It was just before noon on Saturday. Three gyrocopters flew low as they approached Nyaung Pin Lay village. A school and surrounding residential area was bombed. Eleven were killed, including four children.

A resident told RFA that although the local People’s Defense Forces (PDF) received a tip that the Myanmar military would bomb the school, the warning could not reach them in time due to the lack of internet in the village.

“Information that this would be bombed was sent online to everyone. They did inform us,” the Kani Township resident told RFA on the condition of anonymity for security reasons.

“But because there was no Starlink communication, casualties were high as a result. About a month ago in Nat La Po village, when we got the exact location that would be bombed and cleared the area, there were no casualties. That was fortunate. But now, even though we got the location to be bombed, communication was cut off.”

(AFP)

In Myanmar, home to the world’s longest-running civil war, the military-appointed government has cut off phone lines and internet communications in over 40 percent of townships nationwide. Locals, civil society groups, and revolutionary forces tell RFA that they rely on Starlink — acquiring the devices through unofficial and often expensive channels — as a lifeline for information.

In October 2025, SpaceX announced the disabling of over 2,500 Starlink kits in Myanmar to crack down on transnational cyber-scam syndicates operating along the Thai-Myanmar border. Subsequent restrictions by SpaceX on unregistered units bought outside of Myanmar have shut down countless others.

Since June, more than 20 percent of Starlink internet devices used in Myanmar have had their services cut off, according to a report released on Oct. 23 by the group Athan.

Local residents and human rights activists told RFA that this has created a crisis for the survival of civilians in areas of intense civil conflict.

(Myanmar Military Information Team via AFP)

“The military cutting off phone lines and internet connections from the start was intentionally aimed at concealing human rights violations they commit and restricting people’s freedom of expression,” said Joy, a research director at Athan, a non-profit organization for the Freedom of Expression Movement in Myanmar.

“If Starlink also stops providing services to Myanmar and cuts connections, emergency humanitarian aid, air strike alerts, news regarding military columns, and natural disaster warnings for these local residents will stop immediately.”

According to a report titled “Dead Air” released by Athan on October 23, the communication cut-off directly affects the lives and safety of people in conflict-affected regions as they can no longer receive warnings about airstrikes and military movements, medical aid, or updates on family members’ safety and evacuation routes.

RFA contacted Khaing Khaing Soe, spokesperson for the military-appointed president’s office, regarding when internet and phone lines might be restored. She instead referred RFA to the Ministry of Digital Development and Communications.

Now, not only Starlink devices used by scam operations are being shut down, but Starlink connections used by civilians have also been suspended starting in June this year, with more than 20 percent of devices cut off by October, according to Athan. Consequently, regions like Sagaing, Mandalay, Magway, Rakhine, Kayah State, and other areas experiencing severe conflict were directly affected, Athan’s report states.

RFA contacted SpaceX regarding the impact on civilians in regions where the internet has been cut off, but has not received a response at the time of publication.

“Some of our Starlink devices were disabled. This has caused a lot of trouble for us,” said Aye Myint Aung Aung, Head of the Department of Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency Management under the Mandalay Regional Interim Administrative Council.

“On the other hand, whether it’s our civilians, revolutionary groups, or those leading and operating the administrative mechanism in revolutionary forces, everyone relies on Starlink. As access to information becomes more restricted, limitations on civilian safety also increase. I would define this as a very major challenge for us.”

In Kayah State, Deputy Minister of Defense for the Karenni State Government Khu Daniel told RFA that Starlink connections are being shut down one by one, raising concerns.

“For the public and for the youth currently fighting in battle, it will become a cause for concern,” he said.

(Lillian Suwanrumpha/AFP)

Khun Chit Htoo, who is assisting refugees in the Karenni Region, said that if all Starlink services are shut down, it could have a severe impact on humanitarian aid operations.

“Our current work relies on internet connectivity as well as donors. Since we connect online, we are very concerned,” said Khun Chit Htoo.

“We will face a situation where we can no longer help needy civilians receive the support they really need across all aspects of coordination. If there is no internet line left, I believe we stand to lose a lot because of this single connection.”

While welcoming and supporting the shutdown of Starlink internet lines used by online scam operations to crack down on scam syndicates, 317 civil society organizations issued a statement on July 17 expressing deep concern over potential negative impacts if all Starlink terminals nationwide are shut down.

According to an October 23 report by the Myanmar Internet Project, an organization monitoring internet shutdowns and conflicts, there were 581 military airstrikes that killed at least 353 civilians in the three months from July to September 2026, with 562 of those attacks occurring in areas where internet service was cut off.

Translated by Nayrein Kyaw. Edited by Charlie Dharapak.

Park Sol-ji stared out over the water at Gwangalli Beach with the iconic Gwangan Bridge in the distance, just above the horizon. South Korea’s touristy second largest city of Busan is a drastic change from heavily industrialized Chongjin – her hometown in North Korea. But both cities are large ports on the eastern side of the peninsula, and the sand, the breeze, and the smell of the sea reminds her of home.

“I love looking at the sea, and coming here whenever I miss my hometown is a big part of it,” she told Radio Free Asia Nov. 3. “Also, coming to the seaside makes me feel like I can finally breathe. I think I like it because it gives me such a sense of liberation.”

Park Sol-ji is a pseudonym she is using for safety reasons. Sol-ji fled North Korea 19 years ago when she was 20 years old, arriving in South Korea the following year. Adjusting to life in the fast-paced South was jarring. Though she tried her best to blend in among South Korean 20-somethings , it would all come crashing down whenever she spoke with her unmistakable North Korean accent.

She often found the degree of change in her life to be overwhelming, and she longed to return home, but that was now impossible. In times like that a trip to the sea would always remind her just enough of home to boost her spirits.

These days, she’s shed the accent and looks about the same as everyone else, but she still gets homesick and often travels to the seaside.

(RFA)

Busan is very different from Chongjin. Though both cities are industrialized ports, the South Korean city has – over many decades – invested in travel infrastructure and branded itself as a global tourist destination.

According to tourism statistics compiled by the Busan city government, more than 3.93 million foreign tourists have already visited Busan this year alone. CNN introduced Busan as “Asia’s Next Coastal City,” and Expedia selected Busan as the only Korean destination among its “Top 10 Destinations of the Year for 2027.”

But for Sol-ji, it’s not the glitz and glamor she’s coming for. She is here to take in the memories of the seaside of her childhood, where she played in the sand with her friends and spent precious moments with her family.

Memories roll in with the rising tide

Though the forecast called for cloudy weather, Gwangalli Beach had quite a few visitors from midday, perhaps due to the unexpectedly clear sky. Couples were taking photos with the sea as a backdrop, groups of noisy students on a field trip made their way across the sand, and foreign tourists walked barefoot. Everyone had smiles on their faces. Gwangalli Beach is well known as a romantic spot where the blue sea harmonizes with the spectacular night view of the Gwangan Bridge.

Sol-ji slowly surveyed the seascape and her face lit up as she spoke of the days she and her family would break out a large cauldron, build a fire, catch fish, and cook eojuk, a type of spicy fish porridge. She also remembered how she and her friends used to play by pulling up seaweed to gather in makeshift nets made of their extra clothes. Although these were ordinary childhood games, looking back now, they were moments she can never have again. To her, the sea is a landscape she longs for, as well as a place where she finds solace for her wounds.

“I even dreamt of returning to Chongjin because I missed my hometown, but even in the dream, seeing my dyed hair and decorated nails, I thought I would get caught,” she said. North Korea is notorious for fashion police who crack down on “capitalist” looks like dyed hair, colored nails, blue jeans, clothing with English words and phrases, and other no-nos. In South Korea, Sol-ji is free to dress how she wants to, but that does not erase her longing.

“I really do want to go back just once.”

The old village in the hills

Prior to visiting the beach, Sol-ji had started the day with a train ride to Busan Station, disembarking in the morning. The first spot on her itinerary was Gamcheon Culture Village, a 10-minute taxi ride away. The village started as a ramshackle town built up in the hills for laborers, and it expanded greatly with the swell of refugees fleeing to Busan from the advancing North Korean army in the opening weeks of the 1950-53 Korean War. In recent years the village was painstakingly restored through cultural preservation and beautification projects.

These days, tourists flock to its narrow meandering streets, attracted by the colorfully painted houses, many of which have been converted to shops, cafes and mini-museums. Near the high point of the village sits a colorful statue of the Little Prince, presiding over a space dedicated to the mythos presented in Antoine de Saint-Exupéry’s world-renowned novella.

(Saha-gu Office via korea.net)

Today, the tourists have come in force. More often than not, passersby who came for the village’s unique artsy flair will be speaking in a language other than Korean.

While most tourists are browsing the shops, ordering refreshments, or taking in one of the museums, Sol-ji slowly looks around the alley, finally focusing on a clothesline in the courtyard of one house. She noticed three or four items of clothing hanging on a single line, swaying in the breeze. It was this evidence that people actually live here that conjured up the feelings of her childhood.

“People here hang their laundry on clotheslines like that. It’s exactly the same in North Korea,” she said. She explained that in North Korea some families have washing machines, but rolling blackouts are common in most places, so people still have to do laundry by hand.

“So here they also dry their laundry in the sun,” she said. “Knowing this is quite heartwarming.”

In another area of town she operated a manual pump that once drew water out of the ground. She said it made her think of her grandmother’s house in Chongjin.

Sol-ji walked along, looking around every corner of the alley. Though sun-dried laundry and the hand pump might be similar details, the nature of this town, built up on a hillside, would never make sense in Chongjin, she said.

(RFA)

“There aren’t many houses on slopes like this in Chongjin. It costs a lot of money to build roads and houses up to these inclines,” she said. “Instead, there are many fields on these mountain slopes. It is land where people make a living through farming.”

Noon approached, and it was time for lunch.

Food for reminiscing

Sol-ji’s next destination was the famous open-air Jagalchi seafood market. As she walked from stall to stall, the boisterous calls of merchants mingled together, as they tried to attract customers by shouting out prices in their folksy Busan accents while holding up wriggling fish. Jagalchi is the largest seafood market in the country, and it is another big Busan tourist destination.

Sol-ji looked around the market, carefully observing the fish leaping out of the ice. She seemed to be searching for familiar fish such as flounder, cutlassfish, mackerel, and squid. Although it was an unfamiliar market, the seafood displayed on the stalls was something she often saw back in her hometown, she said.

She recalled how North and South Koreans use different words for squid and two types of octopus and this led to confusion.

“We called squid nakji. So when I’m here and I see the small octopus that they’re calling nakji, that’s what we used to call baby muneo,” said Sol-ji.

She recalled that during her childhood she would often snack on dried squid, tearing off tasty parts and chewing it by the mouthful.

The marketplace also conjured up memories of eating raw fish, but the way she enjoyed it up North was very different. In Chongjin raw fish is served slathered in a thick sauce, and wrapped with other ingredients in lettuce. But she was surprised when she came to South Korea and saw people eat the plain white flesh dipped in only a little bit of sauce.

(RFA)

“I think the seafood I ate in Chongjin was tastier,” she said, smiling broadly. She explained that fish caught in colder places is saltier and tastier.

But then again, she said, it might have just been that she was hungry all the time back then.

“It’s like something out of a dream.”

As the sun set behind Gwangalli Beach, Gwangan Bridge lit up the night sky in a dazzling flash of color. Sol-ji got in line to ride a yacht under the bridge, out to sea to catch the fireworks show exclusively for the passengers.

(RFA)

As the yacht moved along, Sol-ji couldn’t help but notice that it was a stark difference from the pitch black nighttime seascape in Chongjin – out at sea, Busan’s night sky is brightly and colorfully illuminated by the bridge, the cityscape – and soon, the fireworks.

Sol-ji sat on the deck, quietly closing her eyes and feeling the sea breeze. Then in one magic moment, lights shot out of the sky with a loud boom. The fireworks brought a bright smile across her face.

In all her excitement, her thoughts drifted to her childhood friends. Although they live in different places now, she thought how wonderful it would be if they could gaze at the dazzling night sea of ​​Busan together.

(RFA)

“This really feels like a dream, but I really do want to try it with them at least once,” she said. “I want to take lots of photos with my friends and go sightseeing like this.”

Under the glowing bursts, she reflected on her current daily life. Nothing like this would ever be possible in North Korea, she said. But in South Korea she can go wherever she wants, with whomever she wants, wearing whatever she wants. She smiled, realizing that “freedom” isn’t a grandiose ideal or political buzzword, it is contained in an ordinary moment like this, on a boat at sea near Busan, under the brightly lit night sky.

Edited by Yi Yongin in Korean and Eugene Whong in English.

North Korea is attempting to address its decreasing birth rate by improving the conditions of state-run orphanages while increasing crackdowns on illegal abortions, residents in the country told Radio Free Asia.

The total fertility rate for North Korea is estimated to be 1.59 children per woman of childbearing age according to key statistical indicators from South Korea’s Ministry of Data and Statistics. This is well below the replacement fertility rate of 2.1 required to maintain the population.

The rate may be even lower than estimated, a 2025 report by the Washington-based Stimson Center’s 38 North project said.

Orphanages and nurseries were previously poorly supplied, meaning that taking in more children was difficult, but government policies have improved the situation, with supplies of milk, food, clothing and shoes flowing in more regularly, the residents said.

(Kim Won Jin/AFP)

“Recently, authorities have been more quickly sending orphaned children or children born to unmarried women to nurseries or orphanages,” a resident of the country’s northeastern province of North Hamgyong, who requested anonymity for security reasons, told RFA. “The residents’ reaction to this is generally positive.”

The resident talked about a situation where an unmarried woman from Kyongwon county, on the border with China, had to give up her child because of the difficulty raising it alone. The child was quickly accepted into an orphanage in October.

Though the resident did not specify how long it took to place the child, another resident, from nearby South Hamgyong province, told RFA that in another case, in the coastal city of Tanchon, it took about a month.

“In September, in Tanchon, a 6-year-old child became an orphan after his mother, who had been raising him alone, died of illness,” the South Hamgyong resident said on condition of anonymity to speak freely. The child “went to an orphanage after about a month.”

Supplies meeting demand

The government’s apparent priority on supplying nurseries and orphanages has come after a series of child-friendly policies were enacted including the Childcare Law of 2022 and the Law on Preferential Treatment for Multi-Child Families of 2025. Authorities actively encourage childbirth and child-rearing, including by pushing propaganda messaging that “having many babies is patriotism.”

(KCNA via KNS/AFP)

The country’s leader Kim Jong Un famously was brought to tears in 2023 when he publicly discussed the declining birth rate at the National Mothers’ Conference in December 2023.

“Putting our efforts into raising the birth rate together with mothers is a critical revolutionary undertaking that cannot be resolved by the power of our Party and government alone,” he said at the event.

Sources in RFA reports after that incident explained that women were reluctant to marry and have kids because they wanted to focus on their own happiness.

Abortion crackdown

Another way the government has been trying to prevent a declining birth rate is to punish doctors who perform abortions.

By law, abortion is illegal in North Korea, but in practice, some doctors accept payment to perform the procedure in secret.

But these days, those doctors are harder to find, the North Hamgyong resident said.

“There are women who come home pregnant after serving in the military, and they try to get rid of the baby quickly before it is seen by others,” the North Hamgyong resident said. “But recently, abortion procedures have not been easy, so many end up giving birth.”

Unwanted pregnancies happen often in North Korea because sex education is non-existent, the North Hamgyong resident said. But even if the mother gives birth, administrative hurdles and societal pressure make it very difficult to raise the child. This is because it is impossible to register the child without the father, and because of the stigma surrounding unwed mothers.

Many unwed mothers are finding creative ways to put their children born out of wedlock in orphanages without having any official record of the birth, the South Hamgyong resident said. “In late September in Tanchon, a resident found a baby wrapped in a sling in a neighborhood alley and took it to the community center.”

(KCNA via Reuters)

However, it was later revealed that the person who took the child to the community center was actually the maternal uncle of the woman who had given birth, the South Hamgyong resident said. Since the fact that the unmarried woman had given birth might become a major obstacle to marriage if known to the outside world, the uncle had resorted to a workaround for his niece.

The South Hamgyong resident said that the woman did not intend to become pregnant, and had tried to get an abortion but she could not find any doctor willing to provide one.

Edited by Yi Yongin in Korean and Eugene Whong in English.

