Beijing’s maritime outposts could provide enough distraction during a critical 48 to 72 hour window—just enough time for Beijing to conduct amphibious landings and set up a blockade, said the report, commissioned by Taipei’s Mainland Affairs Council, the government body responsible for China policy and cross-strait relations, and conducted by the Institute for National Defense and Security Research.

Experts told RFA that although the Chinese buildup in the South China Sea is likely connected to Taiwan, a democratic island which Beijing considers to be its territory, the scenario discussed in the report lacks adequate substantiation through high-level simulation.

“The report’s headline figure of a 48-to-72-hour delay is its own estimate, not something validated by any rigorous test like an open wargame,” Ray Powell, executive director of Stanford University’s SeaLight maritime transparency project, told RFA.

Powell said the logic in the report does however “make sense.”

“Distributed, expendable outposts do complicate an adversary’s planning,” he said. “But a complication is not necessarily a roadblock, and the routes that matter most for Taiwan run through the Bashi Channel and the Philippine Sea, not the South China Sea.”

Land reclamation

The report was heavily focused on Antelope Reef in the Paracel Islands, where China has reclaimed about 600 hectares (1,480 acres) of land.

The development forms part of Beijing’s broader “active defense” strategy, integrating reclaimed islands into a regional defense network designed to fragment potential U.S. intervention routes and transform the South China Sea into a protected operating zone for Chinese submarines, the report said.

(RFA)

Under that framework, facilities such as Antelope Reef could serve as forward operating bases for China’s coast guard, maritime militia and military forces. The report says they could eventually host surveillance systems, electronic warfare capabilities and anti-ship missiles capable of extending China’s anti-access and area-denial network deeper into the South China Sea.

U.S. carrier strike groups and other naval forces approaching Taiwan through the South China Sea could be forced either to contend with missile, air defense and electronic warfare threats from these Chinese outposts or reroute through alternative approaches such as the Bashi Channel or Miyako Strait, increasing operational costs and travel times, the report said.

Powell also noted that many of the military capabilities described in the report have yet to materialise at Antelope Reef itself.

“What’s actually at Antelope today is reclaimed land, berths and channels—not yet the sensor-and-missile node the report describes,” he said. “That’s a forecast based on China’s Spratly playbook and it may prove right, but the report is analyzing a capability still under construction.”

He added that Antelope Reef’s location in the western Paracels raises questions about its relative importance in a Taiwan contingency.

“Antelope sits in the western Paracels facing Vietnam. Its value to a Taiwan fight relative to China’s many other operational locations across the mainland and the South China Sea is not immediately apparent.”

Broader strategy

Other analysts said that focusing solely on military capabilities risks overlooking the broader strategic effects of China’s activities in the region.

Sze-Fung Lee, an independent researcher specializing in Chinese hybrid warfare, told RFA the debate should not be framed as a choice between military utility and signaling value.

Lee said that the cognitive effects of China’s growing presence in disputed waters could shape decision-making well before any conflict begins.

“Narratives about China’s ability to delay or deny intervention don’t begin when the first shot is fired,” Lee said. “They’re being built now, increasingly visible in the pre-conflict information environment, and will amplify most intensely during the first hours of any operation, when allied decision-making is most fluid and most vulnerable to doubt.”

Lee said the effectiveness of such efforts would depend on a range of political and psychological factors beyond military hardware, including Taiwan’s own perceived willingness to resist and the readiness of allied governments and publics to support intervention.

(Adek Berry/AFP)

“The difficulty in quantifying that impact isn’t incidental – it’s the point,” Lee said. “Gray zone and cognitive warfare are designed to be deniable, incremental, and invisible until the cumulative effect means the battle is already lost before it formally begins.”

Others see the Taiwan connection as only one part of a much larger strategic picture.

China’s South China Sea build-up appears primarily geared toward broader regional objectives, Ed Moon, an independent cross-strait analyst and founder of intelligence site Strait Signal, told RFA.

“My read is that the buildup is more focused on reasons that have little to do with Taiwan,” he said.

Most foreign reinforcements in a Taiwan conflict would likely approach from the northeast through Japan, Guam and Hawaii rather than from the South China Sea, he added.

Still, Moon said the report also reflects a broader shift in how Taiwan’s security establishment views developments in the South China Sea.

“We are absolutely seeing in terms of official rhetoric and indeed reports like this that Taipei is trying to link events in the South China Sea directly to Taiwan’s own safety,” he said.

The democratic island has also shown growing interest in military cooperation between the United States and regional partners, including the Philippines, as well as exercises such as Balikatan, according to Moon.

“So I think Taipei certainly views the South China Sea build-up as linked to PLA plans on Taiwan, and believes that slowing down build-up in the region would directly benefit its own safety.”

Edited by Eugene Whong.

Dr. Tsetan D. Sadutshang, the Tibetan spiritual leader’s longtime personal physician, appeared in a video statement from New Delhi, where the Dalai Lama, 90, is recuperating following the procedure.

“Today, His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama had a very successful knee surgery on his left knee, and his right knee was done in New York in 2024," Dr. Sadutshang said. “I am here to relay this message to all the Tibetans and devotees inside Tibet and around the world.”

(Ladakh Buddhist Association via RFA Tibetan)

It was publicly announced Thursday that the Dalai Lama would depart Friday from his home in Dharamsala, India to travel to New Delhi to “undergo medical treatment on his left knee.”

The Tibetan spiritual leader was seen waving from the front passenger seat of a black sport utility vehicle as he was sent off by well-wishers gathered at the airport before his flight.

In the video statement, Dr. Sadutshang said that the Dalai Lama “is out of recovery post-surgery, and he is back in his room,” and conveyed thanks to the medical workers at Indraprastha Apollo Hospital.

Prayers for the Dalai Lama’s recovery took place in the Indian cities of Ladakh, Dharamsala, New Delhi, Gangtok, and Mundgod.

“We pray for the successful knee surgery of His Holiness the Dalai Lama,” Kunzang Yangdol of the Women Wing of Ladakh Buddhist Association told RFA.

She said that women in different villages chanted Buddhist mantras “from 5:00 AM with the hope that His Holiness heals well.”

In 2024, the Dalai Lama underwent a total knee replacement on his right knee at the Hospital for Special Surgery in New York. Tibetans gathering outside the hospital and his Manhattan hotel bearing Tibetan khata scarves and flowers, praying for his swift recovery.

The Dalai Lama turns 91 on July 6. According to his office, the spiritual leader is expected to travel to Ladakh towards the end of June for an extended visit.

Additional reporting by Thinley Choedon. Translated by Tenzin Dickyi, edited by Kalden Lodoe, Charlie Dharapak and Eugene Whong.

The improvements include ports, runways, military facilities and communications arrays that will improve Hanoi’s maritime and airspace awareness, experts told RFA.

“Hanoi is likely hoping that this development will deter Chinese action against Vietnamese economic activity at sea, including fishing and offshore oil and gas,” Harrison Prétat, deputy director of the Washington-based Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, or AMTI, told RFA.

The Spratlys are a strategically critical and heavily contested archipelago comprising more than 100 small islands and reefs claimed wholly or in part by China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. The region is vital for global trade and is rich in fishing grounds and potential oil and gas reserves. No single nation holds universally recognized sovereignty over the islands.

Hanoi’s Objectives

Over the past decade, claimant nations — most notably China and, more recently, Vietnam — have engaged in extensive dredging and construction as a means to increase their footprint in the disputed territories and to bolster their claims.

Vietnam has been particularly aggressive in reclamation efforts, creating an additional 534 acres (216 hectares) of land across the archipelago over the past year, according to AMTI. This was in addition to the 2237 acres (905 hectares) it had already reclaimed over the past five years. The new reclamation areas undertaken in the second half of 2025 are on a much smaller scale as reclaimable areas become more scarce.

More than one project is active on some of Vietnam’s holdings in the Spratlys, including Cornwallis South Reef, Alison Reef and East London Reef.

(RFA)

The aggressive expansion in the Spratlys is Hanoi’s attempt to improve its ability to operate there, Lynn Kuok, the Lee Kuan Yew Chair in Southeast Asia Studies at the Washington-based Brookings Institution, told RFA.

“Vietnam is strengthening the logistical foundations of its presence in the South China Sea,” she said. “By expanding its network of harbors across the Spratlys, Hanoi is making it easier to move personnel, supplies and equipment between its occupied features and the mainland to sustain operations over longer periods.”

Monitoring the airspace

A key part of the new construction will help Hanoi to patrol the skies. At present Vietnam has a single 4000-foot (1,200-meter) runway on Spratly Island, the fourth-largest island in the Spratly chain from which the archipelago gets its name.

(RFA)

A new, much larger runway at Barque Canada Reef will stretch approximately 13,000 feet (4,000 meters) when it is complete.

In addition to the runway, Satellite imagery also confirms that a new communications structure has been installed — according to AMTI, it appears to be a Doppler VHF Omnidirectional Range (DVOR) navigation beacon that will likely provide accurate navigation for Vietnamese aircraft within 100 nautical miles of the island.

AMTI said similar beacons could be seen at the Spratly airstrips controlled by China.

(RFA)

“The navigation beacon at Barque Canada mainly serves to support Vietnamese aircraft navigating the surrounding areas of the South China Sea,” said Prétat. “I would only expect to see another DVOR beacon if they build another new airstrip, but we will likely see other types of communications and sensing facilities built on all the new outposts.”

The improvements to airspace infrastructure indicate a shift in Vietnam’s Spratly development, said Kuok. The first phase was land reclamation, and now the second phase, adding infrastructure to the enlarged islands and reefs, is underway.

“The installation of communications and navigation infrastructure should improve connectivity among the features Vietnam occupies and support aircraft operating in the South China Sea,” she said.

Insurmountable disparity

Despite the construction boom, Vietnam has no realistic path to matching China’s air capabilities, Prétat said.

Beijing already has four airstrips — at Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, Mischief Reef and Woody Island — and will likely add a fifth at Antelope Reef. Additionally, Vietnam’s air force is far smaller and less technologically advanced than China’s.

“Hanoi is likely hoping that this will improve its ability to monitor its maritime areas and deter Chinese grey zone activity, but it won’t change the fact of China’s overwhelming military dominance in the South China Sea,” Prétat said.

(RFA)

China therefore retains substantial advantages in the Spratlys, with roughly twice as much reclaimed land, more extensive military infrastructure and overwhelming advantages in naval, coast guard and maritime militia capabilities, Kuok said.

Tit for tat?

RFA recently reported that Vietnam protested China’s land reclamation activities at Antelope Reef, but Prétat said China may have started those as a reaction to Vietnam’s Spratly expansions.

China’s construction of a new facility at Antelope Reef suggests Beijing wants to keep that gap sufficiently large — perhaps to signal to Vietnam and other Southeast Asian claimants that “catching up” is not an option. Beijing will do what it must in order to maintain its dominance in the South China Sea, he said.

Kuok said she is concerned that Vietnam’s fortification of features it occupies could create additional points of friction with Chinese forces and therefore increase the possibility of incidents or clashes.

But China’s disputes with Vietnam are less of a flashpoint than those Beijing has with the Philippines, she noted, adding that both Vietnam and China have strong incentives to prevent tensions in the South China Sea from spilling over into the broader bilateral relationship, which remains important economically and politically.

Prétat said that Vietnam’s position in the dispute is complicated by its broader relationship with China.

(Hoang Dinh Nam/AFP)

“Vietnam has been very proactive. They fought battles with China in the South China Sea, but they also have a very different set of international relationships,” he said. “On the one hand, they are one of the stronger voices on the South China Sea disputes, but on the other hand they have a unique relationship with China that they have to maintain.”

RFA attempted to contact both the Vietnamese and Chinese governments for comment on the ongoing construction in the Spratly Islands, but neither responded.

Edited by Eugene Whong.

Hong Kong’s Victoria Park is now much quieter on the anniversary of the Tiananmen Square Massacre, and residents told Radio Free Asia that they find it jarring.

The park had once been the epicenter of peaceful democratic resistance as hundreds of thousands turned out for yearly candlelight vigils to remember the victims of Chinese government’s June 4, 1989 crackdown on pro-democracy protests in Beijing.

Now on that day, pro-China showcases are held in the park, and there’s no mention of the massacre in local media anymore.

“It is not that the Hong Kong media are unaware of June 4, nor is it that they lack the necessary information; rather, they simply do not dare to touch the subject anymore,” a veteran media professional closely monitoring press freedom in Hong Kong, identified only by his surname Chen, told RFA.

On that day in Beijing, the military, on orders to clear Tiananmen Square of pro-democracy protesters, shot and killed hundreds of them, if not thousands. The Chinese government has since expunged the incident from the public record, and it heavily censors public discussion on the subject.

A year after the bloodshed, people gathered to remember the victims in Victoria Park in Hong Kong, at the time still a British colony. The park became ground zero for annual commemorative events, and even though the city reverted to Chinese control in 1997, the gathering thrived, as Beijing had agreed to preserve the civil liberties of Hong Kong residents. At its peak in 2019 attendance reached approximately 180,000.

But this all changed in 2020. The government banned the June 4 vigil that year, due to the COVID-19 pandemic. That same year the draconian Hong Kong National Security Law went into effect, allowing the city’s Beijing-aligned government to begin rolling back freedom of expression and other rights. The 2021 event was again cancelled due to the pandemic, but from 2022 onward, authorities used the security law to keep it banned.

