The man, who identified himself by the pseudonym “Danny,” told Radio Free Asia that this is how he was initially recruited into what he and the Philippine armed forces now believe was a Chinese spying scheme.

Danny is one of three Filipino nationals who were caught for allegedly spying for China earlier this year. He is currently in the Philippine military’s custody, and they allowed him to tell his story to RFA, saying that Danny’s case is part of a growing trend of jobseekers who find themselves spying for Beijing, even unknowingly at first.

Danny has been cooperative since his detention began and his story aligns with evidence in the military’s investigation, according to a military source who requested anonymity due to the sensitive nature of the case. RFA was not able to independently confirm Danny’s testimony using non-military sources.

Easy money?

The ad that caught his eye sought a military consultant, so Danny, who already had deep business connections with the Philippine Coast Guard, posed as an active member to increase his chances of getting hired. The deception seemingly paid off, and he soon began filing reports about the coast guard for extra cash.

At first it was easy, he said. Everything they wanted was all publicly available online. But quickly, the assignments morphed into detailed inquiries on troop movements, including patrols in the West Philippine Sea, Manila’s term for the areas of the South China Sea it considers to be within its exclusive economic zone, much of which is also claimed by China.

At one point Danny got in so deep that he stole data from the mobile phone of his friend, an officer in the coast guard. The information he passed on kept his employer happy. But the requests steadily became more urgent, and his contact more demanding.

Danny spoke to RFA in a mixture of English and Tagalog in a room guarded by Philippine soldiers at an undisclosed location in Manila. He had obscured his physical features with a face covering, sunglasses and a hiking cap. He explained why he initially responded to the ad.

“I had a problem in business and was desperate to find money,” he said. “I was enticed to work for them because of my situation.”

Over the course of the interview, Danny would remove the cap and hood.

Loose lips…

Danny’s realization that what he was doing had dangerous consequences came in August 2024, when Chinese coast guard vessel 3104 collided with two Philippine coast guard ships – the BRP Bagacay and the BRP Cape Engaño – near Sabina Shoal in the disputed Spratly Islands chain. Though no one was hurt, the two Philippine ships sustained heavy damage.

Prior to the incident, Danny had provided the vessels’ coordinates to his employer, and he said his report may have enabled the Chinese to intercept them.

“I was angry, I did not expect that they would ram the ships. I had friends there,” he said.

After the clash in the Spratlys, he started to suspect that his employer might not actually be a U.S.-based publisher, so he cut off all contact.

The employer sent someone who identified himself as “Peter,” whom Danny assumes was a Chinese agent assigned to preserve the asset-handler relationship.

Peter offered Danny an increase in pay to keep sending in information.

“That’s when I learned I was being used, but I still continued.” Danny said.

After meeting Peter, Danny began using an alternative method to transmit data. On his smartphone was an app that to the unsuspecting eye looked like a mobile version of the popular video game Tetris, but in actuality it was the access point for a secret website where he could upload the data he stole.

Cover blown

The military began to suspect that someone was leaking information to the Chinese after the incident in the Spratlys, according to the military source, but the source would not confirm to RFA when they learned that Danny was the culprit.

(Adrian Portugal/Reuters)

About a year after the incident, in mid-2025, Danny suspected the authorities were on to him, and he asked Peter for help.

“‘Remain calm,’ that’s what he said. ‘We will come and get you.’”

But Danny was afraid, he explained. He thought it meant that the spy organization would either send more agents to take him out of the Philippines or worse, silence him.

Before any of that could happen, the Philippine military took him into custody.

“I was surprised, even though I knew it was coming,” Danny said. “Now, I am cooperating with the government, but what will happen to me in the future is uncertain as of yet.”

Danny said his friends in the coastguard now view him as a traitor.

“What I regret most is what happened to Cape Engaño, but there is nothing I can do anymore. It already happened,” he said.

The military would not comment on whether Danny is charged with espionage or any other crime, nor whether he had legal representation, nor if he would be tried in court.

RFA was not allowed to speak to the other two suspected Filipino spies for China – civilian staff members from the Philippine Department of Defense and navy.

Like Danny, they are also believed to have sold sensitive information to the Chinese, including troop positions and details about a military modernization program supported by the Philippines’ key ally, the United States, the military source said.

Spies among us

Apprehending the three spies may only be “scratching the surface” of a larger network, retired Rear Adm. Roy Vincent Trinidad, a spokesman for the Philippine Navy in the West Philippine Sea, told RFA.

“We found out that the payments were sent through electronic wallets, dead drops or sent via delivery packs,” he said. “Where do these come from, and who are these people sending them money?.”

(Dondi Tawatao/Reuters)

Trinidad said the hunt for more Filipino spies and their Chinese handlers is ongoing, and that the arrests of Danny and the two others were a result of the “insider threat program” launched in 2023 that focused on protecting sensitive government data, specifically those relating to the South China Sea.

Officials have said that spy recruitment usually follows a similar pattern. Spymasters recruit on publicly accessible online job platforms, such as onlinejobs.ph or LinkedIn. Often the targets are those with significant experience with the military, either as active duty members or in civilian roles.

One woman, who identified herself using the pseudonym Maria Nena, who once worked for the navy and had sensitive data, told RFA that in 2023, she responded to a job ad for a regional military researcher role for a publication called Military Express. Someone purporting to represent the publication contacted her and gave her a recruitment test.

“I was given a set of questions to answer and was told that I would be given 1-3 assignments to complete as part of the selection process, all of which will be paid upon completion,” Nena said. “After submitting my response, I never heard back.”

Months later she saw a similar ad on Facebook, using her real name as the contact. She grew suspicious and contacted the group. They contacted her via the WhatsApp messenger platform and asked where they could acquire sensitive materials she co-authored for the navy.

“They asked where they could buy the book, but I responded that they were not for sale as they were confidential documents,” she said. “They asked where they can download a declassified document on civil military operations that was released by the United States in 2018. I did not reply.”

She instead informed the authorities about the attempted recruitment, but the complaint was never resolved.

RFA was not able to confirm if both ads were produced by the same organization.

Increasing sophistication

With the spotlight focused on China’s spying activities, the Philippines must be more vigilant about modern ways that Beijing recruits spies, analysts told RFA.

“Now that this activity has been exposed, the Philippines’ defense and security postures must take into account more sophisticated attempts to gather sensitive information including hacking,” said Julio Amador III, a Manila-based political analyst who focuses on maritime disputes in the South China Sea.

There are “acceptable diplomatic activities” where accredited diplomats trade information for a common goal, but buying off state employees to obtain state secrets is patently illegal, he said.

“Information is a polarizing platform,” Chester Cabalza, founder of the Manila-based International Development and Security Cooperation research group, told RFA.

He said that the Filipinos acting as spies for Beijing heralds a new era where the “generation, transmission, and use of information” are the “new drivers for military power.

“Espionage derails the success of a maritime or terrestrial strategy,” he said, stressing that the 2024 Spratlys collision incident proves that the Chinese spy network in the Philippines has been active.

China has flatly denied all espionage allegations. “In the past few years, so-called Chinese spy cases have either collapsed or riddled with factual errors,” Beijing’s embassy in Manila said in a statement in February, when the first reports of the alleged spy network emerged.

Edited by Eugene Whong.

Taiwan’s Ocean Affairs Council Minister Kuan Bi-ling travelled last month to Taiping Island, where she oversaw exercises officially framed as humanitarian operations.

(RFA)

Also known as Itu Aba, Taiping is Taiwan’s only holding in the hotly contested Spratly Islands, strategically located in a resource-rich part of the South China Sea, and at the center of shipping lanes traversed by trillions of dollars in trade each year.

China has increasingly used gray zone tactics – provocative actions by non-military entities such as its coast guard – to project its power in the Spratlys and other areas of the South China Sea, and the Taiwanese minister’s visit seems to be along the same lines, the analysts said.

During Taiwan’s first ministerial visit to Taiping in seven years, Kuan oversaw operations officially framed as humanitarian exercises, but footage also showed a drill where heavily armed coast guard personnel practiced boarding a cargo ship “trespassing” in what Taipei claims are its territorial waters.

Signaling without escalation

The use of the coast guard in this manner blurs the line between civilian law enforcement and military activity, William Yang, a Northeast Asia analyst at the Belgium-based International Crisis Group think tank, told RFA.

“By framing the exercise as ‘humanitarian,’ Taiwan seeks to strike a balance between enhancing its coast guard’s capabilities and avoiding prompting a direct, aggressive response from China,” he said, adding that the inclusion of the armed boarding drill reflects a push to expand the role of law enforcement as part of Taipei’s claim.

Taiwan has long maintained a garrison on Taiping, also claimed by China, Vietnam and the Philippines, but the inclusion of coast guard actions there marks a shift in signalling, Aadil Brar, a Taipei-based independent analyst and former visiting scholar at the National Chengchi University, told RFA.

(Reuters)

“I’d frame it as a deliberate intensification rather than a clean break from existing policy,” said Brar. “When you have the first ministerial visit to the island in seven years, with Ocean Affairs Minister Kuan Bi-ling physically present on the ground, you’re looking at a clear political signal layered on top of routine military activity.”

Brar noted that the participation of a coast guard special task unit and the release of video footage showing an armed boarding operation suggested Taipei “wanted this to be seen,” describing it as “a calculated assertiveness” in Taiwan’s posture.

The timing also coincided with heightened military activity across the region, including the large-scale joint “Balikatan” exercises between the United States and the Philippines, and increased Chinese naval deployments.

“Taiwan is essentially positioning itself as an active stakeholder in that moment, not a passive observer,” Brar said.

Spratly significance

The Spratly Islands are the focal point of overlapping territorial claims by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.

Taiping Island is the largest naturally formed feature in the Spratlys and it has a runway capable of handling military resupply aircraft. A recently upgraded wharf there can accommodate large patrol vessels, though it remains lightly defended compared to the heavily fortified Chinese-controlled outposts nearby.

For Taiwan, the island represents its only foothold in asserting claims in the South China Sea, giving added weight to Taipei’s efforts to demonstrate both presence and governance.

In a 2016 case brought by the Philippines challenging the legitimacy of the nine-dash-line drawn by China to assert its claims over almost the entire South China Sea, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled in favor of the Philippines, declaring China’s line had no basis in international law.

That ruling, however, qualified Taiping only as a “rock” under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, because it was not able to sustain human life or economic activity on its own.

It meant that even if Taiwan were to have undisputed sovereignty over Taiping, its non-island status would limit the territory that could be claimed in its exclusive economic zone, so Taiwan rejects this finding.

Analysts told RFA the visit is also aimed at proving that the island is more than a rock, reinforcing Taiwan’s claim that it is an island with normal administrative functions.

Coast guard gray zone

Taiwan’s coast guard is increasing coordination with its navy to more effectively counter Chinese claims, Yang said.

“As China continues to assert its territorial claims across the South China Sea, Taipei understands that it also needs to step up its involvement in defending its control over Itu Aba,” he said.

Brar said the use of coast guard forces offers Taipei a strategic advantage.

“The coast guard is the ideal instrument,” he said. “It sits in a legally ambiguous space – it’s not the navy, so activating it doesn’t constitute a militarised act under most international frameworks, but it carries weapons, operates with tactical discipline, and can enforce jurisdiction.”

That allows Taiwan to project deterrence while limiting the risk of escalation, he said, describing the approach as “textbook gray-zone operation design.”

Despite the calibrated nature of such actions, the growing reliance on coast guards to assert claims carries risks.

Vietnam protested Kuan’s visit, saying any foreign activities in the Spratlys without its consent infringe on its sovereignty, stressing how even non-military operations can inflame tensions.

As more countries expand the scope of their coast guard operations, analysts warn that there may be less distinction between civilian and military activity, raising the risk of miscalculation.

Still, Taiwan appears to be betting that carefully staged shows of presence – framed as humanitarian and law enforcement missions – can strengthen its position without crossing thresholds that would provoke a direct response from Beijing, Brar said.

“That’s gray-zone strategy in its most refined form,” he said. “You change facts on the ground and shift psychological perception, all while the other side struggles to find a legitimate counter-move that doesn’t cost them more than it costs you.”

Edited by Eugene Whong.

Transcript:

Hello. I’m Bay Fang, President and CEO of Radio Free Asia.

As we mark World Press Freedom Day, I’m proud to say that RFA is back.

Our journalists have resumed producing the news that would otherwise go unread, unseen, and unheard.

Since returning, RFA Uyghur broke the news about Uyghur children in Xinjiang being forced into manual labor;

RFA Burmese saved lives with its coverage of a community in a war-torn village of Myanmar that lacked critical supplies.

And RFA’s Mandarin Service let listeners in China hear from Olympic gold medalist Alysa Liu’s father, who fled China after the Tiananmen protests in 1989.

Audiences have made it clear how much RFA means to them.

And in March, digital engagement showed RFA’s viewership is rebounding.

This is a win, as our existence was in jeopardy last year.

So thank you for sticking by us, as we fought hard to bring uncensored news to you.

But journalists still face enormous challenges.

We were thrilled and relieved that RFA Burmese contributor and award-winning documentarian, Shin Daewe was released.