After a Hong Kong court sentenced pro-democracy activist Joshua Wong to 10 years in prison Thursday for foreign collusion, international lawmakers, activists, and rights organizations condemned the decision saying it violates human rights.

Wong, 30, is one of the most internationally recognizable faces of the now-quashed democracy movement in the city. He was among 45 Hong Kong opposition politicians and pro-democracy activists who were convicted of “conspiracy to commit subversion” under the city’s draconian 2020 National Security Law for taking part in a democratic primary in the summer of 2020. Wong in September pleaded guilty to “conspiracy to endanger national security with foreign or external forces.”

On Thursday, Judge Tam Yiu-ho of the Hong Kong High Court ruled that the case constituted a “serious offense” under the security law, which carries a starting sentence of 13 years. It was later reduced to 10 years in light of his guilty plea.

Wong had already been serving a four-year-and-eight-month sentence for the subversion charge and had been due for release in January, but under the current decision, he will not be released until 2036, when he is 40 years old.

(Chan Long Hei/AP)

The sentence was “utterly shameless,” Chinese democracy activist Wang Dan, who was a student leader in the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and who now lives in exile in the United States, said in a statement.

“For a regime that claims to be powerful to pursue and persecute a young student in this manner only highlights its insecurity and brutality,” said Wang. “Joshua Wong campaigned and advocated for Hong Kong’s freedom. If that is considered a crime, then the real criminals are the authorities who forced a young person onto the streets in the first place.”

International condemnation

Joshua Wong’s pro-democracy activities are not criminal, Phil Robertson, Director of the Bangkok-based rights group the Asia Human Rights and Labour Advocates, said in a statement.

“It’s supremely ironic that China, one of the biggest practitioners of transnational repression in the world, has now sentenced Joshua Wong to 10 years in prison for daring to seek international solidarity to resist that repression,” Robertson said. “Holding meetings with international activists and foreign government officials, talking to the global media, and mounting petition drives are the day to day work of human rights activists, and shouldn’t be criminalized.”

Wong is a hero and the charges against him have no standing, U.S. representative John Moolenaar, Chair of the House Select Committee on China, said in a statement.

“Joshua only pleaded guilty to the baseless charge of foreign collusion because of the CCP’s systematic erosion of Hong Kong’s judicial independence,” he said, using the abbreviation for the Chinese Communist Party. “In return, the CCP has effectively sentenced him under its repressive National Security Law.”

Moolenaar said the sentencing showed China’s “complete disregard” for universal rights.

(Paula Bronstein/Getty Images)

“Joshua and Hong Kong need the international community’s support now more than ever,” he said. “He should be immediately released and reunited with his family.”

Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, or MAC, issued a statement after the sentencing, strongly condemning Hong Kong authorities for continuing to infringe upon the basic human rights under the guise of national security.

The MAC statement said the Hong Kong government’s renewed heavy sentencing under the National Security Law is a continued political prosecution of pro-democracy figures, including Wong, who has been detained for more than 2,000 days since 2020.

The statement called on Beijing and Hong Kong authorities to stop using national security as a pretext to suppress pro-democracy activists and to immediately release those detained for exercising their basic rights.

“Domestic support” for “overseas operations”

The charges allege that between July 1 and November 23, 2020, Wong conspired with Nathan Law, another prominent pro-democracy figure who was in exile overseas, and others to request foreign governments or organizations to impose sanctions, blockades, or other actions deemed hostile by the authorities on China and Hong Kong.

The judge held that after the Hong Kong National Security Law came into effect, Nathan Law continued to push for sanctions overseas, while Wong shared related content through foreign media and social media platforms, attracting the attention of foreign governments and providing support from Hong Kong for overseas initiatives. The judge rejected the defense’s claim that Wong’s role was limited, believing that Wong and Law collaborated and that their roles were equally important.

The defense previously argued that the severity of this case was far less than other national security cases; Wong was only 23 years old when he committed the crime and has been deprived of his freedom for nearly six years, while the prosecution only brought charges after many years. The defense suggested a sentence of about four and a half years and hoped that the court would allow Wong the opportunity to take care of his parents in the future, but this was not accepted by the court.

(Chan Long Hei/AP)

The sentence reflected the seriousness of the case, Hong Kong Police National Security Department Chief Superintendent Steve Li Kwai-Wah said to reporters outside the court. He called on Nathan Law to return to Hong Kong and surrender.

Hong Kong and Beijing have consistently stated that their law enforcement actions are based on evidence and law, and are unrelated to the defendant’s political stance, asserting that the Hong Kong National Security Law is necessary to restore stability in Hong Kong.

Undermining freedom

Wang said that Wong’s harsh sentencing reveals that China cares little about human rights.

(Philippe Lopez/AFP)

“This decision once again tears away the CCP’s mask, proving that it is a regime determined to be an enemy of universal values and the ideals of freedom,” he said. “Ten years – a person’s youth – spent entirely behind bars; Joshua Wong has paid such a high price. He is a hero of our times and the pride of Hong Kong. I hope everyone remembers him, follows his situation, speaks out on his behalf, and prays for him.”

Edited by Eugene Whong.

Read a version of this story in Burmese

Armed ethnic groups and members of Myanmar’s shadow government are hoping that a recently made public U.S. strategy for their country decrease fighting and bring about peace with the military-backed government, the organizations told Radio Free Asia.

The U.S. State Department recently released an Integrated Country Strategy document for Myanmar that outlines Washington’s aims to use diplomacy to promote peace in the volatile Southeast Asian country, potentially providing access to rare earth deposits dominated by China.

The policy document lays out four mission goals, which include protecting U.S. citizens, addressing trade deficits, promoting peace, and increasing U.S. regional influence through engagement.

(Planet Labs via Reuters)

To achieve these goals, dealing with Myanmar’s military-backed government – headed by the same people who ousted the previous government in a coup in 2021 – cannot be avoided. Washington initially shunned engagement with the military after the coup and imposed sanctions on its most senior leaders, but has since softened its stance, rolling back some sanctions and even holding high level talks in September 2026.

A U.S. State Department spokesperson on Tuesday explained the shift to RFA.

“The Administration has been evaluating how to calibrate Washington’s policy towards Burma to achieve regional stability, and also make progress on key U.S. priorities and has determined that wholesale disengagement with the authorities in Naypyidaw countered U.S. strategic interests in Burma and the region. We are pursuing a policy that welcomes dialogue with all stakeholders involved in the conflict as we encourage Burma to make progress on key U.S. priorities, including addressing scam centers, improving the domestic operating environment for U.S. businesses, and building towards a genuine peace process that stabilizes the country.”

(Getty Images)

David Gum Awng, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for the National Unity Government, or NUG, a shadow government made up of former government officials who were ousted in the 2021 coup, told RFA he understood the realities of the situation.

“The NUG respects and acknowledges that the U.S. government is actively engaging in Myanmar affairs and formulating a strategy aimed at peace, economy, and regional stability. The NUG will continue to engage in discussions with the U.S. government, Congress, and the international community including relevant partner nations.

We will also continue to urge that the U.S. government’s policies and practical actions towards Myanmar support the democratic and federal aspirations of the Myanmar people, address the root causes of the conflict, and lead toward an inclusive political resolution. International engagement in Myanmar affairs should not prolong the military dictatorship, but should aim to bring about genuine political change based on the will and rights of the people after escaping from this bad system.”

Kyaw Ni, Deputy Minister of Home Affairs and Immigration for the NUG, shared his opinion that amidst the policies of superpower nations, one must strive to achieve benefits for one’s own country.

“In this policy shift of a superpower nation, small countries suffer a lot, so a country undergoing revolution like Burma suffers even more. It is likely to be affected. Since these are superpower nations, they write policies based on their own interests. So our public also has to struggle among these policies to reach our desired revolutionary goal without harming the interests of our country, our people, and our revolution.”

(Chin Information Center)

Salai Htet Ni, spokesperson for the Chin National Front, an armed ethnic rebel group, said the U.S. government needs to understand the underlying problems in Myanmar politics and get deeply involved.

“The U.S. government needs to understand the military junta’s unjust violence and killing of the people. They need to consider that. On our part, if they can perform first-stage actions like humanitarian aid for war refugees and addressing violent attacks and killings, we would welcome the U.S. involvement even more.”

Another ethnic armed group, — the Karen National Union — said U.S. involvement might reduce the amount of internal fighting, spokesperson Saw Kler Say told RFA on Wednesday.

“The new U.S. strategy could bring about changes or have a specific impact on our country from a military perspective. Firstly, it might lead to a situation where the military junta is compelled to stop its attacks targeting the civilian population.

Secondly, the U.S. might take steps — or offer recommendations — aimed at halting the ongoing internal conflicts. Politically, we also believe they are likely envisioning a political landscape that is acceptable to all parties—one that would include both the detained opposition leaders and the revolutionary forces.

To achieve sustainable peace in Myanmar by 2030, the first step must be to cease attacks targeting the civilian population. The next step involves reaching a consensus on a dialogue process aimed at ending internal conflicts; only through such a mutually agreed-upon framework can a ceasefire be attained.

In addition to these measures, all detained opposition leaders and political prisoners must be released. Without these actions, I believe that any dialogue will be extremely difficult. If detained political prisoners are excluded, meaning the process fails to be truly all inclusive, then a successful outcome may well be entirely impossible.

Regarding the emergence of a federal democracy in Myanmar, the new U.S. strategy presents both positive opportunities and concerning risks. On one hand, it could potentially lead to a genuine transition toward a federal democracy—for instance, by facilitating the abolition of the 2008 Constitution and the drafting and adoption of a new federal constitution. On the other hand, there is a risk that if the discourse is driven solely by U.S. interests, the path toward the federal democracy we envision could be diverted, creating significant challenges."

Representatives of the Kachin Independence Army and the Arakan Army responded that they were not ready to comment.

(Arakan Army)

The Arakan Army’s Khaing Thukha asked that questions be channeled through official emails.

Hla Thein, spokesperson for the Union Solidarity and Development Party – formed by former military officers – told RFA that the U.S. strategy document is constructive for mutual interest and should be welcomed.

“Big nations becoming interested in our country, interested from a positive and beneficial perspective, should be welcomed no matter what. We have no permanent friends and no permanent enemies. If they come to cooperate fairly for our country’s interest, our people’s interest, and national interest, we will warmly welcome them.”

RFA attempted to contact Khaing Khaing Soe, spokesperson for the military government’s presidential office, but received no reply.

Col. Saw Kyaw Nyunt, spokesperson for the 7 EAO Alliance of ethnic armed organizations that have individually signed a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement with the military, said the shift in U.S. attitude might be due to an understanding of Myanmar’s needs.

“In attempting to restart the peace process, international support and assistance are needed. The shift in attitude by the U.S. toward the peace process is likely because they realized that peace is urgently needed due to Myanmar’s reality. By 2030, which is in three or four years, seeking ways to build sustainable peace during that period can be viewed as assessing and speaking on our country’s needs.”

Salai Shein Tun, a secretariat member of the Chin National League for Democracy Party, which won a single seat in Myanmar’s parliament in the 2020 general election, told RFA that the new U.S. policy might face challenges from competitors.

“Speaking of challenges, the challenge from China as a big power is strong. Inside Myanmar and within ethnic regions, the challenge is also strong. In areas bordering neighboring China, they approach with a Chinese style model, whereas looking at the western side, in Chin, Kachin, and Rakhine states, they emphasize federalism. The country they connect with is India … Areas connected with neighboring China do not talk about federalism. Discussions will take quite a bit of effort when those following the Chinese model want to negotiate with the domestic groups that follow the federal model.”

According to the Integrated Country Strategy document, the released text was approved by the Trump administration on Aug. 31, 2026, before the mid-September secret visit to Naypyidaw by Michael Vance, the assistant secretary of state for intelligence and research.

Vance also led at least 12 U.S. government officials during a second round of talks with Myanmar military government officials in Tokyo in the second week of October.

Edited by Eugene Whong.

Update includes comments from Saw Kler Say.

The tiny atoll known as Dongsha Island in Chinese lies more than 400 kilometers (250 miles) from Taiwan’s main island, about 260 kilometers (160 miles) from the Chinese mainland in the northern South China Sea.

The island’s isolation makes maintaining access by sea and air central to sustaining the coast guard and military personnel stationed there.

Beijing likely has the power to cut Pratas off completely, but such a move might not be necessary at all, Benjamin Blandin, a maritime security expert and visiting research fellow at Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research, told RFA.

“China could achieve significant strategic benefits without imposing a complete blockade or forcing an immediate Taiwanese withdrawal,” said Blandin.

For Beijing, the potential gains could include regulating selected activities or compelling Taiwan to negotiate access, Blandin said. Such restrictions could erode Taipei’s authority even while Taiwanese personnel remained on the island.

(RFA)

But disrupting deliveries and making the outpost impossible to sustain are different objectives, Sylwia M. Gorska, a doctoral candidate in international relations at Britain’s University of Central Lancashire, told RFA.

“Making Taiwan’s presence unsustainable would require much more extensive restrictions, particularly given the island’s existing air and maritime supply options,” Gorska told RFA.

The portion of the atoll above sea level features an air strip and two piers.

Both analysts cautioned that recent encounters near Pratas do not establish that Beijing has decided to cut the island off, though these encounters have sharpened concerns about access.

Posturing coast guards

Taiwan’s coast guard on Sunday accused China of “harassment” after a Chinese coast guard ship on Saturday went into a restricted area of water near the atoll. A Taiwan coast guard vessel got as close as 1 nautical mile and asked the Chinese ship to leave.

Taipei called on China to “immediately cease” its acts of harassment, after what it said was the 13th such incursion near Pratas Island this year.

China maintains that the atoll is within its sovereign territory and called the incident a “routine law enforcement patrol.”

It was the third Pratas-related incident between the two countries in October alone, with similar incidents occurring Oct. 18 and Oct. 1.

(Taiwan Coast Guard/AFP)

Such encounters challenge Taiwan’s authority, the analysts said, but the more consequential test would involve Chinese ships issuing instructions to Taiwanese supply missions, then enforcing compliance.

Blandin identified three potentially overlapping stages: normalizing China’s maritime presence, asserting jurisdiction, and establishing effective control over access.

Demands for identification, inspections or course changes would indicate a move toward exercising authority, he said, adding that repeated obstruction of deliveries, personnel rotations or emergency evacuations would provide stronger evidence of an isolation campaign.

“The distinction between challenging Taiwan’s maritime authority and actively preventing the replenishment of its outposts is fundamental,” Blandin said.

Gorska said requirements for advance authorization or compulsory inspections would signal an attempt to regulate access. Persistent obstruction of successive deliveries, particularly alongside interference with flights, would indicate a more extensive effort to isolate Pratas.

“The principal concern is that Beijing may eventually seek to enforce the authority it is currently asserting, thereby transforming jurisdictional claims into restrictions on access,” she said.

Keeping supplies moving

Taiwan has strengthened its local patrol capabilities. Its coast guard said in September that a wharf renovation had been completed on July 1, allowing newly built 100-ton patrol boats to be stationed at Pratas alongside regular deployments of larger patrol ships nearby.

Those improvements strengthen the response around the atoll but do not guarantee security along its supply routes, Gorska said.

Larger reserves would give Taiwan more time to respond to disrupted deliveries, while maintaining maritime and air transport would provide flexibility. Blandin said sea transport would remain important for substantial quantities of equipment and provisions, with aircraft offering a complementary option when conditions permitted.

(Planet Labs)

Escorting deliveries could help preserve access, but repeated Chinese obstructions would force difficult decisions about how far Taiwan should go to challenge them.

Taipei could deploy additional coast guard vessels, improve surveillance or involve military assets more directly, Blandin said. Each option would have to be weighed against the risk of escalation.

“Beijing’s main challenge would be sustaining those restrictions without losing control over the level of confrontation,” Gorska said.

Stopping an individual delivery leaves room to retreat or negotiate, she said. Repeatedly preventing escorted ships or aircraft from reaching Pratas would carry substantially greater risks and could provoke a wider cross-Strait crisis.

Lessons from the Philippines

The Philippines’ efforts to supply its outpost aboard the grounded BRP Sierra Madre at Second Thomas Shoal offer a comparison, although the geography, logistical needs and security arrangements differ.

Blandin said Manila’s persistence in continuing deliveries, along with documenting and publicizing confrontations, offered lessons for Taiwan. Defensive equipment, surveillance and proportionate responses could improve resilience, but none would guarantee access against sustained interference.

