The Philippines on July 29 submitted its official nautical chart of Scarborough Shoal, a disputed feature in what Manila calls the West Philippine Sea – the section of the South China Sea that is within its exclusive economic zone – to the United Nations, to bolster its claim on the area, which is also claimed by China and Taiwan.

Beijing immediately protested the filing, accusing Manila of infringing on Chinese sovereignty.

Taiwan also opposed the move, but in a way that did not outright condemn the Philippines. It also repeated its call for Taiwan to be included in negotiations over South China Sea disputes.

“The filing adds specificity to a Philippine position that was already well established,” Sylwia M. Gorska, a doctoral candidate in international relations at the University of Central Lancashire in the United Kingdom, told RFA. “For Taiwan, the consequence is not the loss of its claim, but a further deterioration in its relative ability to make that claim consequential.”

(AFP)

The episode highlights an increasingly awkward tension for President Lai Ching-te’s government. That government considers itself to be the continuation of the Republic of China, or ROC, and thus continues to formally claim land it historically laid claim to, dating back to the era that it controlled the mainland, including Scarborough Shoal and other South China Sea features.

Meanwhile, the Philippines has become an increasingly important security partner as both governments contend with pressure from Beijing.

Official status

Unlike Manila and Beijing, Taipei is excluded from the United Nations and has limited ability to advocate for its claims via the same international processes being used by other claimants.

But Taiwan’s exclusion from the U.N. system does not invalidate its claim, Aadil Brar, a Taipei-based independent analyst and former visiting scholar at National Chengchi University, told RFA.

“The real problem is procedural rather than substantive,” Brar told RFA.

Taiwan can continue asserting sovereignty through Foreign Ministry statements and other diplomatic channels, he said, but cannot participate on equivalent terms in the international mechanisms through which Manila is formalizing its position.

That disadvantage is compounded by Taiwan’s lack of a physical role around Scarborough.

Gorska noted that China has exercised de facto control around the shoal since 2012 and sharply increased its Coast Guard presence there, while Philippine Coast Guard and fisheries vessels continue to challenge Chinese restrictions.

(Philippine Coast Guard via AFP)

“In practice, Scarborough is now contested primarily by China and the Philippines,” she said. “They are the states maintaining presence, generating the confrontations and forcing decisions about how far coercion can go before it carries wider diplomatic or alliance consequences.”

“Taiwan remains a claimant, but it is largely absent from those day-to-day interactions and therefore has limited influence over the operational conditions around the shoal.”

Strategic restraint

Taiwan’s weak operational position gives Taipei little incentive to turn the Philippine filing into a serious bilateral dispute, analysts said.

The Philippines’ northern islands sit close to Taiwan and the Luzon Strait, a key maritime passage that could become strategically important in any cross-Strait conflict. The Philippines is also a U.S. treaty ally and has expanded military cooperation with Washington.

Gorska pointed to the deployment of the U.S. NMESIS anti-ship missile system in Batanes during this year’s Balikatan exercises as an example of the growing military relevance of the northern Philippines to Taiwan’s security environment.

“A more forceful Taiwanese response would signal continued commitment to the ROC claim, but it would do little to improve Taipei’s position at Scarborough and could impose costs on a relationship that may matter far more in a cross-Strait crisis,” she said.

It is for this reason that disputes between Manila and Taipei will likely be handled quietly, Enrico Cau, a Taipei-based independent security researcher, told RFA.

“Under the current situation it is likely that most differences on disputes in the South China Sea between Taiwan and the Philippines will be ironed out through diplomatic channels and a carefully dosed media exposure, where disagreements are manifested with moderation,” Cau said.

(Jam Sta Rosa/AFP)

He said actions by the Philippines and other regional governments were primarily aimed at countering China rather than challenging Taiwan, giving Taipei an additional reason to exercise restraint.

Brar similarly said Taiwan’s response to Manila had been notably softer than the language it typically uses when responding to Chinese moves in disputed waters.

“Taiwan is almost certainly going to downplay this dispute, and its actual response already shows that,” he said.

Domestic politics

In Taiwan, the restrained approach has become a hotly debated issue in the political arena.

Chen I-hsin, Culture and Communications Committee Chair of the main opposition Kuomintang (KMT), accused the government of applying double standards, contrasting its muted reaction to the Philippine filing with its criticism last year of China’s establishment of a nature reserve at Scarborough Shoal.

Chen urged the Foreign Ministry to negotiate with Manila to defend Taiwan’s sovereignty.

The ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) lawmaker Wu Szu-yao pushed back, saying Taiwan and the Philippines were both victims of Chinese aggression and arguing that the KMT should instead direct its criticism at Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

The dispute reflects a broader divergence over how much political weight Taiwan should give to historic South China Sea claims from the era that the ROC controlled the mainland.

Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung acknowledged in July that Taiwan was not actively pressing its South China Sea claims, while maintaining that its formal sovereignty position had not changed.

Gorska said that distinction was important.

“The Lai administration appears to be reducing the political salience of the ROC’s traditional South China Sea claims rather than abandoning them,” she said. “The claims remain formally intact, but Taipei is no longer treating their public assertion as an objective in itself.”

(I-hwa Cheng/AFP)

Taiwan continues to administer Taiping Island, the largest naturally occurring feature in the Spratly Islands, and has reaffirmed its South China Sea claims when challenged. But analysts said Taipei appears increasingly selective about which claims warrant sustained political attention.

Cau said there were signs within the DPP of a more pragmatic approach that placed greater emphasis on international law and on territory Taiwan could realistically control and defend.

It remained unclear, he said, whether Lai’s softer approach represented a genuine move away from traditional ROC claims or simply an attempt to navigate an increasingly complex regional security environment.

For Taipei, that ambiguity may itself be useful, according to analysts. Taiwan can preserve its formal sovereignty position without allowing a remote shoal it does not control to disrupt a relationship with Manila that is becoming more consequential to its security.

But the Philippine filing also points to a longer-term risk for Taiwan – if regional governments increasingly formalize maritime claims through U.N. filings or eventually reach agreements governing behavior in the South China Sea, Taiwan could find rules affecting its interests being shaped without its participation, Cau said.

Edited by Eugene Whong.

With dozens of hydropower dams either built or under construction on the Mekong River and its tributaries, Laos has gone all-in on its controversial economic strategy to become the “Battery of Southeast Asia” in hopes of selling electricity to neighboring countries.

Pak Beng, when complete, will be the most upstream dam on the Mekong in Laos. It is a joint venture between a Chinese investment company and a Thai energy firm, it will have a generating capacity of 912 megawatts and is expected to produce an average of 4,775 gigawatt-hours annually—enough to power a mid-sized U.S. city for a year.

“The construction has quietly begun,” Brian Eyler, director of the Southeast Asia program at the Washington-based Stimson Center, told RFA. “On paper, hydropower dams provide income for Laos by selling power to Thailand, Vietnam and Cambodia,” he said. “This brings foreign currency into the country, which is more resilient than the kip, Laos’ currency.”

Satellite imagery taken on July 29 shows a large earthen and rock embankment built across a bend in the river, creating a dry work area shielded from the river’s flow. Within the diverted section, workers appear to be excavating and laying the foundation for the dam’s main structure.

Numerous dump trucks and excavators are visible cutting into bedrock and sediment on the riverbed and leveling the surface to prepare a foundation base for the dam, Bruce Songhak Chung, a senior researcher at the Seoul-based Korea Institute for Security Strategy, told RFA.

(RFA)

“Satellite imagery shows what appear to be the early stages of a powerhouse building, a spillway, and foundational work for a ship lock and fish passage intended to allow vessel and aquatic movement past the dam once completed,” Chung said.

So far, only preparatory work has started and the main construction on the dam will begin in October 2026 after the wet season, Chandaly Mao, a communications officer with the Mekong River Commission, told RFA.

(RFA)

The commission is an intergovernmental organization that works with the governments of the four Mekong basin countries to jointly manage the shared water resources and the sustainable development of the Mekong.

“Work will start with the construction of the first-stage cofferdam,” Mao said, adding that the developer expects commercial operations to begin in 2033.

One of many

Meanwhile, further downstream, the Luang Prabang large-scale dam is more than 70% complete and will begin commercial operation in 2030 according to the commission. There are currently two operational dams and 9 others in various stages of completion according to the Stimson Center.

Eyler said there are more than 100 dams in Laos on Mekong tributaries, including the Xayaburi dam, the largest currently in operation. Additionally, Myanmar and Laos signed a joint agreement to develop a new 2,790-megawatt Mekong mainstream dam on July 5.

Little information has been released, but it is expected to sit in a canyon section of the Mekong along the Laos–Myanmar border and it would be one of the largest dams planned on the Mekong, he added.

“All these dams are built by foreign construction companies,” Eyler said. “Laos has the capability to build small dams but not large dams.”

(Stimson Center)

Under this arrangement, the foreign construction company owns the dam for a set period — typically 20 to 30 years — collecting the income it generates, while the Lao government receives taxes and royalties, Eyler said. Once the contract ends, ownership transfers back to the Lao government.

Many of the foreign players involved are Chinese firms or have Chinese backing, and critics are concerned that the arrangement ensnares Laos in a debt trap, making Vientiane increasingly malleable to Chinese creditors.

“This is a sovereign decision of the Government of Lao PDR,” Mao told RFA. “A further consideration is that operating patterns are shaped by concession and power purchase agreements. It is therefore important that these agreements allow operating rules to be adapted for environmental purposes.”

Local economics

Experts also warn the dams affect the livelihoods of the local communities and carry significant environmental and social impact downstream with effects that accumulate as more dams are built along the river.

The dams generate electricity that is mostly sold to Thailand, which is beneficial to the country’s bottom line, but local communities near the dams see little benefit.

The Mekong River Commission has raised four concerns: sediment trapping, fish passage, changes to the flow regime, and socioeconomic impacts on communities that depend on fisheries. Fish passage is a particular concern, both for adults migrating upstream and for eggs and larvae drifting downstream through slow moving impoundments, Mao told RFA.

(RFA)

“Even though some of these dams have fish ladders built into them, the fish ladders don’t work very well,” Eyler said. “So the fisheries are in a dire situation, and people rely on those fisheries for their food and for income as well.”

According to the Stimson Center’s Mekong Dam Monitor project, fisheries are depleting and declining for local people along the entire run of the Mekong in Laos. In a section of the river where the borders of Laos, Myanmar and Thailand meet, entire villages have become ghost towns as fish stocks have collapsed.

Chung said dams also trap sediment and nutrients that would otherwise flow downstream, potentially accelerating erosion in Vietnam’s Mekong Delta and contributing to farmland loss and declining agricultural productivity.

(www.pakbengpower.com)

“Dams can also release large amounts of water suddenly, causing flooding downstream,” Chung said, “Residents of villages affected by flooding and construction could be forced to relocate, losing their homes and livelihoods.”

“It’s very rare that people that live around dams benefit from those dams,” Eyler said. “Typically they bear the costs and then people far away get the benefits.”

Edited by Eugene Whong.

A knockoff version of the popular smartphone game Clash of Clans is seemingly a hit with North Korean players, Radio Free Asia has learned.

The game, given a name that could be translated as “Fortress Defense,” closely resembles earlier builds of the 2012 smash hit by Finland’s Supercell, which has been downloaded more than 500 million times worldwide.

In Clash of Clans, users mine resources, build up their defenses and raid other users’ fortresses. The bootleg version is the latest confirmed example of a North Korean smartphone game that allows online play via the country’s intranet, which is isolated from the rest of the world as a means to prevent residents from accessing information from outside the country.

Footage of a North Korean smartphone obtained near the Sino-Korean border in China’s Liaoning province was shared to an account associated with the username Xiao Yang on the Chinese social media platform Xiaohongshu, also known as RedNote, which is said to be similar to the U.S. platforms Instagram or Pinterest.

Screen footage leaked

When powered on, the phone displayed a logo reading “Hwawon,” a North Korean smartphone manufacturer, meaning that the device cannot connect to the global internet even if taken out of the country. It is restricted to only the North Korean intranet.

In the footage, the user opens the Fortress Defense app on the phone and a loading screen appears that closely resembles a former intro screen of Clash of Clans. The logo uses the exact same wood-grain lettering, just with the knockoff title, with the same arrow-ridden shield, but the resemblance does not end there.

(RFA edit/Supercell/小羊朝鲜之旅小小号 via Xiaohongshu)

Cartoonish characters – a female archer shooting a bow in the foreground, flanked by her allies, and a male warrior charging at her with an extended sword, with his allies close behind – are posed in the exact same way as the actual Clash of Clans intro screen, though the opposing armies’ clothing, hairstyles and equipment are different.

At the bottom of the loading screen, a notice clearly reads: “This product is protected by the software protection law.”

The screen soon displays the message “Please check your data connection status,” followed by an error window reading, “Cannot connect to the server. Please check your network status,” before the app shuts down.

The notices used North Korean word spellings, which indicate that the bootleg was localized for North Korean users rather than a wholesale ripoff of a version of the game meant for the South Korean market.

Chat disabled

How the game actually runs inside North Korea was confirmed through footage on another Chinese video platform, Bilibili.

Footage filmed by a Chinese content creator who visited North Korea last year shows a woman, believed to be a North Korean resident, playing “Fortress Defense” on a smartphone.

At the top of the screen, a counter indicates that there are currently 42,329 players online. This suggests tens of thousands of North Korean players were active when the footage was taken and that there are likely even more users offline.

(十七岁歌手想打中单 via Bilibili)

However, this version of the game does not allow users to type messages to each other. Instead, players are limited to sending each other preset phrases like “Be careful” or “Surrender.”

Fortress Defense’s seemingly blatant ripoff of Clash of Clans’ designs and gameplay has sparked considerable interest among users both in South Korea and elsewhere.

Clash of Clans fans on the South Korean internet forum DCinside commented that Fortress Defense appeared to be a “recycled older version of the original,” and that it “looks like an earlier build” of the game.

Meanwhile, users on the U.S. platform Reddit noted that Fortress Defense “is clearly a private-server game modified from an older system.” They explained that several newer features available in Clash of Clans were not present in the knockoff.

RFA attempted to contact Supercell to inquire whether the company was aware of the unauthorized use of its intellectual property inside North Korea, but as of Aug. 5, there was no response.

Edited by Eugene Whong.

Last month, PNG’s Foreign Affairs Minister Justin Tkatchenko announced in an official statement the immediate cessation of operations and the formal closure of the physical presence of the Chinese Taipei Economics Office, citing Port Moresby’s “unwavering commitment to honoring, respecting and upholding Papua New Guinea’s foundational One-China Policy,” which aligns with Beijing’s view, the “One-China Principle,” which states that Taiwan is an inalienable part of its territory.

The decision was confusing, Paul Barker, executive director of the PNG Institute of National Affairs, a Port Moresby-based think tank, told RFA.

“One really wonders why one would take this action at this point,” he said. “PNG has always stated its position of friends to all and enemies to none and choosing to chart its own path in the region, together with its Pacific partners and its ASEAN colleagues.”

(Taipei Economic Office in Papua New Guinea)

Barker noted that PNG last year signed a mutual defense treaty with Australia, and has defense arrangements with other regional parties including China, Indonesia and the U.S.

“PNG recognized the One China Policy almost immediately after independence, but has also maintained ongoing trade, investment and cultural and related engagement with Taiwan throughout, which seems entirely reasonable, after all so does China with Taiwan, with many aspects of their economies quite connected,” Barker said.

One China?

PNG’s One-China Policy differs from a policy by the same name held by the United States government. While Port Moresby’s policy recognizes Beijing’s view, the U.S. policy merely acknowledges it and takes no official stance on Taiwan’s sovereignty. Both policies recognize the PRC government as the sole and legal government of China and in practice this has still left room for unofficial relations with Taiwan, and similar arrangements exist in many countries around the world.

But unofficial relations with Taipei and Papua New Guinea will soon cease, according to Tkatchenko’s statement.

Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly protested the closure of its office, vowing to continue to operate it “as normal.”

It was not immediately clear to RFA what it would mean to operate the office as normal when it is not recognized by the host government.

In the wake of the decision, Taiwan initiated a review of liquefied natural gas imports from PNG and decided to halt spot purchases, which prompted Beijing to announce it would increase its purchases of the commodity from the Pacific Island country.

(I-Hwa Cheng/AFP)

Taiwan’s response follows a pattern of cutting ties with governments that downgrade its status, Jonah Bock, assistant director for research at the Alliance Futures Initiative, a Washington-based think tank, told RFA.

“It is important for Taiwan to maintain even informal ties with states that do not recognize it,” Bock said. “But it is necessary to send a signal that these actions taken will not go unpunished. The audience is not just Port Moresby but every other country with ties to Taiwan.”

Bock said that the closure of Taiwan’s office in PNG was part of a larger campaign to further isolate Taiwan.

“In the Pacific Islands only three countries—Palau, the Marshall Islands, and Tuvalu—still recognize Taiwan and none appear poised to flip recognition in the short term,” Bock said. “But recognition is only part of Beijing’s objectives; it also seeks to eliminate Taiwan’s remaining international space. That means going after Taiwan’s continuing relationships—e.g. the closing of the Taipei Trade Office in PNG.”