She had been wrongfully detained for almost three years.

And she is not alone as an RFA journalist facing persecution. We still have four contributors serving lengthy prison sentences in Vietnam.

Meanwhile, hundreds more journalists are imprisoned or detained worldwide, with China, Myanmar, and Vietnam among the worst offenders.

As we celebrate World Press Freedom Day, let’s remember that a free press is not a privilege, but a fundamental right.

It can also help shape a future at peace, which is what the world needs right now.

At RFA, we will keep fighting to bring our audiences the truth.

No matter the odds, no matter the obstacles that stand in our way.

I promise you: We’ll meet the moment.

During the three-day visit to the southern coastal city of Guangzhou, Marape discussed partnerships in green energy, agriculture and special economic zones, and he met with investors in two controversial mining projects: a potential gold and copper mine on the Frieda River and an expansion of the Ramu Nickel Mine.

(Chinese government media)

Though the Frieda River Project has not yet broken ground, critics worry that its environmental footprint might be so great that it could destroy the entire Sepik River ecosystem. Meanwhile the Ramu Nickel Mine is often cited as PNG’s environmental and social cautionary tale. Not only has it been criticized for poor occupational health standards, in 2019 a toxic waste catastrophe at the nickel mine turned the ocean red, killed marine life, and caused residents to develop severe skin rashes.

The problem is not only limited to Papua New Guinea; Chinese investment in overseas mining projects all over the world has resulted in serious human rights abuses and environmental harm, a 2023 report by the London-based Business & Human Rights Resource Centre said.

But Marape’s office has viewed both projects as essential for national economic growth, and to diversify the economy away from raw materials export by including downstream processing.

At what cost?

While the government’s attempts to attract investment are welcome, the projects should not be rushed, Paul Barker, executive director of the PNG Institute of National Affairs, a Port Moresby-based think tank, told RFA.

“PNG is a relatively high cost economy which is why there is not already more diversification and value adding,” he said. “High domestic costs are associated with poor infrastructure, local monopolies, including by state-owned and poorly performing monopolies, law and order issues, weak investment over the years in HR development, including technical and business skills, and other factors.”

(Chinese government media)

Barker said conquering these challenges was necessary to enable economic diversification, and to encourage Papua New Guineans to participate in and lead their own economy.

“Secondly, the Prime Minister should be careful not to rush investment with inadequate safeguards,” said Barker. “Social, environmental and safety standards, equity, and ensuring local benefits must be prerequisites.”

The goal of investment should be to uplift the people, not to undermine them, Anton Sekum, the acting general secretary of the Papua New Guinea Trade Union Congress, told RFA.

“Foreign investment is welcome. But it must come with responsibility,” he said. “Too often, experiences across sectors—from large-scale resource projects like Ramu Nickel mine to major infrastructure construction, wholesale, and retail—have shown that worker welfare, wages, and conditions fall below acceptable standards from Chinese owned investments.”

He said that it was important that jobs for Papua New Guineans should not pay only a survival wage.

“They must provide dignity, security, and the opportunity for real economic mobility,” he said. “Foreign investment must play a transformative role—not just extracting value, but building it.”

He also stressed that respect for human rights and the democratic rights of the people were equally important, and called on Marape to make clear to China that exploitation in labor would not be tolerated.

“Papua New Guinea must not seek investors who come only to take,” he said. “Instead, we must seek partners who are prepared to build, to transfer knowledge, and to leave a legacy of empowered people.”

Land acquired

At a press conference Friday, Marape said his trip was “good and wonderful.”

He revealed that in addition to securing investment in the mines, China also gave PNG two tracts of land–one in Beijing and one in Guangzhou–which will be used for diplomatic purposes.

“I want to say thank you to China for this gesture which was unknown to us. The Kundu Beijing project will be workable and will place the face of PNG in China,” he said referring to a partnership program with a goal of advancing PNG’s economy, named after the hourglass shaped drum that is often found in formal ceremonies in Papua New Guinea.

Edited by Eugene Whong.

Myanmar’s former leader Aung San Suu Kyi has been transferred to house arrest, the country’s military-controlled state media announced Thursday.

The 80-year old state counselor was moved from Naypyidaw prison to “the designated residence” to serve the remainder of her sentence, state-run MRTV reported without specifying exactly where this residence was.

State media also showed a the first public photo of the former leader in several years. She was at a table with men in military and police uniforms.

Suu Kyi has been in military custody since the February 2021 coup that dissolved Myanmar’s democratically elected parliament and installed a government headed by General Min Aung Hlaing.

She was convicted of 19 charges, including corruption, and sentenced to 33 years in prison.

Since then, her location has been unclear, and in April, members of civil groups, including her son Kim Aris, launched a campaign urging the junta to prove she is alive.

Aris old Radio Free Asia that the junta’s decision to commute his mother’s sentence was not a release from prison, and she is still held hostage. He repeated his call for evidence she is still living.

“If she has actually been moved to house arrest, then they should be allowing her to communicate with me as her basic human right,” said Aris. “At the moment, all that’s happening is she’s been moved from one undisclosed location to another undisclosed location.”

In 2023, Aung San Suu Kyi’s sentence was reduced to 27 years and then by one-sixth during a Myanmar New Year’s amnesty this year to 22 years and six months.

Having already served more than five years since the coup, 18 years and nine months remain.

Sources close to the military told Radio Free Asia that Suu Kyi was moved to a deputy minister-level residence and a team led by Lt. Col. Tin Aung Tun has been in charge of security since March.

Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Lin Jian on Thursday said that Myanmar’s Aung San Suu Kyi is a long-standing friend of China, and that China has consistently monitored developments regarding her situation.

Edited by Eugene Whong.

Update adds remarks from Kim Aris.

“Olivia and Mira bring decades of human rights and national security expertise in the Indo-Pacific region,” said RFA President Bay Fang. “Their invaluable experience and background will benefit RFA enormously as we rebuild journalistic operations and capacity. I welcome them both to RFA’s board of directors at a crucial time for our company.”

“RFA occupies a unique role as a beacon of press freedom in Asia and globally, amplifying voices and communities that would otherwise be silenced by brutal regimes,” Enos said. “As a member of its corporate board, I look forward to helping RFA achieve its goals, returning it to its status as a bulwark against foreign propaganda and malign influence.”

“RFA’s incisive reporting and analysis of national security issues in the Indo-Pacific, and their timely coverage of China’s tightening grip in the region, makes its work more important now than ever,” Rapp-Hooper said. “I am thrilled to help this great organization meet the moment as a member of its board.”

In addition to her work at Hudson Institute, Enos is an adjunct professor at Georgetown University and a contributor at Forbes. Previously, she worked as Washington Director for the Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong Foundation and as Senior Policy Analyst for Asian Studies at the Heritage Foundation. Prior to working at Brookings and The Asia Group, Rapp-Hooper served as the senior director for East Asia and Oceania at the White House’s National Security Council (NSC), as well as the NSC director for Indo-Pacific strategy.

The two new members join Chair Carolyn Bartholomew, Shanthi Kalathil, Sam Stratman, Michael Green, Michael Kempner, Keith Richburg, and James Mann in serving on RFA’s corporate board.

The imagery shows new buildings and plumes of steam in previously inactive areas of the complex, which lies roughly 90 kilometers (56 miles) north of the capital.

North Korea has long claimed that Yongbyon serves peaceful, civilian energy purposes, but the international community and monitoring organizations say that the complex produces fissile materials to produce nuclear weapons.

The increased activity observed in April follows Kim Jong Un’s announcement at the Ninth Congress of the ruling Korean Workers’ Party in February that the country would build up and diversify its nuclear arsenal over the next five years.

Where there’s smoke…

Images captured by Planet Labs on April 18 and 20 show steam emitting from the thermal generating plant at the radiochemical laboratory. On March 12 and April 25, images showed the reactor discharging water into the nearby Kuryong River. These discharges are consistent with many other images captured since January.

(Analyzed by Jacob Bogle/RFA)

The evidence suggests that North Korea is producing weapons grade plutonium, Olli Heinonen, a former deputy director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency and a distinguished fellow at the Stimson Center, told RFA.

“It looks that North Korea still continues to produce plutonium in the 5 megawatt reactor and it’s on a campaign basis,” he said, using a technical term to indicate a start-to-finish production cycle. “So it operates for about a year or so and then they discharge the fuel which is a very quick operation.”

(Analyzed by Jacob Bogle/RFA)

Jacob Bogle, a U.S.-based private satellite imagery analyst, told RFA that since October 2024, the complex has been in its seventh cycle of fuel irradiation and reprocessing for plutonium production.

“This multi-year cycle of activity has continued to the present and is supported by two key pieces of visual evidence - consistent water discharge from the 5 MW reactor throughout 2026 and occasional activity at the Radiochemistry Lab as indicated by steam generation,” he said.

The findings are consistent with confirmation from the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, that North Korea has significantly expanded its nuclear activities at Yongbyon.

During a visit to South Korea on April 15, IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi told reporters that many of the facilities at Yongbyon, including the main reactor, were active.

“This suggests a serious increase in North Korea’s nuclear weapons production capacity, which appears sufficient to produce dozens of warheads,” Grossi said, adding that the construction of a new nuclear enrichment facility comparable to existing ones had also been confirmed.

Construction ongoing

Satellite imagery also confirms that new buildings are appearing at the complex. Exterior construction on one of the new buildings–suspected to be a new uranium enrichment facility–was completed in either November or December of last year.

(Analyzed by Jacob Bogle/RFA)

Bogle said that melting snow on the roof of the building was visible, suggesting the building is connected to electricity and that interior construction is at a minimum still ongoing.

A vehicle was observed next to the building on April 15, though no external indicators have emerged to determine whether interior work is still in progress or whether the facility has become operational.

Additionally, in March, the roofs of two buildings within the radiochemical laboratory were replaced.

New high-rise residential buildings have also been erected in the area, likely needed to house an expanded workforce.

(RFA)

Heinonen said that the satellite images showed changes to the complex that are not yet understood. In the southern part of the complex, in an area where fuel rods were fabricated, four entirely new buildings have appeared.

“Some of them seem also to be quite well-built and one is even separated from the others with a fence which tells me that it’s very important,” he said. “We don’t know what it is, but I think that these buildings have to do with a plan of Kim Jong Un to enhance the nuclear weapons production and to produce nuclear material and components for nuclear weapons. So we have to see that change as a part of his former and current five-year plan.”

Edited by Eugene Whong.

The crisis was kicked into full gear in March, when 19 members of parliament defected from Prime Minister Jeremiah Manele’s ruling coalition, called the Government for National Unity and Transformation, or GNUT, to join the opposition.

This created an opposition coalition of 28 parliament members, a majority of the 50-seat legislative body. They immediately filed a motion for no confidence, and called on Manele to convene parliament so a vote could be held.

But Manele has been refusing to convene, so he remains Prime Minister.

Shift to Beijing

Manele has been described by observers as pro-Chinese, just like his predecessor Manasseh Sogavare, under whom Manele served as foreign minister.

Then-Foreign Minister Manele signed the 2019 agreement to recognize China instead of Taiwan, and was a central figure in negotiating the 2022 security pact with Beijing that opposition leader Matthew Wale has criticized as being too secretive and undermining the security of the Solomon Islands, based on leaked drafts of the agreement prior to its signing.

Beijing has even set up a police station in the capital Honiara, a move that sparked concern among the U.S. and Australia that China was expanding its security and surveillance capabilities beyond its borders.

Violent civil unrest broke out in 2021, with protesters claiming that Sogavare was selling off the country’s sovereignty to Beijing, and calling for him to resign. Rioters attacked Chinatown businesses in the capital Honiara, torched one of Sogavare’s homes, and attempted to storm parliament.

(Charley Piringi/AFP)

Three years later, Chinese influence in the Solomons was very much on the ballot in 2024, with opposition candidates even saying that if elected as prime minister, they would cancel the security agreement and switch back to recognizing Taiwan, but Manele’s party prevailed and he was sworn in.

Manele’s government is a continuation of the Sogavare’s pro-Beijing stance, Joseph Foukona, a history professor at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, who hails from the Solomon Islands, told RFA.

“So in his role in the previous government, which was where Sogavare was the prime minister, It’s obvious that he promotes the one China policy and his government is sort of aligned with that policy as well,” Foukona said.

But when asked what the current rift in the government is about, Foukona said that there was not really much detail about why the 19 members of parliament defected, only saying that they must be having “internal issues.”

The rift is over more than just the pro-China stances of Manele’s government, Kathryn Paik, deputy director and senior fellow with the Australia Chair at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, or CSIS, told RFA.

“There’s a lot more going on domestically and there’s a lot of power plays domestically happening within the parliament that might have nothing to do with China and the China relationship,” she said. “Parliamentarians are also going to use that relationship with China for their advantage whether it’s to oust Manele or if that’s a good argument against it.

But she said it is likely that China has started to build relationships with other politicians in the Solomon Islands as a hedge, just in case they come into power in the future.

What next?

The opposition, now referred to as the New Coalition, won a legal challenge in mid-April, with the country’s High Court ruling that Manele was unconstitutionally delaying the vote.