Gorska said practical arrangements to prevent dangerous encounters also carried a political challenge: communication should not become an acceptance of Beijing’s claimed authority to approve deliveries.

(Reuters)

The comparison has another major limit. The Philippines has a mutual defense treaty with Washington, and U.S. defense guidelines explicitly include armed attacks on Philippine coast guard vessels in the South China Sea within those commitments. Taiwan has no equivalent treaty.

The Taiwan Relations Act treats efforts to determine Taiwan’s future through nonpeaceful means, including boycotts or embargoes, as a matter of grave concern to the United States. It does not specify a U.S. military response to interference with supplies to Pratas.

That uncertainty would factor into Beijing’s calculations, Gorska said.

For Blandin, China’s ability to deploy ships around Pratas is only the beginning.

“The central question is therefore not simply whether China possesses the capabilities to isolate Pratas, but whether it could sustain such an operation and convert maritime coercion into lasting territorial control at an acceptable political, military and diplomatic cost.”

Edited by Eugene Whong.

Authorities on Oct. 25 and 26 began demolishing about 200 monks’ residences at Dza Sershul Thekchen Dargyeling Monastery in Sershul County in the Kardze (Ganzi in Chinese) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, sources there told RFA, speaking on the condition of anonymity for security reasons.

“Everything is over now,” the source said. “We are losing everything.”

A U.S. State Department spokesperson told RFA on Thursday that the demolitions in Sershul reflect broader Chinese government efforts to bring spiritual institutions, religious education, and monastic life under government control.

“We call on Beijing to end its interference in Tibetan religious life,” the spokesperson said. “Tibetan Buddhists should have the right to practice their faith freely, educate their clergy and choose their religious leaders, including the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, without government interference,” the spokesperson said, referring to Beijing’s past and likely future interference with the established succession customs of the two most important figures in Tibetan Buddhism.

The demolition in Sershul is not isolated, but part of a larger campaign to reduce monk populations at Tibetan religious institutions. RFA reported in August that authorities resumed demolition of the Larung Gar Buddhist Academy. Activists noted the timing – China’s new Ethnic Unity and Progress Law – had just come into effect the previous month.

The law focuses on reshaping ethnic identity, changing the legal framework around language, expanding state oversight of religion, and extending the law’s reach beyond China’s border.

(Citizen photo)

The source in Tibet said that authorities are planning further restrictions that would prevent monks from staying at the monastery after the demolitions.

“Tibetan religion and culture are being destroyed,” the source told RFA, adding that there is little recourse for those opposed to the demolitions.

“No matter how much local people speak out, the authorities do not listen,” the source said. “They do not remember, they ignore us. We have no solutions and we don’t know what will happen.”

RFA contacted the relevant county-level officials in Sershul for comment, but the official who answered the phone did not respond to RFA’s questions and hung up.

Promoting “ethnic unity”

The demolitions and reductions of the monk population are clearly intended to assimilate Tibetans so that they accept Chinese identity, Tenzin Lekshay, spokesperson for the Central Tibetan Administration, or CTA, the Tibetan government-in-exile based in Dharamsala, India, told RFA.

“This is a mask used by the Chinese government under the recently enacted Ethnic Unity Law to assimilate Tibetans and destroy Tibetan religion, culture, and language,” he said. “This is not the first time. We have also seen young monks forcibly expelled from monasteries and sent to China’s colonial boarding schools.”

Though Beijing claims the boarding schools are aimed at providing education to a scattered population, critics have noted that their actual goal is assimilation.

“We strongly condemn the Chinese government’s continued attempts to shut down monasteries and schools established by Tibetans while claiming its authority over Tibet and seeking to eradicate Tibetan national identity,” Tenzin Lekshay said. “It is time for the Chinese government to acknowledge and trust that Tibetan religion and culture are beneficial to China and the world and that the destruction of Tibetan religion and culture will have negative consequences for both China and the world.”

He said that the Chinese government’s actions, which violate international law, would undermine Beijing’s ambition to establish itself as a global leader.

(Citizen photo)

Tibetan monasteries are central to preserving Tibetan culture and religious identity, Sangay Kyab, Chinese liaison officer at the Tibet Bureau, the CTA’s representative office in Geneva, Switzerland, told RFA.

“Tibetan culture and religion are central to the identity of the Tibetan people. China’s policy and goal is to destroy everything that keeps Tibet alive,” he said. “Since China invaded Tibet, there have been successive campaigns against Tibetan monasteries, often under the pretext of reforming them.”

He explained how monks and nuns are subjected to political education aimed at making monasteries conform to the Chinese Communist Party’s ideology.

“The main goal is to restrict the study and practice of Tibetan Buddhism and undermine the Tibetan people’s ability to unite,” he said. “The incident at the monastery is connected to the Chinese government’s broader policies toward Tibet, and there is a risk that similar incidents could occur elsewhere,” he said.

Restrictions in Tibet threaten Tibetan Buddhist heritage, warned the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, an independent, bipartisan U.S. government commission that monitors religious freedom abroad and makes policy recommendations to the U.S. government.

“Demolition of Tibetan monasteries is just one tactic in a wider effort by Chinese authorities to sever the people of Tibet from their Tibetan Buddhist heritage, including the forced assimilation of ethnic minorities through the draconian ‘Ethnic Unity’ law that came into effect in July,” commission chair Asif Mahmood told RFA.

He cited the resumption of demolition at Larung Gar in Sichuan province in July as another example of restrictions on Tibetan Buddhist religious freedom.

“Buddhist monks in these circumstances have faced persistent threats of harassment, expulsion from their monasteries, imprisonment, and worse,” he said.

China is trying to destroy Tibetan Buddhism at its roots, Bhuchung K. Tsering, head of the Research and Monitoring Unit at the Washington-based International Campaign for Tibet, told RFA.

“Monasteries across Tibet are required to follow the orders of the Chinese Communist Party and serve its objectives,” he said. “The Chinese government claims that Tibetans enjoy freedom of religion, but the reality is the opposite of its claims that it is promoting Tibetan Buddhism,” he added.

Translation and additional reporting by Tenzin Dickyi, edited by Tawang for RFA Tibetan. Edited by Eugene Whong for RFA English.

Ahead of the 160th anniversary of Sun’s birth on Nov. 12, the mainland has planned official commemorations, and Taiwan’s government warned that Beijing was using the revolutionary leader’s legacy to further an “anti-independence, pro-reunification” strategy.

Taiwan considers Sun to be the “father of the country.” He helped lead the revolution that ended China’s imperial system and became the Republic of China’s first provisional president in 1912. The government of the Republic of China fled to Taiwan in 1949 when Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalists lost the Chinese Civil War to Mao Zedong’s communists. Taiwan still uses “Republic of China” as its official name.

In Beijing’s view, Sun is the “forerunner of the revolution.” Mao is considered to have continued in his footsteps, and the communist “People’s Republic of China” is said to be the realization of Sun’s unfinished vision. It is this version of history that China wants to push, Jozef Huljak, a political science doctoral candidate at Constantine the Philosopher University in Slovakia whose research examines Taiwan’s cultural and public diplomacy, told RFA.

“In my view, Beijing’s core strategy is a battle over words: if the world accepts its version of history, a takeover can be sold as ‘reunification,’” Huljak said.

(Ann Wang/Reuters)

Though China’s communist government has never governed Taiwan, it considers the democratic island to be a rogue province. It claims the island as its territory and has not renounced using force to bring it under Beijing’s control.

In addition to diplomatic and military pressure on Taiwan, China’s historical messaging promotes a national belonging intended to make political union appear both legitimate and inevitable.

China’s own policy documents describe history and culture as forces driving unification. A 2022 white paper on Taiwan presented national unity as a longstanding Chinese aspiration and tied its achievement to the country’s national rejuvenation.

Sun as a political tool

Sun’s connection to China’s Taiwan policy is explicit. Beijing organized the cross-strait Sun Yat-sen Forum in his ancestral birthplace in June, and about 1,300 Taiwanese participants attended.

At that event, Pan Xianzhang, a deputy head of China’s Taiwan Affairs Office, urged people on both sides to draw inspiration from Sun while adhering to the “one-China principle,” Beijing’s doctrine that asserts Taiwan is an inalienable part of China.

“Beijing’s use of Sun works because Taipei still props him up,” Huljak said.

But the same historical figure can carry different political meanings. During an April visit to Sun’s mausoleum in Nanjing, Cheng Li-wun, chairperson of Taiwan’s main opposition Kuomintang, or KMT, – the Nationalist party founded by Sun – invoked his legacy to advocate reconciliation and dialogue. She also pointed to Taiwan’s democratic development as an expression of his founding principles.

(via REUTERS)

The KMT’s own account of the visit emphasized the continuation of Sun’s ideals in Taiwan and the promotion of peaceful cross-strait relations.

A broader repertoire

Sun’s birth anniversary is part of a wider pattern in which Chinese authorities connect history to a shared national identity and political unity with Taiwan.

Another figure honored on both sides of the strait is Zheng Chenggong, also known as Koxinga, who expelled the Dutch from Taiwan in 1662 and established a regime there. Beijing describes him as a national hero who recovered Chinese territory.

But in Taiwan the way Zheng is remembered depends on who you ask. For some, he is seen as analogous to Chiang Kai-shek, as both were military leaders who lost their respective campaigns on the mainland, fled to Taiwan, and vowed to return. To others, he is seen as having established a kingdom on Taiwan independent from mainland control.

(National Palace Museum via Wikimedia Commons)

In September 2024, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office highlighted commemorations marking the 400th anniversary of Zheng’s birth alongside exhibitions about families separated by the Taiwan Strait.

The two sides also frame the end of World War II differently.

In October 2025, China’s legislature designated Oct. 25 as a day commemorating what it calls Taiwan’s recovery from Japanese rule in 1945. The decision described that event as an important link in the historical and legal basis for Taiwan belonging to China.

But in Taiwan’s view, it was the Republic of China authorities who took over Taiwan’s administration after Japan’s surrender in 1945. The People’s Republic of China was founded four years later and has never ruled Taiwan.

Huljak said these competing interpretations of history and historical figures matter internationally as well as within Taiwan. In his assessment, acceptance of Beijing’s historical vocabulary can help normalize its present-day claims among foreign audiences unfamiliar with the distinction.

Symbols and their limits

The challenge for Beijing is that Taiwan’s identity has diverged since the Chinese civil war, the analysts said.

Under Chiang Kai-shek, the KMT claimed to represent all of China and ruled Taiwan through an authoritarian system. Martial law ended in 1987, and the island held its first direct presidential election in 1996, establishing a democratic basis for political authority.

(Spencer Mosa/AP)

That transformation helps explain the gap analysts see between Sun Yat-sen’s institutional prominence and his emotional relevance to many people in Taiwan.

“Claiming to be the true inheritor of Sun’s legacy is one of many similar methods Beijing uses to court Taiwanese and try to forge common bonds, but these claims have limited currency among a people for whom Sun has limited emotional resonance,” Sasha B. Chhabra, a Taiwan-based security analyst and publisher of the Formosa Review newsletter, told RFA.

Chhabra said Sun remained particularly important to KMT supporters in Taiwan, who prefer engagement with the mainland over independence. Huljak also identified KMT supporters and potential swing voters as audiences Beijing hoped to reach.

Neither assessment, however, establishes that commemorations change political preferences. Shared respect for a historical figure can provide an opening for contact without producing agreement over sovereignty or support for Communist rule.

For Chhabra, figures associated with Taiwan’s own political development have greater relevance to many residents than the revolutionary founder honored by both governments.

“Taiwanese are more interested in commemorating figures with a tangible legacy in the country, such as presidents Lee Teng-hui or Chiang Jing-kuo,” he said, referring to Taiwan’s first directly elected president and his predecessor, who lifted martial law in 1987.

Edited by Eugene Whong.

At the beginning of this month, reports surfaced that around 150 teachers, mostly instructors of Mandarin Chinese who worked in schools that serve the Philippines’ Chinoy, or ethnic Chinese, communities, were returning to China after Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. and other officials cautioned that educational exchanges with Beijing could potentially lead to national security threats.

The exodus was the result of the teachers’ families requesting that they return to China according to the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry, a commercial organization serving ethnic Chinese communities in the Philippines. The federation and the Chinese Embassy approved the requests.

In a report on the SeaLight webpage, the maritime transparency project’s executive director Ray Powell characterized the exodus as an organized recall by Beijing that uses “Filipinos of Chinese heritage” as “a card to be played.”

China and the Philippines have become increasingly at odds over their territorial disputes in the South China Sea, and Beijing has been known to use “gray zone” tactics – pressure that can include anything except armed conflict – to advance its claims.

“China’s gray-zone pressure at sea and its political warfare ashore are intertwined, and this episode shows the connective tissue,” Powell told RFA.

The number of affected teachers could be higher than initially disclosed. China’s Ambassador to the Philippines Jing Quan put it closer to 180 while delivering an address to the 20th anniversary celebration of the Confucius Institute at Ateneo de Manila University.

(Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of the Philippines)

Jing also rejected allegations that Chinese-language education amounted to political infiltration, calling them “baseless and absurd.”

But Powell said in his report that he and Teodoro had concerns about China-linked education programs being tied to China’s United Front Work Department – the strategy and network by which Beijing projects its political influence overseas.

Reports and rhetoric

Maritime confrontation provided the backdrop, while specific developments involving a Chinese university helped trigger the scrutiny of the programs, Aniello Iannone, a lecturer in international relations and general secretary of the ASEAN Studies Center at Indonesia’s President University, told RFA.

“The spark came from a university symposium and a think-tank report,” he told RFA.

Iannone was referring to the symposium hosted in late June at Jinan University in Guangzhou, China, where scholars advanced a claim that Batanes, the Philippines’ northernmost province, belonged to China through Taiwan.

In July, Powell published a report on the SeaLight website that provided evidence linking Jinan University to training teachers for Chinese-language schools in the Philippines – 43 of 56 Filipino teacher trainees sent to China in 2024 through the Philippine Chinese Education Research Center, he said in the report.

The Filipino trainees were not the mainland Chinese teachers who were recalled, Powell told RFA.

“I haven’t found these programs directly teaching Beijing’s South China Sea claims, and I won’t allege it,” he said.

Instead, he argued that affiliated organizations can support Beijing’s objectives through broader political messaging, including appeals for peace and dialogue that he interprets as encouraging acceptance of Chinese pressure at sea.

Powell views the teacher recall as political pressure that directs anger over disrupted lessons toward Beijing’s critics. But he said he had not seen the teachers’ return linked to any Philippine concession over the South China Sea.

Iannone said the available evidence required more careful distinctions.

“Before acting, authorities should separate a structural link, such as who trained a teacher, from conduct, such as what was taught, and publish what they find,” he said.

Lessons from the U.S. backlash

The controversy in the Philippines echoes concerns that drove a backlash against Confucius Institutes in the United States, but the mechanisms differ.

Confucius Institutes are Chinese government-backed partnerships with overseas universities that provide Chinese-language teaching and cultural programs. Their funding arrangements and ties to Beijing raised concerns in the United States about transparency, academic freedom and potential political influence on campuses.

A 2023 U.S. Government Accountability Office report found that the number of institutes at American universities and colleges had fallen from about 100 in 2019 to fewer than five today. Schools most commonly cited potential losses of federal funding and external pressure as contributing to closures. Many also reported reduced language-learning opportunities afterward.

(Matthew Pennington/AP)

The Philippine teacher-placement programs involved in the recall are distinct from Confucius Institutes.

Iannone said the American experience can be seen primarily as a warning about how funding pressure and governance concerns can drive decisions even when allegations of misconduct remain unresolved.

He proposed a public register of educational agreements, funding and staffing covering every foreign government supporting Philippine education, alongside full local control over curriculum and hiring.

Funding alternatives would also be necessary, he said. Greater scrutiny alone would not solve schools’ dependence on overseas teachers.

“A more durable setup would train Filipino Mandarin teachers at home, draw on more than one partner – Taiwan included – and put every agreement on the public record,” he said.

Communities caught in the middle

The consequences could extend beyond disrupted classes.

Iannone warned that public debate could blur distinctions between Chinese state institutions, Chinese-language schools and people of Chinese heritage.

“What worries me more is how quickly the language slides, from PRC state bodies to ‘Chinese schools’ to ‘the Chinese,’” he said.

