

BOOK REVIEW  
*HIGH PEAKS, PURE EARTH*  
*COLLECTED WRITINGS ON TIBETAN HISTORY AND CULTURE*  
BY  
HUGH RICHARDSON

A COMPILATION OF A SERIES OF PROGRAMS  
ON  
RADIO FREE ASIA  
TIBETAN SERVICE  
BY  
WARREN W. SMITH

## *HIGH PEAKS, PURE EARTH*

*High Peaks, Pure Earth* is the title of the collected works on Tibetan history and culture by Hugh Richardson, a British diplomat who became a historian of Tibet. He was British representative in Lhasa from 1936 to 1940 and again from 1946 to 1950, during which time he did many studies on ancient and modern Tibetan history. He wrote numerous articles on Tibetan history and culture, all of which have been published in this book of his collected writings.

Hugh Richardson was born in Scotland, a part of Great Britain that bears some similarities to Tibet, both in its environment and in its politics. Scotland has long had a contentious relationship with England and was incorporated only by force into Great Britain. Richardson became a member of the British administration of India in 1932. He was a member of a 1936 British mission to Tibet. Richardson remained in Lhasa to become the first officer in charge of the British Mission in Lhasa. He was in Lhasa from 1936 to 1940, when the Second World War began. After the war he again represented the British Government in Lhasa from 1946 to 1947, when India became independent, after which he was the representative of the Government of India. He left Tibet only in September 1950, shortly before the Chinese invasion. Richardson lived in Tibet for a total of eight years. While resident in Tibet and after, he studied and wrote about many aspects of Tibetan history, culture, politics, and environment. Richardson spent a total of twenty years in Tibet and India. After his retirement he spent the remaining fifty years of his life doing research on Tibetan history, culture, and politics.

Hugh Richardson was a representative of the British Empire in Tibet. He was therefore a proponent of British interests in Tibet, one of which was the preservation of Tibetan autonomy under a loose form of what the British recognized as Chinese suzerainty, although Richardson himself admitted that suzerainty was a term that was incapable of definition. What suzerainty meant in practice was that Tibet should enjoy freedom from all but symbolic Chinese claims to authority. The British were unwilling to recognize Tibetan independence of China only because they could not actually protect Tibet from China's ambitions. Britain also did not want to jeopardize its interests in China by support for Tibet's independence.

The modern Chinese rulers of Tibet have accused Richardson of being one of the foreign imperialists who tried to separate Tibet from China. The Chinese Communists have attempted to blame the Tibetan desire for independence on the intrigues and instigations of foreign imperialism, mainly British and American. Richardson did indeed promote Tibetan autonomy, because that was British policy in Tibet, but he also revealed in his researches the facts of Tibet's cultural, historical, and political independence of

China. Richardson encouraged the Tibetans to establish and maintain their autonomy of China, because that was British policy, but also because that was in Tibetans' best interests and best reflected their own desires.

Neither Hugh Richardson nor any other friend of Tibet that the Chinese now condemn as the inventors of the idea of Tibetan independence was guilty of anything more than trying to help Tibetans achieve their own wish, or their own self-determination. Richardson was not in fact able to support what most Tibetans actually wanted, independence, because British policy was that Tibet was only autonomous in relation to China. In his official capacity as British representative in Tibet, Richardson was unable to advocate Tibetan independence. It was only in his retirement from official service and during his career as a scholar that he was able to establish the historical basis for Tibetan independence and to advocate it himself.

Hugh Richardson's collected works contain some 65 papers on all aspects of Tibetan history and culture. These papers establish the reality of Tibet's separate national and cultural identity. The papers written during his residence establish the reality of Tibetans' desires to preserve their unique culture, their national identity, and their independence of China.

The first section of Richardson's collected works focuses on the earliest period of Tibetan history, from the seventh to the ninth centuries, when Tibet was a great power in Inner Asia under the Yarlung kings. Richardson's studies reveal the origins of Buddhism in Tibet and the origins of the Tibetan state. The next section focuses on Tibetan history from the twelfth to the twentieth centuries. Many of these papers examine Tibet's relations with the outside world and with China. A major part of this collection is Tibetan Précis, Richardson's report to the British Government of India, written in 1945, summarizing the history of British relations with Tibet and Tibet's relations with China. It was intended to guide British policy toward Tibet after Indian independence. The last section contains Richardson's papers written during his last years in Lhasa, from 1945 to 1950.

This article reviews a selection of Richardson's papers, using his original titles. Some English spellings of Tibetans names and places have been changed from their transliterated forms, given in the book according to the Wylie system, to more easily read phonetic forms.

### *How Old Was Songtsen Gampo?*

Richardson writes that Tibetan tradition says that Songtsen Gampo died at age 82. However, this age is not accepted by Western scholars. The year of Srongtsan Gampo's death is well known. Both the Tibetan and Chinese records clearly establish that Songtsen Gampo died in the year 650, according to the Western calendar. It is the year of his birth that is undetermined. To have died at age 82, Songtsen Gampo would have to have been born in the year 568. However, several Western scholars, relying on Tibetan and Chinese sources, say that his likely birth year was 617.

Chinese historical records say that in 634 the Tibetan king Songtsen Gampo sent envoys to the Chinese emperor. The Chinese emperor replied to this mission, and in a further Tibetan mission to the Chinese emperor the Tibetan king asked for a Chinese princess in marriage. When this request was refused Songtsen Gampo attacked China. After this successful Tibetan attack upon China the Tibetan king was granted a Chinese princess. The princess, Wencheng, was sent to Tibet in 640. If Songtsen Gampo had been born in 568 he would have been 72 years old in 640. However, the minister Gar who went to China to escort Wencheng back to Tibet was said to have referred to Songtsen Gampo as young at the time. These facts make the 617 seem more likely as the date of Songtsen Gampo's birth.

Tibetan records say that Songtsen Gampo was a young man when he became king. There are also references to Songtsen Gampo having been a young king when he unified Tibet. Some Tibetan traditions say that Songtsen Gampo's year of birth was an Ox year. The element of the year of his birth is not mentioned. Given that Songtsen Gampo was a young king in the 630s and he was known to have become king when he was a young man, then the Ox year of 617 or perhaps the Ox year of 605 seem the most likely as the year of his birth. However, Richardson says that this tradition of Songtsen Gampo having been born in an Ox year appears only in much later Tibetan historical stories.

Richardson says that the historical records, both Tibetan and Chinese, are most definite on the fact that Songtsen Gampo was a young king during the 630s, when Tibet expanded to include all of the area of the Tibetan plateau and the Tibetan king received princesses in marriage from both Nepal and China. However, he thinks that the exact year of Songtsen Gampo's birth remains uncertain. Richardson thinks that the most probable year of his birth is somewhere between 609 and 613. This would make Songtsen Gampo somewhere in his twenties during the 630s and 37 to 41 years old in 650 when he died.

### *Ming Hsi-lieh and the Fish Bag*

In the year 730 there were negotiations taking place between China and Tibet about a treaty to end the conflict that had been going on between the two countries almost continuously since 670. The leader of the Tibetan delegation that went to China to negotiate this treaty was known to be familiar with the Chinese language because he had been on previous missions to China. As the story will reveal, he was also familiar with Chinese diplomatic maneuvers and attempts to deceive peoples such as the Tibetans whom they considered to be inferior to the Chinese.

During the negotiations, the Tibetan representative was offered a present in the form of a golden metal fish in two pieces that was made so that the pieces fit together. However, the Tibetan envoy declined to accept the present, saying that he could not accept such an expensive gift. Although the Chinese had offered the fish as if it were a gift with no political or diplomatic meaning, in fact it did have a political meaning, of which the Tibetan envoy was fortunately aware. The tradition at that time was for China to present such a two-piece golden fish to the envoys of every country that was

subservient to China or that came to present tribute to China. The envoy would keep one half of the fish and the other half would remain in the Chinese capital. When the envoy came to present tribute his credentials were established by matching his half of the fish with the other half in the Chinese capital.

In this way the Chinese were able to limit and control the number of envoys who were allowed to present tribute at the Chinese court and, more importantly, who were to receive gifts in return that were usually many times more valuable than that which they had presented. Possession of the metal fish was a valuable privilege, since Chinese gifts to envoys were usually lavish, but acceptance of the fish symbol was construed by the Chinese as signifying the acknowledgment of a political status of subservience to China. The Tibetan envoy refused to accept the gift of the golden fish because he did not want to accept that Tibet was in any way politically dominated by or dependent upon China. The Tibetan envoy was sophisticated enough to know that to maintain its independence, Tibet could not accept any titles or diplomatic symbols from China.

Richardson points out a relatively modern equivalent of this Chinese diplomatic tactic. In 1935 a Chinese envoy visited Tibet to offer condolences upon the death of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama. He offered the Tibetan Government a golden seal in honor of the Dalai Lama. Richardson says that the Thirteenth Dalai Lama himself would have been unlikely to have accepted such a gift because he understood the nature of Chinese diplomacy. However, the Chinese may have thought that in the absence of a Dalai Lama the Tibetans might be unaware of the possible significance, at least as interpreted by the Chinese, of the acceptance of such a gift. However, the Tibetans were not so unaware of the trickery inherent in Chinese diplomacy and, at first at least, they refused to accept the seal. They finally did so, but only after they had examined the inscription on the seal and determined that it implied no political relationship between Tibet and China.

### *The Growth of a Legend*

This article is about a legend from the Tibetan Empire period. The legend is about how the Buddha statue brought by the Chinese princess, Wencheng (*Gyalsa*), to Tibet came to be housed in the Jokhang, which was built by the Nepalese princess, Brikuti (*Belsa*), while the statue brought by Brikuti ended up in the Ramoche, which was built by Wencheng.

The legend that most Tibetans are familiar with has it that the images were switched because of the invasion of a Chinese army soon after the death of Srongtsan Gampo in 650. The images were supposedly switched so that if the Chinese stole or destroyed either of the images they would choose the wrong one. Richardson demonstrates that the legend of the Chinese army invading Tibet and reaching Lhasa has no basis in fact and that the images were switched for a different reason.

Richardson shows that there is no record of any such Chinese invasion of Tibet that reached Lhasa from either Tibetan or Chinese sources. Although many Tibetan sources refer to a Chinese army that invaded Tibet, these were written many hundreds of

years after the event they purport to describe. Richardson shows that they were based upon a misinterpretation of Chinese historical records of the time. The Chinese records speak of a so-called “Lhasa Army,” that was dispatched to Tibet shortly after the death of Songtsan Gampo in the hopes of recovering some of the territory in the Kokonor area that China had lost to the Tibetans. However, the Chinese army was defeated by a Tibetan army near Kokonor and never penetrated any farther toward Lhasa.

Richardson refers to a Tibetan historical record of the period after the death of Songtsen Gampo that describes how the Chinese princess, Wencheng, had the Buddha image, called the *Jowo*, removed from the Ramoche and hidden behind a false wall at the Jokhang. The reasons for her doing so are not given. The Tibetan legend that the statue was removed for safekeeping due to a Chinese invasion, or just the rumor of such an invasion, seem unlikely since Wencheng was still alive and presumably could have defended the image against any invading Chinese army.

In any case, the image remained hidden for some fifty years until the arrival of the second Chinese princess, Jincheng, who was given to a Tibetan king in marriage. Jincheng searched for the image that her predecessor had installed in the Ramoche, but she failed to find it there. Hearing of rumors that the *Jowo* was hidden in the Jokhang, she discovered it there. After recovering the *Jowo* from its hiding place she had it installed as the central image in the Jokhang, perhaps because the Jokhang had become the center of Lhasa and the most holy Buddhist temple in Tibet while the Ramoche was secondary. Presumably the Nepalese *Jowo* was removed to the Ramoche at the same time. In this way the Chinese *Jowo* that was formerly in the Ramoche became the Jokhang *Jowo*, while the Nepalese *Jowo* that was originally in the Jokhang became the Ramoche *Jowo*.

This story has a modern parallel. After the Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1950 the Jokhang *Jowo* was protected, presumably because it was evidence of Tibet’s connections to China, even though many other images in the Jokhang were destroyed during the Cultural Revolution. The Ramoche, however, was the scene of fighting in 1959 and was greatly damaged. The Ramoche *Jowo* was removed from the Ramoche and placed in the Jokhang for safekeeping. It was only returned to the Ramoche in 1985 after the restoration of the Ramoche Jokhang.