(Mike Fiala, Robyn Beck, Richard A. Brooks, Mike Clarke, Dale De La Rey, Anthony Wallace, Philip Fong, Isaac Lawrence, and Peter Parks/AFP)

“In years past—around the time of June 4—newspapers and television stations would invariably report on the candlelight vigils in Victoria Park; some outlets would publish retrospective features on the events of June 4th, and reporters would even interview citizens attending the vigil within the park itself,” said Chen. “Now, however, with the National Security Law in force, such activities are defined as illegal acts, and the media are consequently barred from reporting on them.”

The yearly vigils had been organized by The Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements in China, a civil society organization established in 1989 that in following years became an organization dedicated to preserving the history of the massacre. It was forced to dissolve in 2021 due to political pressure.

In recent years, Victoria Park has been the venue for “Hometown Market Carnivals,” events organized by pro-Beijing organizations that intentionally overlap with June 4.

(Peter Parks/AFP)

But a Hong Kong resident identified by her surname Li, told RFA that she has stopped visiting the park on June 4 because there are no more vigils.

“In previous years, I would take my children to Victoria Park every June 4.” she said. “However, in recent years, the candlelight vigil has been prohibited—labeled an ‘illegal activity’—so I stopped attending. I have heard that some Hong Kongers living overseas are organizing small-scale commemorative events.”

Taiwan takes center stage

Hong Kongers living abroad and many civic organizations in democratic Taiwan are preparing to hold commemorative events on the 37th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square Massacre Thursday, including one in Taipei’s Liberty Square.

Hong Konger communities are holding events in Taiwan, the UK, Canada, Australia and elsewhere, as Victoria Park is no longer an option, Wu Renhua, a survivor of the massacre, told RFA.

(Sam Yeh/AFP)

But the yearly vigils in Hong Kong had been a symbol of freedom that existed in the city in the era of “One country, two systems” no longer exists, Tseng Chien-yuan, executive director of the Taiwan-based New School for Democracy NGO, told RFA.

“The fact that this massive protest—the largest within the global Chinese-speaking community, and one that challenges the ruling party of the People’s Republic of China—was able to exist on PRC territory fully embodied the spirit of Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy,” said Tseng, who noted that now Taipei is now carrying the torch. “That flame was reignited here in Taipei—and, significantly, it was reignited by Hong Kongers.”

He said that in previous years the events had been mostly conducted the language of Taiwan’s Mandarin speaking majority, but now the Cantonese spoken by Hong Kongers in attendance is more common.

“All of this symbolizes the continuation of the spirit of Hong Kong’s Victoria Park right here in Taiwan.”

Edited by Li Nuo in Mandarin and Eugene Whong in English.

Updated June 4, 2026, 8:15 AM EDT

Days before the 37th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre, several relatives of victims of the crackdown learned they would be forbidden this year from visiting their graves, they told Radio Free Asia.

Members of the Tiananmen Mothers group that represents the families said they received notice from the Beijing Municipal Security Bureau that for the first time in more than 30 years, they will not be permitted on the premises of Wanan Cemetery, the final resting place of many of the victims, nor would they be allowed to hold their annual post-funerary rites ceremonies.

“They won’t let us go to Wan’an Cemetery now, nor will they let us read sacrificial texts or eulogies,” Zhang Xianling, a member of Tiananmen Mothers, told RFA Tuesday. “These actions, which used to be routine, are no longer permitted. Now we aren’t even allowed to go there, which is something that has never happened before.”

The group penned a letter in protest urging authorities to lift the ban on their annual cemetery visitation, calling it “unreasonable.”

On Thursday, the group told reporters that the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau had notified them that if family members wish to pay their respects, they must avoid June 4th, apply for approval individually as a family unit, and be accompanied by police officers after approval. They are not allowed to pay their respects collectively.

Zhang told RFA, “Now there are three people on my post. When I go out, three people follow me. That’s the highest level of security. They have informed us that we cannot go to the memorial on the 4th. It’s not allowed for one person, one family, or a group. If we want to go to the memorial, we have to wait until after the 6th. We need their approval before we can go.”

Annual tradition

Hundreds, if not thousands, died during the June 4, 1989 crackdown on pro-democracy protests, and Beijing has expunged the incident from the public record.

For decades, members of the Tiananmen Mothers group have traveled to Wan’an Cemetery every June 4th under police escort to pay their respects and Zhang had planned to do the same this year, but police have been stationed near her home since May 28, she said.

(Photo courtesy of Zhang)

“There are two security guards at the community entrance, two police officers downstairs, and two cars—one police car and one civilian police car,” said Zhang. “The precautions are so strict, not to mention phone calls from foreign journalists.”

On Tuesday, the chief of police accompanied the guards, and Zhang laughed at all the attention she was getting, she said.

“So, I told them, ‘Since the chief is here, why don’t you accompany me out to have some fun?,’” she said, with a hint of sarcasm. “So he drove me to the Olympic Forest Park for a stroll.”

Zhang, 89, is the mother of Wang Nan, who was a 19-year-old student at Beijing’s Yuetan High School when he was shot dead by martial law troops in the wee hours of June 4 at an intersection north of the Great Hall of the People, according to a record of victims curated by the non-government group, Human Rights in China. The bullet entered the left side of his forehead and came out behind his left ear, leaving a bullet hole at the back of the motorcycle helmet he was wearing.

(Manuel Balce Ceneta/AFP)

Troops buried Wang Nan’s body with others in a shallow grave west of Tiananmen Gate but heavy rains washed the soil away a few days later. His body was taken to a hospital morgue and was initially mistaken as that of a soldier as he’d recently returned from military training and was wearing an old military uniform. His family was only able to recover his body days later, and his cremated remains were interred at Wanan Cemetery.

Truth demanded

The Tiananmen Mothers group has consistently demanded the disclosure of the truth about June 4th, accountability, and compensation for the families of the victims. Every year in the run up to June 4th, members of the Tiananmen Mothers are subject to varying degrees of surveillance, and their contact with the outside world and daily travel are restricted.

(Tiananmen Mothers)

Banning the Tiananmen mothers from performing their annual post-funerary rites is exceptionally cruel, a Beijing dissident identifying only by his surname Wu, told RFA.

“Their loved ones were shot dead for no reason, but at least they were still able to mourn them,” he said. “It has been over 30 years, and now even their right to go to the cemetery has been stripped away. This is all so sudden.”

Edited by Li Nuo in Mandarin and Eugene Whong in English.

Updated by Charlie Dharapak with new details from Tiananmen Mothers group on June 4th restrictions.

The plan was unveiled earlier this week in New Delhi, after a meeting of foreign ministers of member nations in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue alliance, or Quad.

Fiji was likely chosen because of its strategic location as a convergence point for many global shipping lanes, Gregory Brown, director of the Alliance Futures Initiative, a Washington-based think tank, told RFA.

“Fiji sits at the crossroads of the South Pacific and is the natural logistics hub for everything moving between Australia, New Zealand, and the wider island chain,” said Brown. “If you’re going to build one port that serves the whole Pacific, you build it where the shipping lanes converge—and that is Suva, the fulcrum for the region.”

(Arun Sankar/AFP)

According to a fact sheet published by the U.S. State Department, the Tuesday’s meeting focused on maritime and transnational security, economic prosperity and security, critical and emerging technology, and humanitarian assistance and emergency response.

“Following the Quad Ports of the Future Partnership conference hosted in India in October 2025, the Quad committed to identifying critical port projects that it can support to increase trade and economic prosperity by increasing port infrastructure and capacity for key Indo-Pacific corridors,” the fact sheet said.

“As such, we are proud to announce that the Quad countries will work with the Government of Fiji, to advance port infrastructure and associated activities in the country.”

The port project would be a major Western infrastructure project in a region that has seen increasing investments from China in recent years, as Beijing and the West jostle for geopolitical influence.

Avoiding “debt-traps”

Through the port project, the Quad hopes to send a message to Fiji and other Pacific island countries that there are alternatives to working closely with China.

In recent years, Beijing has been aggressively investing in Pacific island infrastructure as part of its Belt and Road Initiative.

The plan has been criticized as a “debt-trap”—partner countries borrow heavily to finance bridges, roads or seaports, but when they struggle to repay, China gains leverage and control.

Fiji owes roughly US$110 million to Chinese state banks, or about 6.5% of its external debt, according to its Ministry of Finance. While this figure is relatively small compared to other creditors like Japan (9.7%) the World Bank (36.3%) and the Asian Development Bank (38.7%), the nature of loans from the other major creditors are “highly concessional,” and have longer payback windows than the Chinese loans.

“China’s model in the Pacific is loans,” said Brown. “The debt becomes a strategic instrument.”

(Peter Parks/AFP)

Brown noted that the Quad’s plan is to fund the Fiji port project primarily through grants, allowing Suva to avoid falling into a debt-trap.

“China lends, the Quad gives,” he said. “For a country the size of Fiji, that’s the entire calculation.”

China also provides grants to international partners, but only at a fraction of the United States. According to a March 2025 report by the Washington-based Brookings Institution, Chinese aid spending totaled about 14.6% of that of the United States between 2013-2018, and grants totaled 47.3% of this aid.

The report said that grants are “traditional foreign aid projects in the Western definition” and said that it was a “common misperception” that China’s Belt and Road Initiative is aid.

Still, the prospect of a partnership with Beijing for these projects is attractive. Brown recalled how Fijian Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka toured ports during a visit to China in 2024 and discussed potential partnerships for port modernization.

“The Quad didn’t randomly choose Fiji,” he said. “This pitch is a direct counter-bid.”

He said that Fiji is the biggest, most visible island nation in the Pacific, and should the project be successful, it would send a message that “resonates across the region.”

“I think the whole point is to show the Pacific island countries that there’s a better deal available than Beijing’s,” said Brown.

First steps

Should the Quad’s port project in Fiji prove successful, the climate could be ripe for port upgrades in other parts of the region. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said at a press conference following the Quad meeting that the Fiji project would “serve as a model for other projects in the future.”

Port infrastructure in the Pacific is much needed, Cleo Paskal, a senior fellow at the Washington-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies research institute, told RFA.

“The choice of Fiji is a relatively easy first step - a location that is relatively high profile and dovetails with Australian and Indian priorities,” she said. “Ideally the next choice will be infrastructure in locations that make an even stronger statement, and difference, such as Bina Harbor in Solomon Islands.”

She also noted that the Pacific Island countries that still recognize Taiwan–Marshall Islands, Palau and Tuvalu–would be ripe for cooperation with the Quad, because Chinese infrastructure projects in those countries would be problematic from Beijing’s point of view.

“I expect this is a pilot. If it works, we’ll replicate it,” said Brown. “The real question is whether the Quad can deliver this project on time and within budget.”

Though the port has been announced, construction will not start overnight, as Fiji has yet to agree to the project, Fiji’s foreign minister Sakiasi Ditoka said Wednesday to Indian news outlet The Hindu. Ditoka confirmed that Fiji was in discussions on port infrastructure with the Millennium Challenge Corporation, or MCC, a bilateral U.S. foreign aid agency.

The U.S. State Dept announced in March that the MCC signed an agreement with Fiji for a $12 million grant “to support design and feasibility studies,” which Ditoka said were focused on ports and Fiji’s business regulatory environment.

When asked Tuesday about the port and an initiative on maritime surveillance discussed at the Quad meeting, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning restated China’s stance on the Quad that cooperation between countries should not target a third party, and that China opposes “forming exclusive groupings or engaging in bloc confrontation.”

Beyond the port and maritime surveillance, other projects unveiled at the meeting included a minerals investment framework, an initiative on energy security, and a promise to ensure that countries in the region are connected via undersea cables “by 2026.”

(Will Burgess/Reuters)

Brown believes these commitments indicate a “qualitative shift” away from talking about Pacific strategy to announcing “concrete deliverables.”

“The Pacific is where great power competition will be decided, and the Quad just acknowledged it,” Brown said. “That is, the U.S. has limited resources and has to concentrate them where the strategic stakes are highest.”

He said the port is the Quad’s “belated recognition” that it needs to compete in the region.

“The Quad is essentially saying: we’re not going to let one country control the infrastructure through which strategic resources move,” he said.

Edited by Charlie Dharapak.

“Our rent went up by US$300, from $850 to $1,150. The increase was only in the last four years,” she told Radio Free Asia. “Housing is definitely difficult because affordable housing is difficult to find for safe and attractive spaces.”

Guzman attempted three times to purchase property but was “scared away by the mortgage prices and length of the debt.”

The couple is not alone. Housing costs are skyrocketing in Guam due to military buildup and a surge in military personnel in the U.S. territory. According to the U.S. Navy, the active duty population is expected to surge from 17,000 in 2024 to 24,000 in 2033, due to the relocation of marine units from Okinawa, Japan.

Additionally, contractors working on military upgrades, or even housing construction, require housing. The increase in demand and the dwindling supply are thus pushing prices higher and higher.

(Cpl Brayden Daniel/Marine Corps Base Camp Blaz)

The Guam Housing and Urban Renewal Authority has reported that Guam faced a demand for 9,908 additional housing units in 2025.

Last year, the office of the governor estimated that the Department of Defense plans to invest $8 billion—$3 billion greater than Guam’s entire gross domestic product—over the next five years amid a military expansion driven by the escalating geopolitical situation in the region.

Military upgrades

Earlier this month, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency awarded Lockheed Martin Corp. a new $407 million contract to expand the Guam missile defense program, raising the project’s value from $1.5 billion to $1.9 billion.

The new award is part of the existing Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Weapon Systems contract for the Guam project, designed to provide 360-degree protection against a potential threat from China’s ballistic and hypersonic strikes.