Teodoro, the most well-known Philippine government official who expressed concerns over the educational exchanges, prefaced them with a warning against xenophobia and said that the information the government had on the exchanges did not necessarily constitute wrongdoing.

(RFA)

But prolonged suspicion of China or Chinese could affect Filipinos who earned degrees in China, potentially damaging their careers if employers or institutions began treating their education as evidence of disloyalty,” Enrico Cau, a Taipei-based independent security researcher, told RFA.

He cautioned against assuming that changes in outlook after studying abroad necessarily resulted from organized political influence.

“Mindset shifts in those cases can result from spontaneous changes of mind, rather than from deliberate attempts to influence them,” he said.

Cau nevertheless considers a broad rupture unlikely. Educational exchanges form only one part of a relationship sustained by business networks, institutional connections and extensive personal ties, he said.

He described competing approaches within Philippine policy: a confrontational effort to check Chinese assertiveness and quieter diplomacy seeking to preserve economic and civilian relationships.

“These two souls seem to coexist in some way, producing a mix of constructive and dissonant results,” he said.

Powell said the recall could discourage oversight or prompt schools to seek different partners. He would not predict which outcome would prevail.

Iannone argued that preserving educational ties required arrangements able to withstand continued maritime confrontation.

“The influence concerns should be investigated properly, which means findings the public can actually read,” he said. “Otherwise the Philippines risks spending a great deal of political energy on Mandarin teachers while the harder problems at sea stay where they are.”

Edited by Eugene Whong.

Read a version of this story in Chinese

An “open letter” purportedly signed by students from multiple Chinese universities appeared on a Chinese language website on Monday, calling for the restoration of term limits for the Chinese president, but an investigation by Radio Free Asia was not able to determine if it originated from within China.

The letter, which was no longer accessible on Tuesday, had also called for the promotion of democratic constitutional amendments and the guarantee of space for citizens to discuss national affairs, appeared the same day as the opening of the fifth plenary session of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, or CCP.

RFA’s investigation revealed that the “Siyuan Lake BBS” website hosting the message listed “KR” as its country/region code, indicating South Korea, in its registration information. Its mailing address was listed as “16 Collyer Quay,” a skyscraper in Singapore’s central business district. The administrator’s email address was registered on a server of Chinese tech giant Tencent.

Based on the above information, RFA was unable to determine whether the Chinese language website is located within China. As for which organization or company manages it, this cannot be verified at present.

(ICANN Lookup)

The “open letter,” posted at 3:18 p.m., was titled “A Joint Appeal from a Group of University Students in the Republic.” It was addressed to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, and members of the Fifth Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee, and was written against the backdrop of commemorating the 160th anniversary of the birth of Sun Yat-sen, the founder of modern China at the end of its last imperial dynasty.

The article cites past statements by Sun Yat-sen, Mao Zedong, and Deng Xiaoping regarding democracy, oversight of power, and leadership systems, and questions China’s 2018 constitutional amendment that removed the two-term limit for the president and vice president, paving the way for Xi’s third term as president, which began in 2023.

The letter argues that political stability should stem from predictability in the system and advocates for “limiting the time limit on power and subjecting it to oversight.”

Three Main Demands

The open letter put forward three main expectations:

Restore Term Limits: Abolish the indefinite extension of the term of office for the President of the People’s Republic of China and restore the term limits explicitly stipulated in the Constitution to ensure the orderly transfer of power; clear term limits should also be established for the highest leadership positions of the Party.

Initiate Democratic Constitutional Amendment: Convene a national constitutional amendment conference, steadily and gradually expand the people’s substantive participation in public power, improve the election, supervision, and recall mechanisms, and put into practice the unfinished goal since the 1911 Xinhai Revolution—returning power to the people—step by step.

Safeguard Space for Public Discussion: Safeguard the space for citizens to discuss national affairs in accordance with the law, encourage young people of the Republic to speak the truth, and listen to criticism as well-intentioned suggestions.

The article also states:

“We have no intention of confrontation, much less to create antagonism. We are just a group of young people who grew up reading Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s last words, and with the sentiment that ‘the revolution has not yet succeeded, comrades must continue to strive,’ we are willing to fulfill the responsibility of a scholar for the long-term future of this country.”

Unverified signatures and origin

The post lists 14 universities, including Peking University, Renmin University of China, Tongji University, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xiamen University, and Nankai University, and notes that the petition is ongoing. However, the list only includes the names of the universities and does not provide any individual signatures or proof of signature.

(RFA Mandarin)

As of midnight Beijing time on October 27, the website showed that this article had only been viewed by 656 people and received 1 like. The author on the page is listed as “Lin Ziyi,” with an account level of “LV.1.” The website indicates that this is “Lin Ziyi’s” first article. The article does not provide the names, number, contact information, or other verifiable information of the students who signed the article.

RFA has not independently confirmed the author’s identity, whether the signatories are indeed students, or whether students from the listed schools actually participated.

The website is divided into several topics, with the “Open Letter” posted in the “Complaints and Casual Chat” section. The website is entirely in simplified Chinese and appears to be a typical campus job search or lifestyle information website.

A closer look

The bottom of the page states that it is a “non-official campus forum,” and a closer look reveals that its URL ends with “.com” instead of the usual “.cn” which is China’s internet domain.

Radio Free Asia further investigated the website’s registration information and found that the IP address used by the website was “43.155.168.161”. Further verification with ICANN revealed that the website’s registration information showed the “country/region” code as “KR”, which corresponds to South Korea. The mailing address was listed as “16 Collyer Quay” in Singapore, but the administrator’s email address was registered on a Tencent server (@tencent.com), and the mobile phone number and WeChat account left by the administrator were also Chinese numbers.

(ICANN Lookup)

‘Conscience of intellectuals’

While the authenticity of the petition remains to be verified, its content reflects the conscience of intellectuals, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council Minister Chiu Chui-cheng said at the Legislative Yuan on Tuesday.

Chiu also recalled that as early as 2017, Chinese scholars had expressed their opposition to Xi Jinping’s disruption of the leadership succession system.

At that time, the Chinese scholars stated bluntly, “We, the intellectuals of mainland China, absolutely cannot accept this re-election,” referring to a provision that granted him a second term under conditions that would allow him to serve a third in 2023. They indicated that if the leadership succession system were undermined, 95% of Chinese intellectuals would oppose it.

However, Chiu said that as the CCP later established a “one-man rule” leadership structure, the mechanism for intellectuals to correct their mistakes has “completely disappeared.”

Edited by Charlie Dharapak and Eugene Whong.

Update adds Chiu’s comments to the Legislative Yuan and information about the website’s disappearance.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s weekend visit to China over the newly completed New Yalu River Bridge was largely symbolic, and acknowledged a history that Pyongyang has downplayed for three generations, experts told Radio Free Asia.

During Saturday’s unprecedented one-day car trip to Dandong, China, across the border from North Korea’s northwestern city of Sinuiju, Kim inspected a bus factory, met with high-ranking Chinese officials, and visited a monument that commemorated China’s entry into the Korean War.

The timing was significant. The visit was on the eve of the 76th anniversary of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army’s Oct. 25, 1950 first combat against South Korean and U.N. forces in the war, which would rage on for another three years as the Chinese-backed North and U.S. and U.N. backed South fought to what is largely considered to be a stalemate.

The state-run Korean Central News Agency noted that after Kim and the North Korean delegation toured the Memorial Hall of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, and paid their respects, he told the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Chairman Wang Huning – the fourth highest ranked official in the Chinese Communist Party – that it was North Korea’s duty to remember the sacrifice of the Chinese army.

“It was a moment to recollect the preciousness of the DPRK-China friendship forged at the cost of blood,” the report attributed him as saying. “We will always remember the history when the excellent sons and daughters of the Chinese people helped our revolution at the cost of their blood and steadily and firmly carry forward the history of the DPRK-China friendship,” Kim said, in the report.

Though international media outlets characterized Kim’s day trip to be an effort to expand trade ties between Pyongyang and Beijing, the visit to the memorial hall was the most important part of the itinerary, Ri Jong Ho, who was once a high-ranking North Korean official but escaped to the South and currently lives in the U.S., told RFA.

“A bridge that stayed closed for twelve years opened only days before Kim crossed it, and on the same day the supreme leader stood before a history his regime has avoided for more than seventy years,” said Ri, questioning whether that was a coincidence or pressure from Beijing, which financed the majority of the new bridge, which lay in a state of near-completion since 2014 before finally opening for trade traffic on Oct. 15.

(KCNA via KNS/AFP)

There is a consensus among historians that North Korea’s survival in the Korean War was due to Beijing deploying troops to aid Pyongyang, but the story is different inside North Korea.

According to that version of history, the North Korean military under the tactical genius of Kim Jong Un’s grandfather, national founder Kim Il Sung – with only minimal support from China – was able to stave off defeat against an overwhelming force led by the U.S.

This narrative was important from Pyongyang to maintain because it aligns with the country’s founding Juche ideology of self-reliance.

“Pyongyang will present the photographs as proof of an unbreakable friendship. But those inside the Kim system will see something else: the third Kim leader, bowing in public before a history his grandfather and father suppressed,” said Ri.

“Like-minded totalitarians”

Kim’s visit to Dandong is significant because of the timing, but it is more about managing China’s concerns that North Korea is getting too close to Russia, Sydney Seiler, a senior advisor for the Korea Chair at the Washington-based Center for Strategic & International Studies, told RFA.

“Kim is acting with limited confidence, embracing like-minded totalitarian, autocratic … partners such as Russia and China while ignoring the United States, at least for now,” said Seiler. “Kim is working in a ‘safe zone’ between Moscow and Beijing, ensuring that neither side is overly concerned with Pyongyang’s relations with the other, yet still watching to see if and when national interests are threatened.”

He said that at the moment, it is not likely that any moves by Kim and Chinese President Xi Jinping to strengthen their relationship would concern Putin.

“But the opposite is not necessarily true. If Russia’s support to the DPRK enables, empowers, emboldens, and eventually encourages Kim to consider scenarios of even limited use of force toward the ROK, then the PRC will be concerned,” he said, using abbreviations for the official names of South Korea and China. “Kim getting close to the Chinese may be designed to mitigate such concerns.”

But the trip could also be the result of pressure on Kim to finally open the New Yalu River Bridge – and his country, Ri said.

(KCNA via KNS/AFP)

“I believe Chinese leaders, resentful of the neglected bridge, kept pressing him to open it, and a severe economic crisis left North Korea little choice but to unlock the gate,” he said. “The bridge is open, but I suspect Kim’s fear of opening up, and of the outside information that comes with it, remains deep.”

Ri noted that the bridge had been the vision of Jang Song Thaek, the uncle of Kim Jong Un who supported North Korean economic development through close cooperation with China. Jang in 2009 negotiated to get Beijing to finance the bridge while serving in the regime of Kim Jong Un’s father, Kim Jong Il. Jang’s pro-China views caused him to fall out of favor with the younger Kim and he was executed by firing squad in the early years of his rule following his father’s death.

Message to Washington?

The fact that Kim was able to get into a car and drive to China is intended to point out the lack of effectiveness of sanctions, Hong Min, a senior research fellow at the Seoul-based Korea Institute for National Unification, told RFA.

“The trip implies that ‘one-day shuttle diplomacy’ is possible,” said Hong. “North Korea and China intend to continue close strategic communication regardless of sanctions, and it is a signal that sanctions can effectively be rendered meaningless.”

Because Kim’s visit involved many important officials on both sides, commentators in Seoul and Korea observers raised the possibility that the purpose was for the two countries to coordinate before U.S. President Donald Trump is scheduled to travel to Shenzhen, China for the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting, and the potential for a summit with Kim while he is in the region.

Ri noted that this was not confirmed and said this kind of meeting would shatter North Korea’s established internal narratives.

“For decades, Pyongyang has preached self-reliance, or juche, and insisted that it bows to no foreign power,” he said. “If its leader must first seek Beijing’s permission before sitting down with an American president, that principle would be hollowed out.”

(KCNA via KNS/AFP)

Ri noted that Kim met with Xi Jinping himself prior to his first summit with Trump in 2018. This time he met only with “China’s No. 4.”

Such a posture would resemble a provincial lord seeking an emperor’s approval,” he said. “An ideology that taught North Koreans for three generations to despise sadae, deference to the powerful, would stand exposed as a slogan.”

Edited by Eugene Whong.

A white tiger entered the courtyard outside the National Museum in Seoul. He mugged for the camera and darted up the steps. At the top were the six members of BOYNEXTDOOR, wearing quasi-traditional outfits that mixed elements of hanbok with modern formal wear and a tinge of “bad boy” biker gear.

As they danced in unison and sang the opening lines of their hit single “Animal,” the crowd went wild.

Sitting in the audience was Cho Mi-young – born in Chongjin, North Korea – who arrived with her family in the South in 2004.

Mi-young can’t contain herself. “You’re so amazing!” she cries out, as the monitors show the young men dominating the courtyard with their precise dance moves.

Cho is in the audience at an episode of KBS Music Bank, a Friday night K-pop showcase program with all the latest acts. It has been the start of the K-pop weekend for most of its 28-year runtime. Surprisingly, it’s her first time ever seeing a live K-pop performance in person after 22 years in the South.

Tickets to studio tapings of KBS Music Bank are hard to come by. Fans either have to know someone, know someone who knows someone, or enter the ticket lottery. The episode she’s watching on Oct. 16 is special - it’s a live broadcast and the biggest boy bands, girl bands, and boy-girl bands are plying their craft on an outdoor stage on the grounds of the National Museum of Korea, which the show’s special intro vignette called the “beating heart of Korean culture.”

When the opening act was finished, the show’s hosts began introducing this week’s lineup, as Cho and the rest of the audience settled in. Many more K-pop groups and solo artists would take the stage in front of them on a night they would likely all remember forever.

“I’ve seen it a lot on TV, but today is the first time I’ve seen it with my own eyes,” Cho told Radio Free Asia. “Seeing such beautiful and handsome people dancing and singing right in front of me, moving like that, is absolutely mesmerizing.”

Cho is no stranger to music, or to the stage. In North Korea she had been a vocalist for a state-run provincial arts troupe. After settling in the South, Cho was a fixture in Seoul’s burgeoning musical theater scene and she toured as an accordion player. She later transitioned into broadcasting, at one point even co-hosting the RFA Korean webseries “Northboy Northgirl.”

At present, she runs a content production company and maintains an active presence both online and in traditional media.

(RFA)

But today, she’s just a fangirl in a sea of other diehards, most of whom are screaming the names of the idols on stage.

Music in isolation

On the night of her first live K-pop concert, Cho reminisced about how she first encountered South Korean music in North Korea. At the time, she didn’t have access to what most would describe as K-pop today; instead she took in a lot of trot – a unique South Korean genre that mixes Western foxtrot dance rhythms with pentatonic minor scale melodies. Most young South Koreans consider trot to be music their grandparents like.

But after arriving in the South, she became a huge fan of South Korean love ballads, much slower than the catchiest K-pop numbers, but thicker in emotion. Music occupied much of her daily life in the South early on, as she scanned the radio for something new to listen to.

Today’s performances on the Music Bank stage were a far cry from her own back in North Korea. For one, everyone on stage just seems happy to be there, she said.

“When I performed in North Korea, I was always stiff,” she said. “When we were on stage, we performed with the mindset of conveying the Party’s voice, so I don’t think I ever had the thought that we were actually enjoying our own music.”

Several more musical acts came and went and then the undistorted electric guitar of indie rock band Jannabi’s Kim Do-hyung echoed through the air as vocalist Choi Jung-hoon sang the first few lyrics of “Thoughts on an Autumn Night.”

“Even on that distant shining star up there… love must be alive singing its song.”

The song struck a chord with Cho. Performed by just one singer and one guitarist it was a bit of a shift from the rest of the evening’s heavily choreographed bangers.

“The lyrical melody seems to have a bit of North Korean sensibility to it.”

She sat there, transfixed by Jannabi’s intimate, scaled down performance on the stage and quietly sang along.

“I really am in the South now”

When it was all over, Cho talked about her experience on the show, but it wasn’t only the dazzle of the K-pop acts that caught her eye. She was also amazed by the devoted fans, who sang along with every lyric from memory and chanted in pre-arranged cheers in unison. She thought back to how strange that seemed when she first arrived.

“I didn’t understand it in the past. But as I’ve lived here longer, I’ve come to understand the fans and their pre-prepared chants,” she said. “I think maybe next time, I might enjoy it even more if I learned those.”