### *Ministers of the Tibetan Kingdom*

This article is about the ministers of the king during the Tibetan Empire period. The Yarlung dynasty was formed in the early seventh century when several clan leaders transferred their allegiance from the chieftain of Phenpo to the chieftain of Yarlung. The chieftain of Yarlung thereby became king of all the clans and areas of Central Tibet and he moved his capital from Yarlung to Lhasa. The Tibetan king was highest among all the clan chieftains of Central Tibet but he owed his pre-eminent position to the loyalty of the other clans. He had the most recent example of the fall of Phenpo and the rise of Yarlung to remind him that his power was totally dependent upon the loyalty of the different clans. The clan leaders could shift their loyalty to another chieftain at any time, much as

they had done when they shifted their loyalty from Phenpo to Yarlung. The most prominent chieftains therefore became the ministers of the king and were very powerful.

When the chieftains of Central Tibet united under Yarlung they immediately gained sufficient power to expand farther afield. Rather than fight with each other they were able to use their combined power for further conquests. The Yarlung kingdom very quickly conquered Zhang Zhung to the west, the Sumpa nomads of the Changtang to the north, the Azha of the Kokonor area, and several tribes in the Amdo area. Some of these conquests were more like alliances. All of the peoples of the Tibetan plateau shared similar characteristics although they did not as yet identify themselves as Tibetan. Many tribes joined with the Central Tibetans after only slight resistance. These new conquests and alliances were mostly nomadic peoples. They brought to the Yarlung kingdom military power in the form of mobile nomadic warriors and transportable food supplies in the form of yak on the hoof and yak products such as dried meat and butter. The Central Tibetans added agricultural food supplies like *tsampa*, which was also easily transportable. The nomadic tribes had a tradition of warfare and they had many yaks and horses.

The combination of Central Tibetan agricultural resources with the mobility of the nomads gave the new alliance great military power. In fact, many of the alliances with the peoples of the plateau were made with the understanding that their combined power would be employed for conquests even farther afield. Within a period of only a few decades the Tibetan Empire had expanded from a few valleys of Central Tibet to the whole of the Tibetan plateau. In a short time the Tibetans were threatening the Chinese to the east and the Turks to the north.

Since many of the tribes that united with the Tibetans did so voluntarily or semi-voluntarily, they retained much of their independent power. The Tibetan Empire was dependent upon the loyalty of these different tribes much as the original Yarlung kingdom had been dependent upon the loyalty of the chieftains of Central Tibet. Some of the prominent men of the tribes of the plateau became important ministers of the Tibetan Empire much as the chieftains of Central Tibet played an important role in the early Yarlung kingdom.

Richardson traces the origins of many of the important ministers of the Tibetan Empire and shows that many of them came from allied tribes such as Zhang Zhung, Sumpa, or Azha. Many achieved important positions in the Tibetan Empire due to marriage alliances with the Tibetan kings. The Tibetan king would make marriage alliances with many of the tribes of the plateau in order to ensure political alliances. When such marriages were made, the king's new queen would often bring many members of her family with her to Lhasa. Often, the relatives of such queens, especially her uncles, would acquire important positions of power. Some went on to become chief ministers of the Tibetan Empire.

### *The Origin of the Tibetan Kingdom*

This article is about the origins of the Yarlung Dynasty and the Tibetan Empire. Richardson relates the story from Tibetan mythology about the first king, Nyatri Tsenpo, who is supposed to have descended from the realm of the gods in order to rule the Tibetans. Richardson shows how Nyatri Tsenpo and Ode Gungyal are identical names for the same person, depending upon the area of origin of the story. The name Ode Gungyal is used in Kongpo and perhaps reflects the name of a local ruler of Kongpo. However, because Kongpo was incorporated in the kingdom centered upon the Lhasa area, Kongpo's traditions were likewise incorporated in the mythology of what was to become the Yarlung Dynasty and the Tibetan Empire.

Richardson mentions Chinese sources that say that Tibetans are descendants of the Chiang tribes of what is now eastern Tibet. These Chiang tribes were unified under the rule of a prince of a tribe from what is now Inner Mongolia. Richardson says that it was not unusual, in the age before strong national identities were evolved, that one tribe might adopt members of another or even adopt a prince of another tribe as their leader. Chinese sources suggest that this prince is the one Tibetans knew as Nyatri Tsenpo. The Chiang under the leadership of Nyatri Tsenpo moved further west onto the Tibetan plateau and became the Tibetans.

Richardson also relates the story of the origins of the Yarlung kingdom. Yarlung appears to have had its origins in a previous kingdom centered upon what is now Phenpo, northeast of Lhasa. Phenpo is a logical area to have been the first center around which political organization in Tibet began. Phenpo was and is the most fertile area of the Kyi Chu valley. Yarlung, which inherited the political organization begun by Phenpo, is also fertile but is much smaller and is a less central area than Phenpo. Around Phenpo were other fertile valleys such as the Lhasa valley, Nupri to the west, Nyang and Khyungpo to the northeast, Kongpo to the east, Olkha and Dakpo to the southeast. The chieftains of these areas united around the leader of Phenpo to form the first unified Tibetan political association in central Tibet. However, the leader of Phenpo was unable to retain the allegiance of all these chieftains, who eventually formed another alliance around the chieftain of Yarlung. Yarlung was able to maintain the alliance of all the chieftains of central Tibet, and thus the Yarlung dynasty and the Tibetan state were born.

The chieftains who united around Yarlung retained much of their independent power because the Yarlung state was dependent upon their loyalty. The important chieftains who united around Yarlung became the important ministers of the subsequent Tibetan state. They were also responsible for many of the Tibetan state's subsequent conquests. One of these ministers was immediately responsible for the conquest of Zhang Zhung in what is now Ngari. This area was more fertile at that time than now and was an important center of culture and trade. The conquest of Zhang Zhung was a significant addition to the early Tibetan state.

After the conquest of Zhang Zhung the Tibetans were able to conquer and unite with all of the tribes of the northern Chang Thang, after which their combined forces conquered what were at that time some important independent kingdoms to the west and the east of Kokonor. Once the new Tibetan Empire had unified all of the peoples of the

Tibetan plateau, the Tibetans were able to challenge both the Chinese to the east and the Turks to the north. Within a few short years after the central Tibetans united under Yarlung, the capital was moved from Yarlung to Lhasa, the tribes of the plateau were conquered, and Tibet, now under the leadership of Srongtsan Gampo, was able to demand princesses in marriage from Both China and Nepal. These princesses played a role in the introduction of Buddhism to Tibet.

### *Hunting Accidents in Early Tibet*

This article is about hunting wild yak in ancient Tibet, the accidents that sometimes occurred, and the laws that governed compensation for those injured in hunting accidents or punishment for those who caused the accidents. Hunting, especially of the wild yak, was a favorite sport of the Tibetans in the days of the Yarlung kingdom. The Chinese Tang dynasty annals say that yaks were among the animals sent as presents from Tibetan rulers to the Chinese emperors. Often, when a foreign dignitary visited Tibet he was entertained with a yak hunt. In this case a wild yak would be brought close enough for the dignitary to kill, much like the tiger hunts that the rajas of India and kings of Nepal would organize for visiting dignitaries. The usual method of hunting the yak, as well as other animals, was to round up the animals in a wide ring of hunters and their servants. It was not uncommon for some of the hunters to be killed or injured by arrows flying in all directions or by enraged yaks. A wounded wild yak could easily bring down a mounted man and cause him serious injury or even death. Early Tibetan laws prescribed punishments for those who caused injury or death to others, whether by shooting with an arrow or by failing to come to the aid of someone who was attacked by a wild yak. These punishments depended upon the relative social status of those involved.

The punishments illustrate the great disparity in social status in ancient Tibet. Those of the highest social class were not subject to the death penalty except for falsely disowning responsibility for the death of someone of similar status or for failure to pay blood money for someone whom they had accidentally killed or injured. Those of high status had to pay some compensation to those of lower status, or their survivors, whom they had killed or injured. However, those of lower status who killed someone of higher status could be summarily executed and their property, including female relatives, distributed to the relatives of whomever was killed.

The punishments for another sort of accident, involving those injured or killed by a wild yak or even a domestic yak, give another view of Tibetan life. Anyone could be punished, or even given the death penalty, for failure to rescue someone who had fallen under a yak. Even those of the highest status, who were not subject to death for accidentally killing another person, were subject to the death penalty for failure to come to the assistance of someone attacked by a yak or who had fallen under a yak, even a domestic yak. The owner of a domestic yak could be punished if his yak caused injury to others, especially if the injury were due to the negligence of the owner. In the case where someone rescued another who had been attacked by a yak or who fell under a yak, rewards were to be given by the one who was so rescued.

The laws also specified how the meat of killed animals was to be divided if the animal had been killed by the arrows of more than one hunter, the best parts of the animal going to whoever hit the animal with the first arrow and the lesser parts to those who fired the subsequent arrows. Other laws dealt with those who stole the arrows of others found on the hunting ground, those who let animals escape, and those who divided the meat of slain animals unfairly.

What these laws illustrate is not only the popularity of wild yak hunting in old Tibet, but also the prevalence of a very detailed system of laws at a very early time in Tibetan history. Such a system of laws illustrates Tibet's independent development of law, political administration, and government. This development took place entirely independent of Chinese control or influence. This is evidence that contradicts China's claim to have bestowed all forms of civilization upon the Tibetans who had little culture or civilization of their own.

### *The Province of the De-lon of the Tibetan Empire*

This article is about the Tibetan province known as *De-lon* that existed during the Empire period and consisted of territory conquered from China. During the reign of Trisong Detsen in the eighth century, Tibetan armies captured much Chinese territory in what is now Gansu. In 758 Tibetan armies defeated the Azha, who lived north and west of Kokonor (*Tsho Ngonpo*), and occupied the area of Tsongkha, north and east of Kokonor, and Yarmothang, south of Kokonor. Also in 758, Tibetan armies briefly occupied the Tang dynasty capital at Changan, now Xian. By 787 the Tibetans had conquered Tunhuang and controlled all of the area north of Tibet in what is now Xinjiang. Tibetan annals relate that a province was set up known as De-lon, in the area of what is now Gansu, that consisted of five fortresses and ten districts.

The Tibetan administration of this area was military in nature, essentially a military occupation of territory populated by Chinese and other non-Tibetan peoples. In their usual campaigning, Tibetan armies were known to carry few provisions, except meat on the hoof (live animals). They were known to acquire other provisions, such as grain, from local areas where they campaigned. However, for the military occupation and administration of this area for an extended period, perhaps almost a hundred years, they must have had permanent military bases and permanent means of supply of food and other provisions. The Tibetans must have established military colonies in the occupied areas where they grew their own grain and where they may have had their own families. They probably used the local Chinese inhabitants for forced service such as food provision and transport. High Tibetan officials took over estates for themselves, where they used local people or their own followers for cultivation of the land.

This province existed from sometime in the mid-eighth century until the collapse of the Tibetan empire in the mid-ninth century. Some of the former military outposts in the occupied territories remained even after the end of the empire. This was especially the case in areas on the edge of the Tibetan plateau along the traditional cultural boundary between China and Tibet. Richardson speculates that the administrative headquarters of

this province might have been at such a place on the traditional cultural border, a place such as Labrang Tashikyil. Many Tibetan communities in this area are known as *Ka-ma-lok*, or “not to return without orders.” The Ka-ma-lok were military outposts that were told to remain until they received orders to return. Since those orders never came, these became permanent Tibetan communities on the frontier with China.

Another legacy of the Tibetan occupation of these territories may be the kingdoms of Tsongkha and Tanghut, both of which existed after the fall of the Tibetan empire. Tsongkha was in the area still known as Tsongkha, the area of birth of Tsongkhapa. Tanghut was in the area to the north of Tsongkha in what is now Gansu and Inner Mongolia. Tsongkha was predominantly Tibetan while Tanghut was partially Tibetan. Tibetan was the official language of Tsongkha and one of the official languages of Tanghut.

The history of the Tibetan province of De-lon illustrates Tibet’s former independence and military power. During the age when military power was expressed by access to horses and other beasts of burden such as the yak, Tibetans had both military power and the military skills and mobility inherent in nomadism. Given a centralized political administration based in Lhasa and central Tibet, the Tibetans were able to unify the peoples of the Tibetan plateau into a centralized Tibetan state and to expand Tibet’s power at the expense of China.

#### *Political Aspects of the Nga-dar, the First Diffusion of Buddhism in Tibet*

Richardson writes that Tibetans, who usually see their history as almost exclusively the history of Buddhism, divide that history into two periods, the *nga-dar* and the *chi-dar*, the former and latter diffusions of the faith. The *nga-dar* is the age of the religious kings, the *choegyal* of the Tibetan Empire period of the seventh to ninth centuries. The latter diffusion, the *chi-dar*, began in the tenth century when Buddhism was reintroduced into Tibet from India.