Manele’s government has filed an appeal to that decision, and the Court of Appeal is expected to issue a ruling on Friday.

(Reuters)

But even if he wins the appeal, Manele will eventually have to convene parliament. Legally, the country’s constitution mandates that the body must meet at least once per year, and practically, it must pass yearly appropriations budgets to avoid a government shutdown.

Barring a breakup in the New Coalition or a withdrawal of the motion of no confidence, Manele will have to face the music eventually, and that could lead to his ouster.

Regardless of whether Manele survives the vote or is ousted, the country’s relationship with China will be more of the same, Paik said.

“I don’t expect there to be a fundamental change,” she said. “China has established a pretty regular presence on the ground as of right now and we haven’t seen any real push by any parliamentarians to change that significantly outside of Wale and some other opposition leaders.”

Manele has already survived one vote of no confidence roughly a year ago, defeating a motion led by his predecessor Sogavare.

Shortly after the 19 parliament members switched sides in March, Manele swore in Sogavare as his deputy prime minister in an attempt to stabilize the remaining pieces of his coalition.

Foukona said the off-again, on-again alliance between Sogavare and Manele is driven by their respective personal interests.

“They usually say that in Solomon’s politics there’s no permanent enemy,” he said.

China’s foreign ministry and its embassy in Honiara have not made any direct statement regarding the Solomon Islands since the beginning of the political crisis.

Edited by Charlie Dharapak.

The annual summit brings together leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, to discuss regional security and economic issues. China is participating as a dialogue partner this year, and the forum presents an opportunity to address the South China Sea, a persistent flashpoint where China’s sweeping claims overlap with the exclusive economic zones of several Southeast Asian states.

(Hasnoor Hussain/Reuters)

Regional officials have said they are aiming to complete negotiations on the COC by 2026, but key issues, including its geographic scope, legal status and enforcement mechanisms, remain unresolved after more than two decades of talks.

Resolution unlikely

It is improbable that a code resolving all disputes in the South China Sea could be hammered out at the ASEAN leaders’ summit this year, Joseph Kristanto, a research analyst at Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, told RFA. The key issue at the summit will be if meaningful progress on mitigating tensions can be achieved.

“While the COC may help prevent misunderstandings in daily interactions, I’d say it’s unlikely to stop grey-zone activities or coercive behavior by claimant states, most notably China, altogether,” he said. “Therefore, the COC is best seen as a mechanism for managing friction, rather than transforming the underlying dynamics of the dispute.”

Agreements to reduce friction have been tried before. ASEAN and China signed a non-binding Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in 2002 and began formal negotiations on a binding code in 2013. Progress since then has been described by some officials as slow.

COC negotiators face a fundamental trade-off between a politically feasible but limited “thin” code based on general principles, and a more robust framework with clearer rules and enforcement mechanisms that would be harder to achieve, Kristanto said.

“The slow pace of the COC process demonstrates the complexity of these issues and exposes the limits of ASEAN’s consensus approach,” he said.

Other analysts say that China’s track record of frequent provocations in the region makes them skeptical that any agreement would make a meaningful difference in practice.

“My pessimism on the COC really comes down to two things: China’s track record of undermining or ignoring its existing agreements, and the question of who would actually do the binding in a ‘legally binding’ COC,” Ray Powell, executive director of Stanford University’s SeaLight maritime transparency project, told RFA.

(RFA)

Powell noted that the 2002 declaration already committed parties to self-restraint and peaceful dispute resolution, yet tensions have persisted.

“That experience shows the problem is not the absence of written rules but a lack of any authority China is willing to accept above its own political will,” he said, adding that a meaningful code would require an enforcement or arbitration mechanism that Beijing has historically rejected.

A weaker version, he warned, could risk undermining existing legal protections for Southeast Asian states under international law.

Legal questions

Others argue that even a limited agreement could still play a role in stabilizing day-to-day interactions, provided it is grounded in established international legal frameworks.

“A substantive and comprehensive COC on the South China Sea would not just be about something that could ease the tensions between the Philippines and China,” Josue Raphael J. Cortez of the De La Salle-College of Saint Benilde in the Philippines, told RFA.

“Instead, it would be an inclusive document, grounded in UNCLOS and public international law that should pave the way for all state claimants to coexist responsibly and peacefully,” he said, referring to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Cortez said a meaningful code should go beyond traditional issues such as fisheries and navigation to include broader resource-sharing arrangements, including oil, gas and critical minerals, reflecting the region’s evolving economic stakes.

Though a legally binding framework could help reduce tensions, he cautioned that it would need to be backed by continued dialogue and mechanisms to ensure compliance.

“Forging such an agreement can never be enough,” he said. “Instead, continuous dialogue … must still be continued so as to ascertain compliance and whether future revisions can be undertaken for the framework’s viability.”

The 48th ASEAN Summit is slated to start May 5-9 in Cebu, Philippines.

Edited by Eugene Whong.

According to state media, the country’s leader Kim Jong Un personally guided the construction of the Sinuiju Greenhouse Farm Complex. It has been touted as a way to rejuvenate Wihwa, Mado and Kumdong islands in the Yalu River, near the border with China, which were leveled by flooding in 2024.

At the farm complex’ dedication in February, Kim acknowledged the floods as being the heaviest on record, but said the project overcame nature to create “from which our people will benefit for all ages.”

(RFA)

At a gargantuan 450 hectares (1.7 square miles), the Farm Complex is roughly the size of 625 soccer fields, and authorities claim it can produce vegetables eight months out of the year.

But thermal infrared imagery from NASA’s Landsat-8 satellite suggests that only 44% of the total complex was registering temperatures above the surrounding average, Bruce Songhak Chung, a researcher at the Seoul-based Institute for National Security Strategy, told RFA.

He told Radio Free Asia that after seeing the thermal data from March 10 that the unheated areas were evidence that either heating infrastructure has not been fully installed or that chronic electricity shortages are preventing the greenhouses from operating at full capacity.

(RFA)

Chung also examined nighttime light imagery (VIIRS) captured by the U.S. Suomi NPP weather satellite at approximately 1:30 a.m. on April 17, finding almost no detectable light emanating from the Sinuiju Greenhouse Farm. The electric grow-lights typically used in smart farming operations were largely absent — a finding consistent with reports of frequent power shortages due to poor electricity infrastructure inside the country.

Kim Hyuk, a senior researcher specializing in North Korean agriculture at the South Korea-based Korea Rural Community Corporation’s Rural Research Institute, told RFA that the heat maps showed only parts of the farm were getting power.

“What can be analyzed through nighttime light and thermal infrared imagery at the Sinuiju Greenhouse Farm suggests just one unit equipped with solar panels and five glass greenhouse units — covering only about 25 hectares (0.1 square miles),” he said. “The rest is closer to basic plastic coverings than properly equipped greenhouses, and the electricity that can be generated from the solar installation is not sufficient to meet the farm’s power demands.”

(RFA)

Kim noted that Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) imagery taken on April 19 visually confirmed that crops appear to have been planted across most of the greenhouse units, suggesting an operational rate of roughly 65–75% — somewhat higher than what thermal infrared data alone indicated.

Despite the more optimistic imagery, whether the farm can actually deliver on the authorities’ claim of eight or more months of annual harvests through solar power and geothermal systems remains an open question.

South Korean satellite imagery analysis firm SI Analytics reached a similar conclusion in its own assessment published in March, warning that the large-scale complex risks becoming a “ghost greenhouse” during winter months.

(KCNA/AFP)

In its report, SI Analytics wrote that while the Sinuiju Greenhouse Farm is now being heavily promoted as a model for regional development to showcase achievements in “improving the people’s standard of living” however, it is expected to face significant practical challenges.

The primary issue is the supply of essential energy sources such as coal, heavy oil, and electricity required for its operation. Greenhouses are facilities primarily used in winter, yet this region is a flat border area in the northernmost part of North Korea, making it one of the country’s coldest locations, the report said.

Edited by Eugene Whong.

The increased scope of the “Balikatan” exercises reflect the Philippines taking on a more decisive role in its own defense, while still remaining strongly committed to its bilateral alliance with the United States, the analysts said.

Though officials leading in “Balikatan” exercises do not mention China by name, the war games are occurring amid increased Chinese tensions in the sea. Japan, which, like the Philippines, also faces territorial challenges from China in the East China Sea, is playing a more direct and active role in this year’s drills, reflecting its growing defense ties with Manila.

All told, there are 17,000 personnel participating, including 10,000 from the U.S. and 7,000 from the Philippines and partner nations Japan, France, Canada and Australia.

Active defense posture

The Philippines’ gradual shift to an “active defense posture” reflects the growing defense dynamics in the region, as China sees more opposition from weaker neighbors seeking strength by banding together, the analysts said.

“For years, Manila operated within a relatively constrained framework, relying heavily on its alliance with the United States,” Arnaud Leveau, president of the Paris-based Asia Centre think tank and an assistant professor at Paris Dauphine University, told RFA. “What we are seeing now is a gradual effort to assert greater agency while remaining firmly anchored in that alliance.”

(Ted Aljibe/AFP)

Manila exerting more control over its defense is an indication that it is adapting to the current geopolitical climate, he said.

“I see it as a rather calibrated adjustment to changing circumstances. In this context, signaling resolve should not be seen as escalation, but rather as a form of deterrence,” he said. “Repeated incidents at sea have shown that ambiguity can invite further pressure.”

Chinese provocations at sea have become increasingly common in recent years. Earlier this month, China erected a floating barrier at the disputed Scarborough Shoal to block access to Philippine fishing boats. Around the same time the Philippine Navy spotted ten Chinese coast guard vessels there, attempting to enforce a blockade.

Previous incidents have included Chinese ships blasting Philippine fishing boats with water cannons or even ramming them.

Though Manila may be signaling resolve through this year’s Balikatan, sustaining the effort to be more active in its own defense would remain a challenge, Leveau said, adding that shifting to more “credible capabilities” requires real investments in command structures, improving logistical resilience as well as maritime awareness.

Victor Andres Manhit, president of the Manila-based defense think tank Stratbase Institute, told RFA that the Philippines needed to “fully operationalize its posture of active defense” to thwart China’s ever-increasing territorial threats.

This year’s Balikatan numbers “represent the correct path forward” to address the challenge, Manhit said. This sends a “clear and unambiguous message…that the Philippines and its partners are prepared to defend the rules-based international order against coercion, intimidation, and unlawful claims.”

(Philippine Coast Guard via AFP)

The Philippines will mark the 10th anniversary in July of a 2016 international arbitration court’s ruling that invalidated China’s sweeping territorial claims in the sea region. That landmark ruling is hailed internationally, even as it China has continued to reject it.

The increased participation in Balikatan from other countries besides the U.S. underscores the importance of Manila having partnerships with its allied neighbors, Manhit said. “It affirms that we are not isolated, and that our national security is anchored in strong alliances with nations that uphold international law and share our commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific.”

Evolving alliance

Philippine Armed Forces chief Gen. Romeo Brawner, during a ceremony where he declared the war games open Monday, said the drills served to amplify the “strength of an alliance” and the shared responsibility of securing the region.

“For more than three decades, Balikatan has stood as a living testament to the partnership between the Philippines and the United States. One that has grown stronger, more responsive, and more relevant with time,” he said.

(Noel Celis/Reuters)

Brawner said that participating countries “remain guided by a shared commitment to uphold international law, to respect sovereignty, and to contribute to a free and open Indo-Pacific where nations can thrive without coercion.”

“We are building more than capability. We are building systems that think, move and respond as one,” he said. “Let me emphasize this. Balikatan is readiness made real, cooperation put into action, and peace preserved through our strength.”

Observers told RFA that the joint exercises have evolved into a forum within which all participants can flex their combined strength, including Japan, which until taking on a combat role in Balikatan this year, had participated as an observer or in a limited capacity in prior iterations.

Japan, for one, “is aligning its operational posture with the realities of increased friction in the South China Sea and the Indo-Pacific area as well,” Leveu said, adding that the annual Balikatan drills have evolved “into a platform for more flexible, mini-lateral forms of cooperation” that complements an American-centric alliance.

Lucio Pitlo, a foreign policy expert at the Philippine Association for Chinese Studies, told RFA Japan’s increasing military engagements in the region reflected its gradual shift from its post-World War II pacifist stance, with Tokyo keeping in step with the U.S. defense initiatives in the region.

“Japan has been growing in security profile in the region in recent years, motivated by changing domestic views and regional and global developments,” Pitlo said. Both Manila and Washington welcome this development, because “it has expanded our network of defense partners and increased allied access in our territory.”

Edited by Eugene Whong.

An independent researcher turned a routine job interview into an intelligence operation when he identified a North Korean IT worker applying under a false identity.

RFA’s Jaewoo Park sat down with him to understand how these operatives evade detection.

Outside of Yangon’s Insein Prison, Shin Daewe, who was handed a life sentence for “abetting terrorism” in 2024, told Radio Free Asia that there are still many on the inside that were in need of prayers.

“I am the happiest,” she said. “Whether it’s me or one of the others, we all just wanted every day to see our families. I am lucky today, but I have many friends who are not as lucky as me. I ask everyone to pray for them too.”