Bock noted how similar measures have been occurring in various areas of the Pacific, with Fiji having closed its office in Taipei in 2017 and having revoked diplomatic privileges to Taiwan’s office in Suva in 2018. Bock further noted that PNG itself closed its trade office in Taipei in 2023, and Nauru directed all government officials to uphold the One-China Principle in all activities last year.

“Chinese diplomats in the region are already working to push other countries to end their own ties to Taiwan,” he said. “Short of unification, none of this stops. China will continue to aggressively pursue any action that reduces Taiwan’s international space—its ethos of national rejuvenation relies on unification. It is not an option for China to stop the contest.”

Beyond geopolitics and trade

Barker explained that the decision would affect more than gas exports and trade.

“Educational and cultural links are also strong with scholarships and exchanges, with some useful ongoing development programs in agriculture, and valued investment in PNG,” he said. “The cultural associations between Taiwan and its indigenous population and PNG and the Pacific, of course, go far back, with the dispersion of people from Taiwan and the origins of the Austronesian language stemming from Taiwan going back some 6,000 years.”

He said the cultural links to the indigenous people of Taiwan meant that PNG should try to maintain some sort of engagement with Taipei and that this should not undermine any relationship it has with Beijing.

(Chinese government media)

But Bock said that money talks, and although the office’s closure does not appear to be in PNG’s economic interest in the short term due to cancelled Taiwanese contracts, the timing suggests that arrangements for expanding the economic relationship with China must be in place.

“The move is to curry favor with the PRC and the goal is vast sums of Chinese money,” Bock said.

He explained how Prime Minister James Marape visited China in April to explore increasing trade and investment, then in May, the two countries signed an economic framework agreement, and in July the two sides held high-level discussions about the coming PNG-China Business Forum & Trade Expo in Guangzhou.

“In the months prior to the closure, China and PNG laid the groundwork for a much larger economic relationship. Closing the office is PNG’s payment to ensure China delivers.”

Editing and additional reporting by Eugene Whong in Washington.

Prime Minister Matthew Wale and U.S. Chargé d’Affaires P. Daniel O’Hara signed the finalized agreement Tuesday aboard the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Harriet Lane, which had visited Honiara for the occasion.

Commonly known as a shiprider agreement, the Agreement Concerning Counter Illicit Transnational Maritime Activity establishes a legal framework allowing Solomon Islands law enforcement officers to be embedded on U.S. Coast Guard vessels. The initiative forms part of Washington’s broader deployment designed to enhance regional stability and counter illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing across the Pacific.

(Solomon Islands government)

The move has drawn sharp criticism from opposition leader and former Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare, who previously aligned the Pacific nation closer with Beijing by signing a controversial and secretive security agreement with China in 2022.

Though it may seem like Honiara is hedging its bets by entering into security deals with both Washington and Beijing, engaging with both geopolitical rivals is standard practice, Alexander L. Vuving of the Hawaii-based Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, told RFA.

“This mirrors the actions of many other small countries in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Oceania, signaling that the Solomon Islands cares about its autonomy and wishes to avoid taking sides,” he said. He also dispelled concerns regarding tensions with Beijing over Taiwan, stating, “The shiprider agreement focuses purely on maritime security within the Solomon Islands’ Exclusive Economic Zone, which does not conflict with or affect the One China Policy.”

Maintaining neutrality

The signing occurred a day after the prime minister concluded diplomatic visits to the United States and Japan. Upon his arrival at Honiara International Airport on Monday, Wale emphasized to reporters that the Solomon Islands has no desire to become a proxy battleground for larger powers.

“We are not in a geopolitical game. We are not interested! Let the big boys sort out the big stuff,” he said.

He stated that the country’s foreign policy is meaningless unless backed by reliable development partners, asserting that the nation intends to cooperate with all major powers while letting larger global players manage their own geopolitical rivalries.

He acknowledged China as a critical trading and development ally, affirming that his administration would continue to work closely with Beijing to protect national interests and improve local livelihoods.

(Saeed Khan/AFP)

On a previous diplomatic visit last month to Canberra, Wale and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese signed a memorandum of understanding concerning security and police cooperation, and agreed to begin negotiations on a treaty that would redefine the bilateral relationship.

“Regional powers have largely viewed the recent security agreements with Australia and the US as a positive pivot or rebalance of the country’s foreign policy,” Dr. Vuving said. But he warned that ultimately the ability to maintain more or less neutral stance depends on the domestic political situation.

“The long-term sustainability of this delicate approach requires a parallel balance in domestic politics,” he said. “Any lack of commitment to autonomy could result in increased pressure from rivaling great powers to pick a side.”

That’s politics

Though Wale’s government believes the shiprider agreement to be beneficial, the opposition has strongly criticized the deal.

Manasseh Sogavare, a former four-term Prime Minister who critics have said is very pro-China and who most recently led the country between 2019 and 2024, warned that welcoming the U.S. military could compromise the nation’s sovereignty.

During Sogavare’s most recent term, he orchestrated a dramatic geopolitical shift in the South Pacific by aligning the Solomon Islands with China and severing diplomatic ties with Taiwan.

U.S. officials quickly rejected Sogavare’s criticisms emphasizing that the arrangement is built entirely on mutual respect for local sovereignty.

O’Hara clarified that the agreement actively reinforces local authority by providing American operational capability while keeping all law enforcement decisions under domestic control.

“This agreement is about mutual benefit,” O’Hara stated after the signing. “Your officers will enforce your own laws in your own waters. You decide which vessels to investigate. You determine the violations. You set the penalties.”

Entering into international agreements with a mostly executive approach based on the political leanings of whomever holds the office of the prime minister has left some everyday citizens frustrated by a lack of transparency.

“Did Wale consider Solomon Islanders before signing any foreign agreements?” Brian Wanealafa, a Solomon Islands resident, told RFA. “He should make consultations first, or even bring that before parliament.”

Wanealafa said the criticism extended beyond just Wale.

“The same is with Sogavare, when he signed the security pact with China,” he said, referring to the 2022 agreement. “They should think of the citizens and do nationwide consultations, or bring to Parliament and dissect the agreements openly for people to understand.”

Legal and Sovereign Realities

Criticism that the agreement compromises the Solomon Islands’ sovereignty is invalid because it conflates political concerns with legal principles, Joseph Foukona, a history professor at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, who hails from the Solomon Islands, told RFA.

Foukona described the sovereignty argument as “twisted,” saying it centers more on “political concerns than legal ones.”

“Signing the Shiprider Agreement without parliamentary scrutiny is a non-issue, as it falls well within the executive government’s powers,” he said. “Previous administrations have similarly bypassed parliamentary oversight for memorandums of understanding and treaties.”

He emphasized that the US partnership perfectly aligns with international environmental and maritime treaties the Solomon Islands has already signed.

“These international treaties require a maritime enforcement mechanism to be effective,” Foukona said. “The Shiprider Agreement simply provides the platforms – U.S. Coast Guard vessels – for Solomon Islands law enforcement officers to enforce their own maritime laws and treaty provisions.”

Ultimately, under the pact, local officers will enforce their own laws in their own territorial waters, retaining final and absolute authority over all maritime policing decisions, he said.

Edited by Eugene Whong.

The decision followed Taipei’s review on imports originating from PNG of liquefied natural gas, or LNG, and the move amounts to a warning that countries with ties to Taiwan could face consequences rather than full-scale economic coercion, experts told Radio Free Asia.

“It functions as immediate diplomatic signaling, but also sits within an emerging, if still constrained, strategic adjustment,”Jozef Huljak, a PhD candidate in political science at Constantine the Philosopher University in Slovakia whose research examines Taiwan’s cultural and public diplomacy, told RFA when the decision was in its review stage.

Huljak explained the immediate message was that Papua New Guinea’s decision would not be “cost-free,” while also signaling to other governments that downgrading unofficial ties with Taiwan could carry consequences.

“The LNG review is primarily a signal, but one embedded in a gradual shift toward more calibrated responses as Taiwan’s informal diplomacy comes under sustained pressure,” he said.

Downgrading ties

Papua New Guinea on July 15 announced that it would close Taiwan’s representative office in Port Moresby, saying that the move was meant to align with its “One-China policy” and to deepen trust and economic ties with Beijing.

Port Moresby has never recognized Taiwan since gaining independence in 1975 and establishing relations with China the following year. The Taiwan trade office, which opened in 1990, served as Taipei’s de facto diplomatic mission while facilitating trade and investment.

Taipei blamed the decision on Chinese political and economic pressure, while the United States expressed concern. Beijing, meanwhile, praised the move.

Two days after the announcement, Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung said the country was reviewing its broader economic exchanges with Papua New Guinea, including LNG imports of about 1.2 million metric tons a year – roughly one-third of Papua New Guinea’s LNG exports – while stressing that Taipei’s agricultural and fisheries cooperation had also supported local development.

On Tuesday, Lin said that the country would stop spot purchases of LNG from PNG, AFP reported. Spot purchases are one-off arrangements to cover immediate needs rather than long term agreements for periodic deliveries.

(David Gray/Reuters)

Liquefied natural gas, or LNG, is Papua New Guinea’s largest export commodity, accounting for roughly half of its overall exports.

While Taiwan is the destination for about a third of PNG’s LNG exports, that only accounts for about 8% of Taiwan’s imports of LNG.

Stopping the spot purchases is somewhat of a departure from Taipei’s previous course.

Taiwan has traditionally sought to distinguish itself from China by presenting itself as a reliable partner that does not use trade or investment as political leverage.

Beijing, meanwhile, has repeatedly been accused by Western governments and observers of employing economic coercion against countries that challenge its interests.

The stoppage of LNG spot purchases, however, is not the first such move by Taiwan – it also recently removed Cambodia from visa facilitation programs after Phnom Penh publicly backed Beijing’s position on Taiwan.

Together, these moves suggest Taipei is becoming more willing to attach consequences to governments that reduce cooperation with Taiwan, even if the measures stop short of outright retaliation, Huljak said.

Tit for tat?

Still, analysts cautioned that Taiwan’s options remain constrained.

“I think ... comments made by Foreign Minister Lin still should be primarily viewed as first and foremost diplomatic signaling,” William Yang, a Northeast Asia analyst at the Belgium-based International Crisis Group, told RFA, also while the decision was still in the review stage.

“It’s a warning or it’s a reminder, rather than Taiwan already embracing the idea about weaponizing its existing trade link and relationship with other countries to counter their willingness to ... give in to Chinese pressure,” he said.

Yang said Taiwan was also likely examining its energy relationship with Papua New Guinea not just as a form of leverage, but also as a legitimate precaution due to its heavy reliance on LNG.

Taiwan imports about 95% of its energy, and if Beijing is able to influence countries supplying critical resources, “Taiwan will have to also take a precautionary look and examination of its existing trade relationship with a particular country that has shown the willingness to actually bow to China’s pressure,” he said.

(David Gray/Reuters)

Despite PNG accounting for less than one-tenth of Taiwan’s LNG imports, it provides an important source of supply diversification at a time when natural gas generates nearly half of Taiwan’s electricity following the shutdown of its last nuclear reactor in 2025, according to Huljak.

“A full break would therefore carry higher costs for Taiwan’s energy security than for PNG’s export revenues,” Huljak said. “The review is real, but escalation is structurally constrained.”

Message to other partners

The episode nevertheless carries broader implications beyond Papua New Guinea, analysts told RFA.

The impending trade office closure suggests Beijing is increasingly targeting Taiwan’s informal international presence rather than focusing only on the island’s dwindling group of formal diplomatic allies, Huljak said.

“If left unanswered, Papua New Guinea risks becoming a template,” he said. “Governments could align with Beijing, accept economic incentives, and assume that Taiwan lacks the capacity to respond.”

Taiwan’s objective, he said, is to challenge that assumption by demonstrating that even unofficial relationships have value and that ending them may carry opportunity costs.

Meanwhile, Yang believes any decision by Taiwan to reduce LNG imports from Papua New Guinea would resonate beyond the immediate dispute.

“If Taipei does follow through on ... reducing or ending its LNG trade with PNG, it obviously will be sending a signal to the rest of the Pacific countries,” he said.

“It would not simply just sit idly and allow these countries’ decisions to further shrink Taiwan’s international diplomatic space,” Yang added, describing it as a demonstration of Taipei’s resolve to protect its interests and sovereignty.

Edited by Eugene Whong.

It’s called the Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress—China’s newest law under President Xi Jinping, passed on March 12, 2026, and in effect since July 1, 2026.

The law contains 65 articles, many of which have raised concerns among Tibetans and rights groups. In this explainer, we focus on four key areas of the law that have drawn the most attention: identity, language, religion, and its reach beyond China’s borders.

First, it seeks to reshape how ethnic identity is understood in China. The law calls on Tibetans, Uyghurs, Mongolians, and other ethnic groups to build what it describes as “a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation,” placing a shared national identity at the center of ethnic policy.

Second, it changes the legal framework around language. Under Article 15, Mandarin is given priority in education and government affairs. While the law says minority languages are “respected and protected,” it also states that when Mandarin and minority languages are used together, Mandarin should take priority in position and order.

Third, it expands state oversight of religion. Article 46 requires religious groups, religious schools, and places of worship to promote a sense of community for the Chinese nation, follow the policy of “Sinicization of religion,” and guide religious activities to adapt to socialist society. Critics say this could further increase state control over religious practices, including Tibetan Buddhism.

Fourth, and one of the most internationally scrutinized provisions, is Article 63, which extends the law’s reach beyond China’s borders. It states that anyone living outside China could face legal consequences if Beijing determines their actions undermine “ethnic unity” or create “ethnic division.”

Beijing frames all of this as protection and development, equal rights for all ethnic groups, and continued investment in poorer regions. Officials point to new schools, infrastructure, and job programs in places like Tibet and Xinjiang as evidence of that commitment.

But the law’s reach goes well beyond schools and language. It also links ethnic affairs directly to national security, calling for action against what it defines as separatism, extremism, and terrorism, both inside China and abroad.

Critics say the law gives legal backing to policies that were already being implemented in minority regions. They argue that putting these policies into law could allow authorities to enforce them more broadly and with fewer limits.

In Xinjiang, this builds on years of mass detention documented in Uyghur communities.

In Inner Mongolia, a preview came in 2020, when new Mandarin-language mandates in schools triggered mass protests and a purge of local officials.

In Tibet, it builds on existing restrictions around religious teaching and Mandarin-medium education.

The concern isn’t limited to human rights groups. In June, the United Nations human rights chief, Volker Türk, called on China to repeal the law, warning it risks violating multiple international treaties China has ratified, and could deepen restrictions on language, religion, culture, and expression for ethnic minorities.

Whatever this law is ultimately called—unity or assimilation—it’s now in effect. And its impact is likely to be felt for years to come, in Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and beyond.

RFA Tibetan spoke with regional experts, rights advocates, and a Chinese government spokesperson for their comments on the new law:

Frank Lehberger, sinologist

“This is however not a recent reversal of policies, but a concretization of legal, ideological and brutally repressive ethnic policy.”

Brahma Chellaney, geostrategist

“Tibet may see its demographic balance shift in such a way as to make the region indistinguishable from provinces in the Chinese heartland.”

“The 2026 law provides the legal framework for breaking up minority-heavy areas by moving Han Chinese into them while relocating minorities into the Chinese interior for ‘labor programs.’”

“The likely long-term impact will be the erosion of distinct ethnic identities in favor of a singular Chinese national identity, with Mandarin the sole language of education.”

James Leibold, La Trobe University

“The deeper impact may be slower and more bureaucratic: minority identity becomes something to be managed, curated and disciplined by the party-state. That is how assimilation often works, not with one grand announcement, but through schools, textbooks, cadres, museums, slogans and forms.”

“Truly, the paperwork is where empires go to pretend they are being reasonable. Difference is tolerated rhetorically, but the political direction is toward sameness.”

Bhuchung Tsering, International Campaign for Tibet

“This law would be the codification of the change in the bilingual education system in the Tibetan areas ... Tibetan schools have at various times been implementing Model One, which means Tibetan language is the medium of instruction. Now, through the imposition of Chinese on the Tibetan people, and with Mandarin becoming the medium of instruction, China is changing the bilingual education system in the Tibetan area, and that will have an impact on the Tibetan people.”

Tsemoling Penpa, former political prisoner

“The intention behind China’s new Ethnic Unity Law... is the complete erasure of Tibet and Tibetan identity. It’s not only about religion or culture—it is about erasing Tibet as a whole.”

Liu Chang, spokesperson, Chinese Embassy in Washington

“China is a multi-ethnic country where various ethnic groups are all equal and united in a harmonious relationship of mutual assistance. Article 63 targets unlawful acts that undermine ethnic unity and incite separatism, with the fundamental aim of safeguarding ethnic harmony, social stability, and national security.”

“We urge relevant parties to respect the basic facts, stop making unwarranted criticisms and irresponsible remarks on China’s ethnic policies and rule of law, and cease using so-called ethnic issues as a pretext to interfere in China’s internal affairs.”