In September last year, Beijing unveiled its DF-26D missile, an upgraded variant of the missile nicknamed the “Guam Killer,” during a military parade marking the 80th anniversary of Japan’s defeat in World War II.

While the Department of Defense’s surging investment has been praised as an economic boon for Guam, the increasing presence of military personnel on the island and the U.S. territory’s role in Indo-Pacific strategy are taking their toll on the civilian community.

“Housing is a very big issue. We have a shortage of housing,” Sen. Jesse Lujan of the Guam legislature told RFA.“By the same token, we have quite a lot of people who are leaving Guam and looking for, of course, greener pastures. And those homes and those apartments or condos that are being vacated are being occupied, of course, by the military and federal contractors.”

Big military bucks

Housing developers and property owners are targeting military renters, setting prices based on the Department of Defense’s overseas housing allowance for Guam, which averages $2,205 per month for single service members, making rents unaffordable for most residents.

According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Guamanians on average earn less than $3,000 per month. This means that if rent is set according to military rates, then a Guamanian earning the average salary would need to pay more than three-fourths of it in rent.

While these high costs present a conundrum for Guamanian renters, landlords like Tes Schwab, who owns a rental unit in Agana Heights near a large U.S. Navy hospital, are more than willing to lease to military personnel.

(Jamica Johnson, U.S. Navy via AFP)

“We appreciate military tenants,” she said. “I’ve only had two so far, and they have both been reliable payers.”

According to a May 2025 report by the Government Accountability Office, or GAO, the military population in Guam is projected to double in 10 years—from 10,000 in 2024 to 20,000 in 2033.

The report noted that the Department of Defense has yet to determine the infrastructure capacity it needs to support the population surge.

“DOD has identified that those facilities are already facing capacity issues,” the report said. “As such, DOD will not know how much the addition of Guam Defense System personnel will exacerbate existing challenges with the support infrastructure.”

The GAO acknowledged that Guam is already facing a housing shortage for military personnel.

While the Department of Defense is building housing quarters for military personnel, the growing population is outpacing construction, necessitating reliance on civilian infrastructure.

Renovation over construction

Meanwhile, much of the funding for adequate military housing is not going toward constructing new units, but rather to replace or update existing housing, Robert Underwood, president of the Pacific Center for Island Security, a Guam-based think tank, told RFA.

“In spite of the commitments made earlier that they would seek new housing on base to relieve the burden on the civilian community, they are only refurbishing the existing inventory,” said Underwood, a former Guam delegate to the U.S. Congress. “The disconnect between the activities they pursue and the consequences of those very activities is mindboggling.”

Siska Hutapea, president of the real estate company Cornerstone Valuation, told RFA Guam’s housing market is already driven by the significant increase in construction costs.

“The intensive military construction activities in such a short time frame in a fairly small market absorbed all of the construction companies’ capabilities, causing a substantial increase in prices,” Hutapea said. “This puts significant pressure on locals as it limits new supply.”

(Virgilio Valencia/AFP)

She said that median prices have essentially doubled since the start of the modern military buildup in 2012. Back then the median home price was $210,000. In 2025 it was $400,000.

“Infrastructure upgrades would definitely be helpful to release the pressure and assist the locals build more housing units,” she added.

Besides the prohibitive construction costs, Lujan said Guam’s labor shortage exacerbates the housing situation.

Foreign workers hired for Guam projects under the federal government’s H2-B visa program are working on defense projects, limiting the civilian contractors’ ability to complete their housing projects.

“We can’t build homes fast enough because of cost and because of labor shortage,” Lujan said. “So we have a double whammy here.”

The inability to construct new homes fast enough has the U.S. Navy looking to buy existing homes and land suitable for construction, according to a press release detailing a housing initiative announced last September.

To that end the navy is seeking a total of 2,400 housing units, including 1,600 units for families, with some ready for occupancy in 2028, and the rest by 2032.

“This effort is not just about meeting housing numbers,” Rear Adm. Brett Mietus said in the release. “It’s about ensuring our military members have the quality of life they deserve. We must explore every avenue from innovative partnerships and efficient construction to maximizing existing resources.”

Edited by Eugene Whong.

U.S. weapons sales have been an integral part of Taiwan’s security since Washington ended diplomatic recognition of Taipei in favor of Beijing in 1979.

Despite the loss of recognition, through arms sales and other agreements, Washington is still a de-facto military protector of the democratic island, an arrangement that remains one of the most unusual in international relations.

How did the U.S. become Taiwan’s main arms supplier?

The relationship dates back to the Chinese Civil War.

After communist forces established the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the government of the Republic of China retreated to Taiwan. For many years afterwards, Washington recognized Taipei rather than Beijing as China’s legitimate government.

During the Cold War, Taiwan became an important U.S. partner in Asia.

The two sides signed a mutual defence treaty in the 1950s, and the United States maintained military support and stationed forces on the island.

The relationship changed dramatically in the 1970s as Washington sought closer ties with Beijing. In 1979, the United States recognized the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China and ended official diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

But it did not cut ties completely.

Instead, the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act, creating a framework that allowed Washington to maintain unofficial relations and continue providing defensive support to Taiwan.

The law remains the main legal basis for U.S.-Taiwan security relations today. It says the United States will provide Taiwan with weapons of a defensive character and maintain the capacity to resist force or coercion against the island, but also does not explicitly guarantee that American troops would defend Taiwan during a conflict.

What is the current framework?

China’s official policy on Taiwan is called the One China Principle, which says that the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China, and that Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory.

Beijing has said that the island must eventually be reunified with the mainland, by force if necessary. Taiwan rejects Beijing’s claims and operates as a self-governed democracy with its own government, military and economy.

Current U.S. policy toward Taiwan is often described as resting on three pillars.

(AFP)

The first is the Taiwan Relations Act, which governs unofficial relations and arms sales.

The second is the Three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués, a series of agreements through which Washington recognized Beijing diplomatically and acknowledged the Chinese position that there is one China.

The third is the Six Assurances, introduced during the Reagan administration in the 1980s. Among them was a pledge that Washington would not consult Beijing before approving arms sales to Taiwan.

Together these policies created what many people refer to as the “status quo.”

In practical terms, Taiwan governs itself and maintains its own political system, military and economy. The United States maintains unofficial ties with Taiwan while recognising Beijing diplomatically and following its own One China Policy, which “acknowledges” but falls short of accepting Beijing’s stance on Taiwan.

What major weapons has Taiwan bought?

U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have continued under both Democratic and Republican administrations.

Major deals over the years have included fighter aircraft, missile defence systems, anti-ship missiles, tanks, surveillance equipment and naval systems.

One of the most significant sales came in 1992, when the George H.W.

Bush administration approved the sale of 150 F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan.

In 2010, the Obama administration approved a package worth about US$6.4 billion that included Patriot missile defence systems, Black Hawk helicopters and other equipment.

(I-Hwa Cheng/AFP)

In 2019, the Trump administration approved a proposed US$8 billion sale of 66 F-16V fighter jets. The following year, Washington approved several packages including Harpoon coastal defence systems, rocket artillery and sensors.

More recent approvals have included spare parts, munitions and mobile weapons systems intended to improve Taiwan’s ability to survive and respond during a crisis.

What is the situation today?

As tensions across the Taiwan Strait have increased, Taipei has sought to strengthen its ability to defend itself and deter conflict.

Taiwan has not only asked for more weapons. Officials have also pushed for faster delivery of systems already approved by Washington, arguing that delays could affect the island’s defence preparedness.

Taiwan has also increasingly prioritised smaller and more mobile systems that are harder to destroy, a strategy often described as “asymmetric warfare.” Rather than matching China weapon-for-weapon, the idea is to make any potential military operation more difficult and costly.

Meanwhile, Beijing strongly opposes U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, arguing that they violate China’s sovereignty and encourage separatism.

(I-Hwa Cheng/AFP)

China regularly protests such sales and has at times announced sanctions against U.S. defence companies involved in Taiwan-related transactions.

It has also responded to some Taiwan-related developments with military drills around the island, which Beijing describes as warnings against “separatist” activity and foreign interference.

For Washington and Taipei, the argument is different. They say arms sales are intended to help Taiwan defend itself and preserve stability by reducing the risk that Beijing might believe it could use force successfully.

Why does this matter for regional security?

The Taiwan Strait is one of Asia’s most sensitive security flashpoints.

A conflict there could draw in the United States, affect Japan and other U.S. allies, disrupt major sea lanes and shake global technology supply chains, particularly because Taiwan plays a central role in advanced semiconductor production.

For Southeast Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific, the concern is not only whether Taiwan can defend itself, but whether tensions could escalate into a broader regional crisis.

(Sam Yeh/AFP)

That is why even individual arms packages receive close attention. They may not change the overall relationship, but they can signal how Washington, Taipei and Beijing are positioning themselves.

Why are people talking about this now?

Questions about U.S. support for Taiwan resurfaced after reports suggested that the weapons package that Congress agreed to in January could face delays.

The reports emerged as Washington was reviewing military requirements elsewhere, raising questions about whether broader geopolitical priorities could affect support for Taiwan.

U.S. President Donald Trump also said after talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping that he had not decided whether to approve the package. He later said he expected to speak with Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te, but media reports said no concrete plans had yet been made for a call between the two leaders.

U.S. officials also said the reports should not be interpreted as a shift in long-standing policy and stressed that decisions on future sales remained under review.

Edited by Eugene Whong.

Until now, the only bridge connecting the two countries has been the Bridge of Friendship, a much smaller rail-only bridge that was built in 1959 and had been intended to be a temporary measure until a permanent bridge could be built. That never happened, until now.

(RFA)

The new bridge, set to open next month, will be capable of handling up to 300 vehicles, and transporting 2,850 people across the border per day, according to Russia’s Ministry of Transport. It spans about a kilometer (3,280 feet) long and will connect the North Korean city of Rason, with the Russian town of Khasan.

“It appears both sides are pushing hard to complete the final construction in time for the official opening scheduled for this summer,” Bruce Songhak Chung, a senior researcher at the Seoul-based Korea Institute for Security Strategy, told RFA. “The project is showing approximately 80% to 90% completion ahead of the official opening.”

Satellite images from March 10, April 22, and May 16, show the progression of construction on a customs building on the North Korean side. Roofing work is now finished, and ground leveling and paving around the building have progressed significantly, Chung said. Paving work on access roads linking the customs facility is also in its final stages, he said.

(RFA)

On the Russian side, construction of a large-scale customs complex has advanced rapidly. Satellite images from February and April show that building construction with concrete work, access road paving, and site clearing had all moved forward considerably. A small checkpoint building to inspect vehicles before the bridge is also under construction.

June grand opening

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to build the new bridge at a summit in Pyongyang in June 2024. Since then both governments have held events to commemorate its progress.

A groundbreaking ceremony occurred in April 2025, and on April 21 this year, delegations from both countries virtually participated in a bridge connection ceremony.

(RFA)

On the same day as the connection ceremony, the Russian Embassy in Pyongyang announced that the bridge would be completed on June 19 — six months ahead of its original completion date.

Experts suggest the year-round road crossing will further develop trade, economic, and people-to-people ties between the Russian Far East and North Korea.

Moscow and Pyongyang rapidly increased trade and cooperation following Russia’s isolation from the international community following its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Since then, the two countries have ramped up trade and cooperation, with North Korea even sending weapons and soldiers to fight on the Russian side.

Military and economic cooperation will only improve once the new bridge is completed, Joung Eunlee, the director of the Seoul-based Korea Institute for National Unification, told RFA.

“Road transport can move larger volumes of freight more quickly than rail and allow more people to travel, so bilateral trade is expected to grow once the bridge opens,” she said.

North Korea could also use the bridge to more aggressively deploy overseas workers to Russia, Kang Dong Wan, a professor of political science at Dong-A University in Busan, South Korea, told RFA.

The cash-strapped North Korean government routinely skirts sanctions by sending legions of workers overseas to earn foreign wages, then confiscates most of it.

The new bridge would further erode the effectiveness of sanctions, experts warned.

Tumen Bridge vs. Yalu Bridge (A barometer of relations)

The rapid progress on the Tumen River Bridge stands in sharp contrast to the New Yalu River Bridge between North Korea and China, which was structurally completed in 2014, but has not yet opened because completion of infrastructure on the North Korean side has stalled.

It was built as a symbol of North Korea-China economic cooperation, with China providing active investment.

(RFA)

Recent satellite imagery of that bridge shows construction of customs facilities in North Korea have made considerable progress, but some areas still have empty lots and construction materials, Chung said.

Analysts say the diverging fates of the two bridges reflect Kim Jong Un’s strategic tilt toward Moscow over Beijing.

North Korea has been less than enthusiastic about opening the New Yalu River Bridge because it fears increased Chinese interference and influence, Andrei Lankov, a Russia-born North Korea expert and professor at Kookmin University in Seoul, previously told RFA.

Kim Jong Un has blocked the completion of that bridge to stop Chinese-style reform from flowing in and destabilizing the existing power structures in North Korea, Ri Jong Ho, a former senior North Korean official, who defected to South Korea in 2014 and currently lives in Virginia, told RFA.

(KCNA via Reuters)

“The New Yalu River Bridge has become a barometer of North Korea-China relations. It could open within months depending on Kim Jong Un’s decision — or it could take another decade, or remain closed beyond the Kim Jong Un era,” Ri said.

The rapid push to complete the Tumen River road bridge reflects Kim’s judgment that cooperation with Russia is far safer and more advantageous than with China, Ri said.