(Courtesy of Shin Daewe's family)

Known for her work highlighting the challenges facing Myanmar’s environment and the impact of conflict on civilians following the military’s 2021 coup, Shin Daewe was arrested in October 2023 in Yangon while picking up a video drone she had ordered online to use in filming a documentary.

Then in January 2024, a military court sentenced her to life in prison, the maximum sentence under section 50(j) of the Counter-terrorism Law.

Observers at that time said the ruling was a bid by the junta to stamp out criticism by using lengthy sentences to instill fear in opponents to its rule.

The junta reduced her sentence to 15 years in January 2025 as part of a larger prisoner amnesty, before finally releasing her entirely on Friday.

Shin Daewe told RFA Friday evening that she is back home now healthy and happy, and that she is grateful to those who helped her during her time of need.

Shin Daewe had contributed to RFA’s Burmese Service since 2010 and up until her arrest.

(Courtesy of Shin Daewe's family)

“The news of Shin Daewe’s release from detention comes as a welcome relief,” said Bay Fang, President of RFA, in a statement released immediately after Shin Daewe’s release. "Shin Daewe suffered enormously and unfairly for her work to bring uncensored journalism to people in Myanmar. This development is a testament to efforts by many, including RSF and PEN America, to secure her release. I am heartened to learn Shin is back at her home, reunited with her family and loved ones.”

Reporters Without Borders, or RSF, said in a statement that Shin Daewe’s release was an “immense relief” not only for her loved ones, “but also for the entire Myanmar journalism community.”

“It must be made clear that she should never have been arrested, nor subjected to mistreatment,” said RSF. “We now call on the Myanmar regime to immediately release the 40 journalists still detained in the country.”

In 2024, the Alliance for Women in Media Foundation honored Shin Daewe with a Gracie Award for her 2023 RFA video report, Ayeyarwady Riverbank Erosion, and she also won a Wallis Annenberg Justice for Women Journalists Award from the International Women’s Media Foundation.

Edited by Eugene Whong.

“The news of Shin Daewe’s release from detention comes as a welcome relief. Shin Daewe suffered enormously and unfairly for her work to bring uncensored journalism to people in Myanmar. This development is a testament to efforts by many, including RSF and PEN America, to secure her release. I am heartened to learn Shin is back at her home, reunited with her family and loved ones.”

PORT MORESBY, Papua New Guinea — Thousands of sick, disabled and otherwise unwell queued at Wharf T over the past week, hoping to board a Chinese hospital ship to receive free medical care.

Some who were lucky enough to be taken in told Radio Free Asia that it was “a miracle” to receive medical services that are not available in local hospitals on board the Silk Road Ark, a type 920 hospital ship run by China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy, in town for only seven days.

After seeing its last patients Tuesday and holding a farewell ceremony on deck with PNG’s Prime Minister James Marape, the ship departed Wednesday, having completed a 220-day humanitarian mission, where it visited around a dozen countries in Latin America and the South Pacific.

“My daughter Margaret is a sick child,” Kimberly Yanogen, a PNG resident, told RFA on Saturday. “I would have paid 1,000 kina (US$230) or more if I took her to the public hospital or private clinics here.”

(Rodrigo Garrido/Reuters)

She said the doctor performed a physical checkup on her daughter and advised her how to deal with her condition.

“I am so happy to be given this advice free of charge,” she said. “I would like to say thank you to the Chinese government for sending this ship here. They have made our access to service and our lives easier,” she said.

For the Papua New Guinea port call, the final tally was 5,493 patients seen, 339 surgeries performed, China’s ambassador to PNG Yang Xiaoguang reported during a speech at the ceremony.

“This is a visit that deepens friendship,” he said. “As a Chinese saying goes, ‘more exchanges will bring families and friends closer together.’”

Soft power win

Humanitarian visits by the Silk Road Ark and other Chinese hospital ships, that often include services like surgeries, are very effective soft power diplomacy for Beijing, Graeme Smith, Associate Professor at the Department of Pacific Affairs at The Australian National University, told RFA.

“It’s interesting in that it is something that China can do that probably the U.S. and Australia can’t do because of their appetite for risk, he said, noting that complications after surgery could arise and the hospital ship will not be around for post-operative care.

”So if you’re in a country where the immediate medical care is not really there to provide that kind of support then you are opening yourself up to liabilities that I think Australia and the U.S. wouldn’t be willing to take on," he said.

(Harlyne Joku/RFA)

The U.S. Navy also sends hospital ships on goodwill missions, and they do perform surgery, but a visit of the USNS Comfort to Trinidad in August last year performed two “critical surgeries” among 46 procedures, compared to the 339 of the Silk Road Ark’s Port Moresby port call.

Smith recalled his encounter with the Peace Ark, another Chinese medical ship that visited Vanuatu as part of a previous mission.

“It’s not just the soft power of being able to offer these services but also the soft power of ‘we will train up people from your country to become doctors,’ and to be fair I don’t think America in particular does enough of that, or Australia,” he said. “It is an easy win.”

Missions carried out by Chinese hospital ships in the Pacific however “risk undermining health sovereignty by reinforcing dependence on external providers,” Malika Knapp, a fourth-year student at the Australian National University wrote in an article published by the Australian Institute of International Affairs in March.

“Medical assistance and defense objectives are closely intertwined, with free treatment serving to normalize a foreign military presence while advancing China’s geopolitical aims,” Knapp wrote. “But from a health systems perspective, the benefits are immediate but fleeting.”

Long lines

On Tuesday, the final day that the Silk Road Ark was performing medical services, residents at a local marketplace told RFA that people have even slept at the wharf overnight to try to get on the ship.

(Harlyne Joku/RFA)

“I want to take my husband for an eye check on the China ship,” a resident identified only by her given name Grace, told RFA. “I hear all the medical services are free and; there are lots of people waiting in lines so long, but people are sleeping outside the gate to be early enough to get a pass in.”

Some waited long hours to be seen, but told RFA that they left the wharf empty handed.

“I am so worried and disappointed,” said Sherina, who had visited with her husband on Saturday hoping to remove a lump. They were told to instead visit Port Moresby General Hospital, or PMGH.

(Harlyne Joku/RFA)

Enno Awoi, a diabetic, and her husband, who has been immobile since 2003 when he suffered a stroke, waited in line since 1 a.m. on Saturday. She was given medicine to manage her condition, and they referred her husband’s case back to PMGH.

For Junior Pule, who has high blood pressure, filling out the intake forms was so difficult that he asked RFA for assistance.

But residents who assisted with the Silk Road Ark’s visit told RFA they were glad they were able to help.

“It was a good experience for me,” Ayisha Gizoria, a dentistry student in her final year at the University of Papua New Guinea, who volunteered at the pre-boarding triage station, told RFA. “As volunteers we come and do the job for free. We don’t get paid. We do it because we have the heart and empathy to help the sick people around us.”

(Harlyne Joku/RFA)

Ronald Jack, who served as a security guard, said he was happy to witness thousands of the country’s ill come for medical help. He told RFA he wanted to thank the Chinese government.

Though there were many positive reviews on social media, some on wrote that it was “not heartwarming” to see families queuing overnight for basic medical services provided by a foreign entity, adding that it exposed the fact that their own government could not provide these services.

Giving free medical services is “pretty effective, the caveat being that it’s sugar-hit effective,” Smith said. “So they’re there for five days and then you don’t see them for a couple more years.”

But regardless of the mission’s ineffectiveness in terms of long-term health outcomes, Smith said it was “money well spent in terms of building goodwill.”

Edited by Charlie Dharapak.

Update corrects the date that RFA interviewed people in front of the Silk Road Ark.

The presence of the American facility will “serve as a deterrence” to China, but also signals the strong defense relationship between the allies, Rear Adm. Roy Vincente Trinidad, the Philippine Navy’s spokesman for the West Philippine Sea, said on the sidelines of a maritime security forum in Manila.

Manila calls the part of the South China Sea that is within its exclusive economic zone as the West Philippine Sea. Trinidad said the plan was still subject to negotiations, but that it is covered under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement and the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) already existing between the two countries.

Both agreements give the legal cover for America to rotate troops and preposition equipment in the Philippines, where Washington once maintained its biggest overseas naval base.

(Ted Aljibe/AFP)

“They are designed to support our response capability for HADR (humanitarian assistance and disaster response), maritime security and support and sustain our forces deployed, not only the West Philippine Sea, but even the southern border. We welcome this development,” said Trinidad, adding that the facilities would still be under Philippine control.

While no specifics of the plan had yet been released, the Pentagon was looking at opening a Defense Fuel Support Point, or DFSP, in southern Davao region by 2028 capable of supporting over 40 million gallons of fuel and lubricants.

‘Geostrategic revaluation’

That the U.S. is considering Davao for the DFSP amounts to a “geostrategic revaluation” of the region, Professor Chester Cabalza, founder of the Manila-based think tank International Development and Security Cooperation, told Radio Free Asia.

“The American refueling depot to be located in the Southern Philippines can provide a critical alternative to existing ports in Manila and Subic,” he said. “The projected hub opens a broader strategy of maritime deterrence and logistical resilience.”

At the forum, Trinidad refused to publicly divulge details of the project because they are being finalized. But he sought to assure the public that the facilities will remain “under our control,” he said, referring to the Philippines.

Top security and defense officials attended the forum which comes amid hostilities in the Middle East that have prompted an examination of fuel and energy supplies across the South China Sea and Pacific regions.

The proposed facility could support Philippine efforts at monitoring and protecting its interests in the South China Sea, where it has overlapping claims with China and other Southeast Asian countries. While its neighbors have been peacefully trying to resolve the issue, China in the past few years has become increasingly assertive.

Asked if the Philippines was not concerned that the proposed facility would give the Chinese another reason to step-up harassment, Trinidad said, “The greater risk to our security is the lack of a credible deterrence.”

“The greater risk is to have no deterrence at all. So, we welcome these facilities,” he said. “These facilities will help allow the AFP to perform and to sustain these operations. Hence, they serve at a very strong deterrent posture. Thus, we welcome their presence.”

Maritime ‘bullying’

The China Coast Guard, or CCG, has harassed Philippine government vessels and aircraft to support local fishermen in the region, often deploying militia vessels as an intimidation tactic. On Thursday, the Philippine Coast Guard, or PCG, denounced a “clear and deliberate act of bullying” by the CCG for firing flares directly at a Philippine government airplane conducting a maritime patrol on the Panganiban and Zamora reefs in the South China Sea.

The Chinese also sent radio transmissions during the incidents, brazenly claiming ‘indisputable sovereignty’ over the reefs, the PCG said. The claims are part of Beijing’s “expansionist agenda and repeated violations” of international law, it added.

“These reckless and aggressive actions by China represent yet another escalation in their campaign of intimidation and harassment,” the PCG said, adding that firing flares into the aircraft endangered the lives of the crew aboard.

(Philippine Coast Guard via AFP)

Addressing the conference, Phillipine Armed Forces chief Gen. Romeo Brawner Jr. stressed that while the current geopolitical environment had become more complex “dialogue, mutual respect and consensus are very important.”

“These are not abstract ideals. They are the very conditions that have allowed our region to grow, to connect and to prosper. And these are the principles that we must continue to uphold,” Brawner said.

“At the same time, we must be clear eyed about the changes around us. Our maritime domain is increasingly shaped by the shifting geopolitical dynamics, evolving security challenges, rapid technological advancement and the intensifying effects of climate and environmental pressures,” he said.

He said the Philippine military believes that “maritime security is both a national duty and a shared responsibility.”

“We remain committed to protecting our sovereignty and securing our maritime interests, consistent with international law and in a manner that contributes to regional stability. We will continue to act with professionalism, discipline and restraint,” he stressed.

He called for stronger collective efforts to boost maritime domain awareness, while strengthening confidence building measures to “reinforce trust and reduce the risk of miscalculation.”

The Chinese Embassy in the Philippines did not respond to requests for comment.

Edited by Eugene Whong.

At least 1,000 Japanese troops are set to take part in April’s Balikatan exercises alongside forces from the Philippines and the U.S., in a move that carries historical weight but is increasingly viewed through the lens of evolving regional security dynamics.

The South China Sea has become one of Asia’s most contested strategic flashpoints in recent years, with overlapping territorial claims and frequent maritime confrontations. China’s use of so-called “grey zone” tactics – coercive actions that fall short of open conflict – has added pressure on smaller Southeast Asian states, pushing them to strengthen external security ties.

(Jam Sta Rosa/AFP)

“Japan’s involvement in Balikatan and the wider move toward minilateral cooperation do suggest a gradual shift towards a more networked security system in the Indo-Pacific,” Joseph Kristanto, a research analyst at Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, told RFA.

That shift is visible in how exercises themselves have evolved. Balikatan began in the 1990s as a relatively small-scale bilateral training exercise focused on counterinsurgency and disaster response.

But now it involves thousands of troops and it simulates large scale conflict scenarios, including amphibious operations, missile defense and critical infrastructure protection.

The exercise has also grown beyond its original U.S.-Philippines format.