The best performance of the evening, according to Cho, was by a co-ed group called AllDay Project. She thought they looked cool in their all-black outfits, some in furs, others in biker leather – almost like warriors.

But as an artist, Cho’s thoughts naturally turned to the massive effort that must have gone on behind the scenes. The meticulous choreography alone must take many months of practice, she said.

She recalled how she herself had put in a lot of effort as a singer back in North Korea.

“Even in North Korea, artists are trained very strictly in a Spartan manner,” she said. “In terms of the sheer volume of training, it might be difficult to see a significant difference between the North and South.”

But she noted that the payoff in the South is individual success, unlike the North, where it would merely advance the goals of the state.

She said the whole evening was surreal. Back when she was in North Korea, she could maybe catch glimpses of what the music scene in the South was like, but she could never actually see it. Now she finally has seen it in person, “it sinks in that I really am in the South now.”

Cho said that she thinks any North Korean escapee would probably feel the same way.

“The emotion felt in the live setting is completely different from listening to a recording,” she said. “I think many escapees would finally feel they truly have arrived in South Korea when they go to the venue, see the singer in person, and listen to the songs live.”

Edited by Yi Yongin in Korean and Eugene Whong in English.

The closures of Gangjong Grassland Girls’ School, Jasag Village Primary School and Golog Tadra Orphan School have raised concerns among Tibetans about the future of education that incorporates their language, cultural traditions and community life.

Tibetan sources who spoke to Radio Free Asia linked the closures to the Chinese government’s education policies and its promotion of the Ethnic Unity and Progress Law, which took effect on July 1, 2026. They said the shutdowns could further limit opportunities for Tibetan children to learn their mother tongue and cultural traditions.

The Chinese government has cited the high altitude of Golog and shortages of teachers and educational resources as reasons for establishing schools outside the region, saying the move would improve education. It remains unclear where students from the three closed schools will continue their studies.

Education department declines to comment

RFA contacted the education department of the Golog Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture by phone to seek details about the closures.

“We don’t know the details,” the person told RFA, saying the initial work had been carried out by the Machen County administration and that the county’s education department was responsible for the matter.

RFA also contacted the Machen County Education Department, which said it had “no authority to respond.”

Unclear future for students

Gangjong Grassland Girls’ School in Ragya Township, Machen County, was closed on Aug. 28, according to a source in Tibet who spoke to RFA on condition of anonymity for security reasons.

The school had about 450 students and 60 teachers at the time of its closure, the source said. The current situation of the students remains unclear.

(Citizen photo)

The source said the school had been made a government-affiliated institution, with its curriculum following the Chinese government’s education system while retaining some Tibetan-language instruction.

“Currently, the schools in the Golog region are conducting a strong patriotic reeducation campaign,” the source said, adding that Tibetans were afraid to share information because of government restrictions.

Jasag Village Primary School, which was established in 1995 with funds raised by local nomadic families and renamed Ragya Township Residential School No. 2 in 2008, was shut down in September, according to information obtained by RFA. Another source in Tibet told RFA that the situation of its students and teachers remained unclear.

“The Golog Education Department has put considerable pressure on the school’s teachers and shut down the school without providing any clear explanation,” the source said.

Golog Tadra Orphanage School was ordered to close this month, according to information obtained by RFA. Founded in 2005, it provided education and support to Tibetan orphans and disadvantaged children for two decades.

At an event marking the school’s 20th anniversary in 2025, principal Thupten Nyima of the Golog Tadra Orphan School, which provides K-12 education, said it was training more than 1,000 students. Some graduates had gone on to work in government positions and as teachers, he said.

Nyima addressed students and teachers in a recent video posted to social media, saying, “Don’t be sad, students and teachers. If we are bound by karma and fate, all the teachers and students gathered here will sing a song of joy together.”

It is unclear if Nyima’s remarks were made around the time the school was ordered to close.

(Citizen photo)

Critics warn of cultural impact

Dr. Gyal Lo, a Tibetan educational sociologist, said the closures marked a significant change in the Chinese government’s education policy in Tibet.

“The Chinese government sees schools where Tibetans can organize themselves to learn and teach their own culture as a thorn in its side. That is why these schools are being abolished,” he told RFA.

“After Xi Jinping visited Qinghai, the school established by Jigme Gyaltsen was closed, and a new secondary school was built in the eastern part of Ziling,” he said.

Gyal Lo said the closures could distance children from Tibetan traditions and customs practiced in their communities and place them in state-run boarding schools where Chinese is the language of instruction.

“The first impact of the Chinese government’s school closures is that children are distanced from the Tibetan traditions and customs practiced in their homeland. Secondly, when these children enter state-run boarding schools, the entire curriculum is taught in Chinese and is under the government’s control,” he said.

He argued that the policies could affect the transmission of Tibetan identity across generations.

“The aim is to turn the entire Tibetan people into Chinese. This is not limited to a small area; it is a plan with far-reaching consequences,” Gyal Lo told RFA. “The ultimate goal is to turn the younger generation of Tibetans into Chinese through different methods and policies implemented in different regions.”

He also emphasized the role of families in preserving the Tibetan language.

“According to language education theory, a language cannot be passed on to the next generation without being taught within the family. The foundation for preserving the mother tongue and passing it on to the next generation must be laid at home,” he said.

Tenzin Lekshey, spokesperson for the Central Tibetan Administration in Dharamsala, India, said Tibetan schools and monasteries played an important role in preserving the community’s language, culture, traditions and identity.

“The Chinese government is doing all this out of fear. Tibetan schools and monasteries established inside Tibet aim to preserve and protect the rich Tibetan language, culture, traditions and identity. But the Chinese government views these institutions as a hindrance rather than a benefit,” he told RFA.

Ragya Geshe Lobsang Palden, a former political prisoner, said the new ethnic unity law had coincided with the closure of several Tibetan schools, some of which had already been brought under government control.

“These schools could not be shut down before because it was not legally appropriate to do so. Now, with the new Ethnic Unity Law in effect since July, many schools have been closing down,” he told RFA.

“However, many of these schools had already been converted into government-affiliated schools several years ago,” he added.

Dawa Tashi, a researcher at the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Dharamsala, also linked the closures to the new law, saying it formalized policies that threatened Tibetan cultural and linguistic identity.

A former Tibetan political prisoner who visited Gangjong Grassland Girls’ School in 2006 said many of its graduates had gone on to serve their communities. The source requested anonymity for security reasons.

“I remember speaking with a teacher at the school in 2006 who told me that several teachers had been summoned by Chinese authorities. The teacher anticipated that the school might eventually be closed,” the source told RFA.

New government boarding schools

The closures come amid a broader restructuring of education in Golog, where authorities have promoted Chinese-language education and campaigns emphasizing national unity.

On Sept. 1, 2026 the Golog Education Department officially opened the newly established Golog Tsoshar Middle School in eastern Qinghai. According to Chinese state media, the school enrolled 1,200 students, including 1,090 Tibetans, many from farming and nomadic families.

Authorities have described the relocation of students from Golog to the lower-lying Tsoshar area as part of an effort to expand residential education in the highlands. It remains unclear whether students from Gangjong Grassland Girls’ School were transferred to the new institution.

Golog Ziling (Xining) Middle School, a state-run boarding school in Xining, was also opened on Sept. 1, 2019. According to official figures for 2024, it had 800 students, including 778 Tibetans, all from Golog. The school’s official introduction identifies fostering a shared sense of community among the Chinese nation as a central goal of its education.

In September 2026, the Golog prefecture government also launched a public language promotion week encouraging students to learn and use standard Chinese and emphasizing unity among the Chinese people.

Earlier school closures

The latest shutdowns follow several other closures of Tibetan educational institutions in Golog in recent years.

In July 2024, authorities closed Gangjong Sherig Norling School in Machen County after 30 years of operation. Founded by Jigme Gyaltsen in 1994, the institution had about 1,400 students and 58 teachers and staff.

The vocational school combined modern education with instruction in Tibetan language, culture, philosophy and religion. Reports in April 2025 indicated that authorities had permitted it to reopen as a vocational institution, although its curriculum was expected to change.

Dorjeten National Vocational School in Chikdril County (in Golog) was shut down on Dec. 12, 2025, affecting more than 1,300 students, according to reports. Hungkar Dorje Vocational Secondary School in Golog was also closed on June 24, 2026.

The latest closures have raised further questions about the future of Tibetan-language education in the region and whether students from the affected schools will continue to have opportunities to learn their language and cultural traditions.

Background: The three schools

Gangjong Grassland Girls’ School

Founded in 2005 by Tibetan educator Jigme Gyaltsen in Ragya Township, the school was established to provide education for girls, including those from nomadic communities. When it officially opened on Oct. 15, 2005, it had 203 students and 15 teachers. Its curriculum included Tibetan, Chinese and English, as well as mathematics, science, culture and sports.

Gyaltsen described his educational philosophy as follows: “The education of girls is the education of mothers, and the education of mothers is the foundation of human education.”

Jasag Village Primary School

Established in 1995 with funds raised by local nomadic families through the former Jasag Village Committee, the school served children from the surrounding community. It was renamed Ragya Township Residential School No. 2 in 2008 and closed in September 2026.

Golog Tadra Orphan School

Founded in 2005 by the late Dr. Tawo Lobsang Palden and his wife, Choenyi Lhamo, the school provided education, accommodation, food, clothing and health care to Tibetan orphans and disadvantaged children. Over two decades, it served thousands of children. Lhamo now lives in Germany.

Translated by Tenzin Dickyi and edited by Tawang for RFA Tibetan

Beijing imposed sanctions on Oct. 12 against Paraguay’s information and communication technologies minister, Gustavo Villate, and Belize’s foreign minister, Francis Fonseca. Both countries maintain formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan rather than China.

China claims Taiwan is an integral part of its territory and considers it a rogue province. Beijing has sought to persuade governments to switch recognition from Taiwan to China, reducing Taiwan’s network of embassies and official government-to-government relationships.

The Chinese government has described the sanctions as a “warning and deterrence.”

(Cesar Olmedo/Reuters)

When China sanctions individuals they don’t quite have the same effect as U.S. or European sanctions, Ed Moon, an independent cross-Strait analyst and founder of intelligence site Strait Signal, told RFA.

“Chinese sanctions are unlikely to have significant impacts on people without major interests in the Chinese banking system, shareholdings or business interests,” he said.

But the penalties serve a purpose beyond imposing financial losses, said Moon. They signal to observers in China and abroad that Beijing can enforce restrictions when it believes its interests have been harmed, and can serve as a warning to countries closely connected to the Chinese economy about dealings with sanctioned individuals.

While sanctions could discourage engagement with Taiwan, there is little evidence that the strategy is causing isolation for Taipei, William Yang, a Northeast Asia analyst at the Belgium-based International Crisis Group, told RFA.

“We haven’t really seen a substantial level of retreat in terms of foreign parliamentarians’ trips to Taiwan or foreign governments’ cooperation with Taiwan,” Yang said.

The assessments point to a distinction between two types of sanctions: those that impose measurable costs and those whose principal effect is to publicize Beijing’s opposition to Taiwan’s international relationships.

Isolating Taiwan

Only 12 countries retain formal diplomatic relations with Taipei. Taiwan also maintains extensive unofficial relationships with countries that recognize Beijing. Those ties include trade, investment and parliamentary exchanges, explaining why China’s penalties have targeted politicians beyond Taiwan’s formal diplomatic allies.

Yang said Beijing’s campaign is meant to show Taiwan’s government and people that it has the power to restrict international engagement with Taipei, while simultaneously showing foreign governments that there will be consequences for treating Taiwan as a sovereign state.

He added Beijing believes its economic influence gives it leverage to intimidate politicians and governments considering closer engagement with Taipei.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said during an Oct. 12 press briefing that the ministers from Paraguay and Belize were sanctioned for supporting Taiwan independence through their contacts with Taipei and spreading false allegations about Chinese cyberattacks.

(Taiwan Presidential Office/AP)

The next day, Taiwan’s Premier Cho Jung-tai said that Beijing had no right to interfere in Taiwan’s internal affairs or influence its foreign relations. He said Taiwan would continue working with its allies and other democratic governments to defend freedom and democracy and maintain regional peace and security.

Paraguay and Belize also rejected the sanctions. Paraguay’s Foreign Ministry reaffirmed its support for Taiwan, while Belize said the penalties would not alter its foreign policy and defended its relationship with Taipei as a sovereign decision.

Their cooperation involves more than diplomatic recognition. Paraguayan President Santiago Peña visited Taiwan in May, signing agreements covering cybersecurity, artificial intelligence and computing investment, among other areas. Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung visited Belize in September to deepen bilateral ties.

Do Chinese sanctions work?

Previous cases of Chinese sanctions show the difficulty of turning personal penalties into lasting restrictions on engagement.

In June, China confirmed entry restrictions against New Zealand lawmakers following their visit to Taiwan. Beijing said their trip interfered in China’s internal affairs.

(Presidential Office of Taiwan/AFP)

In August 2022, China sanctioned Lithuania’s deputy transport minister, Agnė Vaiciukevičiūtė, after she visited Taiwan. Beijing also suspended exchanges with Vilnius’ transport ministry and paused certain international transportation agreements between the two countries.

That action formed part of a wider dispute after Lithuania allowed a Taiwanese representative office to open in the country in 2021. China downgraded diplomatic relations over the decision.

Cooperation with Taiwan nevertheless continued. Lithuania’s Foreign Ministry reported discussions in April 2026 on strengthening economic and technological ties.

The broader outcome is more complicated. Lithuania’s prime minister described the original representative-office decision as a mistake in February as the country sought to repair relations with Beijing.

Because the dispute involved broader diplomatic and economic pressure, analysts say it is difficult to isolate the impact of sanctions against a single official.

Moon said the same difficulty applied to Paraguay and Belize – Beijing has used various public and private forms of pressure for years, so any subsequent policy change could not automatically be attributed to the latest sanctions.

He said changes in diplomatic language, visits and, at the most dramatic end, diplomatic recognition would provide indicators of whether the relationships were shifting.

Past sanctions have also produced backlash.

In March 2021, Beijing sanctioned European lawmakers and institutions in retaliation for European Union sanctions over human rights abuses in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Although the dispute concerned human rights rather than Taiwan, it similarly targeted individual politicians and their institutions.

The European Parliament responded by freezing consideration of an EU-China investment agreement while the Chinese sanctions remained in place. Beijing lifted the sanctions affecting the EU Parliament’s members and committees in 2025.

Moon said sanctions could carry greater economic weight when directed at people or companies with business interests in China, including in Taiwan.

In a separate action on Oct. 14, Beijing announced restrictions against VWAY, a company linked to the father of Taiwanese legislator and Taipei mayoral candidate Puma Shen.

(I-Hwa Cheng/AFP)

China’s Taiwan Affairs Office accused Shen’s father of using VWAY to continue trading with Chinese firms after sanctions were placed on another of his businesses.

Moon cautioned that Taiwan-related business sanctions were not directly comparable with penalties against foreign governments’ officials, given Beijing’s position that Taiwan is part of China.

Yang said the sanctions’ limited results so far did not rule out a stronger deterrent effect in the future. Responses by Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic allies, including whether they protested collectively or moved toward recognizing Beijing, would be important to watch, he said.

“So far it seems like at least the government of Paraguay and Belize are holding their lines,” said Yang.

Beijing could still regard the publicity itself as a result, reinforcing its claims over Taiwan and demonstrating that engagement with Taipei carried consequences, Moon said.

“But I think for Beijing the mere fact it has created a news cycle out of the sanctions will mean it has achieved the desired effect of reinforcing its claims over Taiwan and showing there are consequences, however limited, to siding with Taipei.”

Edited by Eugene Whong.

He speaks in an exclusive interview with Radio Free Asia.

Radio Free Asia: After more than five years without direct contact, how did you get the opportunity to speak with your mother and how did the Myanmar Embassy in London reach out to you? How was the call arranged?

Kim Aris: I was informed through the British Foreign Office here that the call may take place. This was last week. And then earlier this week, they confirmed that it would take place, and they accompanied me to the Burmese Embassy this morning.

RFA: During your conversation, did Daw Aung San Suu Kyi mention anything about her health or her daily life?