Edited for Tibetan by Tawang and for RFA English by Charlie Dharapak.

Updated to condense responses for clarity.

The video opens with an aerial shot of a lone China Coast Guard ship at sea on a calm day, as soft, whimsical music carries us into China’s latest propaganda song.

“Azure sky, crystal sea, chasing gulls, blazing sun, patrolling the South China Sea, guarding endless loneliness, endless vastness, and guarding this sea, this peace and harmony.”

The lyrics of the first verse introduce the setting – this is a song about an enlisted member of the coast guard stationed on the disputed sea, thinking longingly about someone he loves back home.

In later verses, he asks her what color the clouds are where she is, what perfume she’s wearing, and if she’s drinking coffee or tea, because he’d like a taste too.

The song, “I Miss You on the South China Sea,” is Beijing’s latest attempt to use popular culture to shape international perceptions of one of Asia’s most contentious maritime disputes, analysts told Radio Free Asia.

The English version of the music video was released this month by Chinese state media to coincide with the 10th anniversary of the 2016 international arbitral tribunal ruling that rejected the legal basis of Beijing’s sweeping claims over most of the disputed waters.

A Mandarin version debuted about six months earlier during the Lantern Festival, a Chinese cultural event that marks the end of Lunar New Year celebrations and the coming of spring.

Though the English version is seemingly intended to appeal to an international audience, the analysts questioned whether this campaign is likely to resonate beyond viewers and listeners already sympathetic to China.

“China’s state media spends little time actually thinking about how the message will be received elsewhere,” Ed Moon, an independent cross-Strait analyst and founder of intelligence site Strait Signal, told RFA. “Its major focus is on ensuring that the overall message correctly aligns with the official narrative.”

At one point, the singer uses a quantum physics term romantically, telling his beloved that he would cross time and space to prove with her “what quantum entanglement is.”

But despite the apparent awkwardness of the English lyrics, the song attempts to portray China Coast Guard personnel as ordinary people with very real feelings of longing for home and those they love, while their duties have called them far away to the remoteness of the open sea.

Controlling the narrative

The video reflects a broader effort by Beijing to complement official statements with emotionally driven storytelling, as China increasingly seeks to communicate its positions through documentaries, influencers, short videos and other forms of popular media.

“China wants to project its presence in the South China Sea as peaceful, benign and wholly normal. The focus on the human aspect of the coast guard crew members fits this pattern,” Moon said, adding that Beijing’s state media is primarily concerned with ensuring content aligns with the Communist Party’s official narrative rather than persuading foreign audiences.

(Ted Aljibe/AFP)

Within China’s political system, he said, Beijing’s sovereignty claims are treated as historically and factually self-evident, leaving little perceived need to explain them to overseas audiences.

Instead, Moon said, China has increasingly outsourced the task of “explaining” the country to foreign employees working within its media system and to overseas influencers who produce favorable content about China. As a result, English-language state media has become less important than maintaining consistency with Beijing’s messaging.

He also noted a growing emphasis on producing content in both Chinese and English, describing it as evidence of tighter coordination across state media outlets and a renewed focus on overseas Chinese communities, which Beijing increasingly sees as receptive audiences.

(China Military Bugle via YouTube)

The song represents an effort to use culture as a political tool while softening the image of the China Coast Guard, Jason Ng Sze Chieh, a lecturer at INTI International College Subang in Malaysia, told RFA.

“An attempt to instrumentalize culture and popular media, asserting China’s authority to patrol and ‘protect’ the South China Sea,” Ng said. “The music video is the other track: a targeted production built specifically to sell a peaceful image of China.”

Defending Beijing’s interests

Ng said the song consciously rebrands the China Coast Guard as “a benign force rather than ‘Wolf Warrior,’” using themes of intimacy and personal sacrifice while leaving the underlying political message unchanged.

“The message underneath doesn’t change – China is defending its interests, and nothing else,” he said.

Ng contrasted the music video with what he described as another strand of Beijing’s influence strategy – embracing successful cultural works that were not originally created by the state but later align with its messaging.

(Ezra Acayan/Getty Images)

He said Beijing increasingly pursues “two tracks,” continuing to produce explicitly patriotic material while also co-opting independently produced content that promotes a favorable image of China, particularly among overseas Chinese communities.

“The music video feels like artificial intelligence-generated slop, rendered in the soothing style of Chinese pop and designed to sell the world on China’s ‘peaceful’ intentions,” Ng said, adding that the production’s visuals and even the singer’s voice appeared artificial.

China has increasingly sought to present its coast guard as a professional force maintaining order in what it considers its own waters, even as confrontations with Philippine and Vietnamese vessels have intensified in recent years. Beijing says its actions are lawful and necessary to safeguard its sovereignty, while rival claimants accuse it of intimidation and coercion.

The 2016 ruling by an international tribunal in The Hague found that China’s expansive “nine-dash line” claims had no legal basis under international law. China rejected the ruling and continues to assert sovereignty over most of the South China Sea, where competing claims by the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan have made the waterway one of the region’s most volatile flashpoints.

Edited by Eugene Whong.

Update specifies that the Mandarin version preceded the English version by roughly six months.

In the months following the 2021 Myanmar military coup, ASEAN banned the junta from attending its annual summit. Earlier this year, junta chief Min Aung Hlaing oversaw staged, multi-phased elections which resulted in his being named President in April.

On July 12-13, ASEAN foreign ministers held their first direct, in-person informal meeting with Myanmar’s foreign minister in Bangkok.

Kim Aris, son of Aung San Suu Kyi, spoke to RFA on July 20 about ASEAN’s recent engagement with Myanmar, and about his mother who, according to the military-backed government, was transferred from prison to house arrest in April.

The interview has been edited for length:

RFA: ASEAN recently met with Myanmar’s foreign minister who told them that Aung San Suu Kyi is in good health even though she’s still being detained. He also referred to her as “a sister,” telling them that the military authorities would take care of her.

What were your reactions to those remarks?

Kim Aris: I was shocked. If that’s how they treat their sister, I don’t want to know how they treat other people. They still have not allowed me to have any contact with her, and have been denied her basic human rights.

And while they say they’re looking after her, they’re not providing any evidence to support that fact. And they’re saying that no one’s allowed to talk to her or see her until after she has finished serving her sentence. So she would be over 100 years old by that point.

I don’t know where she’s been held or how she is. And she’s over 81 years old now with ongoing health problems. And the fact that she’s been held in probably very bad conditions in a prison in Naypyidaw for the last five years. That makes me extremely concerned.

RFA: Have you heard any updates about your mother recently?

Kim Aris: No, nothing. The last I heard was when there was some news saying that she had been moved to house arrest. But again, there was no evidence to support that.

(Myanmar Military via AFP)

What are you hoping for at this point?

Half of the international community have been under the wrong idea for the last five years. They have thought that she’s been under house arrest. Actually, she’s been in prison all of this time. But the military spread rumors each year saying that she’s been moved to house arrest and the world listens to these rumors and unfortunately they fall for it all the time. So once again they say that she’s been moved to house arrest without providing any evidence.

All I can ask for is that the international community and the world leaders follow President Macron of France’s example and make their position very clear and call out for proof that my mother is alive and for her to have her basic human rights restored.

She’s been sentenced to however many years it is, I don’t know, 25 or 30 years in prison and these charges against her are completely false. In the first place, she should never have been in prison. So I’m calling for her to be freed.

Following the recent informal meeting, are you hopeful that it could lead to any meaningful changes? What kind of progress would you like to see about your mother and Myanmar people?

I hope that there’ll be no further engagement until certain conditions are met. And that includes the five point consensus that is abided by. And that also includes that my mother is freed along with all the other political prisoners. I can only hope that people will not be engaging with the military too publicly. Obviously I realize they need to talk to them, negotiations need to happen, but this should not happen publicly because that only legitimizes the regime.

(Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs via Reuters)

ASEAN is still engaging with the military-backed government, even though the Five-Point Consensus hasn’t been implemented. What do you think of ASEAN’s continued engagement under these circumstances?

Well, obviously they still have to talk. But again, I’ll say it again, it doesn’t need to be public. It should be done behind closed doors and done in such a way that it does not legitimize the regime.

Do you think this approach is helping to resolve the Myanmar crisis?

It’s hard to say. We’ll have to see if there’s, you know, actual tangible results in times to come. Let us see. But that would include that the military stops bombing the people and frees all the political prisoners. Those are real tangible results, otherwise it’s pretty meaningless.

(Myint Htwe via Facebook)

In your Martyrs’ Day video message, you spoke about the actions against statues of your grandfather, General Aung San, across the country. The military government said it was not destroying the statues but reexamining and correcting them under historic monument laws. What is your response to that explanation?

I don’t see why they needed to go and tear down the portrait of my grandfather outside 54 University Ave. That wasn’t a statue anyway. And that just goes to show that it’s not just about things. They’re correcting whatever it is. I think that’s laughable. I know that last year also there were statues torn down and yet Min Aung Hlaing still visited the museum of my grandfather’s house. It’s a very confusing message that they’re sending there.

My grandfather stood up against fascism and colonialism and he would be appalled to see what the military are doing to the country now. Even though he is the founder of this military, he would not like the direction they’ve taken. He was never about centralized power, he was about federal power and it didn’t matter where the leader of the country came from so long as he was a good leader. That’s what he believed.

(Issei Kato/Reuters)

You have been leading the Proof of Life Campaign to draw global attention to your mother’s situation. What kind of support have you received from governments and the international community so far?

Lots of governments and communities have joined this call and it has been very touching to see everybody join me in this. But that’s been encouraging, it hasn’t actually achieved what I want and that I still do not have any contact with Maymay and I still have no proof that she is alive. Nothing that the military have said or done reassures me in any way because they’re still just saying that she’s fine without providing any evidence.

So, I’m extremely grateful for everybody who joined this call. I can only ask them to continue to call and to do more in order to actually get results because words only get so far. We have to take concrete actions and for ASEAN, that would include actually stopping the illegal flow of weaponry going across their borders.

Do you think the campaign is putting significant pressure on Myanmar’s military regime?

I think it is having an effect, so I shall keep going.

(Soe Teya Tun/Reuters)

Taichito passed away last month. Could you share a little about the bond between your mother and Taichitoe?

Maymay was very fond of Taichito and Taichito was very protective of Maymay. He didn’t like it when people took up too much of her time and he would let them know. So he was actually part of the fighting dog in his blood. So he could be quite bad tempered if he wasn’t happy. But Maymay was able to train him so that he wasn’t too bad.

I think it’s the best gift I could have given her. And he was with her for over 10 years before she was put in prison. I was just very sad that he couldn’t be with her for the last five years.

Have you thought about what you’d like to do with your mother once she’s free?

Just normal family things. I’d like to cook her a meal and go for a walk with her. And, have her spend time with her grandchildren. I’m sure she’s missing us as much as we’re missing her. And I can only think that in time, we will get to see her.

Edited by Charlie Dharapak.

Experts said that once the new bridge connecting Dandong in China with Sinuiju in North Korea is complete, trade volume will more than double, relieving pressure on the aging Sino-Korean Friendship Bridge – the only other connection between the two cities – considered the main artery between the two countries.

Pyongyang and Beijing completed the structure of the New Yalu River Bridge in 2014, with the Chinese government footing the bill, but since then it has remained unopened because the two sides could not come to an agreement on financing construction on infrastructure facilities on North Korea’s end.

But construction resumed in January 2025 after Chinese firms agreed to invest, and if all goes according to plan, the new bridge could go into service as early as autumn, Bruce Songhak Chung, a senior researcher at the Seoul-based Korea Institute for Security Strategy, told RFA.

“Chinese traders involved in cross-border commerce said discussions on an opening ceremony could be held once construction on the North Korean side is completed,” Park Jongchol, a professor at Gyeongsang National University in South Korea said. “On the Chinese side, there were a few predicted dates being discussed — such as October 3, the date the two countries established diplomatic relations — though these have not been confirmed by either Beijing or Pyongyang.”

Even if that prediction ends up being incorrect, Chung said he expects the bridge to open this year based on his assessment of the imagery.

(RFA)

In a July 20 image, construction has advanced significantly in both the warehouse and logistic zone and the customs and security zone on the North Korean side of the bridge, Chung said.

These are located in a roughly 50-hectare (120-acre) area that was cleared and left undeveloped for more than a decade. Since the 2025 restart, dozens of administrative and security buildings, warehouses, and other facilities have been erected, with roofs installed and exterior structures largely completed, the imagery shows.

Closer ties, increased trade

As construction progressed, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited North Korea on June 8 and agreed with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to expand economic cooperation and make greater use of cross-border trade in areas including agriculture, technology, infrastructure, and people-to-people exchange.

Chinese experts suggested that following Xi’s visit, Beijing is expected to provide a large package of gifts to North Korea, with the bridge just a small part of it, Park said.

The bridge itself was to have been a symbol of economic cooperation between the two countries, but instead it became one of the better-known North Korean white elephants, built for a glorious national purpose, but serving no function. But that will change once it opens.

(RFA)

The new bridge will allow direct access for heavy cargo trucks, increase customs capacity, lower transportation costs and support development of Sinuiju, Joung Eunlee, the director of the Seoul-based Korea Institute for National Unification, told RFA.

“The bridge aligns with broader economic interests on both sides of the border,” she said. “China has sought to strengthen Dandong’s position as its principal trade gateway with North Korea, while Pyongyang is expected to increase imports of construction materials and industrial equipment for infrastructure and regional development projects.”

Final touches

In recent months, construction has continued at a breakneck pace, Chung observed.

“Along the northern access road to the bridge, satellite imagery also identified construction materials and temporary shelters for workers, the blue and orange objects visible along the roadside for more than one kilometer—supporting work on the customs complex and road paving,” Chung said.

However, paving inside the customs complex and on access roads has yet to be completed, indicating the ground preparation and foundation work are still underway. So the final asphalt or concrete paving, lane marking and site cleanup must be completed before the customs facility can support regular freight clearance and vehicle traffic, Chung said.

Construction on the North Korean side of the bridge is visible from China, Park told RFA.

“Vehicles continue to carry construction materials across the bridge. It is expected to open this year,” Park told RFA.

The bridge stretches about 3 kilometers (1.9 miles) from the customs facility on the Chinese side into North Korea, and the four-lane highway has now been fully paved in both directions. On June 28, Seoul-based media outlet Daily NK reported that buses have been seen conducting trial runs across it.

(RFA)

Park said he was able to observe about 300 trucks crossing from China into North Korea and roughly the same number crossing back in the afternoon over the aging Sino-Korean Friendship Bridge, which lies just upstream from the new bridge.

The Friendship Bridge was built by the Japanese during World War II, making it older than North Korea itself. Because roughly 70% of Sino-North Korean trade traverses this bridge each year, but it was built for a different era, and can handle only a limited number of crossings per day, Park said.

“Once the new bridge opens, cargo volume is expected to increase several times over, dramatically transforming cross border logistics,” Park said.

(RFA)

Tumen bridge behind schedule

Meanwhile, satellite imagery indicates that construction on the Tumen River Bridge connecting North Korea and Russia — which had reportedly been expected to open on June 19 — is still underway.

Satellite imagery captured June 30 shows construction on the bridge itself, plus North Korea’s customs facility and access roads, has been completed. But work on the Russian side, including roads, a checkpoint and a customs complex, remains unfinished.

(RFA)

The roughly 1-kilometer (0.6-mile) bridge will connect the North Korean city of Rason with the Russian town of Khasan and will be capable of handling up to 300 vehicles and 2,850 people per day, according to Russia’s Ministry of Transport.

Despite the delay, Russian President Vladimir Putin Monday met with North Korea’s Foreign Minister Choe Sun Hui, emphasizing close ties between two countries.

Experts told RFA that the new bridges may provide a means for China to undercut international sanctions on North Korea, meant to deprive Pyongyang of cash and resources that could be funneled into its nuclear and missile programs.

Russia was the first to openly violate sanctions on North Korea, Joung said. Moscow needed allies as it faced increased isolation following its invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Entities in China, on the other hand have found ways to get around sanctions, such as by transferring goods ship to ship while at sea, or by setting up shell companies to obfuscate where goods or money are sent and received, Joung noted.

The bridges would make it even easier for Moscow and Beijing to skirt sanctions without meaningful international oversight or enforcement, regulated only by the health of their relationship with Pyongyang, she said.

“The New Yalu River Bridge and the Tumen River Bridge seem to be one of the barometers of North Korea’s relations with China and Russia,” Joung said. “Both bridges are expected to open this year, and diplomatic ties and economic cooperation between North Korea and China, North Korea and Russia, and among all three countries are likely to be stronger than ever.”

Edited by Eugene Whong.

Chinese authorities in Xinjiang’s regional capital Urumqi on July 4 arrested two Uyghur sisters and their mother for sending goods to their eldest sister in Turkey, and a third sister was arrested a week later, the eldest told Radio Free Asia.

Guzelnur Kamil said her family had been shipping ordinary household goods, including clothing, footwear, hats, daily necessities, seasonings, and packaged food items to support her business in Turkey.