Edited by Eugene Whong.

During talks in Beijing, Xi warned Trump that mishandling the Taiwan issue could lead to “clashes and even conflicts” and urged Washington to “exercise extra caution” over arms sales to Taiwan, according to Chinese state media and media reports following the summit.

Xi’s statements, combined with concepts outlined in China’s 15th Five-Year Plan, released in March, suggest Beijing increasingly sees Taiwan and the South China Sea as part of a connected strategic theater tied to regional security, maritime control and long-term competition with Washington, the analysts said.

Mainland communist China considers democratic Taiwan to be a rogue province and Beijing appears to be entering “a phase of taking more concrete steps to accelerate the push for reunification,” William Yang, a Northeast Asia analyst at the Belgium-based International Crisis Group think tank, told RFA.

(I-Hwa Cheng/AFP)

“While the Communist Party still mentioned peaceful development across the Taiwan Strait, they have connected the mission of ‘reunification’ to the goal of achieving national modernization, suggesting that Beijing wants to start making more concrete progress on the issue of unification with Taiwan,” he said, talking about the content of the Five-Year Plan.

Maritime strategy

The plan reflects a leadership increasingly concerned about “uncertainty and instability” in the global environment while seeking to strengthen Beijing’s position around Taiwan and the South China Sea, according to a new report by the U.S.-based think tank Foreign Policy Research Institute, or FPRI.

The report described growing Chinese efforts to strengthen control over nearby maritime areas, including renewed island-building activity at Antelope Reef in the South China Sea.

Yang said Beijing increasingly viewed Taiwan and the South China Sea through the same strategic lens.

“China certainly views the Taiwan and South China Sea theater as closely connected, so its strategic planning and preparation around Taiwan and the South China Sea should also be viewed as highly relevant,” Yang said. “Beijing’s activities around Taiwan and the South China Sea should be viewed as part of its larger efforts to strengthen its posture and expand its presence and control across the critical sea lanes and maritime choke points.”

He added that Washington’s own assessment of China’s intentions was evolving.

“The longstanding, dominant narrative in Washington regarding China’s calculation and plan for Taiwan and the South China Sea has always been that Beijing is seeking to assert its dominance over Taiwan and the South China Sea to achieve its hegemonic ambition in the Indo-Pacific region,” Yang said. “However, the U.S. intelligence service already came out to overthrow that assessment earlier this year by arguing that they don’t think China would be looking to invade Taiwan by 2027.”

Speaking after meeting Xi, Trump said the two sides had “talked a lot about Taiwan” but said he had made no commitments to Beijing. He also declined to say whether the United States would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack.

Trump further described a pending U.S. arms package for Taiwan as “a very good negotiating chip,” prompting concern in Taiwan over whether Washington’s support could become tied to broader negotiations with Beijing.

Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te later defended U.S. arms purchases as “the most important deterrent” against regional instability, while Taiwan officials stressed there had been no change in longstanding U.S. policy toward the island.

Strategy of strength

Rather than signaling a dramatic strategic shift, the Five-Year Plan represents a more systematic effort to strengthen China’s position over time, Sylwia M. Gorska, a Ph.D candidate in international relations at the University of Lancashire in the United Kingdom, told RFA.

“The underlying priorities remain largely consistent: securing China’s maritime periphery, reducing vulnerability to external pressure, and limiting the ability of the United States and its allies to constrain Chinese influence close to the mainland,” Gorska said.

She said Beijing increasingly appeared focused on “steadily strengthening its position across contested waters” through coast guard operations, maritime militia activity and persistent military pressure below the threshold of open conflict.

(Brendan Smialowski/AFP)

“There does appear to be a closer linkage emerging between Beijing’s Taiwan strategy and its posture in the South China Sea,” Gorska said, noting that the trend was visible in Beijing’s confrontations with the Philippines around Second Thomas Shoal in the disputed Spratly Islands chain, as well as in the growing Chinese naval and air activity around Taiwan.

“The issue is not only territorial control, but also the creation of conditions that could complicate external military responses during a future regional crisis.”

The FPRI report also argued that Beijing’s growing emphasis on instability and “security” suggested the Chinese Communist Party increasingly saw strategic opportunity in a distracted United States and a fragmented international environment.

(Brendan Smialowski/AFP)

It said China was likely to continue promoting its “Community of Common Destiny” vision and broader governance initiatives through multilateral institutions including the United Nations.

Gorska cautioned against viewing China’s strategic moves as preparing for an inevitable conflict.

“Beijing still appears more focused on expanding its leverage, constraining U.S. freedom of maneuver, and improving its long-term position than on triggering a near-term war,” Gorska said.

Edited by Eugene Whong.

Wale was sworn in on Friday after winning 26 out of 50 votes in parliament, edging out the 22 votes for Foreign Minister Peter Shanel Agovaka, and drawing to a conclusion months of political chaos surrounding Wale’s predecessor Jeremiah Manele, who last week was ousted in a no-confidence vote.

“Fellow Solomon Islanders, change is coming,” Wale said during his inaugural address.

The new prime minister takes office amid mounting geopolitical tension across the Indo-Pacific, and he will likely exercise more diplomatic caution with China, unlike the two prime ministers before him, Graeme Smith, associate professor at the Department of Pacific Affairs at The Australian National University, told RFA.

“I think it’s a pretty seismic shift in the diplomatic sense. It does bring the Solomons more back into kind of an Australian, and to a lesser extent U.S. orbit,” he said. “It’s certainly a development that will have, I think, pleased people in Canberra.”

Wale has been opposition leader for roughly seven years, dating back to the beginning of the fourth term of Manasseh Sogavare, during which it could be said that Honiara decisively entered into Beijing’s sphere of influence – in 2019 the Solomon Islands stopped recognizing Taiwan in favor of China, and in 2022 entered into a secretive controversial security pact with Beijing, which, at the time, Wale criticized as undermining the security of the country.

(Charley Piringi/RFA)

When Sogavare’s term was up in 2024, parliament chose his foreign minister Manele to succeed him, in what was largely seen as an extension of Sogavare’s pro-China stances.

Smith said that the switch to Wale likely would not vastly change relations with China, but “he certainly will be much more moderate in his language around Beijing and certainly far less enthusiastic than his two predecessors in both Manele and Sogavare.”

Wale during his speech described the current global climate as a difficult period shaped by geopolitical rivalry and economic uncertainty, pressures he said the Solomon Islands cannot escape.

“We take government at a difficult time given what is happening throughout the world,” Wale said. “We are not immune from the impacts of these geopolitical events.”

He pledged that his government would pursue disciplined and prudent management to guide the country through the challenges ahead.

Wale’s election reflects a broader struggle over the future foreign policy direction of the Solomon Islands, international relations scholar Alexander L. Vuving of the Hawaii-based Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, told RFA.

“For the people of Solomon Islands, the key concerns are economic and political issues within the country,” Vuving said. “But for the wider Indo-Pacific, the most important question is how the next government positions itself among the major powers.”

Wale vs. Agovaka

The political contest was widely interpreted as a choice between maintaining close ties with Beijing or recalibrating relations toward Australia and Western allies.

Agovaka, who had served as foreign minister under Manele but then led an exodus of lawmakers from the ruling coalition in defecting to the opposition in March, was widely estimated to have been the favorite to succeed him, especially after Manele endorsed him after his ouster.

A vote for Agovaka therefore would have been seen as a vote to stay the course in maintaining close China ties, whereas a vote for Wale would favor a more cautious approach to China’s expanding security footprint while favoring stronger engagement with Australia and the United States, Vuving said.

“The election can turn Solomon Islands in a very different direction about how it positions itself among the major powers,” he said, adding that Wale’s victory was likely to be welcomed in Western capitals as evidence that China’s growing influence in the Pacific can still be challenged.

(Solomon Islands government via AFP)

Smith acknowledged that Wale’s victory came as a surprise.

“He’s been opposition leader for seven years now, and I think a lot of people assumed that he’d missed his chance and this day would never come,” he said. “I think a lot of people I assumed it would be Agovaka that would get the job given that he was sort of the lead critic of Manele, and in many ways sort of was the main person pushing the no confidence motion.”

Smith said that Agovaka’s world view was much more pro-China, and that among parliament there is more support for China over Taiwan, pointing out that Wale’s coalition might not be very stable, as he won the “bare minimum” of 26 votes in a 50 seat parliament.

“Wale will be looking to get a few more numbers across and that may mean that he has to give a signal that he’s a bit more pro-China,” he said. “So he will not be stridently anti-China but he’ll certainly be less pro than Agovaka would have been.

Challenges ahead

Holding on to power could be difficult with such a slim majority, Joseph Foukona, a history professor at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, who hails from the Solomon Islands, told RFA.

“It’s going to be a challenge for him in terms of trying to continue to maintain the numbers on his side,”Foukona said. “If there’s any political disagreement or tensions within his group, we might see people moving or changing sides again.”

Smith said Wale will be under pressure to publicly release the details of the 2022 security agreement with Beijing, which he had been a huge critic of and which until now has been confidential, save for a leaked draft of the deal prior to its finalization. Wale might then push to revise parts of it, he said.

Foukona said that Wale would likely be more transparent than his predecessors, not just about the 2022 security pact, but also in other arenas.

“Often when he speaks he sort of emphasizes transparency and accountability and this is one area that we must see some changes in terms of going forward,” Foukona said of Wale. He said Wale’s government might put more resources into the country’s anti-corruption commission, and disclose details about international agreements signed by the previous government.

Strategic importance

Located in the South Pacific and relatively close to Australia, the Solomon Islands occupies maritime space considered important for regional security and trade routes. During World War II, the islands were a major battleground. Today, competition has shifted toward infrastructure, technology, and access to resources.

One major area of rivalry involves undersea telecommunications cables, which carry nearly all global internet traffic.

“The undersea cables have become critical infrastructure,” Vuving said. “China is trying to gain influence in that business, and that has triggered pushback from the United States and particularly Australia.”

(Daniel Munoz/Reuters)

The cables are part of a larger telecommunications infrastructure competition in the islands. Chinese technology giant Huawei recently completed the installation of more than 160 telecommunications towers across the country under a Chinese-funded project.

Vuving also said that the Solomons controls a vast Exclusive Economic Zone rich in fisheries and seabed minerals, including resources increasingly important for renewable energy technologies and artificial intelligence industries, but which the country lacks to capacity to exploit.

“Countries like the Solomon Islands need major powers with the capability to mine those minerals, and China is looking for that,” said Vuving, who said that China’s expansion in the Pacific has been gradual. He described China’s approach as “salami slicing.”

“You don’t see a big shift overnight,” Vuving explained. “Every day, they expand a little bit. After years, they gain huge influence and can lock people into those relationships.”

He said that regardless of who is in charge of the Solomons, the country would still have to balance influence by foreign powers.

“You’re small, and you’re playing the game with giants,” he said.“In that way, you’re very vulnerable.”

Vuving argued that the Solomon Islands must diversify its international partnerships to avoid overdependence on any single country, strengthening ties not only with China, Australia, and the United States, but also with partners such as Japan, India, France, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

He said the long-term challenge for the Solomon Islands will be maintaining political independence while navigating relationships with competing global powers.

“The fate of great power competition may not be decided entirely in Solomon Islands,” Vuving said. “But for a small Pacific nation, it is extraordinary to find itself at the centre of such an important geopolitical contest.”

Eugene Whong reported from Washington. Edited by Charlie Dharapak.

SAIPAN, Northern Mariana Islands —A growing push in Washington to restrict Chinese travel to the Northern Mariana Islands could kneecap economic recovery in the U.S. territory as it rebuilds from the havoc left last month by Super Typhoon Sinlaku, analysts and residents told Radio Free Asia.

Supporters of the Economic Vitality and Security Travel Authorization Program, or EVS-TAP, say that ending its 14-day Chinese visa-free travel allowance would put a serious dent in the economy of the islands, officially a commonwealth and abbreviated as CNMI, where according to a 2025 economic study, tourism accounts for more than two-thirds of GDP.

“China was one of our top source markets prior to the pandemic, generating significant revenue through airlines, hotels, restaurants, retailers and small businesses,” the Marianas Visitors Authority’s managing director Jamika Taijeron, told RFA.

“Our tourism stakeholders need consistency and predictability in federal travel policies so they can plan long‑term operations, maintain workforce stability and stay committed in their Marianas investments,” she said.

Though the program was introduced in 2024 with the intent on boosting tourism, a group of lawmakers in March expressed their concern, saying it encourages birth tourism.

The federal scrutiny began weeks before the typhoon rolled through, but the resulting destruction has magnified the stakes in the islands.

Tropical getaway or stay away?

As the CNMI works to restore power, repair damaged infrastructure and revive a tourism industry still far below pre‑pandemic levels, its tourism sector must still compete with other tropical getaway destinations in the Pacific.

(Bryan Manabat/RFA)

Sinlaku knocked out power to more than 15,600 customers, toppled hundreds of poles and transformers, and forced Saipan International Airport into limited daytime‑only operations. Officials estimate overall damage could reach into the hundreds of millions of dollars, affecting homes, government facilities and tourism‑dependent infrastructure.

The territory is roughly 6,000 miles from the U.S. mainland but only hours from major Asian hubs, and China remains the only large‑scale tourism market capable of restoring pre‑pandemic visitor volumes, according to statistics from the Marianas Visitors Authority.