Kim Aris: Well, she was more concerned about my health and the rest of the family than anything else. But obviously, I asked after her health and how things were, where she is. She wasn’t able to reveal too much, but I know that she’s been held in some residence, I believe in Naypyidaw, and she sounds healthy. But at the same time, I know that she is in some pain because her hand is not very well; she has tendonitis. So at times, the pain is quite extreme, and I think she is even unable to use that hand at times. Nothing too clear. I know that she’s getting a regular six-monthly checkup, but I know that will be a military doctor, so it’s not like having her own personal doctor.

RFA: Do you know whether she has any access to news from the outside world?

Kim Aris: I don’t think she does. As far as I’m aware, she has no radio or television and doesn’t get any newspapers or anything like that. We know that the conversation will have been monitored and recorded, so we can’t talk about anything sensitive. Besides which, there was a lot to talk about just talking about what’s happened in the family over the last five years. So that’s what we talked about.

RFA: During these recent developments, do you believe there could be a political breakthrough on the horizon?

Kim Aris: I sincerely hope so. I think everybody is tired of the fighting now, and people are starting to think that they need to start talking to each other. But I think the first thing that needs to happen before anybody will start talking is the political prisoners, including may may (Burmese expression for “mom”), need to be freed.

RFA: Some observers believe the Myanmar authorities may be looking for a way out of Myanmar’s ongoing political crisis. What is your take on this?

Kim Aris: Well, it’s very clear the military have been trying to be more appealing to the international community, especially following their elections at the end of last year and the beginning of this year. So they are doing whatever they can to try and get people to work with them again. But people need to remember that the military haven’t actually abided by any of what they have said they will have done over the last five years. They have not met the five-point consensus, and yet people are starting to re-engage with them without having seen any evidence of actual progress.

RFA: The Myanmar military authorities have recently been releasing more information about Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Do you see this as a reason for optimism? What do you think the Myanmar military’s move might be?

Kim Aris: I always have hope, and I do hope that this will result in actual progress and that she will be free before long. And even before she’s free, I want more regular contact with her, and I want to know that she’s receiving external medical treatment.

RFA: Did they promise you could speak with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, your mother, regularly?

Kim Aris: No, I haven’t heard anything more on that yet.

RFA: You made it very clear that your mother should never be used as a bargaining chip for diplomatic recognition, sanctions relief, or political advantage. You also urged the UK government and others not to trade humanitarian rights for political legitimacy. And now, one of our RFA audience members raised a difficult question. They asked if negotiation and compromise may be necessary to secure your mother Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s release. How would you respond to that?

Kim Aris: Well, I realize there are people who have been calling for my mother’s release all the time for the last five years, and without their support, I wouldn’t even have gotten this far. And people do have to negotiate—that’s very clear. At the same time, they should not be legitimizing the military by open discussions like this and welcoming Min Aung Hlaing to their country without actually having secured progress.

RFA: After hearing your mother’s voice for the first time in more than five years, what message would you like to share with the Myanmar people or international community?

Kim Aris: Well, I would say she is sounding well and strong still, but at 81 years old and with ongoing health concerns, and we still don’t know what conditions she’s really been kept under, I’d ask for everybody to continue to fight for her freedom. Burma needs to come forwards, and may may is part of that process still. People need to talk to one another, and one of the few people who is actually able to get people to talk to one another is may may. So please, do not stop fighting for her freedom. Fighting for her freedom is also fighting for the freedom of Burma.

Edited by Charlie Dharapak.

Updated 5:05 PM ET

Allowing Myanmar’s detained former leader Aung San Suu Kyi to speak on the phone with her son for the first time in five years is not enough – the military government must immediately release her and all other political prisoners, a human rights advocate told Radio Free Asia Thursday.

The country’s military-backed government announced that the former leader – currently under house arrest – was allowed to talk for 20 minutes to her son Kim Aris at 2:30 p.m. via a call placed to the Myanmar embassy in London, where Aris resides.

The chance to talk to her son came just days after the military released images of her receiving a letter and some books sent by Britain’s King Charles III.

(Myanmar Presidential Spokesman via Reuters)

While the phone call was a joyous occasion for mother and son, much more must be done to bring peace to Myanmar, Aung Myo Kyaw, an official with the Thailand-based Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), told RFA.

“Aung San Suu Kyi is not only a mother to Kim, but also a mother to the country,” said Aung Myo Kyaw. “What the citizens of the country need is the release of all political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi.”

He said that the gradual easing of restrictions on Aung San Suu Kyi is a political calculation by the military government, which he said was failing in all aspects.

At a time when the military continues to airstrike populated areas of the country, simply allowing her to talk to her son in the U.K. will not bring peace, he said.

“FREE HER. FREE THEM ALL”

In an interview with Radio Free Asia after speaking with his mother, Kim Aris said that it’s clear that the Myanmar military-backed government have been trying to “be more appealing to the international community.”

“But people need to remember that the military haven’t actually abided by any of what they have said they will have done over the last five years,” Aris told RFA. “They have not met the five-point consensus, and yet people are starting to re-engage with them without having seen any evidence of actual progress.”

In a Facebook post, Aris said that he was glad to finally hear his mother’s voice again and thanked supporters for continuing to advocate for her freedom.

But he reiterated that she is still “unjustly detained.”

“One conversation is not regular family access. Family access is not freedom,” he said. “My mother must never be used as a hostage or bargaining chip for diplomatic recognition, sanctions relief or political advantage.”

He called on governments that engage with Myanmar’s military authorities to not legitimize them in exchange for humanitarian rights.

“My mother and all political prisoners must be released immediately and unconditionally. Freedom is not negotiable. Accountability Before Legitimacy. FREE HER. FREE THEM ALL,” he wrote.

Aung San Suu Kyi has been detained since the 2021 military coup that ousted her and the rest of the country’s democratically elected government from power. She was sentenced to 18 years for a broad range of crimes that include corruption and election fraud, though she maintains that she is innocent.

For the duration of her detention, her exact location has not been easy to ascertain, and in April the military government moved her into house arrest. Until the brief phone call with her son Thursday, she had had almost no contact with the outside.

Radio Free Asia attempted to contact a spokesman for the military government to discuss more details about the phone call between Aung San Suu Kyi and Kim Aris, but there was no response.

Updates with Kim Aris comment from RFA interview.

Edited by Eugene Whong.

The remarks came after prosecutors in the vice president’s impeachment trial presented evidence of the alleged corruption – a financial forensics accountant testified that Cale88 Foods Corp., controlled by Duterte and her husband Manases Carpio, received 319 million pesos (US$5 million) from state-run Chinese firms. Duterte said the allegations were politically motivated.

The revelations raised alarm bells, with Filipino officials and experts immediately raising the specter of Chinese spy and malign influence operations as the two countries have become locked in an increasingly tense territorial dispute in the South China Sea, parts of which are claimed by Manila and referred to as the West Philippine Sea.

(RFA)

Gaining access to the most influential people in a target country is a fundamental malign influence strategy for Beijing, retired Rear Adm. Roy Vincent Trinidad, spokesman for the Philippine military in the West Philippine Sea, told RFA.

“Part of the rulebook of the Chinese Communist Party includes economic elite co-optation and political elite co-optation,” Trinidad told RFA. “If they could co-opt a political leader, have him elected by building him up politically through foreign malign influence, they would have achieved the objective without firing a single shot.”

While donations or grants by any government are not illegal per se and are governed by rules, if the supposed investments are “used to advance the position of our adversary…it will have very serious national security implications,” Trinidad said.

“When another country would like to occupy your territory, would like to sow false narratives to advance their interests, they are creating trouble not only domestically, but in the region,” he stressed.

Going bananas?

Duterte was impeached in May for large-scale corruption and death threats against President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., her former political ally turned nemesis.

The prosecution on Oct. 13 dropped three of the charges – misuse of funds, bribery, and grave threats – to speed up the trial, but she still remains accused of having unexplained wealth.

During the trial proceedings earlier in the month, the Anti-Money Laundering Council said the funds paid to the food company controlled by Duterte and her husband were in suspiciously high amounts for what they had been reported as – payment for banana chips, and that the firm did not have the operational capabilities that matched those payments.

(Bertrand Guay/AFP)

The defense cited customs records that showed outgoing banana chip shipments with a declared value of 217 million pesos ($3.4 million), which is still about 100 million pesos less than the payments received.

Additionally, the trial revealed that the company had only two employees, which Senator-Judge Joel Villanueva during the proceedings said was “alarming” considering the company’s reported revenue and sales.

Government officials cannot be the direct beneficiary of funds from any foreign government, Leila de Lima, one of the prosecutors in Duterte’s impeachment trial, told RFA. She called the case a “substantiation of financial infusion by China” to influence.

“VP Sara’s receipt of funds from China without any exempting justification such as a legitimate business squarely constitutes a betrayal of her oath and disloyalty to the Philippines,” she said. “There can only be one reason for the receipt of hundreds of millions of pesos in monetary benefits by a public official from a foreign government.”

China’s Embassy in Manila did not immediately respond when contacted by RFA. But in a short statement it issued on Oct. 5, the embassy urged “relevant individuals in the Philippines to stop political manipulation and not drag Philippine domestic politics into China-Philippine relations.”

“A serious matter”

President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., talking to reporters during a visit to Singapore on Oct. 11, acknowledged that the prosecution’s allegations were a “serious matter” that needed to be investigated.

If found to be true “it would go straight to the top of our list of threats that are facing the Philippines,” Marcos said, according to official transcripts of his interview with the traveling Filipino press.

“We are talking about the sovereignty of the Republic,” he said. “We are talking about the safety and security of the state. And I cannot think of any discussion that occurs at a higher level than that.”

Following Marcos’ statement, the National Security Council as well as state intelligence units were tasked to probe deeper into the allegations. The council said it took the allegations very seriously at a time of increased Chinese intelligence operations locally.

“The reported transactions and any credible information involving significant financial flows that may bear upon the country’s national security warrants careful, in-depth and responsible assessment,” national security adviser Eduardo Oban told reporters. He said the NSC will work with other agencies to assess “national security implications, if any, arising from the reported transactions.”

Alleged Chinese spy operations have been documented in the Philippines, and defense and national security officials are working to weed out Filipinos compromised by Chinese operatives. Earlier this year, RFA interviewed one of three Filipinos recently caught spying for China, who explained he had been recruited through an online advertisement.

(Jason Gutierrez/RFA)

The military is in the process of weeding out more alleged spies through an “insider threat program” launched in 2023 and designed to protect sensitive government information, including data linked to the South China Sea.

After Marcos’ remarks, Vice President Duterte dismissed the allegations against her as political theatrics meant to target and harass her family through surveillance. “And this could have serious implications to our relationship with China,” she said.

Duterte is the daughter of former President Rodrigo Duterte, whose six-year term ended in 2022. During his presidency, the elder Duterte pursued a conciliatory stance toward Beijing—a sharp contrast to Marcos, who has leaned heavily into a U.S.-aligned foreign policy.

The younger Duterte joined forces with Marcos – himself the son of a former president – during the 2022 campaign to form an unbeatable UniTeam ticket that united the country’s two most powerful political dynasties.

The alliance between two of the leading political families in the country however soon crumbled, with Marcos in 2025 allowing the International Criminal Court to arrest Rodrigo Duterte for deaths related to his war on drugs.

Officials told RFA they would continue their operations against foreign operatives known to operate in the country. On Oct. 12, the military said its intelligence operatives helped immigration officials in raiding a hub for online gaming operations near military headquarters, and arrested 76 individuals, mostly Chinese nationals.

Operatives told RFA that the raid was part of its program to disrupt Chinese spying and malign influence operations, but declined to elaborate citing the sensitivity of the ongoing investigation.

Edited by Eugene Whong.

Beijing and Vientiane opened a joint support and training center and an aviation academy at Ban Keun, about 50 kilometers north of the Lao capital, on Sept. 29. Beijing says the facility will train Lao air force pilots and it will be maintained by both countries.

The airfield, once complete, would be China’s second joint military outpost in Southeast Asia, after a Chinese-funded expansion of Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base opened in April of last year. The facility at Ream, despite its official designation as a dual-use facility, has seen a regular rotation of Chinese naval vessels.

The joint facility in Laos could allow China to deepen military ties, familiarize personnel with overseas operations and lay the groundwork for a larger presence, Joseph Kristanto, a research analyst at Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, told RFA.

“Ultimately, I think the more important question is not simply whether Ban Keun could accommodate Chinese military aircraft, but whether Beijing intends to develop the facility into a sustained operational hub,” he said.

China’s Defense Ministry said in an announcement that the facility would be maintained by both countries and was “not directed against any third party.” It said its construction and use complied with domestic and international law and would strengthen military cooperation and support regional peace and stability.

Laos’ state news agency KPL reported that officials from both countries described the project at the opening ceremony as the product of cooperation based on mutual respect and equality. The facility would develop Lao military pilots’ practical skills, it said.

(RFA)

The KPL report also said both sides pledged to expand cooperation through joint training and exercises, personnel development and humanitarian assistance. Neither that report nor the Chinese announcement specified how many Chinese military personnel would work at Ban Keun, how long they would remain or the conditions governing Chinese aircraft deployments.

Satellite imagery analysis provided to RFA suggests some construction continued after the opening of the joint airfield. But its future military significance will depend on more than its physical completion, including the extent of Chinese access and the frequency and nature of activities there, Kristanto said.

China already operates military facilities on disputed features in the South China Sea. Ban Keun could extend its overseas presence inland, offering opportunities to build closer ties with the Lao military and gain experience operating from a foreign facility, he said.

The airfield’s immediate military advantages are less clear, analysts said. China has airbases in its own southern territory closer to the South China Sea, raising questions about what additional operations an inland facility in Laos would enable.

Strategic advantage for Beijing?

In satellite imagery of the airfield during its opening, eight aircraft are visible. Private satellite imagery analyst Jacob Bogle told RFA they were K-8, also known as JL-8, light attack and training aircraft.

(Noel Celis/AFP)

Examining an Oct. 7 image, he identified what he thought was one remaining aircraft, while cautioning that the image was blurry. He suggested the others had likely moved into hangars, although their locations could not be established from that observation.

Bogle also identified what appeared to be workshops and temporary construction infrastructure beside the southern end of the runway.

“So while the runway and main buildings are completed, it looks like there is still some minor work that is being finished,” he said.

The imagery does not establish who owns or operates the aircraft. Both China and Laos operate the K-8 type, according to analysts cited by Reuters.

But a Lao military officer, while downplaying concerns over increased Chinese military presence in Southeast Asia, confirmed to RFA that at least some of the fighter jets at the facility are Chinese.

“It is a pilot training airport. A group of people are envious that Laos has a flight training center, yet Laos has never complained about neighboring countries hosting U.S. air bases,” said the officer on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak on such matters.

“When Laos built Ban Keun Airport for pilot training, some people overreacted. Naturally, Chinese officials brought their own fighter jets, given that it is a joint Lao-Chinese operation,” he said.

Bogle said it was too early to determine China’s future position at Ban Keun, but that the facility warranted monitoring.

(RFA)

Kristanto said operating combat aircraft from Laos would require substantial investment in fuel storage, maintenance facilities, munitions, air defense and other supporting infrastructure.

“At present, I see little evidence that Ban Keun offers a decisive operational advantage over China’s existing facilities,” he said.

Such limitations do not rule out a broader role in the future. Ban Keun could theoretically support intelligence gathering, surveillance, logistics or forward aircraft deployments if the necessary infrastructure and access arrangements were established, he said.

Surrounding Vietnam?

A sustained Chinese military presence in Laos could add another consideration for neighboring Vietnam, which already faces China across its northern land border and contests Beijing’s claims in the South China Sea.

China’s expansive maritime claims overlap with the exclusive economic zones of Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia. Vietnam also claims the Paracel and Spratly island groups, where competing sovereignty claims are distinct from disputes over rights to surrounding waters. China controls the Paracels, while several governments occupy features in the Spratlys.

In 2016, an international arbitral tribunal rejected China’s claims to the entire South China Sea based on its controversial nine-dash line, which surrounds the whole sea. This claim was seen to exceed what Beijing could legally claim under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Beijing rejected the decision, and has continued to assert its claims over areas that are within the exclusive economic zones of the other claimants.

China has strengthened this position through island-building and military infrastructure, including runways, surveillance equipment and air defenses on occupied reefs. Those facilities support a wider maritime presence in waters where rival claimants seek to protect fishing grounds, energy resources and access to their outposts.

