”

Before her disappearance, Zhang kept close contact with friends and family, but communication was abruptly cut off after July 30, according to CYST. Afterwards, contradictory statements appeared on her WeChat account, raising further concern.

(Changsha Intermediate People's Court via AFP)

Prominent Chinese human rights lawyer Jiang Tianyong traveled to Changsha to provide legal assistance to Zhang’s mother. According to CYST, while Jiang was meeting her mother at a cafe on Sept. 16, he was taken away by three unidentified men and brought to the police station. He has since been released.

“Her activism took place in France,” Wang told RFA. “It is important for the French government also to protect the rights and freedom of expression of its residents in France and press the Chinese government to release her.”

Ginger Duan, Chinese Youth Stand for Tibet (CYST) founder and Zhang’s best friend, told RFA that in their last direct contact after July 30, Zhang said she was in the hospital, but when asked by Duan, she could not confirm it with a selfie or a doctor’s note. “I didn’t believe her,” Duan told RFA.

Duan said CYST represents a new generation of young Chinese committed to peacefully mediating ethnic conflicts.

“Yet, when these youths attempt to foster grassroots exchanges and dispel longstanding misunderstandings about Tibet among the Mandarin-speaking public, the Chinese Communist Party responds with arrests,” Duan told RFA.

“This action clearly exposes the true nature of Beijing’s Tibet policy: they neither want genuine mutual understanding between Han and Tibetan people, nor do they want a real resolution to the Tibetan issue.”

“We therefore urge the international community to pay close attention to this case. Only through sustained global awareness and pressure can the CCP be compelled to release Tara and finally confront the Tibet question,” Duan said.

According to Duan, Zhang now faces a heavy sentence, with charges tied to national security, particularly concerning the highly sensitive issue of Tibet and China’s ethnic minority policies.

“It’s quite alarming that her arrest is a sign of the Chinese government’s increasing repression, tightening of ideological control, which means that there is increasingly heavy repression in places like Tibet and Xinjiang, where even expressing solidarity for the rights of Tibetans and Uyghurs is often now treated quite harshly,” Maya Wang of Human Rights Watch said.