The CNMI welcomed 487,008 visitors in 2019, including 185,526 from China. By 2023, total arrivals had fallen to 215,543, and Chinese arrivals dropped precipitously to 10,764 in fiscal 2025, brought on by a sudden halt in EVS-TAP processing at the beginning of the current administration. Even though the program has restarted, the market remains a fraction of its former size.

Even though tourism is critically important to the CNMI’s economy, concerns about security have some in Washington characterizing EVS-TAP as “Communist China’s back door” into the United States.

On March 9, more than a month before Sinlaku’s landfall, 34 members of the House of Representatives urged the secretaries of Homeland Security, State and the Interior to shut down EVS-TAP and other federal entry programs that allow Chinese nationals to visit the CNMI without visas. Their letter echoed concerns raised in January by three U.S. senators and mirrored a bipartisan push last year citing birth‑tourism cases and human‑smuggling prosecutions.

The lawmakers cited estimates that more than 3,300 babies have been born in the CNMI to Chinese nationals since 2009, with annual births rising from fewer than 10 to nearly 600 at the peak. They warned that many of these U.S.-born children were raised in China and could reach voting age by 2030, a scenario they said could allow a “hostile nation” to influence American elections.

In public statements, Kimberlyn King‑Hinds, the CNMI’s delegate to Congress, rejected the claims, saying that Washington often misunderstands the islands’ circumstances. Critics have accused her of supporting policies that benefit Chinese interests, but she said her position is rooted in economic necessity.

(Farah Master/Reuters)

“It’s not about China. It’s about retirement. It’s about paying employees,” she said. “This is about the economy. This is about tourism. This is about customers. We need customers for this economy to keep moving. That’s just the reality.”

Legal analyst and former CNMI resident Chanho Roh told RFA the debate in Washington reflects broader tensions in U.S. immigration enforcement, with unusually high stakes for the islands.

“Even when Congress closes one legal loophole, new methods or pathways often emerge,” he said, noting that birth tourism and visa‑waiver policy are politically linked but “not identical policy questions.”

Roh said visa‑waiver arrangements typically rely on reciprocity, and CNMI residents do not receive comparable visa‑free access to China, including Hainan Island. But he warned that eliminating the program without an “alternative economic strategy” risks worsening the Commonwealth’s decline.

“The aftermath is already visible — abandoned developments, unresolved legal disputes involving Chinese investors, and deteriorating properties that affect the islands’ appearance and economy,” he said.

Stalled recovery

In a letter that addressed the claims of the 34 lawmakers, the Saipan Chamber of Commerce said terminating the visa‑waiver programs would deepen the CNMI’s economic strain and jeopardize its fragile recovery. Lawful tourism supported by the programs, the group said, remains essential to sustaining small businesses and protecting jobs for U.S. citizens and residents.

The Chamber acknowledged that birth tourism was once a challenge but said it is no longer a prevailing issue. Targeted policy changes, enhanced screening and close coordination with U.S. Customs and Border Protection have “effectively mitigated” the problem.

(Yuichi Yamazaki/AFP)

The CNMI’s heavy reliance on tourism leaves it exposed to sudden shocks, such as the recent super typhoon, Betty Bai of Saipan Chinese News and a tourism events operator, told RFA.

She noted that competitors such as Thailand, Maldives, Palau and Fiji offer visa‑free or visa‑on‑arrival access for Chinese travelers. “CNMI lost its edge,” she said.

Rather than debating extremes, she said, the focus should be on managing the visa policy properly and “making it work.”

But even if EVS-TAP is left alone, diversification is necessary in the tourism industry, Steve Jang, an entrepreneur and operator of Plumeria Steakhouse in the bustling tourist hub of Garapan, told RFA.

“Eliminating the waiver would almost certainly reduce arrival numbers, leading to lower occupancy rates, reduced business revenue and potential job losses,” he said. “Relying too heavily on any single market is a risk. Diversification would make our local economy more resilient.”

Edited by Eugene Whong.

Update adds a link to the letter from the 34 lawmakers.

For example, during the 2022 visit of United Nations High Commissioner Michelle Bachelet to China, her statement “I admire China’s economic development” was expanded and promoted as “I admire China’s economic and human rights development.” China ignored corrections issued by the UN office, and the misleading report remained on the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s website for more than two years.

(OHCHR via AFP)

Another distortion occurred in 2019, when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited China and said, “I wish for the Uyghurs to live happily,” became “Uyghurs are living happily.” The Turkish government later recognized China’s distortion and issued a clarification.

These distortions happen often. For a government like China, which rules not only through force but also through strict control of information, this practice is routine.

(Wang Zhao/AFP)

Words such as “my friend,” “smart,” or “great”— could easily be taken out of context and mischaracterized by Chinese state media. Such words can be used to portray the United States as supporting or at least tolerating China’s policies.

On January 19, 2021, the United States was the first country to officially declare the situation of the Uyghurs as genocide. Following this, more than 20 governments and parliaments, as well as two other members of the U.N. Security Council have described the situation similarly.

RFA learned that 15 days prior to this week’s planned visit by President Trump, a series of security measures were implemented in the Uyghur region. In addition to routine measures such as prohibiting the spread of information online and blocking calls from overseas, authorities also restricted petitioners from traveling to file complaints, especially those going to Beijing.

These restrictions make it clear that China wants nothing to get out of the Uyghur region so they can control the narrative while the U.S. delegation is there. It is therefore very likely that Beijing will be looking for opportunities to twist even the most innocuous statements made by the delegation to reinforce its claims about the Uyghur region.

Shohret Hoshur is a journalist with RFA Uyghur. He fled the Uyghur region in 1995 after his reporting about Beijing’s repressive policies against Uyghurs made him a target of the Chinese government. An 18-year veteran at Radio Free Asia, he won awards for his exclusive reporting from inside the Uyghur region, where Beijing denies human rights violations and closely guards the flow of information. Shortly after joining RFA, Chinese authorities began monitoring anyone known to have had contact with Hoshur, even arresting many of his family members.

Edited by Eugene Whong and Charlie Dharapak.

“RFA’s journalists braved extraordinary conditions to bring us this insightful and powerful study of community resilience in war-torn Myanmar,” said RFA President and CEO Bay Fang. “Their multi-part project goes beyond battlefield statistics to show the personal impact of armed conflict—a story that would otherwise not see the light of day.

“As RFA rebuilds, this impactful series speaks to the uncensored, accurate journalism that our audiences expect from us.”

In their winning report, the duo trekked through the perilous Myanmar jungle to reach the conflict-ridden Kayah state, where they spent three weeks interviewing dozens of residents including healthcare workers and insurgent fighters, all working to build a more stable community. The four-part series examines the locals’ efforts to install an enduring democratic system in Myanmar, build a reliable police force in Kayah state, and profiles the doctors and nurses treating rebel fighters in a secret hospital in the jungle.

RFA Burmese, along with other language services, resumed content production in late 2025. Since returning, their Facebook video views hit 12.7M in April as interactions grew 15%. The Service also launched a new podcast, “Challenges of Myanmar Youth,” which has attracted millions of listeners. In March, RFA Burmese published an exclusive video report about a town in a high-conflict area of Sagaing that lacked sufficient safe houses, leaving many locals vulnerable. Soon after RFA’s report, the National Unity Government donated the residents additional shelters, with local residents crediting RFA for this development.

The expansion of the runway at Thitu Island and the port at Nanshan Island, are intended to solidify Manila’s physical presence in the Spratlys in response to recent Chinese escalations in the Spratly archipelago, a scattering of hundreds of small islands, atolls and reefs claimed by many different countries, experts said.

(RFA)

Once completed, Manila will have better access the two islands, making supply runs and other logistic challenges easier, thereby improving readiness to react to emergencies in territory it considers to be within its exclusive economic zone, they said.

“Hope” for a larger runway

Thitu, called Pag-asa, meaning “Hope” in Tagalog, is the larger of the two islands, and is the only Philippine-administered feature in the Spratly Islands with a permanent civilian population. It was first occupied by the Philippines in 1974 and it is also claimed by China, Taiwan and Vietnam. Its most prominent manmade feature is a 1.3-kilometer (.8-mile) runway.

In its 2025 budget, Manila earmarked 1.65 billion pesos (US$27 million) to extend the runway to 1.5 kilometers (.93 miles) a length sufficient to accommodate certain variants of the F-16 fighter jet, as well as light combat and transport aircraft. Another 300 million pesos ($5 million) has been set aside for the construction of a sheltered port.

Satellite imagery captured by Planet Labs confirms that construction began shortly after the budget was approved and remains ongoing as of May 2026.

The roughly 200-meter (656-foot) extension appears to be over an area that was previously submerged.

(RFA)

In an image from April 2, a barge can be seen on the western part of the runway, likely delivering construction materials.

The runway extension marks a significant shift in the Philippines’ posture to strengthen the resilience of its outposts in the South China Sea, Harrison Prétat, deputy director of the Washington-based Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, told RFA

“The real recent drivers I think have been the tensions between China and Philippines at Second Thomas Shoal basically from around 2021 up until 2024,” said Prétat.

(Eloisa Lopez/Reuters)

Second Thomas Shoal, located roughly 224 kilometers (139 miles) from Thitu has been a flashpoint between the two countries since 1999, when the Philippines deliberately grounded a navy ship on the shoal and stationed troops aboard. The vessel-turned-outpost, which requires constant resupply from the Philippine Coast Guard and Navy, has been at the center of escalating confrontations since approximately 2021.

China began using coast guard and naval vessels to interfere with and block those supply missions from the Philippines. Tensions reached a critical point in the summer of 2024, when Chinese personnel rammed Philippine vessels and boarded them and a Filipino sailor lost a thumb in the incident.

Shortly afterward, Manila and Beijing reached an agreement to reduce tensions at the shoal, but both sides recognized the situation had already grown too dangerous and volatile, Prétat noted.

“In that context, if you look at improvements to the runway at Thitu Island, it makes sense,” he said. “The more they can reinforce the access and the logistics capabilities of their outposts, I think it makes them a little more resilient to a situation like at Second Thomas Shoal.”

(RFA)

Zheng Zhihua, an associate professor specializing in maritime affairs at Shagnhai Jiao Tong University, told the South China Morning Post that Beijing would have significant concern if U.S. forces were able to use the facilities on the island. He added that if the expanded runway and shelter ports accommodated U.S. military aircraft or coast guard vessels, it could shift the strategic pressure in maritime maneuvers back onto China.

The small port in a “vast” sea

Nanshan Island is the eighth largest natural island of the Spratly Islands, located 98 miles (158 km) east of Thitu. Called Lawak, meaning “vast” in Tagalog, The Philippines first took possession in 1974, and it is the fourth largest of the Philippine-occupied islands – situated far from the main areas of Chinese maritime activity in the region.

Satellite imagery captured from October 2025 through April 2026 shows that port expansion on Nanshan Island remains ongoing but is still in early stages.

(RFA)

The Philippine government appropriated more than 1 billion pesos ($27 million ) for the sheltered port facility on Nanshan Island, to replace the current port that has a narrow entry channel and is too shallow for larger ships.

Experts think that upgrades on Nanshan Island would undoubtedly bolster the Philippine Coast Guard’s docking capabilities and strengthen enforcement operations in the area.

“The number one impact, I think, will be on the Philippines’ ability to continue using those facilities,” said Prétat said. “We don’t know what the port will look like yet because it’s early, but if they can have a more accessible port, it would make that outpost a bit easier to resupply and easier to operate from.”

Strong diplomatic messages

Philippine officials have paired the infrastructure push with pointed diplomatic messaging. In February, lawmaker Risa Hontiveros and Philippine Coast Guard spokesman Jay Tarriela visited Thitu Island, meeting with local residents and issuing a firm statement of sovereignty. During the visit, Hontiveros said, “We will never give up Spratly Islands, including Thitu.”

(Jam Sta Rosa/AFP)

On April 9, the Philippines unveiled a new coast guard command base on the island in a formal ceremony attended by Transport Secretary Giovanni Lopez, Sen. Erwin Tulfo, and Coast Guard commander Adm. Ronnie Gil Gavan said the base represents a permanent step to demonstrate that the coast guard is ready to defend the country’s interest in the waters, its fishermen, their livelihood and, most importantly, its sovereignty.

Prétat said the Philippines navy is still at a significant disadvantage in the Spratly Islands compared with China, which maintains an extensive coast guard fleet and a network of large bases throughout the South China Sea- enabling it to deploy vessels across the region on short notice.

“Both of these expansions ― on Thitu Island and Nanshan Island ― are part of efforts by the Philippines to increase its patrols and increase its activity in the South China Sea,” said Prétat. “The Philippines is trying to improve this ability as much as it can to keep its ships out there ― to monitor what is going on, have maritime domain awareness, access rotate troops, conduct logistics, and maintain some type of presence.”

Edited by Eugene Whong.

The man, who identified himself by the pseudonym “Danny,” told Radio Free Asia that this is how he was initially recruited into what he and the Philippine armed forces now believe was a Chinese spying scheme.

Danny is one of three Filipino nationals who were caught for allegedly spying for China earlier this year. He is currently in the Philippine military’s custody, and they allowed him to tell his story to RFA, saying that Danny’s case is part of a growing trend of jobseekers who find themselves spying for Beijing, even unknowingly at first.

Danny has been cooperative since his detention began and his story aligns with evidence in the military’s investigation, according to a military source who requested anonymity due to the sensitive nature of the case. RFA was not able to independently confirm Danny’s testimony using non-military sources.

Easy money?

The ad that caught his eye sought a military consultant, so Danny, who already had deep business connections with the Philippine Coast Guard, posed as an active member to increase his chances of getting hired. The deception seemingly paid off, and he soon began filing reports about the coast guard for extra cash.