In recent iterations, countries such as Japan and Australia have taken on more active roles, with Japan participating as an observer since 2012, and last year sending a single frigate and about 150 non-combat personnel.

The increased participation from multiple countries reflects a broader push to build interoperability among like-minded partners.

New domains such as cyber, space and information warfare have been incorporated, mirroring how regional planners now view potential conflict as spanning multiple fronts rather than being confined to conventional naval or territorial disputes.

Regional anxiety

Still, the emergence of these overlapping partnerships does not signal a post-American security order.

“This does not replace the traditional U.S.-led ‘hub-and-spoke’ system. Instead, it adds another layer to it,” Kristanto said.

The “hub-and-spoke” model – under which the U.S. maintains bilateral alliances with countries such as Japan, South Korea and the Philippines – has underpinned Asia’s security architecture for decades.

What is changing, according to experts, is the growing number of links between those “spokes,” as countries deepen cooperation with each other through joint exercises, intelligence sharing and defense agreements.

(Jam Sta Rosa/AFP)

That layering is partly driven by uncertainty over Washington’s long-term bandwidth in the region, even as it remains the central security guarantor.

U.S. security commitments in Europe and the Middle East, alongside domestic political debates over defence spending, have prompted some regional governments to hedge by strengthening ties with other partners.

“The latest move comes amid rising regional anxiety about U.S. defense commitment and capacity in the Indo-Pacific region,” William Yang, a Northeast Asia analyst at the International Crisis Group, told RFA.

Countries such as Japan are therefore stepping up – not to replace the United States, but to reinforce deterrence and share the burden.

“These moves are certainly not intended to take over the central role that the U.S. takes in terms of regional deterrence,” Yang added.

In practical terms, that shift is translating into deeper operational integration. Exercises are no longer just about presence or signalling, but about testing how forces coordinate across multiple domains and contingencies, Yang said.

“Having more partners such as Japan involved could lead to real operational changes over time, not just symbolic ones,” Kristanto said, noting that drills are becoming “more integrated and more multilateral.”

Japan’s participation also builds on a steady expansion of defence ties with the Philippines, including joint maritime exercises and the provision of coastal radar systems.

These capabilities are designed to improve Manila’s ability to monitor its waters, particularly in contested areas where Chinese vessels have maintained a persistent presence.

(Jam Sta Rosa/AFP)

“Japan’s more proactive participation in bilateral military drills and patrols as well as multilateral military exercises could help strengthen regional coordination and capacity building in areas such as countering Chinese gray zone operations and strengthening Southeast Asian states’ maritime domain awareness,” Yang explained.

‘More connected network’

What would be the first deployment of Japanese combat troops in the Philippines since World War II–when Imperial Japan occupied what was then a U.S. territory–is not lost in public opinion.

Protesters in the Philippines say Tokyo has unresolved wartime grievances with Manila, while protesters in Japan fear the move is part of a larger trend of increased militarism counter to the spirit of their pacifist constitution.

Experts told RFA that Japan’s participation reflects a broader effort to connect security arrangements across the Indo-Pacific into a more cohesive framework.

For Shen Ming-Shih, a research fellow at Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research, this is most clearly seen along the so-called First Island Chain – a strategic arc stretching from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines.

(AFP)

“Japan now participates with ground troops in addition to warships this year, indicating a rising possibility of joint U.S.-Japan-Philippines responses to South China Sea conflicts,” Shen told RFA, pointing to “a growing likelihood of alliance-based joint operations and defense industry cooperation.”

Although no formal multilateral alliance exists, these overlapping partnerships are beginning to resemble a more connected network.

“Through the alliances between the U.S. and these countries, a network of alliances centered on the U.S. will be formed,” Shen said.

For Beijing, that growing coordination is likely to be viewed with concern, particularly as exercises become more frequent and more operationally substantive.

“The expansion of these minilateral groupings will likely be viewed with concern,” Kristanto said, warning that it “does increase the risk of misperception and sharper responses in contested areas.”

Edited by Eugene Whong.

Port Moresby, PAPUA NEW GUINEA – Six months after Papua New Guinea and Australia signed a bilateral defense treaty, public opinion in PNG remains divided, with some telling Radio Free Asia that they like that the pact creates opportunities for youth, and others saying that they worry about potentially being drawn into a larger conflict between the West and China.

Unofficially named the Pukpuk Treaty, after the Tok Pisin word for “crocodile,” it is Port Moresby’s first mutual defense pact and it draws the two regional allies closer together in an era of increasing Chinese influence in the Pacific.

Beyond the nuts and bolts of coordination and cooperation during crises, the pact also allows 10,000 Papua New Guineans to join the Australian Defense Force, or ADF, and become eligible for Aussie citizenship.

Supporters of the treaty say that in a country where 58% of the people are under 25 and, according to World Bank data 3.8% youth unemployment, the opportunity is too great to ignore.

“I agree with the Pukpuk Pact. It is an employment opportunity for our ever increasing youths who can’t be employed after leaving school,” John Kau, a former colonel in the Papua New Guinea Defense Force, or PNGDF, told RFA. “Our country’s leaders have no idea on how to mitigate the lack of jobs for the school leavers.”

Kau said that it would be good for young Papua New Guineans to take on Australian citizenship because earning an Australian salary would enable them to take care of their extended families.

But he also understood that the treaty means that Papua New Guineans could be called on by Australia in the event of war.

“I have no problem as long as it is a just cause,” said Kau.

(David Gray/AFP)

The citizenship for service agreement was a major selling point of the Pukpuk pact. Shortly after the treaty was announced in August 2025, Papua New Guinea’s Defense Minister Billy Joseph told Australian media that there was “a very big pool” of young Papua New Guineans “and Australia can have as many as they want.”

He added that recruitment would take place at regional centers and in the capital Port Moresby.

Divided opinion

But on the streets of Port Moresby, not everyone is lining up to enlist. Chris Pole, a young Papua New Guinean, told RFA that he found it hard to believe that the treaty would allow 10,000 Papua New Guineans to join the Australian military, especially when the PNGDF has only 4,000 personnel.

“The Pukpuk recruitment alone will outnumber the PNGDF size, so if there is a war, definitely Australia will use Papua New Guineans as pawns,” he said, noting that pawns in a game of chess are often sacrificed to protect more valuable pieces. “Papua New Guineans will be sought out first when there is a war and put on the front line if Australia decides to support the United States in a war against China.”

Australia also has a mutual defense agreement with the U.S. and New Zealand through the 1951 ANZUS Treaty, and Washington entered into a defense cooperation agreement with Port Moresby in 2023.

Pole called on the country to remain in its traditional neutral foreign policy stance of being “friends to all, enemies to none.”

But Bosco Bothoa, another young Papua New Guinean, told RFA he would love to serve if it meant he would become an Australian.

“I definitely would want to be a citizen of Australia as stated in the pact, of course,” he said. “In Australia there is better standard of living than in PNG and the salary would be higher.”

But Bothoa also understood the responsibilities that could come with enlisting and acquiring a new citizenship. When asked if he would be prepared to fight if war erupts in the Pacific, he said, “War is not the ultimate solution,” but if it happens, “then we will have to serve our country as citizens of Australia.”

Bothoa and others who want to enlist might have to wait though. In a Facebook post on Jan. 4, the PNG Ministry of Defense advised that the first phase of recruitment under the plan would only be open to Papua New Guinean citizens who have permanent residency status in Australia. Phase two would start at a later date and include applicants living in Papua New Guinea.

The PNGDF told RFA that the recruitment process has not yet been finalized, and it remains under consultation.

Mutually beneficial

The Pukpuk treaty is a win-win, according to the Washington-based Center for Strategic & International Studies. In an article published shortly after the treaty was signed, the think tank said that the treaty deepens the relationship between the two countries, and that enlisting Papua New Guineans into the ADF would be good for both sides.

“Given the ADF’s recruitment challenges and PNG’s undermanned defense forces, the arrangement offers clear benefits for both nations,” the article said. “As a mutual defense treaty, the Pukpuk Treaty stands as both a continuation of previous aspects of the Australian-PNG relationship but also constitutes a fundamental change in the depth of that relationship.”

But the treaty might be at odds with Papua New Guinea’s constitution, Jerry Singirok, a Papua New Guinean former two-star general who is now a defense strategist, told RFA.

(Will Burgess/Reuters)

“Regardless of how best the Papua New Guinea government want to justify the integration of a foreign force, our constitution does not provide for military integration with a foreign power,” He said. “The PNG Defence Force is mandated to serve the sovereign interest of PNG and any arrangement that embeds PNGDF with the Australia’s Defence Force or aligns PNG’s military doctrine with Australia,’s could be seen as undermining PNG’s national sovereignty, violating the principle of non alignment which PNG had historically upheld.”

He said that barring an amendment to the constitution, the legality of the Pukpuk Treaty could be challenged in court.

Prior to the treaty’s signing, a spokesperson for the Chinese Embassy in Papua New Guinea said that China “adheres to the principle of non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs,” adding that the treaty should not prevent Port Moresby from cooperating with a third party nor should the treaty target a third party or undermine its “legitimate interests.”

The treaty does not mention China by name.

Edited by Eugene Whong.

Update corrects the given name of Col. Kau.

TAMUNING, Guam - A U.S. plan to potentially mine an area of Pacific seabed roughly the size of Nevada near two U.S. territories is the latest example of increasing competition in the region between the United States and China, a local government official told Radio Free Asia.

The zones of seabed marked off for potential development total 69 million acres (280,000 square kilometers) in two distinct geographical areas east and west of the Northern Mariana Islands and Guam.

“In both areas, the primary minerals for commercial development include potential commercially viable quantities of cobalt, nickel, copper, manganese, zinc, rare earth elements, along with other minerals that may prove economically viable to extract and process in the future,” Douglas Boren, the Pacific regional director for the U.S. The Department of Interior’s Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, or BOEM, stated in a March 13 memo detailing the plan.

(BOEM)

In the same memo, Boren said that the Trump administration recognizes an “overreliance” on foreign-sourced minerals and the products that use them, potentially jeopardizing “U.S. defense capabilities, infrastructure development and technological innovation.”

Boren cited executive orders that direct the Department of Interior to expedite mineral development in the region, including one signed by the president on April 24, 2025, which emphasized “strengthening partnerships with allies and industry to counter China’s growing influence over seabed mineral resources.”

The memo specified that the areas identified would be subject to “environmental analyses conducted for the proposed lease offering.” meaning that parts of the two tracts might be omitted from the area to be leased. It also acknowledged concerns from those opposed to the undersea mining proposal, including potential harms to fisheries, tourism and the environment.

Geopolitics at play

Sen. William Parkinson of the Guam legislature noted that the race to explore the ocean floor is driven by a broader strategic contest unfolding across the Indo-Pacific.

“Guam is very much on the front line of it,” Parkinson told RFA. “There are environmental concerns about deep-sea mining, and those are real.”

Parkinson said the concern over China’s increasing influence in the Pacific goes beyond mining.

(Mar-Vic Cagurangan/RFA)

“When vessels tied to the Chinese state are repeatedly surveying waters near Guam and other strategic corridors, we have to ask not only what minerals they are interested in, but what military advantage they may be seeking,” he said, adding that competition between Washington and Beijing carries echoes of World War II, when Guam was part of the Pacific Theater campaign.

Reuters and other news outlets reported this week that in addition to surveying for minerals, China is mapping the seabed, and the data has military applications, according to naval experts.

Beyond being one variable in the larger arena of strategic competition with China, undersea mining is also big bucks. The emerging industry has a potential valuation as high as US$20 trillion according to the Belgium-based management consulting firm Arthur D. Little.

Local opposition

But people living in Guam and the Northern Marianas feel like their concerns are not being heard, Guam’s Governor Lou Leon Guerrero said in response to the March 13 memo.

“We are disappointed that, in all our attempts to engage with BOEM throughout this process, they have not considered and have ignored the very people who are most affected by their actions,” she said. “We will show up on every front to make sure that our concerns are heard and that our oceans are protected.”

(Mar-Vic Cagurangan/RFA)

Last year, the Guam and Northern Marianas legislatures separately adopted resolutions calling for a moratorium on deep-sea mining in the waters around the islands. Federal decisions, however, supersede local legislative actions.

To speed up the leasing of marked areas, the BOEM streamlined the permitting process and removed territorial governments from the decision-making process.

Guerrero said the plan was “driven by industry interest” at the expense of “environment, biodiversity, fisheries, tourism, public health, national security and regional relations.”

The proposal ignores the people and governments of nearby areas, Angelo Villagomez, a researcher at the Center for American Progress in Washington, told RFA. He criticized pushing forward “an industrial experiment in one of the most biodiverse and culturally significant ocean regions on Earth.”

“This decision to advance the largest seabed mining proposal in U.S. history ignores the overwhelming concerns voiced by the people and local governments. Deep-sea mining poses irreversible risks to fragile ecosystems, fisheries that sustain our communities, and the cultural heritage of the Chamorro and Refaluwasch peoples,” he said, referring to two ethnic groups living in the Marianas.