Tibetan tradition holds that Buddhism was first introduced into Tibet by the Nepalese and Chinese queens of Songtsen Gampo. During his reign the Tibetans expanded their influence into all areas of the Tibetan plateau and beyond, Buddhism was established, and a system for writing the Tibetan language was acquired from India. The Nepalese queen founded the Jokhang in Lhasa. Nepalese influence is found in the Jokhang in the architecture and workmanship and in the fact that it faces in the direction of Nepal. Almost all other temples in Tibet face south in order to receive the warmth of the sun, with the exception of the Ramoche Tsuglhakhang in Lhasa, which faces east toward China in recognition of its founding by the Chinese princess.

Richardson writes that Buddhism as practiced in Tibet at that time was probably confined to the royal court and a few noble families and consisted mainly in the learning of a few basic principles of the faith. There were no lamas and no religious texts written in Tibetan. Buddhist materials and practitioners were mostly from India and Nepal. As Richardson says, Buddhism at that time was practiced for the Tibetan kings rather than by them. The new religion had hardly superseded the old *Bon* religion, although Bon

itself was hardly an organized religion. Bon consisted of a variety of traditions and rituals that coexisted with Buddhism and were also substantially incorporated by Buddhism. Buddhism was primarily favored by the kings and a few families associated with the kings. Buddhism was thus in rivalry with Bon and the many families that still favored the Bon religion. Whether a family or a clan favored Buddhism or Bon was often a reflection of their political loyalty to or rivalry with the emerging centralized authority being established by the Tibetan kings.

Royal patronage for Buddhism declined temporarily after the death of Songtsen Gampo. It revived under Trisong Detsen, who built the Samye temple in 779. This was also the era of the great debate between the Indian and Chinese versions of Buddhism, in which the Indian version substantially prevailed. During this time the first Tibetans were ordained as monks. Indian texts were translated into Tibetan for the first time and Tibetan equivalents for Sanskrit terms were established. Trisong Detsen's successor Tride Songtsen showed his devotion to Buddhism by founding temples and by appointing monks as ministers of state. His successor Ralpachen carried this patronage even farther by granting large estates for the support of temples and even appointing a monk as chief minister, a post that previously had been reserved for the noble families.

However, Ralpachen was assassinated in 836, and his successor, Langdarma, is said by tradition to have persecuted Buddhism. In 842 Langdarma was assassinated by a monk, after which the Tibetan empire itself collapsed. However, Richardson says that Langdarma may have done little more than to reduce the great privileges accorded to monks and the lavish patronage allowed for Buddhist temples. After the collapse of the empire, Buddhism survived in some peripheral areas of Amdo and Ngari. It was from these areas that Buddhism was reintroduced in the tenth century.

#### *Political Rivalry and the Great Debate at Samye*

Here, Richardson writes about the great debate at Samye in the reign of Trisong Detsen, during the latter part of the eighth century. Tibetan tradition about this debate is that the Indian doctrine prevailed over that of the Chinese. The Indian doctrine was one of a gradualist approach, in which enlightenment depended upon works, whereas the Chinese doctrine maintained that enlightenment might come instantaneously through some extraordinary insight. The proponent of the Indian school was the *pandit* Kamalashila, who was invited to Tibet after the death of Shantarakshita, the first abbot of Samye. The proponent of the Chinese school was Hwashang Mahayana. Richardson says that it was the growing popularity of the teachings of Hwashang Mahayana, who had been invited to Tibet by the tsenpo, Trisong Detsen, that led the proponents of the Indian school to challenge him to a debate.

Both schools had their Tibetan followers. Prominent among the supporters of the Chinese school was one of Trisong Detsen's queens, Dro Changchub. There was a strong political rivalry underlying the debate. The principal supporters of the Indian school were from the Ba and Nyang clans. The Dro clan was the leading proponent of the Chinese school. The Ba and Nyang were among the original Tibetan clans, while the Dro were

from the region of Tunhuang, a territory only recently conquered from China. The Dro clan had long had good relations with the Chinese; one queen of the Dro clan had arranged the marriage of the second Chinese princess to a Tibetan tsenpo in 710.

The Indian school may be said to represent a more traditionalist Tibetan version of Buddhism, based upon its original sources, and the preference of old central Tibetan clans. The proponents of the Chinese school were from the border areas between Tibet and China. They represented a new, less traditionalist version of Buddhism based upon the possibility of instant enlightenment. The idea of instantaneous enlightenment was extremely controversial to those schooled in the Indian tradition, which held that enlightenment could be attained only after good works done over innumerable lifetimes. Political rivalries between the clans also played a large role.

Richardson writes that the debate may have been held over a long period of time, perhaps as much as a year, and at several places. Lhasa is mentioned as one of the places at which the debate was held. However, he says that the Tibetan tradition that the majority of the debate was held at Samye is very strong. Therefore, he says, it has to be accepted that Samye was the primary place where the debates took place. The tradition that the Indian side indisputably won, however, is more open to challenge. Both sides claimed to have won the debate. Chinese histories say that the Chinese side won the debate, although they cannot explain why Hwashang Mahayana subsequently retired from Tibet to Tunhuang. They also cannot explain why, if the Chinese side won the debate, that the Indian school of Buddhism subsequently prevailed in Tibet. The Chinese version was not entirely eliminated; however, it survives primarily in the Nyingmapa Dzogchen School. The result of the debate was therefore not so dramatically in favor of the Indian school as Tibetan tradition maintains.

### *Two Chinese Princesses in Tibet*

This article is about the two Chinese princesses who were married to Tibetan kings during the Tibetan Empire period. In 634 the young Tibetan tsenpo, Songtsen Gampo, sent a mission to the Chinese. The Chinese sent a mission in reply. When the Chinese mission returned, the Tibetan tsenpo sent a request for a Chinese princess in marriage. The Tibetans had heard that the Turks and the Azha, both of whom resided to the north of Tibet, had received Chinese princesses in marriage. The award of a Chinese princess was a recognition on the part of the Chinese of the power of the Turks and the Azha. The Tibetan tsenpo demanded a similar recognition of Tibet's power. At first the Chinese refused, reportedly because the Azha king, who happened to be at the Tang Chinese capital at Changan at the time, objected to the Tibetans receiving a princess. Upon hearing of the Azha king's interference, Songtsen Gampo invaded the Azha territory and severely defeated them. Songtsen Gampo then invaded Chinese territory. After this he was awarded a Chinese princess in recognition of Tibet's power.

In 641 the princess Wencheng (*Mun-sheng Kong-co*) was sent to Tibet. She lived with Songtsen Gampo until his death in 650 and survived another 30 years, dying in 680. Tibetan records say very little about Wencheng except for the fact of her marriage to

Songtsen Gampo, although the story of her coming to Tibet, including the tests that the Tibetan envoy Gar Tongtsen had to pass before the princess could be sent are the subject of one of the most famous and popular Tibetan operas, *Gyalsa Belsa*. Chinese histories, on the other hand, credit Wencheng with bringing civilization, or at least Chinese civilization, to Tibet. Later Chinese governments have claimed that Wencheng began the process by which Tibet became a part of China.

Tibetan histories have more to say about the Nepalese princess, who became Songtsen Gampo's queen a few years before Wencheng and who founded the Jokhang in Lhasa. Wencheng is credited with having helped to clear away some obstacles created by certain local spirits who inhabited the place where the Jokhang was to be built. Wencheng is also thought to have founded the Ramoche Tsuglhakhang, although Richardson thinks that the founder may have actually been the second Chinese princess, Jin Cheng.

The second Chinese princess, Chin Cheng (*Kim-sheng Kong-co*), came to Tibet in 710. She was intended as a bride for the tsenpo Dusong, but he died in battle before the princess arrived. Instead, she became the queen of Dusong's son and successor Tride Tsugtsen, who was only a boy of six years old at the time. Jin Cheng was involved in an interesting episode in the history of Buddhism in Tibet. She offered refuge in Tibet to a community of Buddhist monks who had to flee their home in Khotan in what is now Xinjiang. However, some of the monks reportedly brought smallpox with them, and the queen Chin Cheng was one of its victims. After this, Buddhism was banned in Tibet for 20 years. Chin Cheng is credited with founding a Buddhist temple in Tibet, but there is some confusion about what temple it was. Richardson thinks that she may have founded the Ramoche, although Tibetan tradition credits Wencheng as the founder. Chin Cheng is credited in Tibetan tradition with having discovered the Jowo image hidden in the Jokhang and having established it as the central image there. However, Richardson thinks that she, rather than Wencheng, may have actually brought the image to Tibet.

#### *The Political Role of the Four Sects in Tibetan History*

Richardson writes that the various schools of Tibetan Buddhism had no powerful political role until the time of the Mongol Empire of the thirteenth century. At that time the Mongols threatened to invade Tibet. The most influential Tibetan lama of the time, Sakya Pandita of the Sakya Gompa in Tsang, was sent to appease the Mongol Khan, Godan. Sakya Pandita so impressed Godan that, rather than invading Tibet, he made Sakya Pandita governor of Tibet and his own spiritual adviser. Tibet thereby avoided an invasion by the Mongols, but Tibet did lose some degree of its independence. The Sakyapas became the dominant sect in Tibet, both spiritually and politically, for the next hundred years, or as long as the Mongol Empire lasted. The dominance of the Sakyapas was not total however; the Drigungpa challenged them for influence in some parts of central Tibet.

After the fall of the Mongol Empire the Sakyapa were succeeded in political influence in Tibet, not by the Drigungpa, but by the Pagmodrupa, another school of the

Kagyupa sect. The Pagmodrupa were free of outside domination, but their political influence did not extend to all of Tibet. However, their rule was characterized by a return to Tibetan independence of outside interference and of toleration of all religious sects. This toleration allowed for the growth in influence of other sects, including the Karmapa, who increased their influence by means of continuing patronage relations with the Ming emperors of China. Also, during the rule of the Pagmodrupa a new religious sect, the Gelugpa, was founded by Tsongkapa. The Gelugpa were a reformed sect that observed a stricter adherence to the rules of monastic discipline than the older sects. Tsongkapa founded the monastery of Ganden near Lhasa in 1409, while close disciples later founded Drepung in 1416, and Sera in 1419, both in Lhasa.

Pagmodrupa influence gradually declined and another sect, the Karmapa, centered at Rinpung in Tsang, became dominant. However, the Rinpung Karmapa controlled no centralized political administration and their political influence was confined primarily to Tsang. Their rivals were the growing Gelugpa, who were centered in Lhasa. Conflict between the Karmapa and the Gelugpa was exacerbated by the Karmapas' attempt to extend their influence into the area of Lhasa and central Tibet. The Karmapa were successful in extending their power into Lhasa and limiting that of the Gelugpa for a brief period at the beginning of the sixteenth century. The Gelugpa did not disappear during this time, but their power and influence was less than that of the Karmapa. The Karmapa had better relations with the Nyingmapa, Sakyapa, and Kagyupa, all old sects like themselves, than with the new Gelugpa.

Karmapa dominance in central Tibet encouraged the Gelugpa to seek their fortunes and patronage elsewhere, especially among the Mongols. In 1579 the Gelugpa lama Sonam Gyatso met Altan Khan and was given the title Dalai Lama. This brought Mongol patronage for a Tibetan religious sect back into the politics of Tibet. Sonam Gyatso's incarnation, designated the Fourth Dalai Lama, was Altan Khan's grandson. The fourth Dalai Lama went to Lhasa with a large Mongol entourage. This aroused the animosity of the Karmapa of Tsang, who accused the Gelugpa of seeking dominance by means of foreign interference in Tibet and led to many years of rivalry and warfare between the Karmapa of Tsang and the Gelugpa of Lhasa.

The issue was finally settled in 1640 by the Fifth Dalai Lama, who, with the military assistance of the Mongol Gushri Khan, finally established Gelugpa dominance over all of Tibet. Once again, as under the Sakyapa, Tibet was politically united, but only by means of foreign military patronage.

#### *General Huang Mu-sung at Lhasa, 1934*

The Chinese Government sent a mission to Lhasa in 1934 under the leadership of General Huang Mu-sung, ostensibly to express condolences to Tibet for the death of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, but actually to coerce the leaderless Tibetans to accept Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. General Huang claimed that his visit had only religious purposes. He visited all the monasteries in Lhasa, where he displayed great reverence and distributed lavish gifts to the monks. He disclaimed any political role or purpose;

however, the Tibetans were not so naïve. Therefore, the *Mimang Tsongdu* held a meeting and decided to broach the issues of the borders between China and Tibet as well as the matter of the Panchen Lama with Huang. Huang replied that the Panchen Lama, in exile in China since 1924, would not be returned to Tibet with a Chinese military escort. As to the border, Huang essentially denied the existence of two separate countries between which there was any border. He said that Tibet should accept that it was a part of China, it should obey the Chinese Government, in exchange for which the government would protect Tibet. The Tibetan Tsongdu replied that Tibet had been ruled by thirteen Dalai Lamas and would never become part of China. Tibetans would defend their independence to the last man against any invader. Faced with this blunt refusal of his demands, Huang made a series of more subtle proposals.