“They were simply miscellaneous everyday items,” she told RFA.

“My mother said, ‘Even if we cannot send you cash, let us send you goods so you can do business, my child, and provide for your children,’” she said.

Guzelnur, who moved to Turkey in 2016, said the shipments were assembled by her sister, Guljennet Kamil, who from 2018-2020 was detained in an internment camp.

Guljennet also suffers from partial paralysis following an accident and was helped by her sister with a share of the profits from her business. However, according to Guzelnur, the police used this communication as a pretext to target the family.

Investigation

Guzelnur said the police interrogation of her family began on July 1, and explained that her mother, Bahargul Tohti, along with her sisters Guljennet and Gulzeper Hekim, were interrogated several times.

Police used Guljennet’s shipping of goods to Turkey as a pretext, alleging suspicion of “supporting terrorists,” she said, adding that her mother and sisters were ordered to lead police to the exact shops where they purchased the goods and the logistics companies they used to ship them.

“On the 4th, they spoke very politely, asking my mother to come to the police station at 9:00 AM,” she said. “After taking her in, they also brought in my sisters. They took their blood samples and photographed them from the front, back, and sides. After that, they just took them away without saying a word.”

Turkey is one of 26 countries that China considers “sensitive,” along with primarily Muslim-majority nations such as Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Kazakhstan according to Human Rights Watch. Under China’s “Strike Hard Campaign,” those who have been to these countries, have families, or otherwise communicate with people there, have been questioned, detained, and even imprisoned.

Guzelnur said her family in Urumqi has not sent her any goods for more than a year. Instead, she has been importing merchandise from Central Asian countries. The shipments from her family had already ceased long before her family was arrested by police.

“We have documentation for everything—from where it was shipped, and even who received the goods,” Guzelnur said.

“We provided those files, and my mother and sisters provided everything to the police. Yet the police still told them, ‘We will investigate you; there are also things going on over there in Turkey.’ What things could be going on here? We have nothing going on here. We can even present clean records from here.”

According to Guzelnur, her mother and sisters were taken to the Nanjiao Police Station in Urumqi.

“One is an orphan girl, one is my mother, and one is my disabled sister... What am I supposed to do now?!” she told RFA, referring to her adopted sister Gulzeper.

RFA confirmed that Guljennet was moved from the police station and is currently being held at the Tianshan District Detention Center.

Ethnic unity law

The arrests came just days after China’s new ethnic unity law went into effect. On July 10, Norway-based Uyghur activist Abduweli Ayup posted on X, “Three Uyghurs detained in Urumqi. The National Security police didn’t tell the reasons, they put them in detention on July 4th. They are the first target we learned after China enacted the ethnic unity promotion law.”

Critics of China’s ethnic unity law warn that the law brings accelerated forced assimilation and cultural erasure of Uyghurs and Tibetans. It also raises fears of Beijing’s increasing transnational repression and its ability to stifle dissident voices overseas.

Guzelnur told RFA that her third sister, Gulmire Kamil, who remained at home after her mother and two sisters were arrested on July 4, was arrested by police a week later.

Gulmire previously served 10 years in prison for her connection with the July 5, 2009 unrest in Urumqi.

Translated by Tahir Izgil. Edited by Charlie Dharapak and Eugene Whong.

The buildings, each roughly 52 meters (171 feet) long, began to appear in satellite imagery between 2023 and early 2025 at small North Korean Army bases south of Kaesong, just a few kilometers north of the Demilitarized Zone, or DMZ, and only 52 kilometers (32 miles) from Seoul, the capital of South Korea.

Their number, design and location suggest they could serve as maintenance and storage facilities for transporter erector launchers, or TELs, or multiple launch rocket systems, or MLRS, two types of weapons systems that can quickly launch guided missiles or rockets against targets across South Korea, experts told RFA.

TELs are used in situations where precisely hitting one target is the goal, whereas MLRS is used to attack many targets over a broad area.

(KCNA via KNS/AFP)

The experts noted that neither weapons system has been spotted in imagery but said that the weapons systems infrastructure was the likeliest explanation.

“I see no reason for civilian activity at this level of construction in this location,” Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., a senior fellow for imagery analysis at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, told RFA.

Rockets or missiles?

The buildings seem more likely to be for MLRS rather than TEL, Bermudez said. Each building is connected to dedicated access roads designed for military vehicles, but the turning radius appears suitable for smaller vehicles rather than a large TEL.

“Multiple rocket launches seem reasonable,” he said. “Multiple rocket launchers grouped in batteries of four would fit, with the ability to have another vehicle — a support vehicle — in there.”

Each structure features a central drive-through hall with vehicles able to enter one end and exit the other, and a raised midsection roof tall enough to let a launcher elevate its missile or rocket modules for maintenance, Jacob Bogle, a U.S.-based private satellite imagery analyst, told RFA.

“North Korea has been quietly increasing its MLRS infrastructure before making any public announcements,” Bogle said. “These structures are only part of improvements to the DMZ area, but they are among the most potent.”

(RFA)

Another factor that indicates that the buildings are for TEL or MLRS is that they are so close to the border, Bruce Bennett, a senior national security analyst, told RFA.

He noted that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un unveiled 50 new TELs last February capable of carrying 600-millimeter missiles, most likely KN-25s.

“Those missiles are just over 8 meters long, so the launchers are likely about 10 meters,” Bennett said. “A battery of three or four such launchers could fit inside one of the 52-meter buildings, one after the other.”

The 50 new TELs could potentially fill 13 to 17 of the newly built structures — leaving extra room for the other 600-millimeter systems and shorter-range launchers Kim has separately showcased.

Force buildup

North Korea has a long track record of sheltering its missile forces in drive-through facilities, experts said.

“It even built such facilities for its Scud missiles, but more recently it has been building such facilities even for its longer-range missiles,” Bennett said.

(RFA)

Similar drive through structures are present at the nearby Kal-gol missile operating base, according to the ‘Beyond Parallel’ project by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies.

The Kal-gol missile base is one of the most developed of North Korea’s approximately 15-20 undeclared ballistic missile facilities — with a specialized drive-through building with an arched clerestory allows for the elevation of a Hwasong-5/6 missile on a TEL or MEL, or missile erector launcher, for training and maintenance, the report said.

To tout his missile capabilities, Kim Jong Un has held three ceremonies since 2022 — most recently this year — unveiling more than 330 newly produced TELs for KN-25 and short-range Hwasong-11D missiles, the latter with a range of just over 100 kilometers (62 miles).

“These TELs will mainly be deployed close to the DMZ at a variety of bases because of the short-range of their missiles and this is almost certainly only the beginning of Kim’s deployment of new missiles near the DMZ,” Bennett said.

“North Korea is mechanizing its forward forces, so that they could move rapidly forward. It is also a reasonable probability,” Bermudez said.

Forward deployment

The construction of the drive through buildings also follows Kim Jong Un’s recent push to strengthen frontline firepower. These have included: a February ceremony presenting 600-millimeter multiple rocket launchers, a May order from Kim to reinforce southern border defense, and live-fire tests in June of an upgraded 240-millimeter multiple rocket launcher equipped with autonomous precision guidance and an extended range of up to 90 kilometers (56 miles).

Experts say the timing of the new drive through buildings is difficult to view as coincidental.

North Korea is “reinforcing its forward-deployed troops,” Bermudez said. “You just don’t build this many structures of the same type unless you’re forward deploying additional assets.”

(RFA)

Bogle said the pattern fits a long-standing North Korean survival strategy built on redundancy.

“Every new building, every new base, and every underground facility requires the ROK and U.S. to invest even more in building up supplies, and requires more of a burden for intelligence agencies to know what weapons are where at any given time,” he said.

Edited by Eugene Whong.

The sanctions on the Philippines’ Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. came last month, when China’s Foreign Ministry accused him of repeatedly making “irresponsible remarks” about China, damaging Chinese interests and undermining bilateral relations, all for comments critical of China’s claims in the sea and aggressive activity there.

(Mark Cristino/AFP)

The impact of the sanctions – which forbid Teodoro and his family from entering China and prevent any individuals or organizations from doing business with them – appears limited. Teodoro has indicated he has no intention of traveling to China, raising questions about what Beijing hopes to achieve.

But the analysts say that Beijing’s campaign against Teodoro attempts to use the memory of World War II to cast Japan as an aggressor in the Pacific in the modern day – in order to distract from the illegality of Beijing’s claims over the entirety of the South China Sea.

“A purely South China Sea argument is difficult terrain for China,” Aniello Iannone, a lecturer in Indonesian and Southeast Asian politics at Diponegoro University in Indonesia, told RFA.

Iannone explained that Manila’s claim to its own exclusive economic zone has legal bases under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS, a 2016 decision at the Permanent Court of Arbitration that said China’s claim to the whole sea was invalid, and several other legal mechanisms.

“Bringing Japan into the picture changes the terms of the dispute,” he said. “It shifts attention away from Chinese conduct at sea and towards a broader political question: what kind of security order are Manila, Tokyo and Washington building in the region?”

The case against Teodoro

Zhang Junshe of the People’s Liberation Army Naval Military Academic Research Institute offered an unusually detailed case against Teodoro in comments to nationalist-leaning Chinese news and commentary site Guancha.

Zhang accused Teodoro not only of “manipulating” and “internationalizing” the South China Sea dispute, but of hyping the “China threat” while “whitewashing Japan’s new militarism,” referring to recent policy shifts in Tokyo that have led to increases in military spending, more active roles in cooperating with allies to counter regional threats, and significant debates over potential changes to pacifist clauses in Japan’s constitution.

Zhang juxtaposed these shifts against Japan’s occupation of the Philippines during World War II, going as far as describing Teodoro’s position as “recognizing a thief as one’s father.”

(Ted Aljibe/AFP)

The Philippines endured a brutal Japanese occupation between 1942 and 1945, a history Beijing regularly invokes in its criticism of Tokyo’s expanding security role.

Zhang said Japan was using the Philippines as a “springboard” and “stepping stone” to loosen the constraints of the constitution, expand overseas military deployments and increase its regional military influence.

History as a weapon

Iannone said China’s use of Japan’s history in the Teodoro case should be understood as political rather than simply commemorative.

“Beijing is not just asking Filipinos to remember the Japanese occupation,” he said. “It is using that history to question the legitimacy of Japan’s return as a security actor in Southeast Asia.”

Iannone said that China is alarmed by the Philippines’ willingness to work closely with Japan on security matters.

“The underlying suggestion is that Japan’s military normalization is not historically neutral, and that Manila is helping rehabilitate a former aggressor by deepening security cooperation with Tokyo.”

As part of their closer cooperation, Manila and Tokyo are not only agreeing to cooperate in strategic areas of the South China Sea, they are moving towards talks on the boundaries of their respective EEZs in waters where Taiwan has overlapping claims, Iannone said.

(AFP)

China considers Taiwan as a rogue province, but an integral part of its own territory, so negotiations on boundaries between Japan and the Philippines in these waters without Chinese input would be seen as an affront to the legitimacy of Taiwan’s – and therefore China’s – claims.

“From Beijing’s perspective, these are not isolated developments,” Iannone said. “They can be read as parts of a strategic network linking the Philippines, Japan and the United States along China’s maritime periphery.”

That creates a complication for Manila, which has sought to defend its South China Sea claims through international law while maintaining its one-China policy and avoiding open involvement in a cross-strait confrontation.

“China has an interest in weakening that distinction,” Iannone said.

“Once Philippine cooperation with Japan is portrayed as part of a Taiwan-related security architecture, even ordinary maritime cooperation can be recast as participation in a wider containment strategy.”

A symbolic target

The Philippine government has strongly backed Teodoro in light of the sanctions on him – the Department of Foreign Affairs called the sanctions an “unfriendly act” that would further complicate bilateral relations, while the Philippine military described them as political intimidation and said Teodoro’s statements were grounded in international law.

Teodoro said he would continue carrying out his duties and defending the Philippines against what he called China’s “wickedness,” including at sea.

China has not specified which of Teodoro’s comments it considered irresponsible, Enrico Cau, a Taipei-based independent security researcher, told RFA. Teodoro’s position, however, has received “strong backing by the Philippines’ political and security establishment.”

The support suggests “at least a substantial share of the country’s political and security stakeholders, as well as a vast share of the population likely support such a position,” he said.

(Mark Cristino/AFP)

Iannone described the sanctions as “performative coercion” whose direct impact was limited but which sought to shape wider regional calculations.

“Teodoro is the immediate target, but the message is aimed at several audiences,” he said. “For Teodoro and the Philippine political class, the message is that China is prepared to personalize diplomatic conflict and impose costs on officials who speak bluntly about Chinese coercion or advocate closer security cooperation with Japan and the United States.”

Punishing Teodoro is therefore not the objective, Iannone said.

“The aim may not be to make Teodoro change his position,” he said. “It may be to make others think twice before adopting the same tone.”

Cau noted that China overusing sanctions to try to silence its critics – especially in ways that have limited effect – carries a risk of undermining the threat of future sanctions.

Iannone, meanwhile, said that the sanctions on Teodoro may in fact have the opposite of their intended effect.

“In the Philippines, where distrust of China is already substantial, the sanction can reinforce his image as someone prepared to defend Philippine sovereignty,” he said.

Edited by Eugene Whong.

MANILA, Philippines – As the Philippines marks the 10^th anniversary of an arbitration ruling it won against China in the disputed South China Sea this weekend, analysts told Radio Free Asia that Manila should counter Beijing’s continued aggression in the disputed area through diplomatic means, while Philippine military officials called for deterrence with the help of allies.

The 2016 ruling at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague established that China’s Nine Dash Line – which encircles the South China Sea to claim it as Chinese territory – has no basis in international law.

Manila celebrates the anniversary of the ruling on July 12 each year, calling it “West Philippine Sea Victory Day,” after what it calls the region of the sea that lies within its exclusive economic zone, or EEZ.

“The Department of National Defense joins the Filipino community in celebrating the 10th Anniversary of the 2016 Arbitral Award, a landmark ruling that affirmed the Philippines’ rights and entitlements in its Exclusive Economic Zone,” Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro said in a statement Saturday.

(AFP)

China continues to reject the outcome of the ruling, and has spent the last 10 years stepping up its island-building activities in the mineral-rich sea region. It actively controls areas within the Philippines’ EEZ including Scarborough Shoal.

But it has no answer to the ruling, Rafaela David, co-convenor of the civilian-led Atin Ito Coalition, a group that advocates for Philippine sovereignty, told RFA.

“Missiles cannot substitute for legal arguments, and military intimidation cannot rewrite international law,” she said, alluding to China’s test of a submarine-launched ballistic missile earlier this week. “No act of coercion can erase this historic victory. We will continue to stand firm, defend the West Philippine Sea, and safeguard the rights and future of generations of Filipinos.”

Though the ongoing dispute has seen heated moments – such as China firing water cannons and pointing potentially blinding laser guns at Filipino forces – the Philippines should continue to employ peaceful methods to sway public opinion to its cause, Francis Rico Domingo, a political analyst at the state-run University of the Philippines, told RFA.

“The Philippines needs to continue pushing back against China using diplomatic means,” he said. “This involves filing diplomatic protests as often as possible and exposing China’s illegal activities to the public and the United Nations.”

Expanded deterrence

The court’s ruling in 2016 cements the Philippines’ legal foundation in the perennially disputed sea, Military chief General Romeo Brawner Jr. said Friday at a forum that gathered security experts in Manila, but he argued that more collaboration with “like-minded forces” led by the U.S. in deterrence efforts.

To that end, he called for improvement in Manila’s deterrence capabilities. He said that while advanced military equipment is needed there must be “national resolve to stand firm in defense of what is rightfully” Philippine territory.

(Ted Aljibe/AFP)

“Our objective has never been to provoke conflict,” he told the forum. “Our objective is to prevent conflict by making it clear that the Philippines has both the resolve and the capability to protect its sovereign rights in accordance with international law.”

Brawner said the security environment in the disputed area continues to evolve.

“We continue to face illegal, coercive, aggressive and deceptive tactics,” Brawner said, adding that these activities “seek to alter the status quo while remaining below the threshold of armed conflict.”

(Southern Theater Command)

Brawner said that the Philippine military’s “assertive transparency” strategy – thoroughly documenting Chinese aggressive actions and provocations and revealing them to the world – must continue.

“Through our policy of assertive transparency, we document unlawful incidents, verify the facts and make them known to the Filipino people and to the international community,” he said. “We do this not to escalate tensions. We do it because truth matters. Transparency strengthens accountability. It reinforces the rules based on international order and it denies those who employ coercive actions the ability to shape the narrative through deception.”

Shift in Focus

Though the military may be equipped for deterrence in the disputed sea, the public might not be used to it in this role, Domingo said.

Two years ago the Philippine military shifted from its role as an internal force meant to quell insurgencies and keep the peace domestically to the Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept, or CADC, focused on defense from external threats and protecting territorial sovereignty.

The concept “has been frequently mentioned, but the public is not aware of what the strategy is and how it really works,” Domingo said. Because China rejects the arbitration ruling, Manila must “permanently engage other countries to strengthen its capacity to defend itself from external aggression.”