Ban Keun would introduce a different geographic consideration for Hanoi, potentially bringing Chinese military activity to its western side as well.

Bogle argued that facilities in Laos and Cambodia, together with China’s South China Sea bases, had effectively encircled Vietnam.

Kristanto was more cautious. Vietnam would have to account for the possibility of a Chinese military presence beyond its northern border and the South China Sea, he said, but Ban Keun’s inland location and China’s existing airbases limit its immediate operational value.

“For now, I would characterize Ban Keun as a potentially important strategic foothold rather than a major shift in the regional military balance.”

Ream offers a comparison

China’s involvement at Cambodia’s Ream naval base shows why a facility’s use over time can be more revealing than its designation as a joint training center, the analysts said.

China financed an expansion of Ream, on Cambodia’s southern coast, where its joint support and training center opened in April 2025. Cambodia maintains that Chinese personnel and warships are not permanently based there.

An analysis published in May 2025 by the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative documented Chinese naval vessels rotating through Ream after their initial arrival in December 2023.

(RFA)

It also found that visiting Japanese and Vietnamese vessels used a different waterfront area from the large pier occupied by Chinese ships, suggesting unequal access to some facilities. Those findings described arrangements at the time and do not establish current access rules.

Kristanto said the comparison with Ban Keun was useful in examining how China could expand its military presence through partnerships that initially fall short of large, permanent bases.

“Rather than immediately establishing large, permanent military bases, Beijing appears to be pursuing arrangements that could provide access, logistical support, and opportunities for a more sustained military presence.”

The differences remain substantial. Ream provides direct access to the sea and can support naval deployments, while Ban Keun’s military utility depends heavily on the aircraft and supporting infrastructure deployed there, he added.

For the Lao facility, subsequent construction and deployments will help establish whether the training partnership develops into a broader operational role.

“Its future significance will depend on the extent of Chinese access, the infrastructure developed, and the frequency and nature of PLA activities there,” Kristanto said.

Edited by Eugene Whong.

Aung San Suu Kyi has been detained since the 2021 military coup that ousted her and the rest of the country’s democratically elected government from power. She was sentenced to 18 years for a broad range of crimes that include corruption and election fraud, though she maintains that she is innocent.

For the duration of her detention, her exact location has not been easy to ascertain.

The military government moved her to house arrest in April, but still have allowed almost no contact with the outside.

Aung San Suu Kyi received an envelope that contained diplomatic communication, and two books from King Charles – “The Land Gardeners: Soil to Table” and “Soil: The ​World at Our Feet.”

The delivery – which the military government revealed in a public statement – lasted only 10 minutes. It is the first acknowledgement of the detained former leader receiving correspondence from abroad.

Family members, Myanmar watchers and world government officials told RFA that they were pleased to know she was allowed to receive the king’s message, but they warned against allowing the military to use the delivery as propaganda.

Kim Aris, the younger son of Aung San Suu Kyi, told RFA that he took comfort that his mother was in the king’s thoughts and that he appreciated the kind gesture.

“I take comfort in knowing that my mother remains in the thoughts of His Majesty King Charles III, and I sincerely appreciate his kind gesture in sending her books. However, we must not allow the military regime to use such selective disclosures to create an illusion of normality or gain international legitimacy. A gesture of kindness should never be used to distract from the continued violation of my mother’s fundamental human rights. My mother, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, is an 81-year-old Nobel Peace Prize laureate who remains unjustly detained on politically motivated charges, hidden from the world and denied direct contact with her family and independent medical assessment. Despite recent developments, we still have no direct communication with her or credible, independently verified information about her health and wellbeing. I hope His Majesty’s thoughtful gesture will also serve as a reminder to world leaders that my mother’s situation remains unresolved. I urge all governments engaging with Min Aung Hlaing to insist on meaningful humanitarian progress, including regular, direct family contact, independent medical access, and her immediate and unconditional release, together with all political prisoners.”

Cara Chittenden, a communications officer at the UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, told RFA that Aung San Suu Kyi should not be in detention.

“The UK continues to condemn the arbitrary detention of Aung San Suu Kyi and calls for her immediate and unconditional release, alongside all those arbitrarily detained in Myanmar. We remain gravely concerned about her continued detention and wellbeing. The UK has also co-sponsored a number of Human Rights Council resolutions on Myanmar, including most recently in March 2026. The resolution condemned human rights violations against the people of Myanmar, including the Rohingya and other ethnic minorities.”

A spokesperson from the U.S. Department of State said that Washington remained “concerned about all individuals unjustly detained” and continued “to call for their release and the military to engage in genuine dialogue with all opposition groups to end the conflict in Burma. The United States remains steadfast in our support for the people of Burma.”

Aung Myo Kyaw, a spokesperson from the Thailand-based Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, told RFA that the delivery of the books and letters was a positive development.

“However, the world does not view Aung San Suu Kyi as a ‘special prisoner,’ as the regime claims (in its statement); rather, she is recognized as a national leader. Whenever the military junta faces crises on various fronts, they tend to use Daw Aung San Suu Kyi as a hidden political card. In this instance, too, their actions are merely a gesture—a performance intended to project themselves as flexible and big-hearted.”

Kyaw Htwe, an exiled member of the Central Working Committee of Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy party, told RFA that the meeting was the military engaging in political theater.

“Engagement should be measured by political progress. When they fail to bring about such political progress, they typically resort to their usual tactic: releasing news regarding our Chairperson, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, to manipulate the situation. Rather than just sending books or letters, it is necessary to allow her to meet with her family—specifically her younger son—as well as her legal team.”

That legal team is reportedly seeking to meet her in person since May 30 prison-to-private house transfer, sources close to the legal team told RFA. The legal team’s repeated requests to meet with her are ignored by military authorities.

Myint Htwe, a government leader in a part of the country not controlled by the military, said that the junta’s move to publicize the delivery was meant to try to gain legitimacy.

“These are just the same old tactics. The fact that they chose to issue a press statement—when they could have easily handled the matter quietly—suggests a softening of their stance. I interpret this as a deliberate attempt to signal—to put on full display—that they are treating a communication from the British monarch with great seriousness, as a legitimate government would. Furthermore, I see it as an effort to project the image of being a legitimate government to the rest of the world.”

Edited by Eugene Whong.

Rubio is leading a U.S. delegation of more than 200 business representatives and will arrive in Uzbekistan on Saturday for the first leg of a six-day trip that also includes two stops in India. While in Samarkand, he will attend the C5+1 ministerial meetings – with officials from the five Central Asian countries of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.

(Mark Schiefelbein/AP)

According to the Washington-based Uyghur Human Rights Project, more than 400,000 Uyghurs live in these Central Asian countries and combined they form the “vast majority” of the Uyghur diaspora outside of East Turkestan, which is the name by which Uyghurs call their homeland, currently under the control of the People’s Republic of China.

As a U.S. senator, Rubio was a champion of Uyghur issues and now as Washington’s top diplomat, he is expected to discuss the safety and rights of Uyghurs with the C5 leaders, Abdureshit Abdulhamit, vice president of the Munich-based World Uyghur Congress, told RFA.

(RFA Illustration)

“We urge him to seek clear commitments that no Uyghur will be forcibly returned to China, where they could face persecution, imprisonment or torture,” said Abdureshit. “Uyghurs seeking protection should have access to fair asylum procedures.”

He also urged Rubio to address intimidation and surveillance targeting Uyghur communities, saying people should be able to preserve their culture, discuss detained relatives and communicate abroad without fear.

Communities at risk

Compared to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, Uyghurs in Uzbekistan face more challenges to their social and cultural rights, Zumretay Erkin, another vice president of the organization, told RFA.

“Uzbekistan is also complicit in deporting Uyghurs to China at the explicit request of the Chinese government,” she said. “Uyghurs are subjected to tight surveillance and transnational repression.”

(RFA Illustration)

Zumretay said Rubio’s diplomatic visit is a “unique opportunity to raise Uyghur human rights, even in a trade and investment context,” noting that the U.S. government was among the first to take action to address the Uyghur genocide.

Washington classified China’s treatment of Uyghurs in the Uyghur region as genocide in 2021.

Moral leadership

Rubio can show the world that the United States’ moral leadership still matters, Omer Kanat, executive director of the Washington-based Uyghur Human Rights Project, wrote in an opinion piece in The Diplomat.

Kanat cited former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s public calls against returning Uyghurs to China as a precedent. He also pointed to Thailand’s February 2025 deportation of 40 Uyghurs as a warning of the consequences when diplomatic efforts fail.

(RFA Illustration)

“This upcoming trip to Central Asia gives Rubio a chance to show that the United States won’t countenance a repeat of that tragedy,” he wrote. “With the right messaging, the trip can fortify China’s neighbors to stand firm against Beijing’s pressure to return Uyghurs to China.”

The WUC also called on Rubio to hear directly from Uyghur representatives and establish follow-up mechanisms for individual cases.

“We would judge the visit by concrete results: stronger protection against deportation, action on cases of harassment and a clear American commitment to follow through after the meetings end,” said Abdureshit.

Edited by Eugene Whong.

Authorities are still investigating Wednesday’s firebombing of the Dalai Lama’s representative office in South Africa, police told Radio Free Asia, as activists accused China of having a hand in the attack.

The office of the Tibetan spiritual leader in Pretoria suffered extensive damage in the 11 p.m. attack, but nobody was hurt, the representative Dhondup Gyalpo told RFA.

“I heard the sound of breaking glass and saw smoke coming into the house. As soon as I realized what was happening, I broke a window and got outside,” he said. “Another firebomb that had not exploded was hanging above the window. I was slightly injured by broken glass.”

(Dhondup Gyalpo)

Shortly after the fire brigade extinguished the blaze, the crime scene experts and detectives arrived to investigate, but no suspects have been arrested,” police spokesperson Brigadier BM Muridili, told RFA.

Wednesday’s firebombing was the second such attack on the office in months. The office had previously been firebombed in July, on the Dalai Lama’s 91st birthday. Gyalpo described Wednesday’s attack in detail.

“The Molotov cocktail used in the attack produced more smoke than flames. At first, it looked as though the entire building was on fire,” he said. “When I entered, the smoke was so thick and overpowering that I could almost taste it.”

The fire engulfed parts of the property, causing extensive damage to the building, furniture and official documents, he said. Neither Gyalpo nor Khenpo Jamyang Gonpo, a staff member at the office, was injured in the fire.

“Transnational repression”

The attacks on the Dalai Lama’s office are part of a “global rise in transnational repression” by the Chinese Communist Party against the Tibetan people, the New York-based rights group Students for a Free Tibet said in a statement.

“Students for a Free Tibet urges South African law enforcement and government authorities to conduct an immediate, thorough, and independent investigation,” the group said. “Law enforcement must not dismiss these attacks as ordinary local crime, but must explicitly examine political motives and potential foreign state involvement.”

The Desmond & Leah Tutu Legacy Foundation also condemned Wednesday’s attack in a statement and called for stronger protections of freedom of expression, religion and association.

Desmond Tutu and the Dalai Lama are both Nobel laureates for their nonviolent struggles, and in the statement, the foundation noted their long friendship.

(Ted S. Warren/AP)

“We stand with the Tibetan community in South Africa and with everyone who lives and works at the Office,” the foundation said. “No community in South Africa should have to go to sleep wondering whether their home will be set alight because of who they are, where they come from or what they believe.”

Gyalpo said he suspected that the attack might be politically motivated, but cautioned that the perpetrators and their motives have not been identified yet.

“There seems to be a warning sign intended to intimidate us but we are not scared,” he said. “We have no reason to hate the people of South Africa and there is also no reason why the people of South Africa should not like us,” he said.

Edited by Tawang in Tibetan and Eugene Whong and Charlie Dharapak in English.

Chinese authorities in 2018 lied to the family of a Uyghur bus driver who died in their custody, an investigation by Radio Free Asia has revealed.

Authorities told the family of Yasinjan Toxti, who had been detained in a “re-education” facility on suspicion of “religious radicalism,” that he had died in a car accident.

Yasinjan’s sister Reyhangul told RFA that the details did not add up. A resident of Belgium, Reyhangul discussed the moment in 2018 when her younger sister in the Uyghur region told her of her brother’s death.

“How could someone held in ‘re-education’ die in a traffic accident?” she recalled asking. She said her sister replied, “That is what the police told us. We have to accept that explanation. Under the current circumstances, we cannot ask any further questions about it.”

2018 was the height of China’s Uyghur internment campaign aimed at “curbing terrorism” where an estimated 1.8 million Uyghurs were put in detainment facilities claimed by authorities to be vocational training centers. The U.S. in 2020 classified Beijing’s actions in the Uyghur region as a genocide.

Inconsistencies uncovered

In an attempt to gain more clarity on the circumstances of Yasinjan’s death, RFA this month telephoned the Qartal Bazaar police station in Aksu, an oasis city in the Uyghur region, where Yasinjan lived and worked.

Two separate police personnel shared information that conflicted with what authorities told Reyhangul’s family in 2018.

The chief of the police station was the first to answer RFA’s questions.

(RFA Illustration)

A police officer on duty provided further details.

(RFA Illustration)

In assessing that Yasinjan had been in detention for “five or six months,” the police chief may have been referring to his cumulative time in re-education across multiple sentences, and the police officer who said he was taken to the hospital after “nine or 10 days” may have been referring to the length of time into his latest sentence. RFA was unable to confirm what either expression of time meant exactly.

Educational pursuits

Yasinjan was born in 1980 in Aksu and lived there his entire life. Having received only a primary school education himself, Yasinjan saw the importance of education and sent his five-year-old son, Hebibulla Yasin, to study in Egypt. His sister was already living in Egypt overseeing her own children’s education, and agreed to be Hebibulla’s caretaker there.

Sending children abroad for educational purposes was at the time common for many Uyghur families, because China had been expanding its policy of “bilingual education,” – which in practice was replacing the Uyghur language with Mandarin Chinese for most classes.

Many Uyghur parents viewed this as accelerating assimilation, and feared their children would lose their Uyghur cultural and religious identity. Egypt, which had a strong reputation for Islamic education, and relatively low living costs, was a natural choice for families wishing to preserve their culture.

Before 2017, more than 5,000 Uyghurs were living in Egypt, but mass arrests by the Chinese government under the “Strike Hard Campaign Against Violent Terrorism” intensified the next year. Arrests often targeted Uyghurs with family members abroad, especially in “sensitive” Muslim majority countries like Turkey and Egypt.

Arousing suspicion

Because his son was in Egypt, Yasinjan was detained several times between 2016 and 2018 on suspicion of “religious radicalism” and subjected to short periods of “re-education,” according to Reyhangul. Authorities were able to compel Yasinjan to bring Hebibulla home, but even after his son returned, Yasinjan remained under suspicion.

Yasinjan was in custody four separate times between 2016 and 2018. His latest detention was for stopping the bus in the middle of his route to allow Muslim passengers to observe the call to prayer.

It was during this latest detention that he died – not of a traffic accident as Reyhangul said authorities previously claimed – but after arriving in a “re-education camp” as confirmed by police in RFA’s investigation.

Years after Yasinjan’s death, while Reyhangul was searching for more information, she learned that other members of her family had been detained – her sister, who had told her about their brother’s death, for “leaking state secrets,” and her mother, who had traveled to Turkey, for “visiting a sensitive country.”

Still, Reyhangul does not know where they are detained, nor the length of their sentences, she said.

Edited by Eugene Whong and Charlie Dharapak.

From that discussion with Congressional staff, policymakers, rights advocates, academics, and journalists, RFA is reporting out a set of recommendations and ideas regarding TNR’s development, growth, and sophistication. Issues raised were ways of protecting journalists and advocates, TNR’s use by Beijing as a tactic aimed at manipulating global narratives, artificial intelligence’s role in expanding its scope, its growing presence on U.S. soil, including universities and diaspora communities, and Beijing’s growing influence with international institutions, such as Interpol, to aid its efforts.

“From RFA’s exclusive reporting on restrictions of religious freedom in Tibet and forced labor and human rights abuses in Xinjiang, to closing our physical bureau in Hong Kong after authorities enacted Article 23 and named us a ‘foreign force,’ RFA and our journalists have endured every iteration of TNR designed to silence us and inhibit transparency,” RFA President and CEO Bay Fang said.