Huang suggested that Tibet and China should maintain the traditional relationship of *Cho-Yon* (priest-patron). The Tibetan Tsongdu and *Kashag* jointly agreed, on the condition that the term “Central Government,” which Huang had used to imply that Tibet was a part of China, should be replaced with “Chinese Government.” Huang accepted that no Chinese troops would be placed in Tibet but proposed that Tibetan troops would be under the command of a Chinese officer. This officer should also supervise the Tibetan Government, much as the *Ambans* had in the past. The Tibetans did not agree to this. The Tibetan Tsongdu and *Kashag* agreed only to the presence of one Chinese representative in Tibet with a small escort. This representative would not be allowed to interfere in Tibetan affairs.

Huang suggested that Tibet must consult with China about all external relations. The Tibetans declared that Tibet was independent and they would deal with all external affairs without consulting with the Chinese. Huang demanded that China should approve the appointment of all Tibetan officials. The Tibetans agreed only to inform China about the appointment of officials. Huang said that China should be responsible for the defense of Tibet. The Tibetans replied that as Tibet was a religious country no one was likely to attack it. Huang suggested that China should be informed about the reincarnation of a Dalai Lama so that China might offer an official seal and a title. The Tibetans agreed only to inform China after the installation of a Dalai Lama so that China could not claim to have officiated or appointed him. Huang suggested that the Panchen Lama should be allowed to return to Tibet. The Tibetans agreed but insisted that he should not be accompanied by a Chinese military escort.

These negotiations in 1934 demonstrate Tibetan determination to remain independent of China. They also demonstrate a Tibetan awareness of Chinese negotiating techniques aimed at convincing Tibetans to accept Chinese sovereignty. Huang Mu-sung was frustrated in his attempt to convince Tibetans to accept Chinese sovereignty. However, when he returned to China he claimed more success for his mission than it had actually achieved. Huang claimed that Tibetans were much more willing to accept Chinese authority over Tibet than was actually the case. However, the record of the negotiations as revealed by Hugh Richardson shows that this was not the case.

### Tibetan Précis

One part of *High Peaks, Pure Earth* is an official report that Hugh Richardson wrote for the British Government of India in 1945, titled Tibetan Précis. Richardson's report is a short history of Tibet that concentrates on Chinese and British relations with Tibet.

History Down to the Close of the XIX Century:

The first part of Richardson's report to the Government of India is about Tibet's early history, its relations with India, the first British contact with Tibet, and early Sino-Tibetan relations. Richardson writes that during the seventh and eighth centuries Tibet was a great military power that extended its influence even into northern India. From this time or earlier there developed a strong religious connection between India, the home of Buddhism, and Tibet. Tibet acquired Buddhism from India due to the travels of Indian teachers to Tibet and Tibetan students to India. Tibetans devoted great efforts to the translation of Indian Buddhist texts. Tibet became the most important repository of Buddhist texts after Buddhist monasteries in India were destroyed during the Muslim invasions of India beginning in the tenth century.

First British contacts with Tibet began after the British expanded their control over India up to the foothills of the Himalayas in the eighteenth century. In response to a Bhutanese invasion of the Cooch Behar area, to the south of Bhutan, the British sent troops to resist the Bhutanese. The Bhutanese then appealed to the Panchen Lama for assistance. The Panchen Lama wrote to the British governor of India on behalf of the Bhutanese, and the British took the opportunity of this correspondence with the Panchen Lama to suggest that a British envoy be allowed to visit Shigatse. At the same time, the British concluded a treaty with the Bhutanese that resolved conflicts between Bhutan and British India. The Panchen Lama then allowed a British envoy to come to the Panchen Lama's monastery of Tashilhunpo at Shigatse. The British envoy, George Bogle, went to Tashilhunpo in 1774 and stayed for several months. He established a warm friendship with the Panchen Lama and married a Tibetan woman who was one of the Panchen Lama's relatives.

Bogle found that although the Panchen Lama commanded sufficient authority to initiate relations with a British envoy, he did not have the authority to conclude any official agreements. Such authority was held only in Lhasa and ultimately, he was told, in Peking. The Panchen Lama and his officials admitted that China exercised some sort of authority over Tibet. However, Tibetans at this time often claimed to be under the authority of China simply in order to avoid opening official relations with the British. The Tibetans also typically invoked the patronage of China in order to impress the British that Tibet had a strong protector. When, however, the British attempted to deal with the Chinese about Tibet, the Tibetans would maintain that China had no authority in Tibet.

Another British mission went to Shigatse in 1782 on the occasion of the installation of the reincarnation of the Panchen Lama. This British envoy found a quite active trade of Indian merchants in Shigatse. In 1792 the Gurkhas of Nepal invaded southern Tibet. The Gurkhas were expelled with the assistance of the Chinese emperor, who sent an army to Tibet. The Tibetans reportedly suspected that the Gurkhas had been encouraged to invade Tibet by the British, who had been expanding their influence in all the Himalayan states. The Chinese also feared that the British would come to be a rival for influence in Tibet. The result of the Gurkha invasion was that all British and Indian traders and visitors were banned from Tibet. Thus began a period of British and Indian exclusion from Tibet that lasted almost a century and gave rise to the reputation, at least among the British, that Tibet was a closed country.

British attempts to establish direct relations with Tibet having been rebuffed, the British finally attempted to enter trade relations with Tibet with the permission of the Chinese. In 1876 the British made an agreement with China to allow the importation of British tea into Tibet. The Chinese promised to allow this and other trade between India and Tibet. However, the Tibetans refused to acknowledge the authority of China to make such an agreement on behalf of Tibet and the Chinese proved unable to enforce the agreement upon the Tibetans. As Richardson says, this was when the British began to suspect that China's authority over Tibet was purely symbolic. They also began to realize that it was a mistake to make agreements with China about Tibet without consulting the Tibetans.

This state of affairs was emphasized in 1885 when the British secured an agreement with China to send a mission to Tibet, but the mission was refused entry by the Tibetans. The Tibetans, for their part, fearing British encroachment upon territory they considered to be under Tibetan influence, sent soldiers into Sikkim. This was done to reaffirm Tibetan authority over Sikkim and was apparently done without informing the Chinese. However, the British also claimed authority over Sikkim; they protested to the Chinese and demanded that the Tibetans should be compelled to withdraw. The Chinese were unable to compel the Tibetans to withdraw; therefore, the British had to invade Sikkim to expel the Tibetans. The British invasion of Sikkim led to another treaty with China to settle the borders between Sikkim and Tibet and to once again attempt to allow trade between India and Tibet. However, the Tibetans again refused to acknowledge China's authority to negotiate about Tibet's borders or to regulate trade relations between Tibet and India. Having been repeatedly frustrated in trying to deal with Tibet through the Chinese, who had been shown to have no real authority in Tibet, the British finally decided to try to establish direct relations with the Tibetans.

#### Lhasa Expedition and 1904 Convention:

In 1899 the British sent two letters to the Dalai Lama. However, both were returned unopened. At the same time the British heard rumors that Tibet had established relations with Britain's rival, Russia. A Russian agent, the Buriat Mongol, Dorjjeff, had long been a resident in Lhasa and had become a confidant of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama. This same Dorjjeff had been appointed by the Dalai Lama to represent Tibet's interests

with Russia, and Dorjjeff had made a visit to Russia to do so. The British were competitors with the Russians for influence everywhere in Central Asia in what was called the Great Game, and were therefore very jealous of any attempt by the Russians to establish influence in Tibet. Because they were excluded from Tibet while the Russians seemed to be welcome, the British began to contemplate sending a mission to establish their interests in Tibet. This mission would have to take into account Russia's interest, as well as that of China, which was still recognized by the British as having some sort of authority over Tibet.

In 1903 the British arranged with the Chinese for negotiations about trade to take place at Khampa Dzong just across the Indian border in Tibet. The British showed up for this meeting but were met with only low-level Tibetan officials who denied that they had any authority to negotiate. The Tibetans also obstructed Chinese attempts to negotiate at Khampa Dzong, which again demonstrated to the British the lack of Chinese authority over the Tibetans. Given Tibetan obstructionism, the British Government authorized a further penetration of Tibet up to Gyantse. Since this advance was certain to encounter Tibetan opposition, the trade mission was turned into a military mission, and British attempts to open Tibet to trade were transformed into a British invasion of Tibet.

The British expedition of 1904 reached Lhasa after several months and several battles in which many Tibetans were killed and wounded. The British and their Indian conscripts suffered far fewer casualties due to their superior weaponry and military tactics and discipline. The Thirteenth Dalai Lama fled from Lhasa before the arrival of the British and sought refuge in Mongolia. In subsequent attempts to negotiate a treaty with the Tibetans the British found that the Chinese Amban in Lhasa exercised little authority over the Tibetans. A treaty was finally signed with the Tibetans, even in the absence of the Dalai Lama. The Chinese Amban assisted in the negotiations but did not sign the treaty. The treaty established British rights to trade with Tibet and set up trade markets within Tibet for that purpose. Despite their suspicions, the British found little evidence of Russian influence in Tibet.

The British invasion of Tibet in 1904 was undertaken by the British Indian Government because of considerations about India's border with Tibet. However, the British Government in London was less enthusiastic about this adventure. The British Government insisted, since China had not signed the 1904 Lhasa Treaty, that Britain must seek a separate agreement with China that acknowledged China's acceptance of the Lhasa Treaty. This treaty with China was concluded in 1906. The unfortunate effect of this treaty was that it reestablished Chinese influence in Lhasa and British recognition of such. By means of its invasion and the Lhasa Treaty, the British had finally managed to establish direct relations with Tibet. However, this direct contact was abandoned by the terms of the treaty with China in 1906. In the 1906 treaty China was recognized as not a foreign power in relation to Tibet. The 1904 Lhasa Treaty had excluded all foreign powers from Tibet, by which the British meant the Russians. The British acknowledgment that China was not a foreign power in relation to Tibet was equivalent to British recognition of some degree of Chinese authority over Tibet.

In his report Richardson complains that all the advantages gained for British India by the Lhasa Treaty of 1904 were given up in the subsequent agreement with China in 1906. British India had established direct trade relations with Tibet, but by the terms of the 1906 treaty trade was once again placed under the supervision of China. Richardson says that Chinese influence in Tibet, which was almost nonexistent in 1904, was re-established after 1906. As Richardson writes, the Chinese were quick to take advantage of this situation and to take measures to increase their influence in Tibet.

The difference in policy between the British Government in London and that in India was due to their different political considerations. The British Government of India was responsible for the frontiers of India and therefore saw Russian influence in Tibet as a great threat. The British Government in London was less concerned about India and very little interested in frontier adventures or expansion of the British Empire from India to Tibet. The British Government in London was reluctant to accept any responsibilities in Tibet and therefore was happy to acknowledge Chinese authority there. The Chinese benefited from this in that they were able to achieve international recognition of their authority over Tibet when they exercised very little authority in fact.

This had been the case before and since. Before the invasion of 1904 the British had discovered that Chinese authority over Tibet was more symbolic than actual. However, because the British Government in London was unwilling to accept any colonial responsibilities in Tibet, the British went back to the system of acknowledgment of China's nominal authority over Tibet. The Chinese were to benefit from this international recognition of their authority over Tibet even in the period up to 1950 when their actual control over Tibet was nonexistent. In the period after 1904, however, the Chinese realized that their claim to sovereignty to Tibet was very vulnerable and they took steps to make their control more effective.

The Chinese began by claiming that the treaty of 1906 entirely superseded the Lhasa Treaty of 1904. In other words, the Chinese said that the 1906 treaty, in which they recognized the validity of the 1904 Lhasa treaty, had made the Lhasa Treaty invalid. They further claimed that the 1906 treaty was a British acknowledgment of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, when in fact the British recognized some degree of Chinese authority over Tibet but not full sovereignty. The Chinese also sent officials to Tibet to supervise trade between Tibet and India. These officials did everything in their power not to facilitate trade but to put obstacles in the way of trade. They also attempted to prevent direct contact between British officials and Tibetans. The Chinese also punished Tibetan officials who had signed the 1904 Lhasa Treaty and they dismissed the Amban who had assisted in the negotiations for the Lhasa Treaty but who had not signed it.