But Domingo said that the Philippines also needed to engage Beijing diplomatically, and had to publicly acknowledge that every tension must be deescalated.

For the CADC to be effective, the Philippines must review outdated military and defense concepts “to add the importance of protecting our sovereign rights, territorial integrity and sovereignty,” Teodoro said at the forum on Friday.

(National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea via AFP)

Teodoro said adjustments in the posture are under review because currently the Philippines’ is still focused on “land-based, post-invasion defense” that was still a product of post-World War II strategy.

He called for a bump on the country’s defense budget, and noted that even Indonesia, which has a separate territorial dispute with China, looks to increase its defense spending to acquire new hardware.

“I would like to see a visible economic dividend from the West Philippine Sea that we all worked for, if unilaterally or in convergence with those who have truly helped us,” he said.

Popular support

In Teodoro’s Saturday statement, he noted that 86% of Filipinos were in support of Manila working with other countries to defend its territorial sovereignty.

“We will seek not only to increase public knowledge of the West Philippine Sea, but also to ensure that this knowledge strengthens our national resolve and resilience,” he said, vowing to “resist and combat” any attempts to deny the country its rights in its EEZ, “For these are not only ours to protect, but also those of future generations of Filipinos.”

The 10th anniversary of the landmark 2016 court ruling comes weeks after scholars affiliated with the Chinese government said at an academic symposium that the Philippines does not have legal sovereignty over the Batanes, a group of islands that lie north of the Philippines’ largest island of Luzon which have been administered continuously by the Philippines or its predecessor states since the 18th century.

The academics argued that the Batanes are “a natural geographical extension of Taiwan,” which China considers a renegade province.

Edited by Eugene Whong.

Update adds comments from Rafaela David.

The Ocean of Peace Alliance, signed Monday in Suva by prime ministers Sitiveni Rabuka of Fiji and Anthony Albanese of Australia, requires that in the event of an attack on either country, both would “act to meet the common danger.”

Though the exact wording of the treaty does not absolutely require both sides to mobilize their military forces in such a situation, it still ties the security of the two countries together more closely than their previous agreements, the experts said.

The treaty “marks the continued march of Australia’s diplomacy,” Alan Tidwell, director of the center for Australian, New Zealand and Pacific Studies at Georgetown University in Washington, DC, told RFA.

“Internationally, the treaty signals to competitors that Australia is leading an effort to align parties in a Westerly tilt,” he said.

Tidwell noted that the alliance is the latest in a series of agreements with several Pacific Island countries including Tuvalu, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, and Vanuatu.

“Australia has firmly established itself as the standard bearer of Western engagement with Pacific Island democracies in the South Pacific.”

The Ocean of Peace Alliance is Fiji’s first, and Australia’s fourth – Canberra signed a bilateral defense treaty with Papua New Guinea in 2025, and with the United States and New Zealand in 1951.

Hours after Rabuka and Albanese signed the treaty, China’s foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning told reporters during a press conference that Beijing hopes that “the country concerned” would respect the Pacific island countries’ independence.

“China always upholds the principles of mutual respect, equality, mutual benefit, openness and inclusiveness in carrying out cooperation with Pacific island nations,” she said. “We do not engage in geopolitical rivalry or seek selfish political gains.”

Pacific NATO?

On Thursday, Newsweek published a report that suggested that opening up the alliance for others to join could lead to a South Pacific version of NATO to counter China.

(Hollie Adams/Reuters)

With Australia in an alliance with the United States, and Washington in its own alliances, in theory the mutual defense clause could be triggered by events far away from either Fiji or Australia. But several experts told RFA that that the prospect was unlikely.

(Hollie Adams/Reuters)

“I would not say that this treaty is the start of a major defense bloc like NATO,” Kathryn Paik, deputy director and senior fellow with the Australia Chair at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, or CSIS, told RFA. “However, the flexibility built into this agreement to allow additional partners points to Australia’s creativity in crafting fit-for-purpose agreements and treaties throughout the region to continue to build out the regional security architecture.”

She said that it allows Pacific Island countries more power in decisions regarding their own defense.

“If others join – especially other Pacific Island nations – it will demonstrate an increasing prioritization of Pacific-led security agreements and the need for collective defense in the face of potential external threats,” Paik said.

Though the language of the treaty sounds similar to NATO’s Article 5, the Ocean of Peace Alliance, even if joined by other countries, would be fundamentally different, Gregory Brown, director of the Alliance Futures Initiative, a Washington-based think tank, told RFA.

“Just like NATO, you are required under the alliance and under the treaty to consult your constitutional processes in the event of an attack on either one,” he said. “Australia doesn’t have to defend Fiji as if it’s Australia and Fiji doesn’t have to defend Australia as if it’s Fiji. They’re required to take it back to their constituent processes to respond in some fashion.”

Ocean of Peace

The name of the Ocean of Peace Alliance gets its name from Rabuka’s central foreign policy platform, which advocates for the Pacific countries to address challenges like climate change, geopolitics and strategic competition through consensus and cooperation, while rejecting coercion and militarism. Rabuka also hoped to apply the principles of Fiji taking a “friends to all and enemies to none” approach to navigating regional competition between China and the United States.

(Ben Strang/AFP)

In 2025, leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum adopted the “Blue Pacific Ocean of Peace Declaration,” based on Rabuka’s vision.

But Brown said the Ocean of Peace Alliance is somewhat of a departure from Rabuka’s earlier messaging.

“I think maybe Rabuka has been reading Aristotle who, a couple thousand years ago, told us that ‘friends to all’ means ‘friends to none,’” he said. “In fact what Rabuka has decided is that ‘I’m going to sign a mutual defense treaty,’ which by definition is a departure from just friends to all.”

“He’s identified a threat to Fiji and he’s decided to align his security with one set of partners against that threat,” said Brown. “For me, that’s not a betrayal of Fijian sovereignty. It’s an exercise in strategic autonomy.”

In addition to signing into the Ocean of Peace Alliance, Australia and Fiji also signed into effect the Vuvale Union, another treaty-level agreement that integrates the two countries economically.

Hours after the agreements were signed, China fired an intercontinental-range ballistic missile into the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, in what experts told RFA was a message to U.S. allies, but which Beijing said was a routine test.

New Zealand’s Prime Minister Christopher Luxon said in a statement Thursday that Wellington would discuss with Suva and Canberra about the prospect of joining the alliance.

Edited by Charlie Dharapak.

Since former general Min Aung Hlaing was sworn in as Myanmar’s new president in April, the removal of statues of Aung San in public areas have increased in Magway, Bago, Yangon, Ayeyarwady, Sagaing, and Mandalay regions, according to an RFA tally.

(Reuters)

In June, authorities demolished a bronze Aung San statue in Zee Kone, Bago Region. On July 1, officials demolished one statue in Mya Kan Thar Park in Thaketa Township and two statues in Thumingalar Park in South Okkalapa Township, Yangon, fencing them off. Residents tell RFA government authorities are monitoring the sites so that no one can take photos.

The military-backed government took issue with media reports including one published Thursday by RFA Burmese that documented the disappearance of the statues.

“Some media outlets are currently reporting the removal of General Aung San statues in certain areas. In reality, not all statues of General Aung San are being removed; rather, only statues with incorrect proportions and shapes are being reviewed and handled in accordance with the law,” said government spokesperson Khaing Khaing Soe in a statement published on Friday.

For months, the military-backed government hadn’t commented on why the statues were being removed.

Statues of Gen. Aung San were erected around the country between 2015 and 2020 during the government led by Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy, or NLD. In a July 8 statement the NLD said that it had participated in the construction of the statues in accordance with the will of the people and with the contributions of individual citizens in accordance with the law.

They are destroying his statues “because Gen. Aung San left his daughter Aung San Suu Kyi for the Burmese people,” said Bo Bo Oo, a vice chairman of the NLD. “The dictator... is attacking the statues as well as oppressing the citizens,” he said, referring to Min Aung Hlaing.

“Nevertheless, Aung San will always be in the hearts of the people.”

(Soe Zeya Tun/Reuters)

A politician from Tharyarwady, who did not want to be named for security reasons, criticized the wiping of Gen. Aung San’s image from public display, including de-circulating banknotes with his image, as an act of successive military dictatorships.

“Gen. Aung San was erased from the public eye for several years, resulting in the boom and rebirth of his role in history in recent administrations, starting from the Thein Sein government to the time of ‘our mother’ Aung San Suu Kyi, from vinyl pictures to papers. And finally during the rule of Aung San Suu Kyi, there have been many statues of the general. There have been many in every neighborhood and city.”

He said that so many statues of Aung San felt like a “punch to the gut” for many of the previous military leaders.

Government officials announced that a special exhibition will be held at the General Aung San Residence Museum in Natmauk, Magway region, for the Martyrs’ Day celebration on July 19, and that the public is welcome to visit.

“Gen. Aung San is a very important figure in the history of Myanmar’s independence struggle,” government spokesperson Khaing Khaing Soe said in a statement.

“Therefore, in order to ensure that the statues of the general are kept in accordance with their dignity, and that future generations can study and preserve the historical value and tradition correctly, they are being reviewed in accordance with The Protection and Preservation of Ancient Monuments Law 1962.”

Translated by Kyaw Min Htun. Edited by Charlie Dharapak and Eugene Whong.

China’s state-run Xinhua news agency reported Monday that a Chinese navy submarine launched a missile carrying a dummy warhead toward international waters in the Pacific at 12:01 p.m. local time, describing it as a “routine arrangement” in annual military training and not directed at any specific country or target.

Analysts said the timing and trajectory suggested Beijing was using the test to send a broad political and military message across the Asia-Pacific.

“China’s latest ICBM test serves several purposes,” William Yang, a Northeast Asia analyst at the Belgium-based International Crisis Group, told RFA. “It demonstrates the progress in China’s advanced missile capabilities, sends a signal to regional countries, including Australia and other Pacific states, about Beijing’s ability to respond resolutely to what it views as a challenge to its interests, and allows the People’s Liberation Army to maintain regular military drills across the Asia Pacific region.”

(Reuters)

Though Yang referred to it as an ICBM, or intercontinental ballistic missile, Xinhua did not specifically use those words. The U.S. State Department called it an “intercontinental-range ballistic missile,” in a statement where it criticized the launch at a time when “the United States is working harder than ever to prevent nuclear proliferation,” and “China is doing the opposite.”

The launch also drew criticism from Japan, Australia, New Zealand and Taiwan, with several governments saying they had received only short notice.

The test touched a nerve across the region because it came against the backdrop of intensifying strategic competition in the Pacific, where China, the United States and its allies have been vying for influence over sea lanes, security ties with Pacific Island countries, and military access to the region.

For China, the Pacific islands have become an increasingly important diplomatic and strategic arena as Beijing seeks to expand its presence beyond East Asia. For Australia, New Zealand and the United States, the region has become a frontline in efforts to prevent China from translating economic influence into a deeper security foothold.

Australia-Fiji treaty

The missile landed in the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone only hours after Australia and Fiji signed a mutual defense treaty.

Yang said the timing was “also a political signal to Canberra and other U.S. allies that China will not be deterred by their efforts to undercut China’s interests in deepening its influence in the Pacific region.”

The defense pact, known as the Ocean of Peace, commits Australia and Fiji to assist each other if attacked. It was signed as Canberra has sought to rebuild security ties and trust in the Pacific after years of concern among island governments over climate change, development needs and outside interference.

(Leon Lord/AFP)

China has meanwhile deepened engagement with several Pacific island states through policing, aid and infrastructure agreements, raising alarm in Washington and allied capitals over the possibility of a more permanent Chinese security role in the region.

The launch occurred during “a crowded window of allied activity” that included not only the treaty signing – but also on the heels of RIMPAC, Valiant Shield, and Resolute Dragon – U.S.-led bilateral or multilateral military exercises focusing on the broader Pacific region, Aadil Brar, a Taipei-based independent analyst and former visiting scholar at National Chengchi University, told RFA.

Message sent

Though the Chinese navy said that the launch was directed at no particular country or target, Brar said the distance and direction was deliberate.

“That trajectory alone shows the real aim was less about any single target and more about proving China can range deep into the Central Pacific, threading through waters used by the Philippines, Guam-based U.S. forces, and Pacific island states, all at once,” he said.

The route described by Brar, from the Chinese coast across the Philippine Sea and south of Guam before landing near the Marshall Islands and Nauru, would have taken the missile through a corridor that matters strategically to both Washington and Beijing. It passes through waters used by U.S. forces based in Guam, near routes that could be critical for moving reinforcements in a regional conflict, including one involving Taiwan.

Brar said Taiwan was not directly overflown this time, but the test still carried implications for the island because it demonstrated China’s ability “to hold reinforcement routes at risk well beyond the first island chain,” the arc of islands running from Japan through Taiwan and the Philippines to Borneo, forming a key maritime boundary around China’s near seas.

(AFP)

Such abilities would complicate any U.S. intervention in a hypothetical Taiwan Strait crisis, he said.

Taiwan, which China claims as its own territory, has long warned that Beijing is stepping up military pressure on the democratically governed island through war games, air and naval patrols, and missile development. Chinese officials have not ruled out the use of force to bring Taiwan under Beijing’s control.

Still, Yang said he did not think the launch was directly related to Taiwan in this case, arguing that Beijing’s “target audience is the wider region rather than the Taiwanese government,” given its timing alongside the Australia-Fiji agreement and the missile’s launch and impact areas.

The test launch might not have been the best strategy for China, Gregory Brown, director of the Alliance Futures Initiative, a Washington-based think tank, told RFA.

“I don’t know that the intention from the Chinese is actually to threaten the Pacific Islands or Australia. It certainly got everybody’s attention,” said Brown. “It’s probably an own goal for China to have done this now, because now there’s reason to say this is the sort of thing and sort of behavior why Fiji would want to sign a treaty with Australia or maybe get closer to the United States.”

China last publicly conducted an intercontinental ballistic missile test in 2024, in a launch that underscored the country’s growing strategic capabilities and prompted renewed scrutiny of the pace and opacity of its nuclear modernization.

Editing and additional reporting by Eugene Whong.

A Tibetan activist died Thursday after setting himself on fire outside the United Nations headquarters in New York.

Lobsang Palden, popularly known as Lobga Rangzen, a longtime Tibetan activist based in New York, died at Bellevue Hospital after succumbing to his injuries, Jamphel Choesang, president of the Regional Tibetan Youth Congress of New York and New Jersey, told Radio Free Asia.

The self-immolation comes one day after China’s new ethnic unity law went into effect, with critics warning that the law brings accelerated forced assimilation and cultural erasure of Tibetans and Uyghurs. It also brings fears of Beijing’s increasing transnational repression and its ability to stifle dissident voices overseas.

“The unfolding genocide inside Tibet and the enforcement of the draconian ‘Ethnic Unity and Progress Law’ on July 1 are what drove Lobga Rangzen to this tragic decision,” Penpa Tsering, head of the Central Tibetan Administration said in a released statement on Friday.

(Lobga Rangzen via Facebook)

Rangzen was a well-known Tibetan activist who participated in demonstrations and campaigns calling for Tibetan freedom and raising awareness of human rights issues under Chinese rule.

Before the incident, Rangzen posted a Facebook video where he spoke about the situation in Tibet and the importance of efforts to preserve Tibetan language and culture. He also criticized Chinese government policies in Tibet, which he described as an “erasure” of Tibetan identity, and urged Tibetans in exile to increase their efforts in their struggle.

Content warning: Below is language that readers may find disturbing.

In a subsequent Facebook livestream post, Rangzen propped the camera on the sidewalk and walked a few steps to a traffic median across from the U.N. building and placed a large Tibetan flag on a traffic post. Moments later, he set himself on fire. In the video, cars were seen driving past on First Avenue, honking their horns. Rangzen fell to the ground. Two men in security uniforms reached him a minute and 10 seconds later with fire extinguishers.

(Lobga Rangzen via Facebook)

Tibetans have previously committed acts of self-immolation to protest against Beijing’s policies in Tibet and regions with large Tibetan populations in exile.

Penpa Tsering said that from 2009 to around 2022, roughly 157 Tibetans have self-immolated inside Tibet, referring to this act as “offering of the body” for the Tibetan cause.

Thupten Choenyi, a friend of Lobga Rangzen, told Radio Free Asia: “About 15 minutes before he set himself on fire, I had a video call with him on WhatsApp. It was around 5:30 P.M. Unlike our previous conversations, he spoke very quietly and sounded deeply disappointed. He told me, ‘I think China will never listen to us.’”

“He was smoking during the call, and I told him not to smoke. He replied that he doesn’t drink, but he does smoke. He was also sipping from a Coke bottle, and his T-shirt was wet. I asked him where he was, and he said he was in front of the United Nations.”

“Then he suddenly asked, ‘Can I take a screenshot of our video call?’ I said yes, and he sent it to me immediately. A short time later, he set himself on fire. He also called a few of his close friends before carrying out the act. I am very sad right now.”