Beyond the Northern Marianas and Guam, Washington has begun engaging with the governments of the Cook Islands, Tonga and Nauru to forge seabed mining partnerships. Though no commercial mining has begun, the International Seabed Authority has issued several contracts in the Clarion-Clipperton zone, an area between Hawaii and Mexico which is known to host the world’s largest polymetallic deposits, but also an abundance of biodiverse sea life. Most awarded contracts in the zone are sponsored by Nauru and Tonga.

(William West/AFP)

Meanwhile in an area of seabed near American Samoa, another U.S. Pacific territory, mining exploration activities are already underway.

Deposits there contain an estimated 10 billion tons of high-grade ore, offering a significant, strategically located U.S. offshore source of nickel, cobalt, manganese, and copper, according to John Wasko, executive director of the American Samoa Development Council.

“China has a monopoly on terrestrial refining. Why bother?” Wasko told RFA, explaining that the U.S. has the potential to produce rare earth elements in a more sustainable way than by using the “old and dirty” technology in Chinese rare earth refineries.

Chinese monopoly

According to the Canadian government, China mines 69% of the global total of rare earths annually, with the U.S. a distant second at 12%. China also has a 90% monopoly on refining, where rare earth elements used in everyday items like cellular phones, cars, and solar panels are separated from the mined ore.

Though most of China’s rare earth production comes from terrestrial mines, it is also trying to increase its rare earth mining capabilities in the seas to possibly expand on its dominance of the rare earths market.

Parkinson expressed concern that the increasing competition between large powers was turning the Pacific into “a chessboard where island communities are pushed aside.”

“The Pacific must remain in the hands of Pacific Islanders,” he said. “We cannot allow the blue continent to be treated as a warehouse of raw materials or a covert battlespace. Our people, our environment, and our security all demand better than that.”

Edited by Eugene Whong.

Update corrects American Samoa as the U.S. territory where deep-sea mining exploration activities are underway.

Airane revealed to RFA Korean’s Jaewoo Park that after interacting with mysterious figures online, he found himself in a videocall with an East Asian man going by the name “Benjamin,” who promised him big bucks.

The deal? “Benjamin,” would pose as Airane in remote job interviews and once hired, the two would split the job’s salary.

Screenshots of “Benjamin’s” face taken by Airane closely match those of a man identified as a North Korean hacker by California-based security firm DTEX.

North Korean hackers are increasingly using the identity borrowing tactic as a way to avoid detection as they engage in illicit activities to earn money for their cash-strapped government.

While lending an identity might seem like easy money, those who go along with such a scheme should be aware that they could be charged as accomplices to cybercrime.

Edited by Eugene Whong.

But any cooperation between China and the Philippines to explore undersea oil reserves in disputed waters would be in preparation for the next energy crisis, not a solution to the current one, the experts said.

Talks this week between the two sides have shown “positive progress,” Beijing’s embassy in Manila said in a statement Thursday, urging both sides to “set aside differences and pursue joint development.”

Philippine officials, meanwhile, confirmed that no joint activity has started, but could in the future should negotiations be successful.

The renewed engagement comes amid disruptions to the Strait of Hormuz, a major shipping conduit through which one-fifth of global oil and gas flows.

The disruptions have heightened concerns over energy security in Asia, where many economies rely heavily on imports from the Middle East.

Out of gas

The Philippines is under pressure to secure new energy sources brought on by declining output from its Malampaya gas field, which supplies a significant share of the country’s electricity.

For Manila, the South China Sea has long been seen as a potential alternative source of energy.

The U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates the region holds about 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.

But Beijing claims almost the entire South China Sea and any energy supplies that lie within, including in the areas also claimed by Manila. Parts of the sea are also claimed by Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan and Indonesia.

(RFA)

At times, the competing claims can lead to violent clashes, such as in June 2024, when Chinese Coast Guard ships, according to Philippine officials, rammed supply ships near the Second Thomas Shoal, a reef that had become a flashpoint in the area claimed by both countries.

One Philippine sailor lost a finger in the incident, and at least seven others were injured, the officials said.

The turmoil and instability in the region is a major reason why its energy resources remain untapped.

While analysts say the Iran war is likely to increase attention on those resources, it will not necessarily accelerate their development.

Delayed gratification

“Disruptions to Hormuz are already pushing attention toward the South China Sea, but as a strategic hedge rather than a practical substitute,” Sylwia M. Gorska, a PhD candidate in international relations at the University of Lancashire in the United Kingdom, told RFA.

She said because of the importance of the strait to global gas supply, disruption can create enough volatility to force governments to do what they can to reopen it rather than look for gas elsewhere.

“The key issue is not whether the strait is formally open, but whether energy can move through it reliably and at acceptable cost,” she said.

(Omar Kamal/AFP)

Gorska said that the loss of supply cannot simply be replaced by new sources of oil in the South China Sea, because development there would require years of stable operating conditions and large amounts of capital investment.

“The real constraint is not whether resources exist, but whether they can be turned into supply,” Gorska said, highlighting legal uncertainty, operational risks and the absence of stable investment conditions in the South China Sea region.

The significant oil reserves in the sea are unlikely to provide the short term relief needed to deal with the shocks to the system brought on by Hormuz, Taipei-based independent analyst and a former visiting scholar at the National Chengchi University, Aadil Brar, told RFA.

“Hormuz was moving 20 million barrels a day of oil,” he said. But in the South China Sea, “turning gas fields into actual supply? That’s 5–10 years of drilling, pipelines, and US$10 billion in investments.”

“It’s a hedge for the next crisis, not a fix for this one.”

Competition remains fierce

“While incentives to cooperate increase on paper, behavior remains competitive,” Gorska said, referring to previous attempts at cooperation between Manila and Beijing that faced significant obstacles.

(Adrian Portugal/Reuters)

A 2018 agreement between the Philippines and China on joint exploration did not result in any joint projects and was later terminated, while constitutional limits on foreign participation – reinforced by a 2023 Philippine Supreme Court ruling – remain a key constraint.

International law does, however, provide for joint development arrangements, Brar said, but he acknowledged that implementation remains difficult in practice.

“Trust is thin and power’s uneven,” he said, noting that previous cooperative efforts have not been smooth. “It’s been more shoving than pushing together.”

Edited by Eugene Whong.

Vietnam has condemned China’s land reclamation activities at Antelope reef in the disputed Paracel Islands, following reports of accelerated dredging, landfill and construction operations there that, according to a U.S.-based think tank, could make it “China’s largest feature” in the South China Sea.

“Any foreign activities conducted in Hoang Sa, including Hai Sam reef, without Vietnam’s permission are completely illegal and invalid,” Vietnamese foreign ministry spokeswoman Pham Thu Hang said on Saturday, referring to the archipelago and the reef claimed by Hanoi and Beijing, as well as Taiwan, by their Vietnamese names. “Vietnam resolutely opposes such activities.”

Last week, the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, or AMTI, a project of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, or CSIS, in Washington, published an analysis of satellite imagery that said vast land reclamation efforts underway at Antelope Reef over the past month could make the reef suitable to construct a 9,000-foot (2700-meter) runway.

According to new @AsiaMTI analysis, Antelope Reef is set to become China’s largest feature in the Paracels and potentially in the entire South China Sea.

Read more: https://t.co/PT2ZYGKIoe pic.twitter.com/tw4YmeofVq

— CSIS (@CSIS) March 20, 2026

Beijing has constructed several airstrips of that size on other islands in the South China Sea including in the Spratly Islands, another disputed archipelago, the AMTI report said.

China’s foreign ministry during a press conference Monday asserted its position that the Paracels were Beijing’s territory.

“Xisha Qundao is China’s inherent territory, over which there is no dispute,” the ministry’s spokesperson Lin Jian said, referring to the archipelago by its name in Mandarin Chinese. “Necessary construction on our own territory is aimed at improving living and working conditions on the islands and growing the local economy.”

Territorial flashpoint

Though sovereignty over the Paracels is disputed, China took effective control of the archipelago after a 1974 naval clash with South Vietnam, which lost the Vietnam War to North Vietnam the following year.

The island chain is now one of several flashpoints in the South China Sea, where multiple countries assert overlapping territorial and maritime claims.

Media reports in early 2026 highlighted new Chinese dredging and landfill activity at Antelope Reef. Previously it had been one of China’s smallest outposts in the area.

Beijing began major dredging there in October 2025 and has started what appears to be preliminary construction for an airstrip in recent weeks, including more than 50 small grey-roofed structures and a helipad near the lagoon entrance, as well as foundations for larger buildings and several jetties, the report said.

AMTI estimated that the reclaimed land at Antelope Reef measures roughly 1,490 acres (6.02 square kilometers), close to the 1,504 acres (6.09 square kilometers) of Mischief Reef, China’s largest outpost in the South China Sea. By comparison, Woody Island – the largest Chinese-held feature in the Paracels – measures about 890 acres (3.60 square kilometers).

“If construction proceeds at the pace seen in satellite imagery, Antelope Reef is set to become China’s largest feature in the Paracels and potentially in the entire South China Sea, equaling or even surpassing the size of Mischief Reef in the Spratlys,” the report said.

The lagoon at Antelope Reef could also support a larger maritime presence.

“This could allow more coastguard along with large numbers of maritime militia to maintain a presence at the reef, as has been common in recent years at Mischief Reef,” AMTI said.

Antelope reef is located about 162 nautical miles (300 kilometers) from Sanya Port in China’s Hainan province and 216 nautical miles (400 kilometers) from Da Nang, Vietnam. Sanya is a major base for Chinese naval and air forces overseeing the South China Sea, underscoring the location’s strategic importance.

The Law of the Sea

China’s expansion of the reef does not necessarily bolster its claims to the Paracels from a legal perspective, according to Josue Raphael J. Cortez, the Faculty and Practicum Coordinator at the School of Diplomacy and Governance at De La Salle-College of Saint Benilde in the Philippines.

“This is because if we will be utilizing UNCLOS as the basis of a country’s maritime entitlements, the basis is and will always be the natural conditions of these features,” he told Radio Free Asia, referring to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

(Photo credit: Planet Labs Inc.)

Adopted in 1982 and in effect since 1994, UNCLOS is the primary international legal framework governing maritime rights. Because it heavily relies on “naturally formed” land features to define each country’s exclusive economic zone and territorial seas, artificial expansion does not automatically create new legal rights.

Cortez also said that regional reactions would be closely watched, particularly given the reef’s proximity to Vietnam.

“Given that the reef is proximate in Vietnam’s portion of the South China Sea, it will be an interesting opportunity for the region to have an idea of how such a move will be perceived,” he said.

The development also comes amid renewed tensions elsewhere in the South China Sea, particularly between China and the Philippines over competing sovereignty claims.

Manila recently rejected Beijing’s claims over disputed territory, including Scarborough Shoal, insisting the Philippines’ claims are grounded in international law. China, meanwhile, has pushed back against what it calls “misrepresentations” of its position.

The shoal is a triangular chain of reefs and lagoons located off the western coast of the Philippines which China has maintained control of since a standoff in 2012.

Manila continues to assert its rights under international law, including a 2016 arbitral ruling that found Beijing’s claims in much of the South China Sea have no legal basis.

Edited by Eugene Whong.

The story was updated to include the response from China’s foreign ministry.

Smith, who leads research teams at ANU that focus on Chinese investment, migration, military engagement, and aid in the Pacific region, told RFA’s Eugene Whong in an interview that Pacific countries must walk a “delicate tightrope” in the midst of the competing interests of Beijing and its rivals.

But he also said that at times, the tug-of-war geopolitics that permeate regional diplomatic forums can seem like a distraction when these countries are faced with more local “bread and butter issues.” The interview has been edited for length and clarity.

(RFA)

RFA: Let’s start off with the Solomon Islands where China has normalized a police presence in Honiara following the passage of a security pact in 2022. Do you think it could be said that the Solomons are China’s most important strategic partner in the Pacific right now?

Smith: I think they’re getting a lot of payoff for not an awful lot of investment in Solomons. Certainly, they’re really getting bang for buck. Even their police presence — it’s only a dozen or so policemen — but in terms of the propaganda value, it’s immense. To be fair, the police there have been pretty well received because they focus on community policing rather than sort of the traditional policing you might see in somewhere like Australia. So in some ways, their approach works a bit better with the local conditions.

RFA: So you would classify that police presence as propaganda?

Smith: Obviously, these days China’s all about selling models and the model of policing that they’re selling is of concern, but in terms of the number of boots on the ground that they’ve got there, it really is a very token presence. Tellingly though, all of the people there are kind of ex-peacekeepers, so they’re not really police. They’re more people on the internal security side of things.

RFA: Beijing has been putting pressure on the Pacific countries to stop recognizing Taipei in favor of Beijing, which the Solomons have done. How important is the status of Taiwan vis-a-vis Beijing’s One China Principle in the Pacific region?

Smith: Well, it’s a pretty big part of what drives China’s behavior in the region. They still are very, very focused on limiting Taiwan’s diplomatic space. So even if a country recognizes Beijing, they’ll then be pressured to take extra steps to limit any Taiwanese presence in the country. So even commercial offices, they’ll be pressured to close those down. It still remains a big focus of China in the region, and Taiwan has gone from being a very significant presence in the Pacific to having just three allies. Interestingly though, one of them will be hosting the Pacific Islands Forum this year, so that’ll be Palau, and that could make for some very interesting theatrics.