British recognition of Chinese authority was furthered by a treaty between Britain and Russia in 1907 in which each recognized the other's area of influence. Neither claimed influence over Tibet; instead, they both recognized a limited Chinese authority over Tibet. The Chinese also moved to militarily and politically reaffirm their authority over Tibet. Almost immediately after the 1904 British invasion the Chinese began to move into eastern Tibet from Sichuan. The Chinese governor of Sichuan, Chao Erh-feng, moved into the Kham area of eastern Tibet and established Chinese governmental

authority there. Chao acted ruthlessly to repress Tibetan opposition, for which he was known to Tibetans as “Butcher Chao.”

The Dalai Lama, who had fled to Outer Mongolia in 1904, had since taken up residence at Kumbum in Amdo. In order to forestall further Chinese incursions into Tibet he was forced to accept a Chinese invitation to Beijing in 1908. The Dalai Lama was subsequently allowed to return to Lhasa but only after acknowledging his subordination to Beijing and Chinese authority over Tibet.

The Dalai Lama arrived back in Lhasa in December 1909. In the meantime, Chao Erh-feng had captured Chamdo and was moving his forces closer to Lhasa. In February 1910 some of Chao’s troops reached Lhasa, whereupon the Dalai Lama once again fled, this time to seek refuge with the British in India. The Chinese claimed that their troops were in Tibet only to police the trade marts established by treaty with British India. However, neither the British nor the Tibetans believed that the Chinese were in Tibet for any other reason than to establish direct Chinese control over Tibet. This was confirmed by their attempt to depose the Dalai Lama after he fled to India. The decree deposing the Dalai Lama was ineffective, since no Tibetan accepted that China had the authority to depose a Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama, who had been in exile from 1904 to late 1909, was once again a refugee after only two months in Lhasa. However, this time he was the guest of British India and his residence there was to result in British patronage for Tibet for many years to come.

In India the Thirteenth Dalai Lama sought British help to expel the Chinese from Tibet. He no longer acknowledged China’s claim to any authority over Tibet. The Chinese also claimed that they exercised authority over Bhutan and Nepal, a claim that was rejected by the British. The British Government informed the Dalai Lama that it was unable to intervene in Tibet, despite having directly done so in 1904. The Dalai Lama refused to return to Tibet while the Chinese were there. In the meantime, he established friendly relations with the British officials in India with whom he came into contact and he gained a favorable impression of the British way of governance as opposed to that of the Chinese.

One of the British officials in India, Charles Bell, was later to play a large role in British relations with Tibet. Bell wrote at the time that Tibet had been abandoned to Chinese aggression, an aggression that had been brought about because of the British invasion of 1904. The British invasion had brought about China’s attempt to establish its direct control over Tibet, but the British had withdrawn from Tibet and failed to protect Tibet from China’s retaliation.

Within Tibet, resentment against the Chinese was growing. In October 1911 the revolution in China began that was to end the Manchu Qing dynasty. By November the Chinese troops in Lhasa attempted to return to China, but before they could do so they were attacked by Tibetans who resented the treatment they had received at the hands of the Chinese. Fighting went on between Chinese and Tibetans in Lhasa until the end of 1912, when the remaining Chinese troops were expelled from Tibet by way of India. The

Dalai Lama crossed the border into Tibet in June 1912 but was unable to return to Lhasa until January 1913.

After the collapse of the Manchu Qing dynasty a Chinese Republic was established. The Chinese Republic continued Chinese pretensions to authority over Tibet and sent a message to the Thirteenth Dalai Lama confirming him in his position. This the Chinese considered as a conciliatory measure because the former Chinese Government had deposed the Dalai Lama when he fled to India. However, the Dalai Lama was no longer willing to accept any Chinese pretensions to authority over Tibet. He declined the Chinese offer to confirm him in his position, saying that he needed no authorization from China in order to be the Dalai Lama. He also denied any Chinese authority over Tibet, saying that the Chinese had violated the terms of the traditional Cho-Yon relationship between Tibet and China. The Dalai Lama's rejection of Chinese authority over Tibet was considered by Tibetans to be a declaration of Tibetan independence from China.

#### Simla Convention and Frontier Agreements, 1914:

This part of Richardson's report to the Government of India is about the events between the Tibetan declaration of independence in 1913 and the negotiations about Tibet between Tibet, British India, and China at Simla in 1914. The Dalai Lama was in exile in India from 1910 to 1912. He sought the patronage of the British Government of India in order to establish Tibetan independence of China. After the fall of the Manchu Qing dynasty in 1911 the Dalai Lama returned to Tibet in 1912. Early in 1913 he reached Lhasa and declared Tibetan independence from China. At the same time, Mongolia declared its independence from China under the patronage of the Russians, and Mongolia and Tibet then recognized each other's independence.

This relationship between Mongolia and Tibet once again aroused British suspicions of Russian influence in Tibet. The British were still unwilling and unable to assume a role as patron of Tibet. Therefore, they hoped to recognize Chinese authority over Tibet sufficient to prevent Russian influence there but insufficient to allow for direct Chinese control. In 1912 the British proposed that China should be allowed to supervise the external relations of Tibet but should not interfere in its internal affairs. China should not station troops in Tibet except for a small number who would be allowed to accompany a Chinese Amban in Lhasa. The Chinese replied that they had the right to intervene in the internal affairs of Tibet but that they had no intention to incorporate Tibet within China. This exchange of proposals was to become the basis for the 1914 Simla Convention on Tibet.

The Chinese were reluctant to accept British mediation in what they considered an internal affair. However, the new Chinese Republic was desirous of good relations with the British, mostly because they needed British recognition of the new Chinese Republican government. In addition, the Chinese Republic was powerless in Tibet unless they undertook an outright military invasion, of which they were incapable at the time. Also, the Tibetans themselves had repudiated any Chinese authority whatsoever and they

had expelled all the Chinese from Lhasa. The Chinese were thus dependent upon British mediation in order to re-establish Chinese influence in Tibet.

In 1913 the new Chinese government offered to open negotiations with the British in regard to Tibet. The Chinese were concerned about their lack of influence in Tibet, direct British contact with and influence in Tibet, the loss of their control over Mongolia to the Russians, and Mongolian relations with Tibet. The British suggested three-way negotiations that would include Tibet as a full partner along with Britain and China. Also, the British suggested that the Tibetan border with China should be discussed. The Chinese resisted these suggestions because they regarded Tibet as a part of China. They thought that China could negotiate on behalf of Tibet and they recognized no border between China and Tibet.

Finally, the Chinese were forced to agree to the three-party format because they were desperate to re-establish their influence in Tibet by means of British recognition of Chinese authority there. The Chinese were reluctant to accept Tibet as a partner in negotiations, but they knew that the British would recognize a far greater degree of Chinese authority over Tibet than would the Tibetans themselves. They also had to agree to negotiate about Tibetan borders with China. This, however, they considered as equivalent to provincial boundaries and as anyhow temporary, to be altered to China's advantage at a time of greater Chinese power. Still, the Chinese tried to have the status of the Tibetan representative downgraded to a subordinate of the Chinese delegation. This the British and the Tibetans resisted until the Chinese were forced to accept that the Tibetan representative was to be the equal to the Chinese at the negotiations.

The Chinese were willing to make these concessions because of their hope of recovering as much as possible of their former position in Tibet through British recognition of such. The Chinese were unable at this time to militarily retake Tibet, and they feared losing Tibet altogether to the British or as an independent state under British protection. However, the Chinese considered these negotiations only as a temporary measure to forestall Tibetan independence until China's power was restored and China could reassume what it thought was its rightful authority over Tibet.

Tibetan aims in attending the Simla Conference were to achieve Chinese and British recognition of Tibetan independence. They sought to have all Tibetan cultural areas included within the Tibetan state. The Tibetans arrived at the conference with tax records showing Tibetan administration over almost all the territory of what they regarded as Tibet. They denied that the previous relationship between Tibetan Dalai Lamas and Chinese emperors implied Tibetan subordination to China. The British hoped to establish an autonomous, but not independent, Tibetan state, one that would recognize Chinese suzerainty and would not require direct British administration of Tibet but that would create a buffer state between British India and both Russia and China.

During the negotiations at the Simla Conference the Chinese claimed that Tibet had been a part of China since the Mongol conquest of both China and Tibet. They claimed that Chinese emperors had often sent armies to the assistance of Tibet and that

China had exercised administrative authority over Tibet. The Chinese demanded recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet but promised that Tibet would not be converted into a Chinese province. China claimed that all of Qinghai and the part of Kham conquered by Chao Erh-feng were now parts of China.

The British proposed the division of Tibet into inner and outer zones. Outer Tibet was to be composed of all of central and western Tibet. Inner Tibet included Amdo and eastern Kham. Outer Tibet would be autonomous while Inner Tibet would come under a loose form of Chinese administration. The final negotiated agreement, known as the Simla Convention, recognized Chinese “suzerainty” over Tibet. China would not send any troops or officials to Outer Tibet. Only an Amban with an escort of 300 troops might be stationed in Outer Tibet. The British negotiated a separate secret agreement with Tibet about the border between British India and Tibet. The Simla Convention was agreed to by the Tibetan, British, and Chinese representatives. However, the Chinese Government later refused to ratify the Convention.

The Chinese Government said that their refusal to ratify the Simla Convention was based solely upon their dissatisfaction about the boundary between Inner and Outer Tibet. The British Government warned the Chinese that if they refused to ratify the Convention the British might consider it binding upon Great Britain and Tibet alone. China would not be a party to the Convention and would not achieve British recognition of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. Britain would thereby have concluded a treaty directly with Tibet, which the Chinese wanted to prevent, and Britain could deal directly with Tibet about trade and any other issues.

The Chinese still refused to ratify the Convention, saying that the boundary was still an issue. Although the boundary undoubtedly was an issue, especially for the Chinese authorities of Sichuan, who claimed much larger territories in Eastern Tibet, the Chinese Government may have been reluctant to recognize Tibet’s authority to enter into a treaty with Great Britain and China. The Chinese may have thought it better to await a time when they could impose their authority over all Tibet by force rather than recognize Tibet’s status as less than under full Chinese sovereignty.

The Chinese Government continued to refuse to ratify the Convention. Therefore, it was concluded between Britain and Tibet alone. The Chinese Government denied that it was bound by any of the provisions of the Convention. Since the Chinese refused to recognize the border between China and Tibet as negotiated during the Simla Conference, the border between India and Tibet secretly negotiated between the British Government of India and Tibet became the most significant achievement of the Simla Convention. This border agreement was negotiated by the British representative, Sir Henry McMahon, and the Tibetan representative, Lonchen Shatra. The Chinese representative was unaware of these negotiations or of the agreed-upon boundary between India and Tibet. The boundary line included some formerly Tibetan territory, particularly the Tawang area, inside the boundaries of India. This boundary, known as the McMahon line, was later to become the cause of the border war between India and Communist China in 1962.

Because China refused to ratify the Simla Convention and because Tibet and British India did ratify it, trade relations between India and Tibet were somewhat improved. The Chinese were unable to interfere with Indian trade to Tibet as they had before the fall of the Qing in 1912. The British were also able to conduct direct diplomatic relations with Tibet without the intermediary or interference of the Chinese. According to the British interpretation of the situation after the Simla Convention of 1914, China lost British recognition of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet.

The British also held that China could no longer claim the right to appoint an Amban at Lhasa, China could not claim that Tibet was part of China's territory, China would have no role in the appointment of the Dalai Lama, and China had no right to protest about British trade or diplomatic relations with the Tibetans. However, the British had to admit that the Chinese denied the validity of the Simla Convention and therefore of any of the British interpretations of British rights in Tibet or limitations on Chinese authority over Tibet. As Richardson writes, China gained nothing by its refusal to ratify the Simla Convention, but it retained, in its own opinion, the right to settle with Tibet in China's own way and at a time of China's choosing.

#### First Great War Period:

British interest in Tibet was soon diverted by the First World War, which broke out in 1914. Even though the British were preoccupied, the Chinese were unable to take advantage because of China's own weakness. China did make some attempts to gain territory at Tibetan expense in Kham, but this was resisted by the Tibetans. The Chinese also made attempts to negotiate directly with the Tibetans without British mediation, but the Tibetans insisted that China should ratify the Simla Convention. The British supplied the Tibetans with some arms and ammunition with which the Tibetans were able to retake considerable territory from the Chinese in Kham, particularly Derge and Nyarong. The Tibetan advances in Kham were so great that the British refused to supply the Tibetans with any more arms and ammunition, fearing that they would go too far and provoke the Chinese into a response that would cause the Tibetans to lose the territory they had gained.