(Tenzin Dhonyoe/RFA Tibetan)

Penpa Tsering, attending the International Tibetan Youth Conference in Dharamsala, India, said that Rangzen had always carried the Tibetan cause and devoted his time to it in New York. He said that wherever it happens, inside or outside Tibet, those who give their lives for the Tibetan cause must be remembered. He announced that the Kashag (cabinet of the Central Tibetan Administration) had met that morning to organize a day of memorial prayers.

Sonam Tso, who was among more than 100 participants at the conference, told RFA, “It is heartbreaking to hear of his death, yet I hope it will help more people around the world learn about Tibet and the Tibetan cause.”

(Tenzin Dhonyoe/RFA Tibetan)

Tibetans gathered outside the United Nations headquarters for a candlelight vigil and prayers following Rangzen’s death Thursday evening.

As news of the passing of Rangzen spread, Tibetan communities including groups in Dharamsala, Australia, Taiwan and elsewhere in the United States have begun holding prayer gatherings in his remembrance.

Responding to the immolation at a daily Beijing news conference on Friday, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun said Tibet has been an inalienable part of the country’s territory since ancient times and Beijing believes “relevant countries will handle the matter in accordance with domestic laws.”

Additional reporting by Dickey Kundol, Tenzin Dhonyoe, Tashi Wangchuk, and Kalden Lodoe. Contributions from Reuters. Edited by Charlie Dharapak.

The report, published by the China-based South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative, or SCSPI, found that U.S. military activity in the South China Sea remained extensive in 2025, despite signs of operational strain due to Washington’s increased activity in the Middle East.

Although the SCSPI is not government-led, it is widely viewed by analysts as broadly reflecting Beijing’s strategic outlook, and the report indicated increased Japanese and Philippine deployment to the South China Sea.

“China increasingly views Japan and the Philippines’ efforts to deepen defense cooperation … as attempts by both countries to challenge China’s core interests and cross a red line,” William Yang, a Northeast Asia analyst at the Belgium-based International Crisis Group, told RFA.

Japan participated in 71 U.S.-led exercises in and around the South China Sea last year – the highest number among U.S. partners – followed by the Philippines with 32, and Yang said the focus on Tokyo and Manila shows that Beijing considers Washington’s allies more formidable than in the past.

(Jiji Press/AFP)

“They see both countries’ assertive approach toward maritime disputes with China as a threat to its maritime interests and sovereignty claims and believe it is necessary to start increasing pressure on both countries,” Yang said.

He added that Chinese officials have been “increasingly criticizing Japan and the Philippines for provoking regional instability by engaging on the Taiwan issue” and “have taken steps to increase economic and grey zone coercion against both countries in recent months.”

Washington distracted?

Despite the increased attention to Washington’s allies in the report, Beijing’s largest concern is still U.S. activities in the sea, Yang said.

“However, in light of the U.S.-China detente under Trump and Washington’s continuous entanglement in the Middle East, Beijing thinks it needs to seize this window of opportunity to increase pressure on particular U.S. allies in the region amid Washington’s distraction,” he said.

The SCSPI report concluded that indeed growth in some U.S. strategic platforms had slowed – It recorded nine U.S. carrier strike group deployments into the South China Sea in 2025, up slightly from eight the previous year, but said the overall intensity of carrier operations had declined because of extended deployments in the Middle East, maintenance demands, and operational accidents involving several carriers.

(Ted Aljibe/AFP)

Analysts say the more significant issue for China is not the number of U.S. carriers entering the South China Sea, but how allied networks are making American military presence more persistent.

“The report focuses on Japan and the Philippines because they are two of the most important allied pressure points on China’s maritime perimeter, but they create different military problems for Beijing,” Sylwia M. Gorska, a Ph.D candidate in international relations at the University of Lancashire in the United Kingdom, told RFA.

Multilateral containment?

She said that the Philippines represents China’s “forward-access problem, pointing to its proximity to the disputed Scarborough Shoal and Spratly Islands, the Luzon Strait, the Bashi Channel and Taiwan’s southern approaches.

“From Beijing’s perspective, the Philippines is no longer only a South China Sea claimant,” she said, “It is becoming a practical access and surveillance platform.”

She said Manila’s increased surveillance capabilities would be useful for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance flights, or ISR; maritime-domain awareness; joint patrols, logistics; missile-capable deployments; and crisis response along the southern First Island Chain, the arc of islands running from Japan through Taiwan and the Philippines to Borneo, forming a key maritime boundary around China’s near seas.

(AFP)

Japan, meanwhile, presents “the depth-and-integration problem,” she said.

“It does not need to be a South China Sea claimant to affect the military balance there,” said Gorska, adding that Tokyo’s surveillance capabilities, anti-submarine warfare, logistics, missile defense and interoperability with U.S. forces link the South China Sea with Taiwan, the East China Sea and the wider western Pacific.

But Gorska cautioned against interpreting the report as evidence that Beijing now sees Japan and the Philippines as greater threats than the United States, saying it “should not be read as a move from a U.S.-centric threat perception to an ally-centric one.”

American “backbone”

Any resistance to China’s projections of power in the region would still be led by Washington, Gorska said, adding that the U.S. would provide “the operational backbone of any serious regional contingency: command-and-control, ISR, undersea warfare, long-range strike, strategic mobility and extended deterrence.”

Gorska said that China’s sharper focus reflects concerns that allied cooperation is turning periodic U.S. deployments into a more enduring military posture.

“The issue is not a shift from ‘U.S. threat’ to ‘ally threat’. It is China’s sharper focus on how allied geography and interoperability compress the time available to localize a crisis before U.S.-aligned forces can sense, reinforce and act.”

Yang said that Beijing’s long-term strategic assessment remains largely unchanged.

“I don’t think there is a major strategic shift in Beijing,” he said.

“Their threat assessment remains largely the same, which is to prevent U.S. containment of China’s capability to project its power across the region and into the Pacific.”

But the report indicates that Beijing cannot ignore Washington’s allies and the opportunities presented by U.S. military activity in the Middle East.

China “does see the need and an opening to sharpen its approach and increase pressure on Japan and the Philippines at a time when U.S. attention and resource allocation to Asia is undermined and distorted.”

Edited by Eugene Whong.

In early April, the cyclone appeared over the Solomon Sea, between PNG and the Solomon Islands. It rapidly increased in intensity and severely damaged roads and homes, and submerged crops. PNG authorities reported 25 fatalities due to landslides and flooding.

Though authorities have been trying to assist affected residents, they have not yet been able to reach everyone. Marina Kaisa Eroro, who lives with her family in Samarai Island off the southeastern tip of the New Guinean mainland, told RFA.

(Marina Kaisa Eroro/RFA)

The cyclone blew down her breadfruit, betel nut, and fruit trees, she said.

“The trees fell on our water tank and damaged our source of drinking water,” said Eroro. “No assistance at all came from the authorities.”

Eroro said that councillors from the ward, the lowest division of the local government, had visited to determine the extent of damage.

The island is under the jurisdiction of the Bwanabwana Rural local-level government, or LLG, in the Samarai-Murua district of Milne Bay Province.

The province is headquartered on the mainland, though many of its administrative bodies are located on Samarai, which was the provincial capital until 1968.

(Marina Kaisa Eroro/RFA)

“No national or provincial government official visited our area to assess the damage,” said Eroro.

Even in cases where residents do get assistance, it is minimal, Cora Diala, who lives in the village of Waraka in Weraura LLG, in the Rabraba district of Alotau, on the mainland part of Milne Bay province, told RFA.

(Fay Duega/RFA)

“Last month was the first time we saw relief supplies from the government,” she said, adding that the extent of the relief was a 1 kilogram packet of rice for most people. “Widows like me got two packets of rice. Nothing else.”

Relief aid

After the storm had dissipated, foreign governments began offering money to the PNG government as aid.

On May 14, the Chinese Embassy in Port Moresby handed over US$1 million to the PNG government in a public handover ceremony, during which Chargé d’affaires Pang Hanzhao, after giving the oversized check to several senior officials, including Prime Minister James Marape, expressed condolences to the affected people, saying “a friend in need is a friend indeed.”

Marape expressed his gratitude, saying the assistance came at a critical time, when the government was continuing to “support communities affected by Cyclone Maila, and is gratefully appreciated by the PNG Government and people.”

Other countries also provided assistance, including $1.72 million (2.5 million Australian dollars) from Australia to both PNG and the Solomon Islands.

The U.S., meanwhile, delivered relief supplies through existing disaster preparedness programs.

(AFP)

But the government has not distributed assistance to everyone affected.

It focused only on the areas and communities that needed assistance most, Randal Ganisi, the acting disaster coordinator in Milne Bay province, told RFA.

“Much of the relief supplies was given to Murua Island communities who were severely affected by the tropical cyclone Maila than those only partly affected,” said Ganisi. “However other districts of Milne Bay province were not supported with relief supplies due to the fact that they were not severely affected.”

Though he provided a list of LLGs that the supplies were delivered to, he was not able to provide an outline of how much cash and food supplies were sent to each territory.

RFA contacted the National Coordinator for an update on the distribution but received no response.

Edited by Eugene Whong.

“As recently as about ten years ago, vehicle traffic would stop around midnight, and lights were barely visible,” Park Jongchol, a professor at Gyeongsang National University in South Korea, told RFA.

Park recently visited the Chinese city of Dandong, which lies across the Yalu River border from North Korea’s Sinuiju. The bridge connecting the two cities is the major gateway for overland trade between the two countries, and tourists often visit the Chinese side of the river to catch a glimpse of one of the most isolated societies in the world.

For decades, the two sides of the river sharply contrasted at nighttime. Dandong was awash with neon, and later LED signs, brightly lit streets, and apartment buildings with illuminated windows. But Sinuiju was completely dark, save for illuminated statues or portraits of North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un’s father and grandfather, who were his predecessors.

Power shortages are so rampant in North Korea that in some places, the lights come on for only a few hours each day. Pyongyang was so embarrassed of the contrast with China, that in 2021, it ordered Sinuiju to be supplied with electricity until 10 p.m. to hide the severity of the country’s shortages. After 10 though, the city would virtually disappear to anyone looking across the river from Dandong.

“But now, Sinuiju is very noticeably bright — there are apartment buildings and factories with their lights on from night through morning,” said Park, who was in Dandong in early June, ahead of Chinese President Xi’s visit to North Korea.

(Park Jongchol/RFA)

Park said that during his three-day trip, he visited parts of Dandong that are across the river from rural villages far away from downtown Sinuiju, and even they were illuminated. He also described a noticeable increase in vehicle traffic at the border, with their headlights observable at night.

“Sinuiju has built North Korea’s largest solar power plant, and areas like Wihwa Island are now very bright at night,” he said, referring to a small island in the Yalu, upstream from the bustling downtown area.

Dramatic transformation

Nighttime satellite imagery captured at 1:30 a.m. on June 10 by the Suomi NPP satellite — jointly operated by NASA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration — also detected bright lights in Sinuiju, Bruce Songhak Chung, a senior researcher at the Seoul-based Korea Institute for Security Strategy, told RFA.

“Notably, the Sangdan-ri and Hadan-ri areas of Wihwa Island, which have traditionally been dark at night, were detected bright,” Chung said. “It appears the lights are being used at the Sinuiju Greenhouse Farm Complex to promote plant growth and increase crop yields during nighttime hours.”

(RFA)

Satellite imagery confirms the presence of the large solar and wind energy plant that Park referred to.

Construction of the plant began in 2019. It stretches 1,300 meters (4,300 feet) at present. Alongside the solar plant are small wind turbines. The combined capacity of the plant is 1,000 kilowatts according to North Korean state media. That is enough to power roughly 1,000 to 1,500 homes in the developed world at peak performance.

Solar boom

In the past, North Korean cities along the border relied heavily on hydropower, but aging infrastructure often failed to provide a stable electricity supply. Solar energy appears to be stepping in to solve this problem.

The newly installed solar panels are visible not only in Sinuiju but also in other cities, as well as in rural communities, mining areas and remote mountain villages along the border, Joung Eunlee, the director of the Seoul-based Korea Institute for National Unification, told RFA.

“Having traveled along the China-North Korea border for more than 15 years, I have observed a significant increase in solar panels installed on factories, office buildings, military facilities and customs offices in major border cities,” Joung said. “I have also noticed a growing number of apartment buildings equipped with outdoor air-conditioning units, which are imported from China either legally or illegally.”

(RFA)

Satellite images also confirm a boom in solar installations that accelerated after 2018 and continued through the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly at factories and state-owned enterprises. Similarly, solar panels are appearing on hospitals, government offices, military facilities, cultural venues, hotels and restaurants in Pyongyang and other cities.

Renewable initiative

As North Korea seeks to modernize its economy and raise living standards, access to a more reliable electricity supply is becoming increasingly important.

To that end, the North Korean government promulgated its Renewable Energy Act in 2013 and has since incorporated renewable energy development into its 2016 and 2021 five-year national economic plans.

Several large-scale solar projects are currently under construction or have recently been completed across the country. North Korea’s state-run newspaper, the Rodong Sinmun, has continued highlighting the need to expand the use of renewable energy sources, including wind, tidal and solar power as recently as June 19.

(Park Jongchol/RFA)

Park said the trend towards renewables could point to a broader long-term shift in North Korea’s industrial structure.

Joung said the country is rapidly developing its renewable energy industry, and its close relationship with China is integral to the expansion.

China accounted for roughly 75% of global solar module production and has become the leading supplier of high-performance components and equipment at low cost. Over the past 15 years, the price of solar modules and installation has fallen by about 95%, while efficiency has continued to improve, she added.

But even as North Korea goes solar, the gains are uneven.

“Even though nighttime satellite imagery shows brighter lights in some border cities, including Sinuiju, many parts of North Korea remain in darkness because they still lack access to electricity,” Joung said. “It will also be important to watch whether the gap between regions continues to widen.”

Edited by Eugene Whong.

The four-legged surveillance machines will be able to monitor remote locations in contested waters and maintain a presence around isolated islands, thereby reducing the required manpower to keep an eye on Chinese activities in or near areas claimed by Taiwan, which Beijing considers to be part of its territory.

Lessons learned from recent conflicts have shown that unmanned systems can effectively contribute to defense, Enrico Cau, a Taipei-based independent security researcher, told RFA.

“If we use Ukraine as a comparative context to gauge the relevance of unmanned platforms in a hypothetical Cross-Strait scenario, it appears natural to think that the use of similar platforms in such a scenario will play a key role,” said Cau.

“This is not only because unmanned platforms allow armies to spare human lives but also because their replicability offers the possibility to manufacture and deploy them in shorter time, higher volumes, and at lower cost compared to other platforms,” he said.

Robodog showcase

The three prototype robot dogs on June 2 navigated a test ground during a demonstration by Taiwan’s military-owned National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology.

Built for reconnaissance, surveillance and combat roles, they were equipped with cameras, sensors, and one even carried a mounted weapon.

The robots are intended for potential deployment on Taiwan-controlled islands in the South China Sea, where personnel must maintain a constant watch over vast stretches of sea while operating far from the main island of Taiwan.

“The marines believe that on beaches and the coastline, including for the coast guard in Nansha and Dongsha for patrols and inspection, there is a pressing need,” Jen Kuo-kuang, deputy head of the institute’s missile and rocket systems research division, said at the event, referring to the heavily contested Pratas and Spratly island chains.

But the trend extends well beyond robot dogs.

Taiwan has accelerated development of military drones, drone boats and other autonomous systems in recent years, while China has invested heavily in unmanned surface vessels, underwater drones and surveillance networks. Across the region, unmanned systems are increasingly being viewed as a way to monitor remote maritime areas at lower cost and with fewer personnel.

A matter of scale

These new technologies are only the beginning of drone warfare concepts in the IndoPacific, and it will matter more who can churn them out faster, Jason Wang, a national security researcher and the chief operating officer at ingeniSPACE, a Silicon Valley geo-intelligence analytics firm, told RFA.

“China’s scaling ability is significantly different from Taiwan’s,” said Wang. “They already produce 500-600k per month. Ukraine is 200K per month. Taiwan is only discussing 200k per year.”

He said for Taiwan, it is even more difficult due to geography.

“Everything Taiwan needs to sustain itself must already be on the island.“

(I-Hwa Cheng/AFP)

Also limiting Taiwan’s ability to produce vast numbers of drones are the demographic realities of the island, Harun Talha Ayanoglu, a visiting scholar at Taipei’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research, or INDSR, found in a recent study.

“Taiwan’s ability to sustain credible deterrence will depend not on the size of its reserve force alone, but on how effectively it integrates manpower with scalable and operationally relevant unmanned systems under conditions of demographic constraint,” Ayanoglu wrote.

Taiwan entered the category of a super-aged society in 2026, with more than one-fifth of its population aged 65 or above. The shrinking pool of military-age citizens is raising questions about the long-term sustainability of manpower-intensive defense models and adding urgency to efforts to integrate new technologies into the armed forces.

In response to the potential manpower shortage, Taiwan has reintroduced one-year military conscription and begun incorporating drone training into both conscript and reserve force programmes.

According to Ayanoglu, unmanned systems can help smaller and less continuously trained units operate more effectively by extending surveillance, targeting and situational awareness capabilities.