RFA: Let’s move on then to Fiji, which appears to be in a situation where it must balance a defense partnership with Australia while also receiving investment from China.

Smith: It’s been interesting because with the previous prime minister, Frank Bainimarama, they had a very loyal ally and someone who was quite dependent on Chinese diaspora funding to stay in power. With current Prime Minister Rabuka, initially he took some steps to increase Taiwan’s voice in the country. He changed the name of their representative office there in Suva, but he’s sort of slowly backtracked a little bit. And I think in many ways just had to address the reality of, you know, China is a much bigger trading partner than Taiwan with Fiji. And that’s the reality throughout the region.

(Andres Martinez Casares/Reuters)

RFA: Then, how difficult is it for countries in this situation to maintain the balance between China and Western countries as they compete for influence in the region?

Smith: Fiji carries that balance a bit better than most countries, and partly because it’s not as dependent on China for trade as other countries are. Its major trading partner unusually is not China, it’s the United States, and China often comes in at number three or even number four as its most significant trading partners. So that allows it to be somewhat immune to the sort of economic coercion or economic threats that other Pacific Islands are vulnerable to—the most extreme case being Solomon Islands, which has, usually, two-thirds of its exports going to China.

RFA: Let’s move on, then, to Papua New Guinea, which similarly maintains security ties with the U.S. and Australia, but recently entered into an economic partnership with China in November of 2025 to boost exports of agricultural products and fisheries.

Smith: PNG’s got an election year on the horizon, so that does change the equation there. It means that the politicians are going to look for propaganda victories. PNG’s been interesting in that they, in terms of their defensive cooperation, pushed for a treaty with Australia. So this was an initiative that came from the PNG side, not from the Australian side, and got that across the line.

So in terms of security partnerships, they’re much more integrated with Australia and the U.S. than any other Pacific country outside of the Northern Pacific. Meanwhile, in many ways, the trade deal was kind of, “Yeah, we’re sorry, we still want to trade with you.” And they do. They export a huge amount of Liquefied Natural Gas not just to China, but also to Taiwan. So they have to walk a pretty delicate tightrope. And in an election year next year, Prime Minister Marape will be keen to get some infrastructure projects underway. So certainly he’ll be looking to China to bankroll some of those before he goes to the next election.

RFA: So then is maintaining the balance between China and Taiwan just as difficult? Or is it just that money is so important that it makes these kinds of problems go away?

Smith: In terms of the formal diplomatic space, really, Taiwan doesn’t have a lot of wiggle room there, even less than what it has in Fiji, and that’s kind of the quid pro quo. On the other hand, if you look back to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum that was held in Papua New Guinea in 2018, Taiwan was there.

As long as it’s just economics, I think Taiwan is still given a little bit of leeway. It’s when it comes into actual diplomacy that China is a little bit uneasy, because, to be honest, a lot of China’s economic prosperity comes from Taiwan. The two countries economically are very tightly integrated, and this is something that China is not at all unhappy about. They like tight integration because it enhances their argument for unification much more strongly than anything else.

RFA: Let’s pivot to the countries that have entered into the Compact of Free Association with the U.S., which are Palau, the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia, which signed an economic framework agreement with China in late 2025.

Smith: FSM is the one of those that recognizes Beijing, and they switched to Beijing some time ago. There was some noise from the outgoing president that he would like to switch to Taiwan, but that of course did not happen. In doing so, he sort of flagged a lot of interference that had been going on from China within FSM. But a lot of the drama has been around getting the compact negotiated. That seems to have largely gone through. Aid cuts that have affected a lot of the Pacific haven’t really hit the compact states because a lot of their money comes through the U.S. Department of the Interior, not through the State Department. So they’ve been largely unaffected.

(Taiwan Presidential Office via AFP)

But the leadership of all countries is quite different. In Palau President Surangel Whipps Jr., you have a very pro-, almost Trumpian type figure. He quotes Ronald Reagan in his speeches, but his term is up after this electoral term. So what happens after that will be of interest and concern to the U.S. In the Marshall Islands, it’s always a little bit unstable, but certainly they’re still very much in the U.S.-Taiwan camp. And the FSM, yeah, they’re always interesting to watch because you have these independence movements within the FSM, and you’re never sure when they’re going to bubble to the surface.

RFA: The 2026 Pacific Islands Forum will be in Palau, and we’re about five and a half months out from that. Should we expect that China and U.S. competition will be a major theme of the event? And if not, what other key issues would you say would dominate the discussions at this forum?

Smith: Most of the Pacific Island Forum members are kind of a bit annoyed by the distraction of geopolitics. They want to talk about the bread-and-butter issues of poverty, of climate change, of things that actually affect their daily lives. So this Punch and Judy act over who sits where and who gets recognized really ticks them off. The Solomon’s ended up inviting neither China nor Taiwan to the last one, or America for that matter.

It’s unlikely Palau will follow suit. They’ll definitely want to have Taiwan in the room in some form. How China reacts to that will be really interesting to watch. But from the point of view of the member countries, this is just an annoying distraction to them because they’re facing existential threats. They’re looking in many cases to migrate in the face of current climate change or the prospect of future climate change. So they’ve got some pretty big issues to discuss, and Taiwan-China is from their perspective not one of them.

RFA: So these issues would be more important than worrying about which power you’re aligned with militarily or economically, correct?

It varies among the member states. Obviously, if you’re sitting in the Northern Pacific, it’s more of an existential question to you than if you’re sitting in Solomon Islands, well away from any prospective fighting over Taiwan. Certainly for Guam and countries like this that aren’t full PIF members, if you have a missile called the “Guam Killer,” obviously it focuses your mind in a way that it doesn’t for Tonga or Samoa or these other places that are well out of the firing line. So there is division within the PIF over how much they care about this. But by and large, the South Pacific nations see it as a somewhat annoying distraction.

(Andy Wong/AFP)

RFA: Why is competing influence in the Pacific so important in a global sense?

Smith: The geopolitics matter in the sense that if there is a conflict over Taiwan it is quite an important region. The U.S. Navy would have to sail through that region to retake Taiwan should they choose to do so, which I have to say doesn’t look terribly likely under the current administration.

And it is important in the sense that in these countries, the extreme case in the Pacific would be Kiribati where China’s influence actually starts to corrode the polity … where you have a government that has been adopting very restrictive measures, often at the encouragement and certainly at the inspiration of China.

You can’t take a photo in front of the government building in Kiribati without someone coming up to you and saying “Hey, don’t do that.” And that certainly would never have happened 10-15 years ago. So it can have a corrosive effect. Solomon Islands would be another example where you’d see it having a slightly corrosive effect on politics. Politics has never been terribly clean in Solomon’s anyway, to be frank, but it certainly hasn’t had a terribly positive impact there either.

Edited by Charlie Dharapak.

Due to funding uncertainty, RFA will pause its editorial operations on Oct. 31, 2025.

These video testimonials for the series “We are RFA” were recorded in March 2025, in the days following the termination of RFA’s funding grant. Since then, more than 90% of the editorial staff was furloughed or laid off.

Truong Son, RFA Vietnamese

Truong Son, director of RFA Vietnamese, has not been able to return home since he began working at RFA. For him, this is not only a job but also a duty.

“We bear the responsibility to tell the truth and break the censorship and propaganda the Vietnamese authorities impose on the entire society,” he said, adding that some people have been imprisoned in Vietnam for writing for RFA.

Losing RFA would mean the communist regime in Vietnam gains total control over information for 100 million people, he said.

Hye Jun Seo and Jamin Anderson, RFA Korean

For decades, Radio Free Asia has been a critical source of uncensored news for North Koreans living under an authoritarian regime with extremely limited access to information.

“RFA’s mission is to protect the North Korean people’s right to know and their right to freedom of speech,” said RFA Korean reporter Jamin Anderson, who along with her colleague Hye Jun Seo have interviewed many North Korean escapees.

“We want our audience to hear their stories.”

Mamatjan Juma, RFA Uyghur

RFA Uyghur journalists and their families have faced ongoing intimidation tactics from the Chinese government for years.

“China arrested and sentenced at least 50 of our colleagues’ relatives and loved ones in an attempt to stop us from what we are doing,” said RFA Uyghur’s Mamatjan Juma.

Their job has been reporting on China’s treatment of the Uyghur people, which the United States government has designated as genocide and crimes against humanity.

Aye Aye Mon, RFA Burmese

RFA Burmese journalist Aye Aye Mon was forced to flee Myanmar after the military coup in 2021. She has risked her life and her freedom to return and report on the civil war and its impact on the people of Myanmar.

“It’s an honor to provide a voice for those who need it most,” she said.

Eugene Whong, RFA English

RFA podcast host and editor Eugene Whong has been the voice behind many video reports. In 2021, he reported on Mya Thwe Thwe Khaing, the first peaceful protester killed by the Myanmar junta following the coup in 2021.

“I realized that at that moment these were not just words that I was reading into a microphone,” he said. “It’s an actual account of events that happened to real people.”

Kitty Wang, RFA Mandarin

RFA Mandarin journalist Kitty Wang said that the Chinese government’s suppression of information about the Tiananmen Square massacre shaped her as a journalist, forging her commitment to protecting and upholding freedom of information.

“Without it [information], there can be no freedom of thought. Without it, people live in darkness. Through my work at RFA, I hope to bring them light,” Kitty said.

Win Ei San, RFA Burmese

Win Ei San arrived in the U.S. as a refugee and has been working as a graphic designer for RFA Burmese for a year and a half.

“I have learned so many things in such a short time,” said San, who has worked on projects related to the ongoing civil war in Myanmar and its casualties.

“I have so much more I want to do.”

Vuthy Huot, RFA Khmer

“If we don’t keep fighting, we won’t survive,” said RFA journalist Vuthy Huot who survived a genocide by the Khmer Rouge. As a journalist with RFA Khmer, he tells stories that matter to local people.

“The information is not filtered, not controlled, by the government. The information that helps them make the right decisions.”

RFA Cantonese journalist

“I have to hide my identity because all Hong Kong people are under the threat of the National Security Law,” said this RFA Cantonese journalist.

Threatened by China’s transnational repression, he had to leave his home in pursuit of a safe space to practice independent journalism.

“If I stay in Hong Kong and bow to the government, we have to sacrifice our principles as independent journalists.”

Tashi Wangchuk, RFA Tibetan

Radio Free Asia’s Tibetan Service has served as a bridge connecting people living under Chinese rule in Tibet with the outside world. However, this role comes with significant risks, said Tashi Wangchuk, a journalist for RFA Tibetan Service.

“For me personally, I have received threats from the Chinese government throughout my journalism career, and these have progressively gotten worse,” he said, adding that such intimidation will not deter him from delivering truthful reporting to his audience.

Souphatta, RFA Lao

RFA Lao journalist Souphatta has been reporting on human trafficking stories for three years. She began after a mother contacted her asking for help in rescuing her daughter.

In the years since, parents and younger people trapped in scam centers have told Souphatta that “without RFA, they would not have a future.”

Khet Mar, RFA Burmese

The ongoing civil war in Myanmar, which started after the 2021 coup, has killed tens of thousands of people. During that time, RFA journalists have shed light on the human cost of the war and brought global attention to the fight for democracy.

“While our voice has been diminished, our fight for human rights, press freedom, and a just future for Myanmar continues,” said Khet Mar, an RFA Burmese journalist.

Alim Seytoff, RFA Uyghur

For the past 26 years, Radio Free Asia’s Uyghur Service has exposed China’s atrocities against the Uyghur people in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. This includes mass detentions, the establishment of concentration camps, and the horrific treatment of Uyghur women, according to Alim Seytoff, the director of RFA Uyghur Service.

“As a result of our groundbreaking reports, the first Trump administration determined that China is committing genocide and crimes against humanity against the Uyghur people,” he said.

Thiri Min Zin, RFA Burmese

Thiri Min Zin, an anchor for RFA Burmese, was forced to leave Myanmar after a 2021 coup installed a ruling junta that has targeted journalists. Despite the hardships she has encountered, she remains committed to her work.

“It is my superpower—to tell the truth and help my people,” she said. “What I can do to help my country is to share true information.”

Ounkeo Souksavanh, RFA Lao

For RFA Lao journalist Ounkeo Souksavanh, leaving his home country wasn’t a choice — he was blacklisted by the communist government for his radio show. “In Laos, the truth is not often shared. Anyone who criticizes the government faces arrest.”

Ounkeo joined RFA to report accurate news to the people in his home country. “RFA was a lifeline to keep telling the truth,” he said.

Kim Ji Eun, RFA Korean

As a North Korean escapee, RFA Korean journalist Kim Ji Eun has used her reporting to reach residents still inside the country, where Kim Jong Un’s dictatorship tightly controls all access to information.

“RFA is truly a beacon of hope for those who are in deep despair,” Kim Ji Eun said, adding that she had talked to people who decided to escape North Korea after listening to RFA broadcasts.