In 1918, a British consular officer, Eric Teichman, arranged a truce between the Tibetans and the Chinese in Kham. The truce set a border between Tibet and China at the Yangtze River (*Dri Chu*), although Tibet was allowed to keep the Derge region, east of the river, under its control. This truce required the Tibetans to abandon the Nyarong region. The Tibetans appeared capable of taking all of Kham under their control had they been supplied with sufficient arms and ammunition. However, they were engaged only with one of the local rulers of Sichuan who was not under the control of the government of Sichuan or the Chinese Government in Beijing. The British feared that once the Chinese Government regained control over Sichuan it would expel the Tibetans from any areas over which they might have gained control in Kham. The British therefore advised the Tibetans to accept the truce and to abandon their attempt to gain control over all of Kham.

Having accepted the truce arranged by the British in Kham, the Tibetan Government pressed the British Government of India to finally secure Chinese ratification of the Simla Convention or some other Chinese recognition of Tibetan autonomy. However, the Chinese were less willing than ever to accept a British role in what they considered their internal affair in Tibet. In 1919 the Chinese had been aroused by what later came to be known as the May Fourth Movement, which marked the day that part of China, Shandong province, was given over to Japanese administration at the end of World War I. Chinese nationalism grew out of this event and eventually precluded any Chinese concessions on Tibet or any other territorial or national issue. After this time the Chinese rejected as an interference in China's internal affairs all British attempts to mediate a settlement in Tibet.

The British continued their attempts to secure Chinese recognition of Tibetan autonomy, but the Chinese were never again willing to allow the British a role as mediator in Tibet. This marks a transition in Chinese conceptions of their relationship with Tibet. In 1904, when the British invaded Tibet, China was still ruled by the Manchu Qing dynasty and Chinese conceptions of their relationship with Tibet were still vague. Given British strength and Chinese weakness at the time, the Chinese were willing to negotiate some limitations on their actual authority over Tibet in order to attain British recognition of Chinese suzerainty, if not sovereignty, over Tibet. The Chinese were fearful that they would lose Tibet altogether to British colonialism or that Tibet might become an independent country under British protection. However, after 1919, Chinese nationalism increasingly became a factor in China's conception of its relations with Tibet. Knowing that the British were unable to take over Tibet themselves, the Chinese felt that they could regain full control over Tibet at some time in the future. They were therefore unwilling to recognize Tibetan autonomy, with a role for the British in Tibet, and they were unwilling to accept any limitations on Chinese sovereignty over Tibet.

#### Sir Charles Bell's Visit to Lhasa:

This part of Richardson's report to the Government of India is about the visit of the British Indian official, Sir Charles Bell, to Lhasa in 1920. Bell had been closely associated with the Thirteenth Dalai Lama during the Dalai Lama's exile in India from 1910 to 1912. Bell's visit to Lhasa was considered necessary because of the stalemate in Tibetan affairs after the Chinese refusal to ratify the Simla Convention of 1914, which recognized Tibetan autonomy, or to guarantee Tibetan autonomy in any other way. By 1920, the Chinese were less willing than ever to allow permanent Tibetan autonomy or any role for the British in Tibet due to the rise of Chinese nationalism.

The decision to send a British representative to Tibet meant that the British had decided to deal directly with Tibet as if Tibet were in the same relation to China as the self-governing members of the British Commonwealth, such as Australia, were to Great Britain. It also represented British frustration in ever reaching an agreement with China about Tibet. Sir Charles Bell arrived in Lhasa in November 1920. His instructions were to ascertain the current state of relations between Tibet and China and to inquire about how the British might help Tibet to secure a Chinese guarantee of Tibetan autonomy. Bell was also to tell the Tibetans that the British were unable to supply Tibet with any more arms

and ammunition because of an international treaty that Britain had signed that, temporarily, prohibited arms sales.

Bell had intended to leave Lhasa after less than one month in order to avoid the winter difficulties in travelling back to India. However, the Tibetan Government requested that he stay much longer. The Tibetan Government may have been comfortable with the presence of a British official in Lhasa since they thought his presence might counter Chinese influence in Tibet. Bell also suggested that a longer stay might allow him to establish a more permanent relationship with the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government. Bell eventually was to remain at Lhasa almost a year, until October 1921.

While Bell was in Lhasa he received a request from the Dalai Lama that Tibet be allowed to buy more arms and ammunition so that it might defend itself from Chinese aggression. The Dalai Lama also asked for military training and for mining experts and mining equipment. Bell recommended that these requests should be fulfilled. He said that the British Government had promised to help Tibet secure its autonomy from China and had tried to convince the Tibetans to trust the British as friends. He said that this friendship was in jeopardy due to the British refusal to sell to Tibet any more arms and ammunition, which they needed to defend Tibet's autonomy from China.

Bell argued that Britain was in danger of losing the position in Tibet that it had gained unless it showed itself capable of helping Tibet against China. He said that it was British policy to establish a frontier between China and Tibet, but Tibet would have to defend its own frontier. Tibet had been successful in pushing the Chinese back in Kham due to the arms they had been sold by the British, but they needed more arms and ammunition if they were to be able to maintain their frontier with China.

Bell's proposals forced the British Government of India and the British Government in London to reappraise their strategy and their policy in regard to Tibet. Both agreed that there was little chance to bring China to negotiate again about Tibet; therefore, Tibet was unlikely to get any assurances about Chinese respect for Tibetan autonomy. The British decided to deal directly with Tibet and to supply Tibet with further arms and ammunition so that Tibet might defend itself. The British Government agreed with Bell's proposal that Tibet should be opened to the world but suggested that it be done only at the request of the Tibetans themselves. Britain could not take on the responsibilities of opening and developing Tibet or defending it from the Chinese, but it could help Tibet in doing both. The British decided to continue to pressure China to reopen negotiations about Tibet, but to inform them that, in the absence of any Chinese agreement, the British would treat Tibet as autonomous under Chinese suzerainty. The Tibetans themselves were not informed that the British had acknowledged Chinese suzerainty over Tibet.

The Chinese did not agree to reopen negotiations about Tibet; therefore, the British proceeded with their policy of increased engagement with Tibet. Tibet was sold more arms and ammunition, including 10 mountain artillery pieces, 20 machine guns, 10,000 rifles and sufficient ammunition for all. These were delivered to Tibet from 1922

until 1933. In addition, Tibetans received instruction in the use of these arms within Tibet as well as in India. A telegraph line was constructed between Lhasa and Gyantse. A British geological survey of Tibet was made so that Tibet might begin to develop its mineral resources. British assistance was given to the construction of a hydroelectric power station at Lhasa. An English school was established at Gyantse.

British policy was formulated on the assumption that China would never recognize Tibet's autonomy. Also, that Britain could not establish a direct protectorate over Tibet. Therefore, all that the British could do was to help Tibet to arm itself against Chinese aggression and to help Tibet develop itself economically as an independent country. The Tibetan Government accepted this British policy as it was formulated in 1924. However, they also requested British assistance against Chinese attempts to use the Panchen Lama, who had fled Tibet due to disputes with Lhasa, to regain Chinese control over Tibet.

Lean Years:

This part of Richardson's report is about the dispute between Lhasa and Shigatse and the flight of the Panchen Lama from Tibet in 1924. One of the results of Sir Charles Bell's visit to Lhasa in 1920-21 was that he recommended that Tibet be allowed to buy the arms and ammunition that the Dalai Lama had requested. This request was approved, and the arms and ammunition were delivered to Tibet over the next ten years. Tibet also began building an army and training it with British assistance. This, along with other British assistance projects such as an English school, aroused the resistance of the monasteries. The monasteries also opposed the creation of an army because they were called upon to pay taxes for its support and also because the army became a rival to the Buddhist establishment for influence. The young army officers trained by the British were relatively modern, pro-British, and pro-independence. Some of the army officers were aware that it was the monasteries' dependence upon foreign patrons that had compromised Tibet's independence in the past, and they were therefore in favor of a more secular political system.

The tax burden needed to support the army also fell upon regional authorities such as the Panchen Lama and his monastery, Tashilhunpo, in Shigatse, which taxed much of Tsang. The Tibetan Government demanded that Tashilhunpo pay one-fourth of the total cost of the army, using the precedent of the wars against the Gurkhas of Nepal in which Tashilhunpo had paid one-fourth of the costs. However, during the previous century Tashilhunpo had grown increasingly independent of Lhasa due to the relative importance of the Panchen Lamas of the time versus the Dalai Lamas, many of whom failed to reach maturity. Tashilhunpo was therefore reluctant to acknowledge Lhasa's authority to make it pay taxes for the upkeep of the army. Friction between Lhasa and Shigatse over this issue was pursued primarily by the officials of the Dalai and Panchen Lamas rather than by the lamas themselves, who retained good relations. The Panchen Lama's officials ultimately refused to accept Lhasa's demands for taxes, and they advised the Panchen Lama to flee Tibet for Outer Mongolia, which he did at the end of 1923.

The Panchen Lama declared that he was leaving only for a short time in order to seek a mediator between himself and Lhasa and to raise contributions from Mongols. The Dalai Lama feared that China would exploit the dispute between himself and the Panchen Lama, so he attempted to prevent the escape, but was unsuccessful. The Dalai Lama then accused the Panchen, or at least his officials, of thinking only of themselves rather than about the welfare of Tibet, and the Lhasa government proceeded to take over the administration of Shigatse, Tsang, and the Panchen's estates in his absence.

The Panchen Lama's flight proved to be very damaging to Tibet, as the Dalai Lama had predicted. The Panchen Lama himself was a highly revered figure, so his absence from Tibet was a great loss. Lhasa and the Dalai Lama were blamed by many Tibetans for starting the dispute in the first place by demanding taxes from Tashilhunpo. The Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government recalled that the Panchen had taken the Dalai Lama's place at the behest of the Chinese Amban during both of the Dalai Lama's exiles and accused him of once again falling under Chinese influence at Tibet's expense. The Panchen Lama did, after a year in Mongolia, travel to Peking where he sought Chinese support for his return to Tibet. This allowed the Chinese to assume a role in a Tibetan domestic dispute and to exploit the Panchen Lama in order to increase China's influence in Tibet. The Panchen Lama's flight and his exploitation by China was a great tragedy for Tibet, one that divided Tibet just when unity against China was most needed.

#### Death of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama:

Tibetan monastic officials used the inability of the British to secure a guarantee of Tibetan autonomy from China as an argument that the British were unreliable. The monasteries also opposed any modernizing influences, almost all of which were associated with the British. The monasteries gradually managed to regain their influence with the Dalai Lama and to reduce the influence of the army officers and modernizers. The unwillingness of the British to assume a greater role in Tibet also allowed the monasteries to claim that Tibet could not rely on the British and therefore must make some deal with the Chinese. The Chinese, at the same time, made constant attempts to reestablish their influence in Tibet.

The Tibetan Army, which had been effective in stopping Chinese incursions in the east, was gradually allowed to deteriorate. The English school at Gyantse was closed in 1926. In 1928 the new Chinese Nationalist (KMT) government was established and finally achieved some degree of unified government in China after a long period of disunity. The Nationalist government soon also established the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, which was an attempt to reestablish the Chinese claim to authority over both areas. Mongolia at the time was a separate country entirely under the influence of the Soviet Union, while Tibet had been free of Chinese control since 1912. Given the lack of British influence in Tibet at the time, the Chinese were able to regain some degree of influence. The Dalai Lama received a few Chinese envoys and communicated with China about Tibet's continuing demand for autonomy, if not independence. The Chinese, in a move typical of Chinese diplomacy, interpreted these contacts as evidence that the Dalai Lama accepted China's sovereignty over Tibet.

The British Empire was contracting at the time, and the British were already contemplating having to withdraw from India, as they did in 1947. At the same time, the Soviet Union was an expanding empire. The Soviet Union managed to separate Mongolia from China, and Mongolia ultimately emerged as an independent country. Had the British been willing to commit themselves to making Tibet a British dependency, Tibet might also have achieved independence as Mongolia did.

In 1930 another British representative visited Lhasa. The subjects discussed with the Dalai Lama and Tibetan Government officials were the continuing problem of the exiled Panchen Lama, relations with China, and commercial relations with India. The Dalai Lama remained worried about the situation in regard to the Panchen Lama. The Dalai Lama blamed the Panchen's officials for continuing this dispute, for dividing Tibetan unity and for allowing China to meddle in the affairs of Tibet. In regard to China, there was a feeling in Lhasa that the Chinese would never give up their claim to authority over Tibet, nor would they acknowledge any right of the British to mediate in Sino-Tibetan affairs. Many Tibetans thought that China would never recognize Tibetan autonomy, much less independence; therefore, Tibet would eventually have to accept some arrangement with China.