But Cau argues that technology alone is not the decisive factor.

“If we reframe this question on what could matter in a potential cross-Strait scenario and focusing on the situation from Taipei’s perspective, I believe that the real game changer would be Taipei’s ability to continue to manufacture unmanned platforms also in case of conflict or blockade,” Cau said. “In brief, we can talk of ‘economic sustainability, availability, replicability and deployability at scale’ as key factors in a conflict.”

That challenge is particularly significant because China possesses major advantages in manufacturing scale and supply-chain resilience.

“In that regard, China has an edge as it operates the entire supply chain with very little risk of disruptions,” Cau said. Taiwan, by contrast, remains vulnerable to what he described as the “tyranny of insularity combined with proximity to the mainland”.

The manpower problem

The appeal of unmanned systems is particularly evident in maritime environments, where governments must monitor large areas while maintaining a constant presence around isolated islands and outposts.

China, Taiwan, the Philippines and Vietnam all maintain forces around disputed maritime features in the South China Sea, often requiring costly and manpower-intensive patrol operations.

(Sam Yeh/AFP)

“Active and passive unmanned platforms offer extended monitoring and range capabilities; longer patrol and surveillance times in smaller, more sophisticated packages, without all the logistics and costs associated to manned platforms,” Cau explained.

While China and Taiwan are increasingly investing in autonomous technologies, other regional claimants are developing such capabilities at different speeds.

Cau said that the Philippines cannot compete with China in any aspect of its military, especially where technology is involved, while Vietnam is only starting to develop a homegrown military drone industry with international partners.

As time goes by, technologies will only become more sophisticated.

“The future trends only promise for more of all this,” Cau said, adding that further integration of unmanned systems could evolve beyond monitoring operations, to potentially include offensive capabilities.

Wang said that militaries would likely combine the various unmanned systems and technologies.

“We will see more hybrid platforms, such as robot dogs carrying aerial drones to extend perimeter monitoring,” he said.

Additionally, a drone with mapping technology could tell soldiers what the inside of a building looks like before they enter and engage with the enemy, he said.

“What frightens me is an Operation Spiderweb style attack,” he said, referring to the Ukrainian covert drone strike against Russian air bases in June last year.

“Taiwan’s ports are near many airports/airbases,” he said. “Critical infrastructure will need … to survive an onslaught of not hundreds but thousands at a time. Quantity has a quality all its own.”

Edited by Eugene Whong.

Days earlier, Chinese state media had published extensive coverage of a scientific expedition around the shoal, highlighting coral reef surveys, ecological protection efforts and marine research.

While the findings are framed as scientific and environmental news, they are intended to reinforce Beijing’s claims of sovereignty over the entirety of the sea, Joseph Kristanto, a research analyst at Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, told RFA.

“I think these activities should be interpreted as China’s attempt to normalize its presence in the South China Sea and to confer a degree of legitimacy upon its actions,” he said.

The two reports are part of a growing stream of Chinese state media coverage focusing on scientific research, environmental conservation and biodiversity discoveries in disputed waters, particularly around Scarborough Shoal, which is also claimed by the Philippines.

“While the scientific and environmental dimensions of these activities are significant, given the considerable ecological pressures facing the South China Sea’s coral reefs and marine ecosystems, in the context of disputed features such as the Scarborough Shoal, it is evident that these actions primarily function as strategic signaling by Beijing,” Kristanto said.

Environmental steward?

The South China Sea is claimed in whole or in part by several governments, including China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei.

Scarborough Shoal has been a particular flashpoint between Beijing and Manila since Chinese vessels effectively gained control of access to the feature following a standoff in 2012.

(Jay Tarriela/Philippine Coast Guard)

But 10 years ago, the Permanent Court of Arbitration all but invalidated China’s historical claims that fall within its nine-dash line, which practically surrounds the entire sea.

Beijing has rejected the ruling, and its coast guard maintains constant presence there.

Chinese messaging still asserts that the shoal is part of its sovereign territory and that Beijing has security and maritime rights.

But recently, state media reports have begun to highlight marine ecology, conservation programs, scientific surveys and biodiversity protection.

Kristanto said such activities fit into a broader pattern in which states use environmental governance and scientific research to demonstrate effective administration over disputed territories.

“By framing its activities as scientific research, environmental protection, coral reef surveys, and biodiversity conservation, China positions itself as a responsible maritime governance actor rather than merely a claimant seeking control,” he said. “This strategy shifts the narrative from one of coercion, access denial, or territorial disputes to one centered on conservation, sustainability, and the protection of vulnerable marine ecosystems.”

The approach offers Beijing a relatively inexpensive way to reinforce its presence while avoiding the more confrontational optics associated with military deployments or maritime standoffs.

“I do think that Beijing will seek to expand these activities in the future, as they provide a relatively low-cost and less confrontational means of justifying and asserting its presence in disputed areas,” Kristanto explained.

(Jam Sta Rosa/AFP)

China is also able to suggest that it is the only authority capable of exercising governance over these regions, he said, adding that it also provides “a less militarized framework for responding to criticisms that its actions are destabilizing and coercive.”

Hybrid warfare?

Scientific research in disputed areas is more than just normalizing Chinese presence, they are an integrated part of Beijing’s broader hybrid warfare strategy, Sze-Fung Lee, an independent researcher specializing in Chinese hybrid warfare, told RFA.

“These activities should not be understood as genuine scientific or conservation efforts in isolation,” Lee said. “The research infrastructure itself is frequently dual-use – military and civil – with the ‘civil’ research functioning as plausible deniability.”

China has long used a combination of civilian, law enforcement and maritime assets to strengthen its position in disputed waters, a strategy often described by analysts as operating in the “gray zone” between peace and conflict.

Lee said scientific activities add another layer to that approach.

“Expect these activities to expand in the coming years,” Lee said. “They serve multiple functions simultaneously: normalizing presence in disputed waters, supporting gray zone operations, and feeding into broader influence operations. Beijing has every incentive to keep investing in this layer.”

(Southern Theater Command)

Kristanto noted that other claimants also conduct marine research, environmental monitoring and fisheries protection activities in the South China Sea. The difference, he argued, lies in how closely such efforts are integrated into broader state policy and messaging.

“What distinguishes China’s approach is its scale, coordination, and political integration,” he said. “The narrative is not merely that China is studying or protecting the environment, but that it is doing so as the rightful authority over the feature.”

Kristanto noted there was also a possibility that conservation arguments could eventually be used to justify tighter controls over disputed waters.

“For instance, if a disputed area such as the Scarborough Shoal is designated as environmentally sensitive or in need of protection, China could argue that vessels or fishermen from certain countries should be excluded in the interest of ecological preservation.”

Edited by Eugene Whong.

Though the North Korean navy is one of the largest in the region, most of its fleet is made up of ships constructed in the Cold War era. The new five-year plan includes orders from the country’s leader Kim Jong Un to build two new destroyers per year, the state-run Korea Central News Agency, or KCNA, reported.

The upgraded shipyards in the coastal cities of Nampo and Chongjin appear to be the navy’s attempt at satisfying Kim’s quota, Bruce Songhak Chung, a senior researcher at the Seoul-based Korea Institute for Security Strategy, told RFA,

“If North Korea proceeds with its plans to build additional destroyers and deploy them in both the East Sea and the West Sea, the ships could pose a significant military threat,” said Chung, using the Korean terms for the waters east and west of the Korean peninsula.

North Korea has already built – but has not yet commissioned – two new 5,000-ton destroyers, the Choe Hyon and the Kang Kon, named after historical military figures. Another two destroyers are believed to be under construction in the shipyards.

In March, after inspecting the Choe Hyon, Kim said it represented a “radical change” in maritime defense, something Pyongyang has not achieved in “half a century,” KCNA reported.

New ships

In Chongjin, in the country’s northeast, the imagery shows evidence that a new ship is being built – A large blue building measuring 300 meters (980 feet) by 77 meters (250 feet) is clearly visible alongside a gantry crane. Chung said this could be a destroyer, which, when completed, would be the fourth in the North Korean fleet. The third is believed to be currently under construction in Nampo.

(RFA)

Chung also noted further evidence – the imagery shows that in the south of the shipyard, large-scale excavation and foundation work have been advancing rapidly in recent months, with up to 6 acres (2.4 hectares) of new land developed.

Temporary worker barracks near the construction site are also visible, as is a new rail track for transporting completed sections of ship to be transported outside for assembly into a complete hull.

“This infrastructure expansion at Chongjin shipyard is seen as groundwork for the construction of the fourth destroyer, in accordance with Kim Jong Un’s orders,” Chung said.

(RFA)

Though the imagery clearly shows that a ship is under construction in Chongjin, it is too early to say that it is a destroyer, Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., a senior fellow for imagery analysis at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, told RFA.

“We see some developments at Chongjin. Speculation ranges wide — whether it is going to be a large commercial vessel, whether it’s going to be another destroyer or whether it’s going to be a new larger class destroyer. We don’t have enough information yet,” Bermudez said.

Twin destroyers

On June 4, Kim Jong Un inspected the Kang Kon during a navigation test and ordered that both the Kang Kon and the Choe Hyon be commissioned as soon as possible, KCNA reported.

The two ships are 5,000-ton guided missile destroyers. The Kang Kon drew international attention when it failed to launch on May 21, 2025.

Kim also expressed his ambition to build larger 10,000-ton destroyers in an announcement made ahead of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit on June 8.

According to Bermudez, the shipyard in Nampo, on Korea’s western coast, about 50 kilometers (31 miles) from Pyongyang, began an expansion and a modernization effort toward the end of 2024, and that has led some analysts to speculate that North Korea is planning to build the 10,000-ton ships there.

The Choe Hyon, meanwhile, was visible in the images of the Nampo shipyard.

(RFA)

On June 12, the approximately 144-meter (472-foot) long destroyer can be seen docked at the pier. To its left, construction of what would be North Korea’s third destroyer appears to be actively underway inside a large covered building measuring 170 meters (560 feet) by 33 meters (110 feet) with a dark green roof. Floating cranes, a floating dock and work vessels have been deployed in the water in front of the building to assist with hull block assembly, indicating work is likely in full swing.

North Korea has set a political target of completing the third destroyer by the Workers’ Party Foundation anniversary in October, but based on the satellite images, it is estimated to be only 30-40% complete. Chung said that means it will likely not be finished by the deadline.

Ambitious, but unrealistic

Chung said North Korea’s plan to have 10 new destroyers after five years is ambitious but very unlikely.

“So you’re going to need a lot of personnel who are well trained,” Bermudez said. “You’re going to need a lot of equipment and you’re going to need weapons systems and electronics and bringing that all together at that quantity that quickly will be a challenge.”

(KCNA via Reuters)

He added that the weapon systems and electronics will depend heavily on what Russia and China decide to share with North Korea. North Korea’s newest destroyers feature a Pantsir air defense system from Russia.

“It’s likely — better than a 50 percent chance ­— that Russia is providing technology and experience to the North Korean shipbuilders,” he said. “How much they’re contributing as far as equipment goes, we just can’t tell at this point. They’re probably providing guidance, at a minimum.”

Edited by Eugene Whong.

A Bangkok court on Thursday sentenced two Uyghur men to death for triggering a bomb explosion which killed twenty and injured over a hundred others over a decade ago.

“The deaths and injuries caused by the attack were a terrible tragedy, and the victims and their families deserve justice,” Rebiya Kadeer of the International Uyghur Human Rights and Democracy Foundation (IUHRDF) told RFA.

“However, justice cannot be achieved through proceedings that leave significant questions unanswered regarding due process, the treatment of defendants, and the reliability of key evidence,” Kadeer added.

(RFA)

No group claimed responsibility for the Erawan Shrine bombing in central Bangkok on Aug. 17, 2015, but speculation called it an act of retaliation against the forced deportation of more than 109 Uyghurs from Thailand a month earlier.

Shortly after the bombing, Thai police named 17 suspects. Arrested were two Uyghurs, Adem Karadag (alias Bilal Mohammed) and Yusufu Mieraili, who went on trial in 2016 for planting explosives. Both have denied all charges brought against them

Upon hearing the verdict delivered by a four-judge panel on Thursday, Mieraili shouted “Injustice!” in the courtroom in both English and Thai.

“RIP Thailand’s justice system. I don’t accept any of this,” Mieraili added. “I didn’t do anything wrong.”

(Nicolas Asfouri/AFP)

During the trial, prosecutors presented evidence that Mieraili and Karadag had been near the shrine around the time of the explosion, that they had communicated with each other by telephone, and that a taxi driver had transported them away from the area after the incident.

The judges stated that although the defendants had denied committing the crime, they had failed to refute the evidence presented against them. The court granted both men 30 days to file an appeal.

Defense lawyer Choochat Kanpai told reporters they “will appeal the ruling because there are many aspects of the case that the court has not fully considered, including the treatment of the defendants during the proceedings.”

The decade-long trial was beset by delays due to the coronavirus pandemic and problems securing translators.

(Lillian Suwanrumpha/AFP)

Seven Chinese tourists were among the fatalities when explosives—apparently left in a backpack—detonated.

Beijing welcomed the death sentences.

“The attackers were totally inhumane and extremely heinous,” foreign ministry spokesman Lin Jian told reporters.

“China supports Thailand in conducting the trial in accordance with the law and severely punishing the murderers.”

Bahtiyar Bora of the Australian Uyghur Association who provided assistance and translation for Karadag and Mieraili during court proceedings in Thailand, spoke to RFA about China’s response to the verdict.

“These two Uyghurs fled Chinese oppression and came to Thailand. China is, of course, pleased with their severe punishment and can continue to accuse Uyghurs of terrorism internationally,” Bora said.

Thailand deported 40 Uyghurs to China in February 2025 despite warnings from human rights groups that they would face persecution on their return, drawing swift condemnation from the United Nations.

(Yuriko Nakao/Reuters)

“These actions have reinforced concerns that decisions involving Uyghurs in Thailand may be influenced by political and economic considerations linked to Beijing rather than by international human rights obligations,” Rebiya Kadeer told RFA.

“Against this background, it is difficult for many in the Uyghur community to have confidence that this verdict was reached entirely free from political influence,” Kadeer said.

Adds quote from Bahtiyar Bora of the Australian Uyghur Association.

Pimuk Rakkanam reported from Bangkok, Tahir Hamut Izgil reported from Washington. With reporting from AFP and Reuters. Edited by Charlie Dharapak.

Beijing’s maritime outposts could provide enough distraction during a critical 48 to 72 hour window—just enough time for Beijing to conduct amphibious landings and set up a blockade, said the report, commissioned by Taipei’s Mainland Affairs Council, the government body responsible for China policy and cross-strait relations, and conducted by the Institute for National Defense and Security Research.

Experts told RFA that although the Chinese buildup in the South China Sea is likely connected to Taiwan, a democratic island which Beijing considers to be its territory, the scenario discussed in the report lacks adequate substantiation through high-level simulation.

“The report’s headline figure of a 48-to-72-hour delay is its own estimate, not something validated by any rigorous test like an open wargame,” Ray Powell, executive director of Stanford University’s SeaLight maritime transparency project, told RFA.

Powell said the logic in the report does however “make sense.”

“Distributed, expendable outposts do complicate an adversary’s planning,” he said. “But a complication is not necessarily a roadblock, and the routes that matter most for Taiwan run through the Bashi Channel and the Philippine Sea, not the South China Sea.”

Land reclamation

The report was heavily focused on Antelope Reef in the Paracel Islands, where China has reclaimed about 600 hectares (1,480 acres) of land.

The development forms part of Beijing’s broader “active defense” strategy, integrating reclaimed islands into a regional defense network designed to fragment potential U.S. intervention routes and transform the South China Sea into a protected operating zone for Chinese submarines, the report said.

(RFA)

Under that framework, facilities such as Antelope Reef could serve as forward operating bases for China’s coast guard, maritime militia and military forces. The report says they could eventually host surveillance systems, electronic warfare capabilities and anti-ship missiles capable of extending China’s anti-access and area-denial network deeper into the South China Sea.

U.S. carrier strike groups and other naval forces approaching Taiwan through the South China Sea could be forced either to contend with missile, air defense and electronic warfare threats from these Chinese outposts or reroute through alternative approaches such as the Bashi Channel or Miyako Strait, increasing operational costs and travel times, the report said.

Powell also noted that many of the military capabilities described in the report have yet to materialise at Antelope Reef itself.

“What’s actually at Antelope today is reclaimed land, berths and channels—not yet the sensor-and-missile node the report describes,” he said. “That’s a forecast based on China’s Spratly playbook and it may prove right, but the report is analyzing a capability still under construction.”

He added that Antelope Reef’s location in the western Paracels raises questions about its relative importance in a Taiwan contingency.

“Antelope sits in the western Paracels facing Vietnam. Its value to a Taiwan fight relative to China’s many other operational locations across the mainland and the South China Sea is not immediately apparent.”

Broader strategy

Other analysts said that focusing solely on military capabilities risks overlooking the broader strategic effects of China’s activities in the region.