At first it was easy, he said. Everything they wanted was all publicly available online. But quickly, the assignments morphed into detailed inquiries on troop movements, including patrols in the West Philippine Sea, Manila’s term for the areas of the South China Sea it considers to be within its exclusive economic zone, much of which is also claimed by China.

At one point Danny got in so deep that he stole data from the mobile phone of his friend, an officer in the coast guard. The information he passed on kept his employer happy. But the requests steadily became more urgent, and his contact more demanding.

Danny spoke to RFA in a mixture of English and Tagalog in a room guarded by Philippine soldiers at an undisclosed location in Manila. He had obscured his physical features with a face covering, sunglasses and a hiking cap. He explained why he initially responded to the ad.

“I had a problem in business and was desperate to find money,” he said. “I was enticed to work for them because of my situation.”

Over the course of the interview, Danny would remove the cap and hood.

Loose lips…

Danny’s realization that what he was doing had dangerous consequences came in August 2024, when Chinese coast guard vessel 3104 collided with two Philippine coast guard ships – the BRP Bagacay and the BRP Cape Engaño – near Sabina Shoal in the disputed Spratly Islands chain. Though no one was hurt, the two Philippine ships sustained heavy damage.

Prior to the incident, Danny had provided the vessels’ coordinates to his employer, and he said his report may have enabled the Chinese to intercept them.

“I was angry, I did not expect that they would ram the ships. I had friends there,” he said.

After the clash in the Spratlys, he started to suspect that his employer might not actually be a U.S.-based publisher, so he cut off all contact.

The employer sent someone who identified himself as “Peter,” whom Danny assumes was a Chinese agent assigned to preserve the asset-handler relationship.

Peter offered Danny an increase in pay to keep sending in information.

“That’s when I learned I was being used, but I still continued.” Danny said.

After meeting Peter, Danny began using an alternative method to transmit data. On his smartphone was an app that to the unsuspecting eye looked like a mobile version of the popular video game Tetris, but in actuality it was the access point for a secret website where he could upload the data he stole.

Cover blown

The military began to suspect that someone was leaking information to the Chinese after the incident in the Spratlys, according to the military source, but the source would not confirm to RFA when they learned that Danny was the culprit.

(Adrian Portugal/Reuters)

About a year after the incident, in mid-2025, Danny suspected the authorities were on to him, and he asked Peter for help.

“‘Remain calm,’ that’s what he said. ‘We will come and get you.’”

But Danny was afraid, he explained. He thought it meant that the spy organization would either send more agents to take him out of the Philippines or worse, silence him.

Before any of that could happen, the Philippine military took him into custody.

“I was surprised, even though I knew it was coming,” Danny said. “Now, I am cooperating with the government, but what will happen to me in the future is uncertain as of yet.”

Danny said his friends in the coastguard now view him as a traitor.

“What I regret most is what happened to Cape Engaño, but there is nothing I can do anymore. It already happened,” he said.

The military would not comment on whether Danny is charged with espionage or any other crime, nor whether he had legal representation, nor if he would be tried in court.

RFA was not allowed to speak to the other two suspected Filipino spies for China – civilian staff members from the Philippine Department of Defense and navy.

Like Danny, they are also believed to have sold sensitive information to the Chinese, including troop positions and details about a military modernization program supported by the Philippines’ key ally, the United States, the military source said.

Spies among us

Apprehending the three spies may only be “scratching the surface” of a larger network, retired Rear Adm. Roy Vincent Trinidad, a spokesman for the Philippine Navy in the West Philippine Sea, told RFA.

“We found out that the payments were sent through electronic wallets, dead drops or sent via delivery packs,” he said. “Where do these come from, and who are these people sending them money?.”

(Dondi Tawatao/Reuters)

Trinidad said the hunt for more Filipino spies and their Chinese handlers is ongoing, and that the arrests of Danny and the two others were a result of the “insider threat program” launched in 2023 that focused on protecting sensitive government data, specifically those relating to the South China Sea.

Officials have said that spy recruitment usually follows a similar pattern. Spymasters recruit on publicly accessible online job platforms, such as onlinejobs.ph or LinkedIn. Often the targets are those with significant experience with the military, either as active duty members or in civilian roles.

One woman, who identified herself using the pseudonym Maria Nena, who once worked for the navy and had sensitive data, told RFA that in 2023, she responded to a job ad for a regional military researcher role for a publication called Military Express. Someone purporting to represent the publication contacted her and gave her a recruitment test.

“I was given a set of questions to answer and was told that I would be given 1-3 assignments to complete as part of the selection process, all of which will be paid upon completion,” Nena said. “After submitting my response, I never heard back.”

Months later she saw a similar ad on Facebook, using her real name as the contact. She grew suspicious and contacted the group. They contacted her via the WhatsApp messenger platform and asked where they could acquire sensitive materials she co-authored for the navy.

“They asked where they could buy the book, but I responded that they were not for sale as they were confidential documents,” she said. “They asked where they can download a declassified document on civil military operations that was released by the United States in 2018. I did not reply.”

She instead informed the authorities about the attempted recruitment, but the complaint was never resolved.

RFA was not able to confirm if both ads were produced by the same organization.

Increasing sophistication

With the spotlight focused on China’s spying activities, the Philippines must be more vigilant about modern ways that Beijing recruits spies, analysts told RFA.

“Now that this activity has been exposed, the Philippines’ defense and security postures must take into account more sophisticated attempts to gather sensitive information including hacking,” said Julio Amador III, a Manila-based political analyst who focuses on maritime disputes in the South China Sea.

There are “acceptable diplomatic activities” where accredited diplomats trade information for a common goal, but buying off state employees to obtain state secrets is patently illegal, he said.

“Information is a polarizing platform,” Chester Cabalza, founder of the Manila-based International Development and Security Cooperation research group, told RFA.

He said that the Filipinos acting as spies for Beijing heralds a new era where the “generation, transmission, and use of information” are the “new drivers for military power.

“Espionage derails the success of a maritime or terrestrial strategy,” he said, stressing that the 2024 Spratlys collision incident proves that the Chinese spy network in the Philippines has been active.

China has flatly denied all espionage allegations. “In the past few years, so-called Chinese spy cases have either collapsed or riddled with factual errors,” Beijing’s embassy in Manila said in a statement in February, when the first reports of the alleged spy network emerged.

Edited by Eugene Whong.

Taiwan’s Ocean Affairs Council Minister Kuan Bi-ling travelled last month to Taiping Island, where she oversaw exercises officially framed as humanitarian operations.

(RFA)

Also known as Itu Aba, Taiping is Taiwan’s only holding in the hotly contested Spratly Islands, strategically located in a resource-rich part of the South China Sea, and at the center of shipping lanes traversed by trillions of dollars in trade each year.

China has increasingly used gray zone tactics – provocative actions by non-military entities such as its coast guard – to project its power in the Spratlys and other areas of the South China Sea, and the Taiwanese minister’s visit seems to be along the same lines, the analysts said.

During Taiwan’s first ministerial visit to Taiping in seven years, Kuan oversaw operations officially framed as humanitarian exercises, but footage also showed a drill where heavily armed coast guard personnel practiced boarding a cargo ship “trespassing” in what Taipei claims are its territorial waters.

Signaling without escalation

The use of the coast guard in this manner blurs the line between civilian law enforcement and military activity, William Yang, a Northeast Asia analyst at the Belgium-based International Crisis Group think tank, told RFA.

“By framing the exercise as ‘humanitarian,’ Taiwan seeks to strike a balance between enhancing its coast guard’s capabilities and avoiding prompting a direct, aggressive response from China,” he said, adding that the inclusion of the armed boarding drill reflects a push to expand the role of law enforcement as part of Taipei’s claim.

Taiwan has long maintained a garrison on Taiping, also claimed by China, Vietnam and the Philippines, but the inclusion of coast guard actions there marks a shift in signalling, Aadil Brar, a Taipei-based independent analyst and former visiting scholar at the National Chengchi University, told RFA.

(Reuters)

“I’d frame it as a deliberate intensification rather than a clean break from existing policy,” said Brar. “When you have the first ministerial visit to the island in seven years, with Ocean Affairs Minister Kuan Bi-ling physically present on the ground, you’re looking at a clear political signal layered on top of routine military activity.”

Brar noted that the participation of a coast guard special task unit and the release of video footage showing an armed boarding operation suggested Taipei “wanted this to be seen,” describing it as “a calculated assertiveness” in Taiwan’s posture.

The timing also coincided with heightened military activity across the region, including the large-scale joint “Balikatan” exercises between the United States and the Philippines, and increased Chinese naval deployments.

“Taiwan is essentially positioning itself as an active stakeholder in that moment, not a passive observer,” Brar said.

Spratly significance

The Spratly Islands are the focal point of overlapping territorial claims by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.

Taiping Island is the largest naturally formed feature in the Spratlys and it has a runway capable of handling military resupply aircraft. A recently upgraded wharf there can accommodate large patrol vessels, though it remains lightly defended compared to the heavily fortified Chinese-controlled outposts nearby.

For Taiwan, the island represents its only foothold in asserting claims in the South China Sea, giving added weight to Taipei’s efforts to demonstrate both presence and governance.

In a 2016 case brought by the Philippines challenging the legitimacy of the nine-dash-line drawn by China to assert its claims over almost the entire South China Sea, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled in favor of the Philippines, declaring China’s line had no basis in international law.

That ruling, however, qualified Taiping only as a “rock” under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, because it was not able to sustain human life or economic activity on its own.

It meant that even if Taiwan were to have undisputed sovereignty over Taiping, its non-island status would limit the territory that could be claimed in its exclusive economic zone, so Taiwan rejects this finding.

Analysts told RFA the visit is also aimed at proving that the island is more than a rock, reinforcing Taiwan’s claim that it is an island with normal administrative functions.

Coast guard gray zone

Taiwan’s coast guard is increasing coordination with its navy to more effectively counter Chinese claims, Yang said.

“As China continues to assert its territorial claims across the South China Sea, Taipei understands that it also needs to step up its involvement in defending its control over Itu Aba,” he said.

Brar said the use of coast guard forces offers Taipei a strategic advantage.

“The coast guard is the ideal instrument,” he said. “It sits in a legally ambiguous space – it’s not the navy, so activating it doesn’t constitute a militarised act under most international frameworks, but it carries weapons, operates with tactical discipline, and can enforce jurisdiction.”

That allows Taiwan to project deterrence while limiting the risk of escalation, he said, describing the approach as “textbook gray-zone operation design.”

Despite the calibrated nature of such actions, the growing reliance on coast guards to assert claims carries risks.

Vietnam protested Kuan’s visit, saying any foreign activities in the Spratlys without its consent infringe on its sovereignty, stressing how even non-military operations can inflame tensions.

As more countries expand the scope of their coast guard operations, analysts warn that there may be less distinction between civilian and military activity, raising the risk of miscalculation.

Still, Taiwan appears to be betting that carefully staged shows of presence – framed as humanitarian and law enforcement missions – can strengthen its position without crossing thresholds that would provoke a direct response from Beijing, Brar said.

“That’s gray-zone strategy in its most refined form,” he said. “You change facts on the ground and shift psychological perception, all while the other side struggles to find a legitimate counter-move that doesn’t cost them more than it costs you.”

Edited by Eugene Whong.

Transcript:

Hello. I’m Bay Fang, President and CEO of Radio Free Asia.

As we mark World Press Freedom Day, I’m proud to say that RFA is back.

Our journalists have resumed producing the news that would otherwise go unread, unseen, and unheard.

Since returning, RFA Uyghur broke the news about Uyghur children in Xinjiang being forced into manual labor;

RFA Burmese saved lives with its coverage of a community in a war-torn village of Myanmar that lacked critical supplies.

And RFA’s Mandarin Service let listeners in China hear from Olympic gold medalist Alysa Liu’s father, who fled China after the Tiananmen protests in 1989.

Audiences have made it clear how much RFA means to them.

And in March, digital engagement showed RFA’s viewership is rebounding.

This is a win, as our existence was in jeopardy last year.

So thank you for sticking by us, as we fought hard to bring uncensored news to you.

But journalists still face enormous challenges.

We were thrilled and relieved that RFA Burmese contributor and award-winning documentarian, Shin Daewe was released.

She had been wrongfully detained for almost three years.

And she is not alone as an RFA journalist facing persecution. We still have four contributors serving lengthy prison sentences in Vietnam.

Meanwhile, hundreds more journalists are imprisoned or detained worldwide, with China, Myanmar, and Vietnam among the worst offenders.

As we celebrate World Press Freedom Day, let’s remember that a free press is not a privilege, but a fundamental right.

It can also help shape a future at peace, which is what the world needs right now.

At RFA, we will keep fighting to bring our audiences the truth.

No matter the odds, no matter the obstacles that stand in our way.

I promise you: We’ll meet the moment.

During the three-day visit to the southern coastal city of Guangzhou, Marape discussed partnerships in green energy, agriculture and special economic zones, and he met with investors in two controversial mining projects: a potential gold and copper mine on the Frieda River and an expansion of the Ramu Nickel Mine.

(Chinese government media)

Though the Frieda River Project has not yet broken ground, critics worry that its environmental footprint might be so great that it could destroy the entire Sepik River ecosystem. Meanwhile the Ramu Nickel Mine is often cited as PNG’s environmental and social cautionary tale. Not only has it been criticized for poor occupational health standards, in 2019 a toxic waste catastrophe at the nickel mine turned the ocean red, killed marine life, and caused residents to develop severe skin rashes.