In 1931 fighting broke out in Kham between two monasteries near Kanze. The Tibetan Government took the side of one monastery, Dargye, while the other monastery sought help from a Sichuan Chinese warlord. The Tibetan Army managed to take over control of Derge, Kanze, and Nyarong and moved to within a few days' march of Dartsendo. At this point the Chinese arranged for a truce. However, the Chinese were just negotiating for time so that they could summon enough forces to push the Tibetans back. The Chinese eventually broke the truce and pushed the Tibetans back to the line of the Yangtse (*Dri Chu*). At the same time, Chinese Hui troops from Qinghai attacked from the north. Eventually the Tibetan Army lost all the territory it had gained in Kham and more.

In 1932 a British representative again went to Lhasa. He found that there was much anxiety in Lhasa about the situation in Kham. Many Tibetans thought that their army was performing poorly because the Panchen Lama was supporting the opposing side. However, the British had no evidence that this was the case, and they knew that the Tibetan Army had actually performed quite well. Finally, the conflict in Kham was ended by the outbreak of civil war in Sichuan. At this time the British made another attempt to mediate in the dispute with the Panchen Lama. They secured a letter from the Dalai Lama to the Panchen inviting him to return to Tibet. However, the Panchen Lama demanded that his territory in Tsang should be independent of all control by the Tibetan Government in Lhasa, and that it should collect its own taxes and have its own army. He also demanded that any agreement with Lhasa should be guaranteed by some foreign government such as the British. These demands of the Panchen Lama could not be accepted by Lhasa since they would permanently divide Tibet into essentially two countries and probably allow the Chinese to reestablish their influence in Tibet in support of the Panchen Lama.

The British were equally unsuccessful in mediating any settlement between Tibet and China. All British attempts to convince the Chinese to reopen tripartite negotiations between Tibet, China, and British India were met with the assertion that Chinese relations with Tibet were an internal affair of China that needed no outside mediation. In response to British suggestions that China should recognize Tibetan autonomy, the Chinese indicated that they would negotiate directly with the Tibetans. British officials in China gained the impression that the Chinese were waiting for a time advantageous to themselves when they would reestablish their control over Tibet with or without the agreement of the Tibetans. British officials found that Chinese nationalism had risen to such a height that there was no possibility of China allowing Tibetan autonomy, much less independence. The Chinese were incensed about British activities in Tibet and blamed Tibetan alienation from China entirely on British influence.

The possibility of China's reasserting its control over Tibet was increased in December 1933 when the Thirteenth Dalai Lama died. His death created a struggle for power among his former favorite officials that for a while threatened to lead to truly weakening divisions within the Tibetan Government. Eventually, the two houses of the Tibetan governmental system, the Kashag, a council of ministers, and the Tsongdu, which was something like a parliament, managed to establish order. Nevertheless, the situation was precarious for Tibet. Periods when there was no Dalai Lama tended to be chaotic. A regent had to be chosen to govern during the search for and the minority of a new Dalai Lama. Also, the absence of the Dalai Lama might allow the Chinese to reestablish their influence.

Huang Mu-sung in Lhasa:

When the Chinese Government was informed of the Dalai Lama's death it proposed to send a mission of condolence. The mission was ostensibly nonpolitical, but both the Tibetans and the Chinese knew that the mission had a political purpose. The Thirteenth Dalai Lama had always resisted Chinese influence in Tibet; therefore it was certain that the Chinese would attempt to exploit his absence in order to reestablish their influence. The Chinese mission was led by General Huang Mu-sung, who at first confined himself to making official rounds and visiting monasteries where he made lavish offerings. It was assumed that he was also distributing generous bribes to any Tibetan official who would favor China's cause in Tibet.

General Huang eventually broached the political issue. He proposed that Tibet should accept that it was a part of the Republic of China and that Tibetans were one of the so-called "Five Races" of China. This was refused by both the Kashag and Tsongdu. After this Huang replied with more detailed proposals. He proposed that Tibet and China should resume their traditional Cho-Yon type relationship. The Tibetans agreed to this. China would consider Tibet as self-governing. This was agreed. He proposed that Tibet should consult with China about all foreign affairs. This the Tibetans refused, saying that Tibet was an independent country. He said that all Tibetan officials should be approved by China. The Tibetans agreed only to inform China about official appointments. Huang

offered that China would defend Tibet against any foreign invaders. The Tibetans said that no one was likely to invade Tibet and that this was therefore not necessary.

When informed of the Tibetan response to his proposals, Huang reduced his demands to three: that Tibet should accept subordination to China, that China should control Tibet's foreign affairs, and that China should approve the appointment of all higher-level Tibetan officials. The Tibetans said that Tibet would accept only the degree of Chinese authority that was specified in the Simla Convention that China had never ratified. Even this was contingent upon China's return to Tibet of territories occupied by China in Kham and Amdo. Basically the Tibetan Government proposed to accept the Simla Convention formula of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet in exchange for Tibetan autonomy.

The Chinese mission to Tibet failed to achieve China's goal that Tibet would agree to become a part of the Chinese Republic. Despite the Dalai Lama's absence and a considerable amount of Chinese coercion and bribery, the Tibetan Kashag and Tsongdu had displayed Tibetan determination to remain independent of China. Huang's mission was a failure. However, upon his return to China he portrayed the mission as far more successful than it had actually been. In order to avoid embarrassment to himself, Huang claimed that Tibetans were happy to accept Chinese sovereignty. This intentional mischaracterization of the situation led to a Chinese and an international misconception about Tibet's status and Tibetans' desires for independence. China thereby continued its pretensions to authority over Tibet when no such authority actually existed.

In response to the Chinese mission the British sent a mission to Tibet in 1936 to ascertain what had transpired since the Dalai Lama's death and what had been the results of negotiations with China. The British were assured that Tibet had not admitted any Chinese authority over Tibet. The Tibetans had continued to negotiate with the Chinese on the basis of the 1914 Simla Convention, which British India and Tibet had ratified but which China had not. Under the terms of the Simla Convention, Tibet would accept nominal Chinese authority over Tibet in exchange for Chinese guarantees of Tibetan autonomy. Given that China had refused to ratify the Simla Convention and continually refused to negotiate on the basis of its principles, the Tibetans now considered the Simla Convention to be dead. In other words, the Tibetans had withdrawn their offer to accept any degree of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet because the Chinese had not been willing to accept Tibetan autonomy.

The British mission to Tibet found that the previous Chinese mission had left a radio set in Lhasa and two Chinese technicians who operated the radio but who also functioned as Chinese representatives in Lhasa. The British therefore left a radio set of their own in Lhasa in the care of a British representative. From this time until the Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1950 the British would have a permanent representative in Tibet except for a few years during the Second World War.

The British also continued their attempts to arrange for the return of the Panchen Lama, who was threatening to return to Tibet with a Chinese military escort. The Tibetan

Government welcomed the return of the Panchen Lama but absolutely refused to allow a Chinese escort to enter Tibet. The British acted as intermediaries in sending messages from the Tibetan Government to the Chinese Government protesting against this Chinese escort. Although the British delivered these protests from the Tibetan Government, the Chinese pretended that they never received them and they denied that the Tibetans had objected to a Chinese military escort. The Panchen Lama was in Jeykundo in 1937 preparing to enter central Tibet with his Chinese escort and the Tibetan Government was preparing to resist it. However, the Panchen Lama was delayed, possibly because war had begun between China and Japan. Before he could resume his return the Panchen Lama died at Jeykundo, thus ending at least temporarily the possibility that the Chinese might reestablish their influence in Tibet by means of the Panchen Lama.

The North-East Tribal Frontier. The Fourteenth Dalai Lama:

This part of Richardson's report to the Government of India is about the British claim to Tawang and the discovery and recognition of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama. Given British inability to secure from China any recognition of the validity of the Simla Convention or any acknowledgement of Tibetan autonomy, the Tibetans were surprised when the British claimed one of the concessions that had been made to them at Simla. In the separate agreement between Britain and Tibet over the border between Tibet and India, Tibet had agreed to allow British India to assume political authority over Tawang.

Tawang was an area to the east of Bhutan inhabited by Tibetan people and administered by Tibetan officials. The British assumed that although the Simla Convention between Tibet, China, and British India had never come into effect, the separate agreement between Tibet and India about the border was still valid. The British therefore assumed that British India had the right to sovereignty over Tawang even though they had made no attempt to actually administer it since 1914, the date of the Simla Convention. Even the British had forgotten about Tawang until the late 1930s when British officials decided that they should finally begin to administer the area.

When, in 1936, the British informed the Tibetan Government that India would assume the administration over Tawang the Tibetans were greatly surprised. The Tibetans, like the British, had forgotten this provision of the agreement between British India and Tibet made at Simla or they had assumed that it, like the Simla Convention itself, was not valid. Even the British had to admit that the Tawang area was Tibetan territory and that geographically it was more a part of Tibet than India. The British also experienced great difficulties in trying to establish their administration over Tawang. The Tawang area was to remain a disputed issue between British India and Tibet until the Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1950-51. Thereafter, China claimed that Tawang was Chinese territory. The dispute over Tawang was one of the causes of the Sino-Indian border war of 1962.

In 1938 the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama had been discovered in Taktser village in Amdo. This area was under the control of a Chinese Muslim administration. Without revealing that they were certain that the Taktser boy was the reincarnation of the

Dalai Lama the Tibetan Government made preparations to bring him to Lhasa. However, the Chinese Muslim governor of Qinghai suspected that he was the real reincarnation and that he could exploit this situation for his own profit. He demanded a ransom before he would release the boy and allow him to be taken to Lhasa. The Tibetan Government appealed to the Chinese Government to force the governor of Qinghai to release the boy. However, the Chinese Government suggested that it could do so but that then a Chinese military escort would accompany the boy to Lhasa. This was unacceptable to the Tibetan Government; therefore there was little choice but to pay the bribe to the Chinese governor of Qinghai. Finally, after paying a bribe of 400,000 Chinese dollars the boy was released, and he then proceeded to Lhasa.

The Chinese Government then demanded that a Chinese official should be sent to Lhasa to officiate over the recognition of the Dalai Lama. The Tibetan Government refused this, saying that neither Chinese recognition or officiating in the ceremony was necessary. In the end the Tibetan Government allowed a Chinese representative to be present but not to officiate. The Chinese nevertheless claimed that they had officiated and they conveyed this version of events to the outside world.

#### The Second Great War Period:

This part of Richardson's report is about the period of the Second World War, from 1939 to 1945, when Richardson was not in Lhasa. In 1942 the Tibetan Government established a Foreign Affairs Office. This office was meant to deal with all foreign countries, including China. The British proceeded to deal with this office, since it made little change in their relations with Tibet. However, the Chinese Government refused to deal with the Tibetan Foreign Affairs office, since they said that Tibet was a part of China and therefore China was not a foreign country in relation to Tibet. Chinese relations with Tibet were thus hampered since the Chinese refused to communicate with the Tibetan Foreign Affairs Office and the Tibetan Government refused to communicate with the Chinese any other way.

At the beginning of the war the Chinese Government attempted to obtain supplies from India for its war against Japan. The Chinese proposed that a road from India to China be constructed that would pass through eastern Tibet. The Chinese intended to ignore any Tibetan objection to the passage of this road through Tibetan territory. However, the British Government of India was unwilling to ignore Tibetan objections. The British informed the Tibetan Government of the plan to construct a road from India to China through Tibet. The Tibetan Government objected to this plan, thinking that it was just a Chinese scheme to penetrate Tibet. A Chinese road survey team attempting to enter Tibet was turned back by the Tibetans. In fact, the proposed road had little potential to transport supplies from India to China and its construction costs would have been very great. Nevertheless, the Chinese persisted in trying to persuade the British to cooperate in this road project without regard to the objections of the Tibetans.

By 1942 the British were also at war with Japan and were therefore allies with China. This increased the pressure on Britain to cooperate in the road project through

Tibet. The British proposed to the Chinese that they might secure Tibetan permission for the road project if China would finally guarantee Tibetan autonomy. However, the Chinese did not reply to this proposal. The British finally came to agree with the Tibetans that the main goal of the Chinese was to use the road project in order to reestablish Chinese control over Tibet. The Chinese hoped to convince the British to either ignore Tibetan objections or to use British influence over Tibet to secure Tibetan permission for the road project. The Chinese then planned to exclude British influence over Tibet by posting Chinese officials all along the road route. The British finally decided that the Tibetans were correct in thinking that China's main goal in the road project was the political penetration of Tibet.

In 1943 the Chinese president, Chiang Kai-shek, ordered the governors of the provinces bordering Tibet to send troops to the Tibetan border. It is uncertain whether this was meant just as a threat to force Tibet to allow the road project or whether Chiang actually meant to invade Tibet. In any case, none of the provincial governors obeyed his orders. The governor of Qinghai, Ma Pufeng, demanded military supplies from the Chinese Government before he would send troops to Tibet. Once he received the military supplies he did nothing. The governor of Yunnan simply refused to send troops. The governor of Sikang, the province the Chinese had established in 1939 in eastern Kham, had no actual control over what was supposed to be the Sikang province. The governor of Sikang also therefore did nothing about sending troops to Tibet. This event demonstrated not only Chinese make-believe about control over Tibet but also showed that the Chinese Government could not control even the governors of Chinese provinces.