RFA Tibetan journalist

Radio Free Asia has long been a lifeline for audiences in Tibet, according to an RFA journalist of two decades whose identity is being withheld for safety.

“RFA sheds light on the darkest corner of Tibet,” he said, “and serves as a window for Tibetans inside the region to see the world outside.”

He remains resolute, even though his work has come at a cost.

“My family members who remain in Tibet are constantly surveilled,” he said. “I am determined to continue to tell these stories that counter China’s false narratives.”

Zin Mar Win, RFA Burmese

RFA Burmese’s Zin Mar Win became a journalist after growing up listening to the radio for news. She fled Myanmar after realizing that the ruling junta was targeting journalists, herself included. She has continued to tell her country’s stories.

“While I have a voice, I will tell the truth. This story is not just mine. It’s the story of millions of Myanmar people who refuse to be silenced,” she said.

Chih-Te Lee, Asia Fact Check Lab

Chih-Te Lee is the Director of the Asia Fact Check Lab at Radio Free Asia, where he fact-checks false and misleading narratives, including comments from officials in totalitarian states like China.

“We believe that facts are the most powerful antidote to extremism, conspiracy theory and hearsay,” he said, adding that “fact-based free speech is the foundation of democracy.”

Vuthy Tha, RFA Khmer

Vuthy Tha worked for RFA Khmer’s newsroom in Cambodia before it was closed by Prime Minister Hun Sen’s authoritarian regime in 2017.

Vuthy knew he had to leave Cambodia because the government monitored his movements.

It took him seven years to obtain a work visa and rejoin RFA.

“On my flight to America with my two children, all I could think about was how America was a safe place for us,” he said.

Wai Mar Htun, RFA Burmese

In war-torn Myanmar, “access to information is as important as food,” RFA Burmese journalist Wai Mar Htun said.

“Access to credible information allows people to make vital decisions,” she said. With news sources and VPNs restricted by the ruling junta, RFA serves a critical role.

Mekong reporter, RFA Lao

For the past 10 years, this Lao reporter has been covering the Mekong River, which is a vital source of food, drinking water, and livelihoods for more than 60 million people.

The river is under significant pressure due to the impact of hydropower dams, which are affecting both the local communities and wildlife, he said.

“It has meant everything to me to bring these stories of the Mekong to you,” he said.

RFA Tibetan journalist

Persecution. Harassment. Loss of contact with family members.

This RFA Tibetan journalist has risked it all to report accurate, independent news about the atrocities faced by Tibetans in Tibet. “My family members in Tibet were persecuted on account of my work. … They are still – to this day – being harassed by the Chinese government,” he said.

How has RFA’s journalism impacted Tibetans? “From the widespread Tibet protests of 2008 to the wave of self-immolations and China’s systemic efforts to erase Tibetan identity, RFA has been instrumental in providing a rare window into Tibet,” he said.

July Myo, RFA Burmese

Reliable news can be hard to come by for many in Myanmar, where internet access is often restricted and a civil war has claimed thousands of lives. Young people are being forcibly conscripted into the military, making independent reporting more crucial than ever.

“I am proud to share their stories, to give them a voice,” says July Myo, an RFA Burmese reporter from a town hit by airstrikes.

WHYNOT journalist

What would Chinese-language journalism look like in an open and free environment?

WHYNOT, a digital news magazine affiliated with Radio Free Asia, has an answer.

“Our uncensored reports not only inform our audience of events that are happening now, but also document our time so that history and the truth cannot be erased by the Chinese government,” a WHYNOT journalist said.

Ye Kaung Myint Maung, RFA Burmese

Ye Kaung Myint Maung, a journalist for RFA Burmese, has dedicated years to reporting on Myanmar and remains committed to uncovering the truth.

“Journalism doesn’t stop. The truth doesn’t disappear,” he said.

Due to uncertain funding, Radio Free Asia is not delivering news to our audiences for the first time in our history.

For RFA journalists who sacrificed so much in defying powerful and malignant forces, it’s an excruciating moment. And make no mistake, authoritarian regimes are already celebrating RFA’s potential demise.

When RFA Uyghur journalists first exposed the violent repression and mass detainment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, China harassed and arrested their family members. Still, our journalists bravely continued the work of uncovering atrocities. With the world’s only independent Uyghur-language news service shuttered, China’s propaganda will fester without a potent and effective accountability check.

Without RFA Tibetan journalists, China’s campaign of forced assimilation and erasure of Tibetan culture and language will be underreported. As will China’s regime of intimidation and suppression of pro-democracy activism in Hong Kong, which RFA Cantonese journalists regularly exposed at great risk to their own personal safety. Without RFA Mandarin, WHYNOT and Asia Fact Check Lab, independent reporting and fact-checking in the most widely spoken of all Chinese dialects is severely diminished.

Without RFA journalism in Vietnam, where at least four RFA contributors remain imprisoned, the communist regime has a total monopoly on information disseminated to more than 100 million people.

In Myanmar, where later this year the military government is staging long-promised elections largely condemned as a sham, there will be no RFA Burmese journalists scrutinizing the junta’s promise of a free and fair vote. Those journalists were honored this month with two national Murrow Awards for their excellent reporting.

Without RFA Korean, 26 million North Koreans isolated by the repressive regime’s war on free speech and a free press will lack a critical link to independent information. RFA Korean journalists were celebrated earlier this year at the 50th annual Gracie Awards for their report on North Korean escapees.

RFA Lao journalists exposed the perils of the rush to dam the Mekong River. They also reported on the alarming rise of teenagers trafficked into scam centers in Myanmar, which the United Nations described as a human rights epidemic of exploitation, forced labor and torture. The absence of RFA journalism amputates that fearless reporting in Laos, where criticism of authorities can result in long prison sentences.

It was RFA’s Investigative Unit that laid bare the forced labor scam compounds perpetrated by the Prince Group. Just this month, the United States and the United Kingdom imposed sweeping sanctions against the Cambodian conglomerate, designating it a transnational criminal organization. Without our investigative journalists, the schemes that authoritarian regimes and corrupt organizations work so hard to conceal will likely remain hidden.

The journalists of RFA Khmer, including those who told heartbreaking stories of surviving the Cambodian genocide, worked tirelessly to expose the persistent corruption and cronyism within Cambodia’s authoritarian government. In response, the regime declared two of our journalists as “hostile to the state,” a broad legal designation used to suppress dissent, and deployed their online troll army to harass our journalists on social media. Even in the face of coordinated intimidation, RFA Khmer journalists never capitulated. Without their reporting, Cambodians lose an important spotlight on flagrant violations of basic human rights by the ruling Cambodian People’s Party.

When the initial funding disruption earlier this year forced RFA to furlough the majority of our editorial staff, the handful of journalists who remained launched RFA Perspectives, determined to fulfill RFA’s congressionally mandated mission to provide uncensored, accurate news and information in regions across Asia hostile to a free press. That program, too, will end.

Independent journalism is at the core of RFA. For the first time since RFA’s inception almost 30 years ago, that voice is at risk.

We still believe in the urgency of that mission — and in the resilience of our extraordinary journalists. Once our funding returns, so will we.

Stay tuned.

Rosa Hwang

Executive Editor

WASHINGTON - With the government shutdown and delay in receiving funding for the new fiscal year, effective Oct. 31, Radio Free Asia (RFA) will halt all production of news content for the time being. The move is part of a plan for the Congressionally-funded private corporation to implement cost-saving measures that can help sustain the organization should appropriated funding streams resume. President and CEO Bay Fang issued the following statement:

“Because of the fiscal reality and uncertainty about our budgetary future, RFA has been forced to suspend all remaining news content production - for the first time in its 29 years of existence. In an effort to conserve limited resources on hand and preserve the possibility of restarting operations should consistent funding become available, RFA is taking further steps to responsibly shrink its already reduced footprint.

“This means initiating a process of closing down overseas bureaus and formally laying off furloughed staff and paying their severance - many of whom have been on unpaid leave since March, when the U.S. Agency for Global Media unlawfully terminated RFA’s Congressionally appropriated grant.

“However drastic these measures may seem, they position RFA, a private corporation, for a future in which it would be possible to scale up and resume providing accurate, uncensored news for people living in some of the world’s most closed places.”

During its tenure, RFA’s groundbreaking reporting on the Uyghur genocide in Xinjiang, the CCP’s cover-up of COVID-19 fatalities, the unfolding crisis in Myanmar since the 2021coup, Chinese hydropower projects in the Tibetan regions, and the journeys of North Korean defectors has built a public record of transparency in some of the world’s most repressive places, holding autocrats and elites accountable to their people and internationally. Other measures to conserve resources on hand include ending leases of overseas offices and bureaus in Dharamsala, Taipei, Seoul, Istanbul, Bangkok, and Yangon.

In the last five years, RFA created new editorial units focused on China’s malign influence in the Indo-Pacific region and globally, investigating PRC secret police stations in the United States and Europe, election interference by the Chinese Communist Party in Taiwan and other Asian countries, and PRC influence operations in Pacific island countries. RFA’s incisive brand of journalism has made it and its journalists a constant target, with its reporters facing pressure and threats since its inaugural report in Mandarin was heard in China on Sept. 29, 1996. Authorities in China, Vietnam, Myanmar, and Cambodia have detained family members, sources, reporters, and contributors. Listeners in North Korea have been severely punished and reportedly executed for accessing RFA’s reports. Nevertheless, RFA’s journalistic operations have until now withstood government intimidation and attacks.

In the months since the USAGM illegally terminated its Congressionally appropriated grant to RFA, and despite layoffs and furloughs that diminished editorial staff by more than 90%, the private grantee has continued to fulfill its Congressional mandate to provide accurate, timely news to people living in some of the most closed media environments in Asia thanks to a preliminary injunction issued by the United States Federal District Court for the District of Columbia, which USAGM has appealed. RFA has also continued to win awards for its reporting, including two national Edward R. Murrow awards in August and a Gracie Award in March. While many services, including RFA Uyghur and Tibetan, have already gone dark, others have continued to produce limited output, including RFA Burmese, Khmer, Korean, Mandarin Chinese, and Vietnamese. But these will cease on Oct. 31.

Myanmar government media The Global New Light of Myanmar said the military “conducted operations in KK Park near Myanmar-Thai border” and had “seized 30 sets of Starlink receivers and accessories,” according to the AFP news agency.

AFP said that number is only a fraction of the Starlink devices they identified using satellite imagery and drone photography. On the roof of one building alone in KK Park, images showed nearly 80 of the internet dishes.

(Lillian Suwanrumpha/AFP)

The Global New Light of Myanmar also said junta troops had occupied around 200 buildings and found nearly 2,200 workers at the site, while 15 “Chinese scammers” had been arrested for involvement in “online gambling, online fraud and other criminal activities” around KK Park.

A crackdown by Thai, Chinese and Myanmar authorities starting in February saw thousands of suspected scammers repatriated, with experts saying some in the scam industry participate willingly while others are forced to by organized criminal groups.

(Lillian Suwanrumpha/AFP)

The U.S. Congress’ Joint Economic Committee told the AFP news agency they have begun an investigation into Starlink’s involvement with the centers. While it can call owner Elon Musk to a hearing, it cannot compel him to testify.

Starlink parent company SpaceX did not immediately respond to a request for comment on Monday.

(Lillian Suwanrumpha/AFP)

Online scamming centers have proliferated across Southeast Asia in recent years, especially in some of the more lawless parts of Myanmar, as well as in neighboring Laos and Cambodia.

The centers are often run by Chinese gangs and are notorious for luring unsuspecting people into jobs that entail going online to contact and defraud people, many in China.

Chinese authorities are keen to get the rackets based over the border in Myanmar shut down, and so action against them has become a key factor for rival factions in Myanmar, from the junta to its insurgent enemies and other militias, as they vie for China’s favor.

(Yin Gang, Xinhua via Getty Images)

With reporting by AFP.

It follows Myanmar junta chief Min Aung Hlaing admitting on Wednesday that the military-backed administration will be unable to conduct an upcoming general election across the entire country, as a civil war triggered by a 2021 coup rages on.

(Ye Aung Thu/AFP)

Critics - including many Western nations - have described the election scheduled for late December as a sham exercise aimed at legitimizing the Myanmar junta’s rule after it overthrew a civilian democratic government in 2021.

“I would call them regime-sponsored elections. And if they’re regime-sponsored, they can only lead to one outcome,” Ollogren told reporters in Kuala Lumpur.

The remarks by Min Aung Hlaing were his first public admission that the polls cannot be fully inclusive.

“We can’t hold the election everywhere 100%,” Min Aung Hlaing said in a speech broadcast on state TV from the capital Naypyidaw on Wednesday, adding that by-elections would follow in some areas after a new government is formed.

Myanmar’s last multi-party elections were held on November 8, 2020, with Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) party winning in a landslide victory. The results were not honored and a military coup took place in February 2021.

(Myanmar Ministry of Information via AFP)

The military doesn’t control all of Myanmar. Vast swaths are administered by a range of armed militias, ethnic groups and pro-democracy fighters, some in open, armed conflict with the ruling junta.

The junta has invited ASEAN countries to send observers for the election, due to start on December 28 and to continue in phases into January.

With reporting by Reuters