Delivering opening remarks at the roundtable was Sen. Jeff Merkley (D-OR), former Chair of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC), who introduced the bipartisan Transnational Repression Policy Act (S.2525) last year, co-sponsored by current CECC Chair Sen. Dan Sullivan (R-AK). The conversation, moderated by RFA’s Chief Communications Officer Rohit Mahajan, delved into the issues outlined above, with an eye on fostering greater cross-sector cooperation, understanding, and solutions.

RFA plans to continue engaging on this issue with partners, policymakers, authorities, technologists, freedom advocates, journalists, and experts in this critical space.

Read the chief takeaways from RFA’s session here: https://docs.rfa.org/english/docs/RFA_TNR_Roundtable_Sept.2026.pdf.

The analysis came shortly after Washington accused Fijian national Zhao Fugang of corruption as head of the Overseas Chinese Service Center in Suva.

“Zhao abused his public position by paying bribes to Fijian citizens to advance China-based government, business, and criminal interests,” U.S. State Department spokesman Thomas Pigott said in a statement. “His actions constituted significant corruption and adversely affected U.S. interests in Fiji.”

Though Zhao is now barred from entering the United States, there are probably more people involved in the type of corruption he is accused of – not just in Fiji, but across the entire Pacific region, Gregory Brown, executive director of the Washington-based Alliance Futures Initiative think tank, told RFA.

“I seriously doubt that Beijing set up a corruption and influence operation in Fiji and then decided not to replicate it anywhere else in a region where it’s spending billions on infrastructure, signing security agreements, and competing every day for political influence,” said Brown. “That defies logic and everything we know about the CCP’s overseas influence campaigns. There is no reason similar operations wouldn’t work in Honiara, Port Moresby, Nuku’alofa, or Port Vila.”

(AFP)

Illicit activities that advance Chinese interests occur elsewhere in the Pacific, Kathryn Paik, deputy director of the Australia Chair at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, told RFA.

“There have been many documented cases of Chinese actors in other Pacific countries and territories conducting illegal activities such as drug trafficking, illegal fishing, money laundering, and more,” said Paik. “What is key is that while most if not all of these actors may not be an official Chinese agent, they are conducting activity that is either encouraged by or facilitated by Beijing.”

Illicit disruptors

Zhao is an example of China’s use of “state-condoned illicit disruptors as a form of gray zone activity in the Pacific,” José Sousa-Santos, of the University of Canterbury in New Zealand, wrote in an essay published in Small Wars Journal, a project by the Future Security Initiative at Arizona State University.

Written months before the U.S. sanctioned Zhao – who Australian law enforcement had already identified as having connections to organized crime – the essay detailed how Beijing tolerates and protects criminal figures and networks to serve objectives of the state.

“This does not require a simple command relationship between the Chinese state and organized crime. Nor does it mean that every Chinese criminal actor abroad is an agent of Beijing,” wrote Sousa-Santos. “The more important point is that certain illicit actors can become strategically useful when they extend influence, cultivate local elites, generate deniable economic leverage, support patriotic narratives, and operate in spaces where formal state power would attract resistance.”

Actors like Zhao are valuable in that Beijing can deny all connections of involvement in their illegal activities, all while benefiting from them, the essay said.

“Zhao’s value is that he represents the kind of high-risk intermediary who can move money, cultivate elites, open doors, normalize Chinese influence, and generate dependency while remaining formally outside the state,” it said.

After the U.S. sanctioned Zhao, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning told a news conference she had no knowledge of his case.

“We oppose vilification and smears against China,” she said.

Cooperation needed

In a Facebook post, the Fijian government asked Washington to provide evidence of the allegations against Zhao, and affirmed Suva’s commitment to work with international partners to crack down on transnational crime.

The U.S. and its allies should coordinate with each other to stop illicit activities, Paik said.

“Working collaboratively to identify illegal activity and name specific actors is certainly a start,” she said. “But of course Pacific countries are sovereign nations and the next step will ideally be to take action against these individuals in whichever country they are acting.”

Brown said that the U.S. should not stop with its sanctions on Zhao, but should name other individuals in the region to demonstrate how widespread the problem is.

“If we see three or four more across different Pacific countries in the next six months, the signal becomes a pattern,” he said.

Brown also called for the U.S. and its allies to support Pacific governments in building their own anti-corruption and counter-intelligence capacity, urged Pacific governments to make foreign-linked community organizations more accountable by requiring them to register, and work together to protect Chinese diaspora communities in the region.

“My big question now is whether this designation is a one-off or a campaign,” he said. “If it’s a one-off, Beijing will absorb the hit and move on. If it’s a campaign, it’s a chance to change calculus for every Chinese operative and every compromised Pacific official in the region.”

Edited by Charlie Dharapak.

A North Korean video warns soldiers that they could be punished - and they should be executed - for watching foreign media, a recording obtained exclusively by Radio Free Asia reveals.

A female narrator with a booming voice denounces soldiers for not resisting the temptation to watch “impure recordings” like South Korean TV shows and Hollywood films.

The footage obtained by RFA is a recording of a screen showing the video. It is believed to have been produced in 2023 and is still in use in soldiers’ ideological training sessions, sources inside the country told RFA on condition of anonymity for security reasons.

“I strongly demand, on behalf of all military personnel, the summary execution of those who have become thoroughly steeped in the rotten imperialist ideology, culture and way of life,” the narrator says. She calls for the “relentless pursuit and capture” of those who watch foreign media so that they can be “subjected to merciless punishment.”

The educational video presents the cautionary tales of at least two military personnel who were caught watching foreign media, detailing how they were punished.

Media matters

North Korea routinely punishes citizens for watching foreign media or listening to foreign music which is typically smuggled into the country and distributed on thumb drives and easily concealable micro SD cards.

Distributing it can result in the death penalty. In one high profile case reported in 2021 by RFA, a man was sentenced to death for selling copies of the hit Netflix series “Squid Game.”

(Youngkyu Park/Netflix via AFP)

Offenders that merely watched foreign media – but did not distribute it – are usually given a lesser, but still harsh sentence in a labor camp. Parents can even be punished for the crimes of their children. Citizens can even be presumed guilty on tangential evidence – speaking like South Koreans or texting using South Korean spellings – habits they are presumed to have picked up from watching illegal videos from the South.

Despite the government’s efforts, including the passage in 2020 of the draconian Elimination of Reactionary Thought and Culture Law, which lays out specific punishments for foreign media-related crimes, North Koreans continue to tune in.

But members of the military are under even more scrutiny. A task force called the “109 Group” catches soldiers with surprise inspections, and after a soldier is caught, reports of punishments soon follow.

Because every North Korean spends seven to 10 years in the military after high school, the appetite for South Korean and U.S. media among soldiers is quite high, Yoshihiro Makino, a diplomatic correspondent for the Asahi Shimbun newspaper in Japan and a visiting professor at Hiroshima University, told RFA.

“With so many young people gathered in one organization, it is impossible to say that none of them are interested in that kind of culture,” Makino said.

(RFA Korean)

He added that it is not common in North Korea to see public accounts of military trials, because of the need to protect military secrets, so the fact that the proceedings are shown in the educational video indicates that authorities are concerned about the spread of South Korean culture, which they refer to as ideological contamination.

“Puppet-trash culture”

The educational video continues by showing several people in courtrooms being cuffed and led away as the narrator chastises foreign media watchers for being infected by the culture of the “puppets” of the United States – an oft-used pejorative referring to South Koreans. She calls these people “weeds of our society” and “trash of our era.”

She then blames the U.S. and South Korea for spreading “rotten capitalist and puppet-trash culture on a massive scale,” and complains about sanctions aimed at depriving Pyongyang of cash and resources that could be funneled into its nuclear and missile programs, calling them a U.S. “strangulation campaign.”

Against this backdrop she asks if watching foreign media could be anything but treason.

“Are not those infected by the political poison spread by the enemy a band of traitors acting as one with our principal enemies, and poisonous mushrooms that must be uprooted entirely?”

The narrator goes on to remind soldiers that they aren’t supposed to use civilian mobile phones, with the video showing examples of smartphones and flip phones that authorities confiscated.

(RFA Korean)

“Soldiers performing individual duties, including drivers of passenger vehicles, purchased, watched, stored and distributed impure recordings through civilian mobile phones,” the narrator says. “In the end, these phones led them down the path of treason and counterrevolution, ruining their lives.”

A second video file obtained by RFA, containing footage of a later section of the educational video, discusses the case of Kim Kye Hyang, a military doctor punished for watching foreign media.

“The Party educated … and even appointed her as a military doctor in the revolutionary army,” an on-camera military official says. “But look at what happened. Watching impure recordings turned her, at the very beginning of her life, into an ungrateful and contemptible person.”

(RFA Korean)

The official says her parents are now devastated and they cry often, wishing she had never been born. She denounces foreign recordings as a poison that wastes time, damages health and ruins the lives of offenders and their families.

The footage then shows a detained soldier writing a confession. Weeping, he says that watching foreign recordings “once or twice” gradually filled his mind with South Korean speech patterns and capitalist ideology.

“I deeply regret it,” he says while seemingly crying. With ominous music, the line is repeated several times with an eerie echo effect over a stopped frame of his anguished face.

A female soldier, clad in pink formal wear, appears next. She identifies the regretful soldier as Ju Chol Bom and says his case is proof that watching foreign media is “the path to ruining one’s life.”

The narrator also warns that such crimes are committed through personal connections and will eventually be exposed. The message appears to be that even if authorities do not detect an offense immediately, offenders can still be caught.

“Why do people realize the value of something precious only after losing it?” the speaker asks. “Ju Chol Bom’s fate clearly demonstrates that watching the enemy’s subversive footage, while knowing it is an act of treason and rebellion that dances to the enemy’s tune, is the very path to becoming the most foolish suicide victim in the world and ruining one’s own destiny.”

A male soldier then says that the offense deserves severe punishment and suggests that offenders not only harmed themselves, but others as well.

(RFA Korean)

“Ju Chol Bom and several other offenders received sentences of five or more years of hard labor,” the male soldier says. “Because watching impure recordings is a serious crime, even a general amnesty is not permitted. In the end, with their own hands, they gouged out their own eyes.”

The loud, overarticulate voice of the narrator continues, implying that the actions of Ju and those like him dragged down others.

“But their eyes are not the only ones gouged out …”

The footage of the video abruptly cuts out.

Edited in Korean by Yi Yongin and in English by Eugene Whong.

Viewers were unconvinced and immediately began voicing skepticism about seafood coming from such a surprising place. Within days, Chinese social-media users questioned whether the fish on screen was actually salmon at all. “People expect Atlantic salmon, but we’re getting freshwater rainbow trout that costs half as much,” one Beijing-based WeChat account complained. “How could you not be angry?” The science writer Fang Shimin put it bluntly: “This is cheap rainbow trout being passed off as expensive salmon.”

Where the media campaign had hoped to tell a bigger and more hopeful story about the success of farming in a place most people thought was impossible, the public reaction veered in a different direction. China has rapidly expanded its fish farms in its historically restive and inland west—erecting more than 1,000 in Tibet and Xinjiang—motivated by a slate of priorities including food security, settling a nomadic and politically volatile population, poverty alleviation, and reducing fishing pressure on its polluted eastern shores.

The state-led media campaign around China’s desert seafood also sought to redirect Western attention away from human rights abuses that are pervasive in these two Chinese regions. The growth of these farms in China’s west is the focus of a sweeping investigation by The Outlaw Ocean Project, a news organization in Washington, DC, which showed how much seafood from Xinjiang is reaching the U.S., including government facilities, in violation of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act.

The backlash over rainbow trout was not only about unfair prices, but also about questions of food safety. In a 2018 interview with China Daily, food safety expert Zhong Kai reacted to Chinese companies advertising salmon that was actually trout. He advised that eating freshwater trout raw, as one would eat salmon, could lead to serious illness.

China’s aquaculture industry has expanded at staggering speed, and with that expansion have come the familiar pressures of industrial animal farming: crowding, disease, waste, and chemical intervention. Chinese researchers have increasingly found illegal quantities of drugs in farmed fish, including antibiotics and sedatives at levels that threaten humans.

(Xinjiang Tianyun Organic Agriculture via The Outlaw Ocean Project)

These food safety questions are relevant outside of China. One company, called Xinjiang Tianyun Organic Agriculture, now ships to 14 countries, including the U.S., where its products are sold at Walmart and served at American schools, prisons, and military bases. This trade occurs in violation of a U.S. ban on goods produced in Xinjiang or by ethnic minorities from the region, which Congress enacted in 2021 after finding human rights abuses to be pervasive and severe there. Tianyun’s seafood reaches the U.S. by way of supplier deals with Aqua Star and Sysco, according to Bait to Plate, an online tool that tracks the fishing and seafood industries.

Tianyun said in a statement that claims of systemic forced labor “are completely factually unfounded” and described the U.S. ban as unreasonable and politically motivated. The company added that it strictly abides by China’s laws on labor and contracts. Aqua Star did not reply to a request for comment. Walmart confirmed that it sources seafood from Aqua Star. Sysco said it expects its suppliers to follow all U.S., international, and local laws and that they suspend contracts when they do not.

The Chinese efforts to promote seafood from Xinjiang are not new. As early as 2011, Vice Minister of Agriculture Niu Dun urged officials to “enhance brand building and awareness of the market expansion of Xinjiang’s seafood enterprises.” A 2017 government action plan instructed local offices to coordinate with mainstream media to “systematically publicize the progress of fishery poverty alleviation” in Xinjiang, fostering “an environment of positive public opinion.”

(Xinjiang Tianyun via The Outlaw Ocean Project)

This marketing push intensified in August 2023 when there was a sharp spike in social media posts on the topic. The hashtag “No joke—Xinjiang really does produce seafood” climbed Weibo’s Hot Search List. Videos associated with “Xinjiang seafood” amassed millions of views. Soon, the theme leapt beyond China’s own internet. YouTube, which is banned in China, saw a sharp rise in Xinjiang seafood videos that fall.

“All signs point to this being a coordinated campaign,” said Fergus Ryan, a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. He explained that it had unusual speed and reach due to top-down and algorithmic amplification, unlike natural viral events, which typically grow slowly through grassroots sharing. In his view, the campaign served to redirect attention from mounting international scrutiny after a 2023 investigation found that seafood plants in Shandong had used thousands of Xinjiang labor transfers to process fish destined for major Western markets. Against that backdrop, Ryan argued, the upbeat Xinjiang seafood videos functioned as a kind of information flooding, crowding search and recommendation systems with stories of “fishery miracles” rather than forced labor.

(China Daily via The Outlaw Ocean Project)

China is using other tactics to prevent companies from insulating themselves from these sorts of human rights abuses. In April 2026, the government announced new rules that would make it even more difficult for multinationals to conduct due diligence on supply chains in industries like seafood and cotton.

Part of the same effort, the Chinese government has also organized media tours for foreign reporters and actively recruited foreign food buffs—called vloggers or “frontier influencers”—to record and post videos and other testimonials about the wonders of growing fish in Xinjiang.

Among the most popular frontier influencers is a Russian student named Melissa. “Today, we’ve come to a salmon farm in Nilka, Xinjiang, to be an employee for a day and see what it’s like for ourselves,” she said in a video published in September 2025. These videos were amplified by media outlets affiliated with the government, as well as on state-run channels on YouTube and Facebook. A video featuring Jack, an American vlogger, showcased his tour of a fish farm on the edge of the desert. “It’s incredible how they have developed such a barren land to this extent,” he narrated.

(Zhao Xuelin/Xinjiang Tianyun via The Outlaw Ocean Project)

But it is the government itself that attempts to frame the unlikely industry it has engineered in Xinjiang in the grandest terms. In a 2025 article published by state media, Xinjiang’s aquaculture hotbed in the deserts and rivers of its forbidding western frontier was declared “a testament to human ingenuity and resilience.”

“Xinjiang’s aquaculture is not merely about producing fish,” the article went on, “it is about reimagining how inland regions can contribute to the nation’s protein security, how technology can redefine agriculture, and how harmony between people and nature can be sustained in the most challenging of environments. From snow-fed rivers to desert oases, Xinjiang has shown that blue dreams can indeed flourish on dry land.”

This commentary is based on reporting for a larger investigation conducted by an international team of journalists based at The Outlaw Ocean Project.

The Outlaw Ocean Project is a non-profit journalism organization based in Washington D.C. that produces investigative stories about human rights, labor, and environmental concerns.

The views expressed here are their own and do not reflect the position of RFA.