Sze-Fung Lee, an independent researcher specializing in Chinese hybrid warfare, told RFA the debate should not be framed as a choice between military utility and signaling value.

Lee said that the cognitive effects of China’s growing presence in disputed waters could shape decision-making well before any conflict begins.

“Narratives about China’s ability to delay or deny intervention don’t begin when the first shot is fired,” Lee said. “They’re being built now, increasingly visible in the pre-conflict information environment, and will amplify most intensely during the first hours of any operation, when allied decision-making is most fluid and most vulnerable to doubt.”

Lee said the effectiveness of such efforts would depend on a range of political and psychological factors beyond military hardware, including Taiwan’s own perceived willingness to resist and the readiness of allied governments and publics to support intervention.

(Adek Berry/AFP)

“The difficulty in quantifying that impact isn’t incidental – it’s the point,” Lee said. “Gray zone and cognitive warfare are designed to be deniable, incremental, and invisible until the cumulative effect means the battle is already lost before it formally begins.”

Others see the Taiwan connection as only one part of a much larger strategic picture.

China’s South China Sea build-up appears primarily geared toward broader regional objectives, Ed Moon, an independent cross-strait analyst and founder of intelligence site Strait Signal, told RFA.

“My read is that the buildup is more focused on reasons that have little to do with Taiwan,” he said.

Most foreign reinforcements in a Taiwan conflict would likely approach from the northeast through Japan, Guam and Hawaii rather than from the South China Sea, he added.

Still, Moon said the report also reflects a broader shift in how Taiwan’s security establishment views developments in the South China Sea.

“We are absolutely seeing in terms of official rhetoric and indeed reports like this that Taipei is trying to link events in the South China Sea directly to Taiwan’s own safety,” he said.

The democratic island has also shown growing interest in military cooperation between the United States and regional partners, including the Philippines, as well as exercises such as Balikatan, according to Moon.

“So I think Taipei certainly views the South China Sea build-up as linked to PLA plans on Taiwan, and believes that slowing down build-up in the region would directly benefit its own safety.”

Edited by Eugene Whong.

Dr. Tsetan D. Sadutshang, the Tibetan spiritual leader’s longtime personal physician, appeared in a video statement from New Delhi, where the Dalai Lama, 90, is recuperating following the procedure.

“Today, His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama had a very successful knee surgery on his left knee, and his right knee was done in New York in 2024," Dr. Sadutshang said. “I am here to relay this message to all the Tibetans and devotees inside Tibet and around the world.”

(Ladakh Buddhist Association via RFA Tibetan)

It was publicly announced Thursday that the Dalai Lama would depart Friday from his home in Dharamsala, India to travel to New Delhi to “undergo medical treatment on his left knee.”

The Tibetan spiritual leader was seen waving from the front passenger seat of a black sport utility vehicle as he was sent off by well-wishers gathered at the airport before his flight.

In the video statement, Dr. Sadutshang said that the Dalai Lama “is out of recovery post-surgery, and he is back in his room,” and conveyed thanks to the medical workers at Indraprastha Apollo Hospital.

Prayers for the Dalai Lama’s recovery took place in the Indian cities of Ladakh, Dharamsala, New Delhi, Gangtok, and Mundgod.

“We pray for the successful knee surgery of His Holiness the Dalai Lama,” Kunzang Yangdol of the Women Wing of Ladakh Buddhist Association told RFA.

She said that women in different villages chanted Buddhist mantras “from 5:00 AM with the hope that His Holiness heals well.”

In 2024, the Dalai Lama underwent a total knee replacement on his right knee at the Hospital for Special Surgery in New York. Tibetans gathering outside the hospital and his Manhattan hotel bearing Tibetan khata scarves and flowers, praying for his swift recovery.

The Dalai Lama turns 91 on July 6. According to his office, the spiritual leader is expected to travel to Ladakh towards the end of June for an extended visit.

Additional reporting by Thinley Choedon. Translated by Tenzin Dickyi, edited by Kalden Lodoe, Charlie Dharapak and Eugene Whong.

The improvements include ports, runways, military facilities and communications arrays that will improve Hanoi’s maritime and airspace awareness, experts told RFA.

“Hanoi is likely hoping that this development will deter Chinese action against Vietnamese economic activity at sea, including fishing and offshore oil and gas,” Harrison Prétat, deputy director of the Washington-based Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, or AMTI, told RFA.

The Spratlys are a strategically critical and heavily contested archipelago comprising more than 100 small islands and reefs claimed wholly or in part by China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. The region is vital for global trade and is rich in fishing grounds and potential oil and gas reserves. No single nation holds universally recognized sovereignty over the islands.

Hanoi’s Objectives

Over the past decade, claimant nations — most notably China and, more recently, Vietnam — have engaged in extensive dredging and construction as a means to increase their footprint in the disputed territories and to bolster their claims.

Vietnam has been particularly aggressive in reclamation efforts, creating an additional 534 acres (216 hectares) of land across the archipelago over the past year, according to AMTI. This was in addition to the 2237 acres (905 hectares) it had already reclaimed over the past five years. The new reclamation areas undertaken in the second half of 2025 are on a much smaller scale as reclaimable areas become more scarce.

More than one project is active on some of Vietnam’s holdings in the Spratlys, including Cornwallis South Reef, Alison Reef and East London Reef.

(RFA)

The aggressive expansion in the Spratlys is Hanoi’s attempt to improve its ability to operate there, Lynn Kuok, the Lee Kuan Yew Chair in Southeast Asia Studies at the Washington-based Brookings Institution, told RFA.

“Vietnam is strengthening the logistical foundations of its presence in the South China Sea,” she said. “By expanding its network of harbors across the Spratlys, Hanoi is making it easier to move personnel, supplies and equipment between its occupied features and the mainland to sustain operations over longer periods.”

Monitoring the airspace

A key part of the new construction will help Hanoi to patrol the skies. At present Vietnam has a single 4000-foot (1,200-meter) runway on Spratly Island, the fourth-largest island in the Spratly chain from which the archipelago gets its name.

(RFA)

A new, much larger runway at Barque Canada Reef will stretch approximately 13,000 feet (4,000 meters) when it is complete.

In addition to the runway, Satellite imagery also confirms that a new communications structure has been installed — according to AMTI, it appears to be a Doppler VHF Omnidirectional Range (DVOR) navigation beacon that will likely provide accurate navigation for Vietnamese aircraft within 100 nautical miles of the island.

AMTI said similar beacons could be seen at the Spratly airstrips controlled by China.

(RFA)

“The navigation beacon at Barque Canada mainly serves to support Vietnamese aircraft navigating the surrounding areas of the South China Sea,” said Prétat. “I would only expect to see another DVOR beacon if they build another new airstrip, but we will likely see other types of communications and sensing facilities built on all the new outposts.”

The improvements to airspace infrastructure indicate a shift in Vietnam’s Spratly development, said Kuok. The first phase was land reclamation, and now the second phase, adding infrastructure to the enlarged islands and reefs, is underway.

“The installation of communications and navigation infrastructure should improve connectivity among the features Vietnam occupies and support aircraft operating in the South China Sea,” she said.

Insurmountable disparity

Despite the construction boom, Vietnam has no realistic path to matching China’s air capabilities, Prétat said.

Beijing already has four airstrips — at Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, Mischief Reef and Woody Island — and will likely add a fifth at Antelope Reef. Additionally, Vietnam’s air force is far smaller and less technologically advanced than China’s.

“Hanoi is likely hoping that this will improve its ability to monitor its maritime areas and deter Chinese grey zone activity, but it won’t change the fact of China’s overwhelming military dominance in the South China Sea,” Prétat said.

(RFA)

China therefore retains substantial advantages in the Spratlys, with roughly twice as much reclaimed land, more extensive military infrastructure and overwhelming advantages in naval, coast guard and maritime militia capabilities, Kuok said.

Tit for tat?

RFA recently reported that Vietnam protested China’s land reclamation activities at Antelope Reef, but Prétat said China may have started those as a reaction to Vietnam’s Spratly expansions.

China’s construction of a new facility at Antelope Reef suggests Beijing wants to keep that gap sufficiently large — perhaps to signal to Vietnam and other Southeast Asian claimants that “catching up” is not an option. Beijing will do what it must in order to maintain its dominance in the South China Sea, he said.

Kuok said she is concerned that Vietnam’s fortification of features it occupies could create additional points of friction with Chinese forces and therefore increase the possibility of incidents or clashes.

But China’s disputes with Vietnam are less of a flashpoint than those Beijing has with the Philippines, she noted, adding that both Vietnam and China have strong incentives to prevent tensions in the South China Sea from spilling over into the broader bilateral relationship, which remains important economically and politically.

Prétat said that Vietnam’s position in the dispute is complicated by its broader relationship with China.

(Hoang Dinh Nam/AFP)

“Vietnam has been very proactive. They fought battles with China in the South China Sea, but they also have a very different set of international relationships,” he said. “On the one hand, they are one of the stronger voices on the South China Sea disputes, but on the other hand they have a unique relationship with China that they have to maintain.”

RFA attempted to contact both the Vietnamese and Chinese governments for comment on the ongoing construction in the Spratly Islands, but neither responded.

Edited by Eugene Whong.

Hong Kong’s Victoria Park is now much quieter on the anniversary of the Tiananmen Square Massacre, and residents told Radio Free Asia that they find it jarring.

The park had once been the epicenter of peaceful democratic resistance as hundreds of thousands turned out for yearly candlelight vigils to remember the victims of Chinese government’s June 4, 1989 crackdown on pro-democracy protests in Beijing.

Now on that day, pro-China showcases are held in the park, and there’s no mention of the massacre in local media anymore.

“It is not that the Hong Kong media are unaware of June 4, nor is it that they lack the necessary information; rather, they simply do not dare to touch the subject anymore,” a veteran media professional closely monitoring press freedom in Hong Kong, identified only by his surname Chen, told RFA.

On that day in Beijing, the military, on orders to clear Tiananmen Square of pro-democracy protesters, shot and killed hundreds of them, if not thousands. The Chinese government has since expunged the incident from the public record, and it heavily censors public discussion on the subject.

A year after the bloodshed, people gathered to remember the victims in Victoria Park in Hong Kong, at the time still a British colony. The park became ground zero for annual commemorative events, and even though the city reverted to Chinese control in 1997, the gathering thrived, as Beijing had agreed to preserve the civil liberties of Hong Kong residents. At its peak in 2019 attendance reached approximately 180,000.

But this all changed in 2020. The government banned the June 4 vigil that year, due to the COVID-19 pandemic. That same year the draconian Hong Kong National Security Law went into effect, allowing the city’s Beijing-aligned government to begin rolling back freedom of expression and other rights. The 2021 event was again cancelled due to the pandemic, but from 2022 onward, authorities used the security law to keep it banned.

(Mike Fiala, Robyn Beck, Richard A. Brooks, Mike Clarke, Dale De La Rey, Anthony Wallace, Philip Fong, Isaac Lawrence, and Peter Parks/AFP)

“In years past—around the time of June 4—newspapers and television stations would invariably report on the candlelight vigils in Victoria Park; some outlets would publish retrospective features on the events of June 4th, and reporters would even interview citizens attending the vigil within the park itself,” said Chen. “Now, however, with the National Security Law in force, such activities are defined as illegal acts, and the media are consequently barred from reporting on them.”

The yearly vigils had been organized by The Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements in China, a civil society organization established in 1989 that in following years became an organization dedicated to preserving the history of the massacre. It was forced to dissolve in 2021 due to political pressure.

In recent years, Victoria Park has been the venue for “Hometown Market Carnivals,” events organized by pro-Beijing organizations that intentionally overlap with June 4.

(Peter Parks/AFP)

But a Hong Kong resident identified by her surname Li, told RFA that she has stopped visiting the park on June 4 because there are no more vigils.

“In previous years, I would take my children to Victoria Park every June 4.” she said. “However, in recent years, the candlelight vigil has been prohibited—labeled an ‘illegal activity’—so I stopped attending. I have heard that some Hong Kongers living overseas are organizing small-scale commemorative events.”

Taiwan takes center stage

Hong Kongers living abroad and many civic organizations in democratic Taiwan are preparing to hold commemorative events on the 37th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square Massacre Thursday, including one in Taipei’s Liberty Square.

Hong Konger communities are holding events in Taiwan, the UK, Canada, Australia and elsewhere, as Victoria Park is no longer an option, Wu Renhua, a survivor of the massacre, told RFA.

(Sam Yeh/AFP)

But the yearly vigils in Hong Kong had been a symbol of freedom that existed in the city in the era of “One country, two systems” no longer exists, Tseng Chien-yuan, executive director of the Taiwan-based New School for Democracy NGO, told RFA.

“The fact that this massive protest—the largest within the global Chinese-speaking community, and one that challenges the ruling party of the People’s Republic of China—was able to exist on PRC territory fully embodied the spirit of Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy,” said Tseng, who noted that now Taipei is now carrying the torch. “That flame was reignited here in Taipei—and, significantly, it was reignited by Hong Kongers.”

He said that in previous years the events had been mostly conducted the language of Taiwan’s Mandarin speaking majority, but now the Cantonese spoken by Hong Kongers in attendance is more common.

“All of this symbolizes the continuation of the spirit of Hong Kong’s Victoria Park right here in Taiwan.”

Edited by Li Nuo in Mandarin and Eugene Whong in English.

Updated June 4, 2026, 8:15 AM EDT

Days before the 37th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre, several relatives of victims of the crackdown learned they would be forbidden this year from visiting their graves, they told Radio Free Asia.

Members of the Tiananmen Mothers group that represents the families said they received notice from the Beijing Municipal Security Bureau that for the first time in more than 30 years, they will not be permitted on the premises of Wanan Cemetery, the final resting place of many of the victims, nor would they be allowed to hold their annual post-funerary rites ceremonies.

“They won’t let us go to Wan’an Cemetery now, nor will they let us read sacrificial texts or eulogies,” Zhang Xianling, a member of Tiananmen Mothers, told RFA Tuesday. “These actions, which used to be routine, are no longer permitted. Now we aren’t even allowed to go there, which is something that has never happened before.”

The group penned a letter in protest urging authorities to lift the ban on their annual cemetery visitation, calling it “unreasonable.”

On Thursday, the group told reporters that the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau had notified them that if family members wish to pay their respects, they must avoid June 4th, apply for approval individually as a family unit, and be accompanied by police officers after approval. They are not allowed to pay their respects collectively.

Zhang told RFA, “Now there are three people on my post. When I go out, three people follow me. That’s the highest level of security. They have informed us that we cannot go to the memorial on the 4th. It’s not allowed for one person, one family, or a group. If we want to go to the memorial, we have to wait until after the 6th. We need their approval before we can go.”

Annual tradition

Hundreds, if not thousands, died during the June 4, 1989 crackdown on pro-democracy protests, and Beijing has expunged the incident from the public record.

For decades, members of the Tiananmen Mothers group have traveled to Wan’an Cemetery every June 4th under police escort to pay their respects and Zhang had planned to do the same this year, but police have been stationed near her home since May 28, she said.

(Photo courtesy of Zhang)

“There are two security guards at the community entrance, two police officers downstairs, and two cars—one police car and one civilian police car,” said Zhang. “The precautions are so strict, not to mention phone calls from foreign journalists.”

On Tuesday, the chief of police accompanied the guards, and Zhang laughed at all the attention she was getting, she said.

“So, I told them, ‘Since the chief is here, why don’t you accompany me out to have some fun?,’” she said, with a hint of sarcasm. “So he drove me to the Olympic Forest Park for a stroll.”

Zhang, 89, is the mother of Wang Nan, who was a 19-year-old student at Beijing’s Yuetan High School when he was shot dead by martial law troops in the wee hours of June 4 at an intersection north of the Great Hall of the People, according to a record of victims curated by the non-government group, Human Rights in China. The bullet entered the left side of his forehead and came out behind his left ear, leaving a bullet hole at the back of the motorcycle helmet he was wearing.

(Manuel Balce Ceneta/AFP)

Troops buried Wang Nan’s body with others in a shallow grave west of Tiananmen Gate but heavy rains washed the soil away a few days later. His body was taken to a hospital morgue and was initially mistaken as that of a soldier as he’d recently returned from military training and was wearing an old military uniform. His family was only able to recover his body days later, and his cremated remains were interred at Wanan Cemetery.

Truth demanded

The Tiananmen Mothers group has consistently demanded the disclosure of the truth about June 4th, accountability, and compensation for the families of the victims. Every year in the run up to June 4th, members of the Tiananmen Mothers are subject to varying degrees of surveillance, and their contact with the outside world and daily travel are restricted.

(Tiananmen Mothers)

Banning the Tiananmen mothers from performing their annual post-funerary rites is exceptionally cruel, a Beijing dissident identifying only by his surname Wu, told RFA.

“Their loved ones were shot dead for no reason, but at least they were still able to mourn them,” he said. “It has been over 30 years, and now even their right to go to the cemetery has been stripped away. This is all so sudden.”

Edited by Li Nuo in Mandarin and Eugene Whong in English.

Updated by Charlie Dharapak with new details from Tiananmen Mothers group on June 4th restrictions.