The problem is not only limited to Papua New Guinea; Chinese investment in overseas mining projects all over the world has resulted in serious human rights abuses and environmental harm, a 2023 report by the London-based Business & Human Rights Resource Centre said.

But Marape’s office has viewed both projects as essential for national economic growth, and to diversify the economy away from raw materials export by including downstream processing.

At what cost?

While the government’s attempts to attract investment are welcome, the projects should not be rushed, Paul Barker, executive director of the PNG Institute of National Affairs, a Port Moresby-based think tank, told RFA.

“PNG is a relatively high cost economy which is why there is not already more diversification and value adding,” he said. “High domestic costs are associated with poor infrastructure, local monopolies, including by state-owned and poorly performing monopolies, law and order issues, weak investment over the years in HR development, including technical and business skills, and other factors.”

(Chinese government media)

Barker said conquering these challenges was necessary to enable economic diversification, and to encourage Papua New Guineans to participate in and lead their own economy.

“Secondly, the Prime Minister should be careful not to rush investment with inadequate safeguards,” said Barker. “Social, environmental and safety standards, equity, and ensuring local benefits must be prerequisites.”

The goal of investment should be to uplift the people, not to undermine them, Anton Sekum, the acting general secretary of the Papua New Guinea Trade Union Congress, told RFA.

“Foreign investment is welcome. But it must come with responsibility,” he said. “Too often, experiences across sectors—from large-scale resource projects like Ramu Nickel mine to major infrastructure construction, wholesale, and retail—have shown that worker welfare, wages, and conditions fall below acceptable standards from Chinese owned investments.”

He said that it was important that jobs for Papua New Guineans should not pay only a survival wage.

“They must provide dignity, security, and the opportunity for real economic mobility,” he said. “Foreign investment must play a transformative role—not just extracting value, but building it.”

He also stressed that respect for human rights and the democratic rights of the people were equally important, and called on Marape to make clear to China that exploitation in labor would not be tolerated.

“Papua New Guinea must not seek investors who come only to take,” he said. “Instead, we must seek partners who are prepared to build, to transfer knowledge, and to leave a legacy of empowered people.”

Land acquired

At a press conference Friday, Marape said his trip was “good and wonderful.”

He revealed that in addition to securing investment in the mines, China also gave PNG two tracts of land–one in Beijing and one in Guangzhou–which will be used for diplomatic purposes.

“I want to say thank you to China for this gesture which was unknown to us. The Kundu Beijing project will be workable and will place the face of PNG in China,” he said referring to a partnership program with a goal of advancing PNG’s economy, named after the hourglass shaped drum that is often found in formal ceremonies in Papua New Guinea.

Edited by Eugene Whong.

Myanmar’s former leader Aung San Suu Kyi has been transferred to house arrest, the country’s military-controlled state media announced Thursday.

The 80-year old state counselor was moved from Naypyidaw prison to “the designated residence” to serve the remainder of her sentence, state-run MRTV reported without specifying exactly where this residence was.

State media also showed a the first public photo of the former leader in several years. She was at a table with men in military and police uniforms.

Suu Kyi has been in military custody since the February 2021 coup that dissolved Myanmar’s democratically elected parliament and installed a government headed by General Min Aung Hlaing.

She was convicted of 19 charges, including corruption, and sentenced to 33 years in prison.

Since then, her location has been unclear, and in April, members of civil groups, including her son Kim Aris, launched a campaign urging the junta to prove she is alive.

Aris old Radio Free Asia that the junta’s decision to commute his mother’s sentence was not a release from prison, and she is still held hostage. He repeated his call for evidence she is still living.

“If she has actually been moved to house arrest, then they should be allowing her to communicate with me as her basic human right,” said Aris. “At the moment, all that’s happening is she’s been moved from one undisclosed location to another undisclosed location.”

In 2023, Aung San Suu Kyi’s sentence was reduced to 27 years and then by one-sixth during a Myanmar New Year’s amnesty this year to 22 years and six months.

Having already served more than five years since the coup, 18 years and nine months remain.

Sources close to the military told Radio Free Asia that Suu Kyi was moved to a deputy minister-level residence and a team led by Lt. Col. Tin Aung Tun has been in charge of security since March.

Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Lin Jian on Thursday said that Myanmar’s Aung San Suu Kyi is a long-standing friend of China, and that China has consistently monitored developments regarding her situation.

Edited by Eugene Whong.

Update adds remarks from Kim Aris.

“Olivia and Mira bring decades of human rights and national security expertise in the Indo-Pacific region,” said RFA President Bay Fang. “Their invaluable experience and background will benefit RFA enormously as we rebuild journalistic operations and capacity. I welcome them both to RFA’s board of directors at a crucial time for our company.”

“RFA occupies a unique role as a beacon of press freedom in Asia and globally, amplifying voices and communities that would otherwise be silenced by brutal regimes,” Enos said. “As a member of its corporate board, I look forward to helping RFA achieve its goals, returning it to its status as a bulwark against foreign propaganda and malign influence.”

“RFA’s incisive reporting and analysis of national security issues in the Indo-Pacific, and their timely coverage of China’s tightening grip in the region, makes its work more important now than ever,” Rapp-Hooper said. “I am thrilled to help this great organization meet the moment as a member of its board.”

In addition to her work at Hudson Institute, Enos is an adjunct professor at Georgetown University and a contributor at Forbes. Previously, she worked as Washington Director for the Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong Foundation and as Senior Policy Analyst for Asian Studies at the Heritage Foundation. Prior to working at Brookings and The Asia Group, Rapp-Hooper served as the senior director for East Asia and Oceania at the White House’s National Security Council (NSC), as well as the NSC director for Indo-Pacific strategy.

The two new members join Chair Carolyn Bartholomew, Shanthi Kalathil, Sam Stratman, Michael Green, Michael Kempner, Keith Richburg, and James Mann in serving on RFA’s corporate board.

The imagery shows new buildings and plumes of steam in previously inactive areas of the complex, which lies roughly 90 kilometers (56 miles) north of the capital.

North Korea has long claimed that Yongbyon serves peaceful, civilian energy purposes, but the international community and monitoring organizations say that the complex produces fissile materials to produce nuclear weapons.

The increased activity observed in April follows Kim Jong Un’s announcement at the Ninth Congress of the ruling Korean Workers’ Party in February that the country would build up and diversify its nuclear arsenal over the next five years.

Where there’s smoke…

Images captured by Planet Labs on April 18 and 20 show steam emitting from the thermal generating plant at the radiochemical laboratory. On March 12 and April 25, images showed the reactor discharging water into the nearby Kuryong River. These discharges are consistent with many other images captured since January.

(Analyzed by Jacob Bogle/RFA)

The evidence suggests that North Korea is producing weapons grade plutonium, Olli Heinonen, a former deputy director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency and a distinguished fellow at the Stimson Center, told RFA.

“It looks that North Korea still continues to produce plutonium in the 5 megawatt reactor and it’s on a campaign basis,” he said, using a technical term to indicate a start-to-finish production cycle. “So it operates for about a year or so and then they discharge the fuel which is a very quick operation.”

(Analyzed by Jacob Bogle/RFA)

Jacob Bogle, a U.S.-based private satellite imagery analyst, told RFA that since October 2024, the complex has been in its seventh cycle of fuel irradiation and reprocessing for plutonium production.

“This multi-year cycle of activity has continued to the present and is supported by two key pieces of visual evidence - consistent water discharge from the 5 MW reactor throughout 2026 and occasional activity at the Radiochemistry Lab as indicated by steam generation,” he said.

The findings are consistent with confirmation from the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, that North Korea has significantly expanded its nuclear activities at Yongbyon.

During a visit to South Korea on April 15, IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi told reporters that many of the facilities at Yongbyon, including the main reactor, were active.

“This suggests a serious increase in North Korea’s nuclear weapons production capacity, which appears sufficient to produce dozens of warheads,” Grossi said, adding that the construction of a new nuclear enrichment facility comparable to existing ones had also been confirmed.

Construction ongoing

Satellite imagery also confirms that new buildings are appearing at the complex. Exterior construction on one of the new buildings–suspected to be a new uranium enrichment facility–was completed in either November or December of last year.

(Analyzed by Jacob Bogle/RFA)

Bogle said that melting snow on the roof of the building was visible, suggesting the building is connected to electricity and that interior construction is at a minimum still ongoing.

A vehicle was observed next to the building on April 15, though no external indicators have emerged to determine whether interior work is still in progress or whether the facility has become operational.

Additionally, in March, the roofs of two buildings within the radiochemical laboratory were replaced.

New high-rise residential buildings have also been erected in the area, likely needed to house an expanded workforce.

(RFA)

Heinonen said that the satellite images showed changes to the complex that are not yet understood. In the southern part of the complex, in an area where fuel rods were fabricated, four entirely new buildings have appeared.

“Some of them seem also to be quite well-built and one is even separated from the others with a fence which tells me that it’s very important,” he said. “We don’t know what it is, but I think that these buildings have to do with a plan of Kim Jong Un to enhance the nuclear weapons production and to produce nuclear material and components for nuclear weapons. So we have to see that change as a part of his former and current five-year plan.”

Edited by Eugene Whong.

The crisis was kicked into full gear in March, when 19 members of parliament defected from Prime Minister Jeremiah Manele’s ruling coalition, called the Government for National Unity and Transformation, or GNUT, to join the opposition.

This created an opposition coalition of 28 parliament members, a majority of the 50-seat legislative body. They immediately filed a motion for no confidence, and called on Manele to convene parliament so a vote could be held.

But Manele has been refusing to convene, so he remains Prime Minister.

Shift to Beijing

Manele has been described by observers as pro-Chinese, just like his predecessor Manasseh Sogavare, under whom Manele served as foreign minister.

Then-Foreign Minister Manele signed the 2019 agreement to recognize China instead of Taiwan, and was a central figure in negotiating the 2022 security pact with Beijing that opposition leader Matthew Wale has criticized as being too secretive and undermining the security of the Solomon Islands, based on leaked drafts of the agreement prior to its signing.

Beijing has even set up a police station in the capital Honiara, a move that sparked concern among the U.S. and Australia that China was expanding its security and surveillance capabilities beyond its borders.

Violent civil unrest broke out in 2021, with protesters claiming that Sogavare was selling off the country’s sovereignty to Beijing, and calling for him to resign. Rioters attacked Chinatown businesses in the capital Honiara, torched one of Sogavare’s homes, and attempted to storm parliament.

(Charley Piringi/AFP)

Three years later, Chinese influence in the Solomons was very much on the ballot in 2024, with opposition candidates even saying that if elected as prime minister, they would cancel the security agreement and switch back to recognizing Taiwan, but Manele’s party prevailed and he was sworn in.

Manele’s government is a continuation of the Sogavare’s pro-Beijing stance, Joseph Foukona, a history professor at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, who hails from the Solomon Islands, told RFA.

“So in his role in the previous government, which was where Sogavare was the prime minister, It’s obvious that he promotes the one China policy and his government is sort of aligned with that policy as well,” Foukona said.

But when asked what the current rift in the government is about, Foukona said that there was not really much detail about why the 19 members of parliament defected, only saying that they must be having “internal issues.”

The rift is over more than just the pro-China stances of Manele’s government, Kathryn Paik, deputy director and senior fellow with the Australia Chair at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, or CSIS, told RFA.

“There’s a lot more going on domestically and there’s a lot of power plays domestically happening within the parliament that might have nothing to do with China and the China relationship,” she said. “Parliamentarians are also going to use that relationship with China for their advantage whether it’s to oust Manele or if that’s a good argument against it.

But she said it is likely that China has started to build relationships with other politicians in the Solomon Islands as a hedge, just in case they come into power in the future.

What next?

The opposition, now referred to as the New Coalition, won a legal challenge in mid-April, with the country’s High Court ruling that Manele was unconstitutionally delaying the vote.

Manele’s government has filed an appeal to that decision, and the Court of Appeal is expected to issue a ruling on Friday.

(Reuters)

But even if he wins the appeal, Manele will eventually have to convene parliament. Legally, the country’s constitution mandates that the body must meet at least once per year, and practically, it must pass yearly appropriations budgets to avoid a government shutdown.

Barring a breakup in the New Coalition or a withdrawal of the motion of no confidence, Manele will have to face the music eventually, and that could lead to his ouster.

Regardless of whether Manele survives the vote or is ousted, the country’s relationship with China will be more of the same, Paik said.

“I don’t expect there to be a fundamental change,” she said. “China has established a pretty regular presence on the ground as of right now and we haven’t seen any real push by any parliamentarians to change that significantly outside of Wale and some other opposition leaders.”

Manele has already survived one vote of no confidence roughly a year ago, defeating a motion led by his predecessor Sogavare.

Shortly after the 19 parliament members switched sides in March, Manele swore in Sogavare as his deputy prime minister in an attempt to stabilize the remaining pieces of his coalition.

Foukona said the off-again, on-again alliance between Sogavare and Manele is driven by their respective personal interests.

“They usually say that in Solomon’s politics there’s no permanent enemy,” he said.

China’s foreign ministry and its embassy in Honiara have not made any direct statement regarding the Solomon Islands since the beginning of the political crisis.

Edited by Charlie Dharapak.

The annual summit brings together leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, to discuss regional security and economic issues. China is participating as a dialogue partner this year, and the forum presents an opportunity to address the South China Sea, a persistent flashpoint where China’s sweeping claims overlap with the exclusive economic zones of several Southeast Asian states.

(Hasnoor Hussain/Reuters)

Regional officials have said they are aiming to complete negotiations on the COC by 2026, but key issues, including its geographic scope, legal status and enforcement mechanisms, remain unresolved after more than two decades of talks.

Resolution unlikely

It is improbable that a code resolving all disputes in the South China Sea could be hammered out at the ASEAN leaders’ summit this year, Joseph Kristanto, a research analyst at Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, told RFA. The key issue at the summit will be if meaningful progress on mitigating tensions can be achieved.

“While the COC may help prevent misunderstandings in daily interactions, I’d say it’s unlikely to stop grey-zone activities or coercive behavior by claimant states, most notably China, altogether,” he said. “Therefore, the COC is best seen as a mechanism for managing friction, rather than transforming the underlying dynamics of the dispute.”

Agreements to reduce friction have been tried before. ASEAN and China signed a non-binding Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in 2002 and began formal negotiations on a binding code in 2013. Progress since then has been described by some officials as slow.

COC negotiators face a fundamental trade-off between a politically feasible but limited “thin” code based on general principles, and a more robust framework with clearer rules and enforcement mechanisms that would be harder to achieve, Kristanto said.

“The slow pace of the COC process demonstrates the complexity of these issues and exposes the limits of ASEAN’s consensus approach,” he said.

Other analysts say that China’s track record of frequent provocations in the region makes them skeptical that any agreement would make a meaningful difference in practice.

“My pessimism on the COC really comes down to two things: China’s track record of undermining or ignoring its existing agreements, and the question of who would actually do the binding in a ‘legally binding’ COC,” Ray Powell, executive director of Stanford University’s SeaLight maritime transparency project, told RFA.

(RFA)

Powell noted that the 2002 declaration already committed parties to self-restraint and peaceful dispute resolution, yet tensions have persisted.

“That experience shows the problem is not the absence of written rules but a lack of any authority China is willing to accept above its own political will,” he said, adding that a meaningful code would require an enforcement or arbitration mechanism that Beijing has historically rejected.

A weaker version, he warned, could risk undermining existing legal protections for Southeast Asian states under international law.

Legal questions

Others argue that even a limited agreement could still play a role in stabilizing day-to-day interactions, provided it is grounded in established international legal frameworks.

“A substantive and comprehensive COC on the South China Sea would not just be about something that could ease the tensions between the Philippines and China,” Josue Raphael J. Cortez of the De La Salle-College of Saint Benilde in the Philippines, told RFA.

“Instead, it would be an inclusive document, grounded in UNCLOS and public international law that should pave the way for all state claimants to coexist responsibly and peacefully,” he said, referring to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Cortez said a meaningful code should go beyond traditional issues such as fisheries and navigation to include broader resource-sharing arrangements, including oil, gas and critical minerals, reflecting the region’s evolving economic stakes.

Though a legally binding framework could help reduce tensions, he cautioned that it would need to be backed by continued dialogue and mechanisms to ensure compliance.

“Forging such an agreement can never be enough,” he said. “Instead, continuous dialogue … must still be continued so as to ascertain compliance and whether future revisions can be undertaken for the framework’s viability.”

The 48th ASEAN Summit is slated to start May 5-9 in Cebu, Philippines.

Edited by Eugene Whong.

According to state media, the country’s leader Kim Jong Un personally guided the construction of the Sinuiju Greenhouse Farm Complex. It has been touted as a way to rejuvenate Wihwa, Mado and Kumdong islands in the Yalu River, near the border with China, which were leveled by flooding in 2024.

At the farm complex’ dedication in February, Kim acknowledged the floods as being the heaviest on record, but said the project overcame nature to create “from which our people will benefit for all ages.”

(RFA)

At a gargantuan 450 hectares (1.7 square miles), the Farm Complex is roughly the size of 625 soccer fields, and authorities claim it can produce vegetables eight months out of the year.

But thermal infrared imagery from NASA’s Landsat-8 satellite suggests that only 44% of the total complex was registering temperatures above the surrounding average, Bruce Songhak Chung, a researcher at the Seoul-based Institute for National Security Strategy, told RFA.

He told Radio Free Asia that after seeing the thermal data from March 10 that the unheated areas were evidence that either heating infrastructure has not been fully installed or that chronic electricity shortages are preventing the greenhouses from operating at full capacity.

(RFA)

Chung also examined nighttime light imagery (VIIRS) captured by the U.S. Suomi NPP weather satellite at approximately 1:30 a.m. on April 17, finding almost no detectable light emanating from the Sinuiju Greenhouse Farm. The electric grow-lights typically used in smart farming operations were largely absent — a finding consistent with reports of frequent power shortages due to poor electricity infrastructure inside the country.

Kim Hyuk, a senior researcher specializing in North Korean agriculture at the South Korea-based Korea Rural Community Corporation’s Rural Research Institute, told RFA that the heat maps showed only parts of the farm were getting power.

“What can be analyzed through nighttime light and thermal infrared imagery at the Sinuiju Greenhouse Farm suggests just one unit equipped with solar panels and five glass greenhouse units — covering only about 25 hectares (0.1 square miles),” he said. “The rest is closer to basic plastic coverings than properly equipped greenhouses, and the electricity that can be generated from the solar installation is not sufficient to meet the farm’s power demands.”

(RFA)

Kim noted that Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) imagery taken on April 19 visually confirmed that crops appear to have been planted across most of the greenhouse units, suggesting an operational rate of roughly 65–75% — somewhat higher than what thermal infrared data alone indicated.

Despite the more optimistic imagery, whether the farm can actually deliver on the authorities’ claim of eight or more months of annual harvests through solar power and geothermal systems remains an open question.

South Korean satellite imagery analysis firm SI Analytics reached a similar conclusion in its own assessment published in March, warning that the large-scale complex risks becoming a “ghost greenhouse” during winter months.

(KCNA/AFP)

In its report, SI Analytics wrote that while the Sinuiju Greenhouse Farm is now being heavily promoted as a model for regional development to showcase achievements in “improving the people’s standard of living” however, it is expected to face significant practical challenges.

The primary issue is the supply of essential energy sources such as coal, heavy oil, and electricity required for its operation. Greenhouses are facilities primarily used in winter, yet this region is a flat border area in the northernmost part of North Korea, making it one of the country’s coldest locations, the report said.

Edited by Eugene Whong.

The increased scope of the “Balikatan” exercises reflect the Philippines taking on a more decisive role in its own defense, while still remaining strongly committed to its bilateral alliance with the United States, the analysts said.

Though officials leading in “Balikatan” exercises do not mention China by name, the war games are occurring amid increased Chinese tensions in the sea. Japan, which, like the Philippines, also faces territorial challenges from China in the East China Sea, is playing a more direct and active role in this year’s drills, reflecting its growing defense ties with Manila.

All told, there are 17,000 personnel participating, including 10,000 from the U.S. and 7,000 from the Philippines and partner nations Japan, France, Canada and Australia.

Active defense posture

The Philippines’ gradual shift to an “active defense posture” reflects the growing defense dynamics in the region, as China sees more opposition from weaker neighbors seeking strength by banding together, the analysts said.

“For years, Manila operated within a relatively constrained framework, relying heavily on its alliance with the United States,” Arnaud Leveau, president of the Paris-based Asia Centre think tank and an assistant professor at Paris Dauphine University, told RFA. “What we are seeing now is a gradual effort to assert greater agency while remaining firmly anchored in that alliance.”

(Ted Aljibe/AFP)

Manila exerting more control over its defense is an indication that it is adapting to the current geopolitical climate, he said.

“I see it as a rather calibrated adjustment to changing circumstances. In this context, signaling resolve should not be seen as escalation, but rather as a form of deterrence,” he said. “Repeated incidents at sea have shown that ambiguity can invite further pressure.”

Chinese provocations at sea have become increasingly common in recent years. Earlier this month, China erected a floating barrier at the disputed Scarborough Shoal to block access to Philippine fishing boats. Around the same time the Philippine Navy spotted ten Chinese coast guard vessels there, attempting to enforce a blockade.

Previous incidents have included Chinese ships blasting Philippine fishing boats with water cannons or even ramming them.

Though Manila may be signaling resolve through this year’s Balikatan, sustaining the effort to be more active in its own defense would remain a challenge, Leveau said, adding that shifting to more “credible capabilities” requires real investments in command structures, improving logistical resilience as well as maritime awareness.

Victor Andres Manhit, president of the Manila-based defense think tank Stratbase Institute, told RFA that the Philippines needed to “fully operationalize its posture of active defense” to thwart China’s ever-increasing territorial threats.

This year’s Balikatan numbers “represent the correct path forward” to address the challenge, Manhit said. This sends a “clear and unambiguous message…that the Philippines and its partners are prepared to defend the rules-based international order against coercion, intimidation, and unlawful claims.”

(Philippine Coast Guard via AFP)

The Philippines will mark the 10th anniversary in July of a 2016 international arbitration court’s ruling that invalidated China’s sweeping territorial claims in the sea region. That landmark ruling is hailed internationally, even as it China has continued to reject it.

The increased participation in Balikatan from other countries besides the U.S. underscores the importance of Manila having partnerships with its allied neighbors, Manhit said. “It affirms that we are not isolated, and that our national security is anchored in strong alliances with nations that uphold international law and share our commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific.”

Evolving alliance

Philippine Armed Forces chief Gen. Romeo Brawner, during a ceremony where he declared the war games open Monday, said the drills served to amplify the “strength of an alliance” and the shared responsibility of securing the region.

“For more than three decades, Balikatan has stood as a living testament to the partnership between the Philippines and the United States. One that has grown stronger, more responsive, and more relevant with time,” he said.

(Noel Celis/Reuters)

Brawner said that participating countries “remain guided by a shared commitment to uphold international law, to respect sovereignty, and to contribute to a free and open Indo-Pacific where nations can thrive without coercion.”

“We are building more than capability. We are building systems that think, move and respond as one,” he said. “Let me emphasize this. Balikatan is readiness made real, cooperation put into action, and peace preserved through our strength.”

Observers told RFA that the joint exercises have evolved into a forum within which all participants can flex their combined strength, including Japan, which until taking on a combat role in Balikatan this year, had participated as an observer or in a limited capacity in prior iterations.

Japan, for one, “is aligning its operational posture with the realities of increased friction in the South China Sea and the Indo-Pacific area as well,” Leveu said, adding that the annual Balikatan drills have evolved “into a platform for more flexible, mini-lateral forms of cooperation” that complements an American-centric alliance.

Lucio Pitlo, a foreign policy expert at the Philippine Association for Chinese Studies, told RFA Japan’s increasing military engagements in the region reflected its gradual shift from its post-World War II pacifist stance, with Tokyo keeping in step with the U.S. defense initiatives in the region.

“Japan has been growing in security profile in the region in recent years, motivated by changing domestic views and regional and global developments,” Pitlo said. Both Manila and Washington welcome this development, because “it has expanded our network of defense partners and increased allied access in our territory.”

Edited by Eugene Whong.

An independent researcher turned a routine job interview into an intelligence operation when he identified a North Korean IT worker applying under a false identity.

RFA’s Jaewoo Park sat down with him to understand how these operatives evade detection.

Outside of Yangon’s Insein Prison, Shin Daewe, who was handed a life sentence for “abetting terrorism” in 2024, told Radio Free Asia that there are still many on the inside that were in need of prayers.

“I am the happiest,” she said. “Whether it’s me or one of the others, we all just wanted every day to see our families. I am lucky today, but I have many friends who are not as lucky as me. I ask everyone to pray for them too.”

(Courtesy of Shin Daewe's family)

Known for her work highlighting the challenges facing Myanmar’s environment and the impact of conflict on civilians following the military’s 2021 coup, Shin Daewe was arrested in October 2023 in Yangon while picking up a video drone she had ordered online to use in filming a documentary.

Then in January 2024, a military court sentenced her to life in prison, the maximum sentence under section 50(j) of the Counter-terrorism Law.

Observers at that time said the ruling was a bid by the junta to stamp out criticism by using lengthy sentences to instill fear in opponents to its rule.

The junta reduced her sentence to 15 years in January 2025 as part of a larger prisoner amnesty, before finally releasing her entirely on Friday.

Shin Daewe told RFA Friday evening that she is back home now healthy and happy, and that she is grateful to those who helped her during her time of need.

Shin Daewe had contributed to RFA’s Burmese Service since 2010 and up until her arrest.

(Courtesy of Shin Daewe's family)

“The news of Shin Daewe’s release from detention comes as a welcome relief,” said Bay Fang, President of RFA, in a statement released immediately after Shin Daewe’s release. "Shin Daewe suffered enormously and unfairly for her work to bring uncensored journalism to people in Myanmar. This development is a testament to efforts by many, including RSF and PEN America, to secure her release. I am heartened to learn Shin is back at her home, reunited with her family and loved ones.”

Reporters Without Borders, or RSF, said in a statement that Shin Daewe’s release was an “immense relief” not only for her loved ones, “but also for the entire Myanmar journalism community.”

“It must be made clear that she should never have been arrested, nor subjected to mistreatment,” said RSF. “We now call on the Myanmar regime to immediately release the 40 journalists still detained in the country.”

In 2024, the Alliance for Women in Media Foundation honored Shin Daewe with a Gracie Award for her 2023 RFA video report, Ayeyarwady Riverbank Erosion, and she also won a Wallis Annenberg Justice for Women Journalists Award from the International Women’s Media Foundation.

Edited by Eugene Whong.