One of the results of the proposed road project was that the Americans became involved in Tibetan affairs. In late 1942 two Americans were sent to Tibet to survey the possibilities for a road crossing Tibetan territory. Their survey had little effect in regard to the proposed road, but their trip to Tibet established the first direct relations between the U.S. and Tibet. The two Americans found to their surprise that the Chinese had no control over Tibet and that Tibet had a government that was independent of China. The Americans discovered that Tibet was in fact an independent country and they gained some sympathy for Tibetans' desires to remain independent. After this time the U.S. began to develop its own policy toward Tibet rather than just following British policy or believing Chinese claims that Tibet was a part of China.

#### The Problem in Retrospect and Prospect:

At the end of his report to the Government of India Richardson summarized Britain's goals and activities in Tibet at the time just before the British withdrawal from India in 1947. He also summarizes China's policies in Tibet at that time. Richardson says that Britain's goal was to help Tibet to remain independent and to preserve the existing good relations between Britain and Tibet. British India at that time was supplying military arms and ammunition necessary for Tibet to preserve its independence from China. Britain continued to recognize and uphold Tibet's actual independence by dealing directly with Tibet in all matters both diplomatic and economic. Richardson suggested that Chinese propaganda about Tibet should be countered by every means available,

including radio broadcasting, even though there were few radio receivers in Tibet. The Chinese at that time were broadcasting their propaganda into Tibet in an attempt to convince Tibetans that Tibet was a part of China.

Richardson says that the aim of China's policy and its propaganda was to establish Chinese control over Tibet. China's propaganda toward Tibet was intended to change Tibetans' attitudes toward China from rejection of Chinese rule to acceptance that Tibet should be a part of China. Chinese methods for accomplishing this were to pretend that it was already an accomplished fact that Tibet already was firmly a part of China. The Chinese also cultivated Tibetans from border areas as their agents. They used disaffected Tibetans such as the Panchen Lama's entourage and they offered bribes to any Tibetan official who would promote China's cause in Tibet. The Chinese also employed the traditional Chinese method of cultivating influence in Tibet by making lavish monetary offerings to Tibetan monasteries.

Chinese propaganda about Tibet was primarily directed toward the outside world. China well understood the necessity of convincing the outside world that Tibet was a part of China. Chinese propaganda pretended that China exercised actual authority over Tibet when it had no authority in fact. China pretended that Tibetan Government representatives in China were in fact officials of the Chinese Government. The Tibetan Government did not counter Chinese propaganda, partly because Tibetans were unaware of it but primarily because Tibetans knew that they were independent of China and regarded that fact as self-evident. However, Chinese propaganda was all that the outside world knew about Tibet. Therefore, most of the world thought that Tibet was a part of China and that China exercised actual political authority there. Chinese propaganda was ultimately effective in precluding any international support for Tibet when Tibet appealed to the United Nations for assistance against the Chinese invasion in 1950.

Richardson comments that Chinese propaganda directed toward Tibet at this time contained a new theory about Tibet's place within the Chinese state. Previously, Chinese propaganda had claimed that Tibetans were one of the five nations, Han, Tibetan, Mongol, Manchu, and Muslims, that composed the Chinese state. Now, the Chinese said that Tibetans were but one of five parts of the one Chinese nation. Richardson says that this was intended to preclude any idea that Tibetans were a separate nation that deserved the right to national self-determination, a principle then being formulated in international law. The Chinese Nationalist government agreed to many international laws after the end of the Second World War, some of which called for the right to self-determination for nations. Richardson speculates that the Chinese wanted to redefine Tibetans as something less than a nation in order to avoid having to give Tibetans the right to self-determination. Certainly, this was what the Chinese Communists did when they came to power; they defined the Chinese state as a nation and Tibetans as a minority nationality within the Chinese nation.

Richardson says that the Chinese also used maps as propaganda. Chinese maps showed Tibet as a part of China, but Tibet published no maps to refute the Chinese maps. The British did publish some maps that showed Tibet as separate from China to an extent

consistent with the British position that Tibet was an autonomous part of China. However, the British maps did not go so far as to show Tibet as entirely separate from China. By their failure to make their own maps showing Tibet as separate and independent of China, Tibetans failed to demonstrate to the world that Tibet was independent or even that they wanted independence. Chinese propaganda maintained not only that Tibet was a part of China but that Tibetans had no desire for independence from China. China made much propaganda in this regard and, since Tibet made none to counter it, Chinese propaganda was substantially believed in the outside world.

At the end of his report to the Government of India, Richardson gives some of his own thoughts about the differences between Chinese and Tibetans. He says that Tibetans are fundamentally religious while Chinese are essentially nonreligious. Tibetan Buddhism is a universal religion that allows Tibetans to accept all people, including non-Tibetans, as equals. The Chinese are inordinately proud of their 5,000 years of history about which they constantly remind foreigners. Because of their pride in their own culture the Chinese have difficulty accepting non-Chinese as equals.

Tibet has a reputation for excluding foreigners, but that exclusion usually applied only to non-Buddhists and reflected Tibetans' wish to protect their religion. Tibetans have a feeling of superiority with their own culture due to their confidence in their religion. However, they are open-minded and willing to see the good in other peoples' customs and cultures. Tibetans, he says, have a great regard for the truth. They would rather stay silent than tell a lie. Chinese standards, he says, are more flexible. They have no objection to a useful lie and their fantasies make it difficult to tell between wish and fact. This tendency to portray wish as fact is absent from the Tibetan mind, he says.

Tibetans can be brutal on occasion, he says. But in this they are no match for the Chinese. Conflicts in eastern Tibet between Chinese and Tibetans revealed an indiscriminate savagery toward prisoners and civilians on the part of the Chinese while the Tibetans treated their prisoners well. Tibetans usually cannot compete with the quickness and especially deviousness of the Chinese mind, he says, but Tibetans can be solidly competent, as was demonstrated by the Tibetan negotiators at the Simla Conference of 1914. In practical matters Tibetans are quick to learn and competent in what they do.

The Chinese tend to treat one concession only as a prelude to another. In other words, they will push for as much as they can get. In contrast, Tibetans have a strong national sense of right and wrong and of what is appropriate and just. Tibetans regarded British treatment of Tibetans during the 1904 invasion with approval, despite the loss of Tibetan life, and they appreciated the good treatment of the Dalai Lama in India from 1910 to 1912. On the other hand, they regarded the behavior of Chao Erh-feng, who invaded eastern Tibet in 1905, as unforgivable. Chao was known for his destruction of monasteries and his use of Tibetan scriptures to line the soles of his soldiers' boots.

Tibetans' reluctance to modernize, Richardson says, was frustrating, especially to those like the British who wanted to help Tibet. The Chinese, on the other hand, were

rapidly modernizing. The Chinese made much use of modern liberal political ideas, such as democracy and self-determination, but they saw no need to apply these concepts to their treatment of Tibetans. In the past, the Chinese had regarded Tibetans as barbarians, and their attitudes had changed hardly at all. This attitude was a major impediment to good relations between Chinese and Tibetans. China's attempts to convince Tibetans to be a part of China were hampered by Chinese attitudes of superiority and imperialist intentions toward Tibet. The Chinese, he says, have a reverence about the past that cause them to cling to any and all historic claims to any territory that has at any time been under Chinese domination. They tend to believe that any people they have dominated in the past have in fact welcomed that domination and want it restored so that they too might become Chinese.

Despite the complicated history of Chinese relations with Tibet, Chinese see that history as an inevitable and unvarying process of Tibet becoming a part of China. With the growth of Chinese nationalism in the twentieth century, Chinese began to see their vague relationship of domination over Tibet and China's limited powers to control Tibetan affairs as nothing less than full Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. In order to counter any Tibetan ideas about self-determination for themselves, the Chinese made use of their belief in their own superiority in order to define Tibetans as but one part of the Chinese nation and thus not qualified for self-determination on their own. This fallacy that Tibetans are simply part of the Chinese nation reflects the Chinese tendency to regard their own wishes as facts. As Richardson says, "Another deeply seated tendency of the Chinese mind is to believe, without regard to what other people would call facts, that things are as Chinese theory decrees they ought to be. The Chinese pretense that they have always treated Tibetans with the greatest benevolence, and that Tibetans really want only to be united to China, means to the majority of Chinese that these are the facts."

At the end of his report Richardson summarizes British involvement in Tibet from the beginning to the middle of the twentieth century. He says that the time that the British first became interested in Tibet, at the end of the nineteenth century, coincided with a low point in Chinese, or Manchu, interest in Tibet. The Manchu had established their influence in Tibet long before, in the eighteenth century, but already, by the nineteenth, their interest there and their authority had faded. The Manchu were content to play little or no role in Tibet so long as their symbolic authority was recognized and no other power intruded upon Tibetan affairs.

The British first attempted to establish trade relations with Tibet through the Chinese but found that China exercised no authority over Tibet. The British next attempted to deal directly with Tibet but found them unwilling to open their country to non-Buddhist foreigners. Finally, in 1904, the British forcibly invaded Tibet. The Tibetans resisted but, Richardson says, were won over to friendly relations due to good treatment of Tibetans by the British. What the British did not expect was that their intrusion into Tibet would cause the Chinese to reassert their authority there.

After the 1904 British invasion of Tibet, the Chinese invaded eastern Tibet. Chinese troops reached Lhasa in 1910 and the Dalai Lama was forced to flee to India.

China might have established firm Chinese control over all of Tibet at that time had the Manchu dynasty not been overthrown. The British took this opportunity to attempt to achieve recognition of Tibetan autonomy from the new Chinese republican regime. Richardson says that the Tibetans only hoped for some political distinction from China and the right to manage their own affairs, in exchange for which they were willing to acknowledge some degree of Chinese authority over Tibet. Even though the British had forcibly invaded Tibet, British influence over China became the Tibetans' only hope for some recognition by China of Tibet's separate rights. The Chinese were forced to negotiate due to their political weakness at the time, but they never agreed to recognize Tibetan autonomy, preferring to reestablish their authority over Tibet at a time when they were able. With the rise of Chinese nationalism the prospects for an independent or even autonomous Tibet decreased.

Richardson writes that even during their periods of weakness the Chinese never gave up their claim, or their pretensions, to authority over Tibet. It only awaited a period of Chinese unity and strength before the Chinese would attempt to reassert their authority. The Chinese were unable to do so during the 1930s or 1940s due to the Japanese invasion of China and the civil war between the Nationalists and the Communists. However, after the Second World War was over Richardson thought that China might make an attempt to recover Tibet. The Nationalists, led by Chiang Kai-shek, had evolved a new theory of China's national identity that included Tibetans. This theory allowed the Chinese Government to deny Tibetans the right to self-determination, a right that had been proclaimed in several international resolutions to which the Chinese had been a part. In the event, the Chinese Communists won the civil war and, despite having a Marxist theory of self-determination, they adopted a similar national theory to that of the Nationalists in order to deny the right of self-determination to Tibetans.

At the time that Richardson was writing, in 1945 at the end of the war, it seemed that the Nationalists were more likely to prevail in the Chinese civil war than the Communists. The Nationalists had been allies with the United States during the war and it was expected that the U.S. would support them after the war. However, the Americans had been deceived by Chinese Nationalist propaganda about the true situation in China. The Nationalists were not nearly as popular among the people as they portrayed themselves to the Americans and others. The U.S. and much of the world was therefore surprised when the Communists prevailed in the civil war.

Richardson wrote that he expected that the Indian Government would support Tibet even after Indian independence and the departure of the British. However, the independent Indian Government was much less supportive of Tibet than Richardson had hoped. He also writes that the Tibetans did not seem to realize the precariousness of their situation and the need to establish their independence. Between 1945 and the Chinese invasion in 1950 some Tibetans realized the need to achieve international recognition of Tibet's actual independence and they tried to do so. However, by this time it was too late.

At the end of his report to the Government of India, Richardson has a discussion on the meaning of the term "suzerainty," which was how the British defined China's

relationship with Tibet. Richardson begins by saying that the term suzerainty was almost incapable of definition. Its actual meaning depended upon the circumstances of the particular case. The dictionary definition of suzerainty used by the British was "nominal sovereignty over a semi-independent or internally autonomous state."

British India had some contact with Tibet in the eighteenth century, when it had observed that China's influence there was minimal. By the time that British India attempted to reestablish contact with Tibet at the end of the nineteenth century, China's influence had declined further until it was almost nonexistent. Nevertheless, British knowledge about Tibet was so slight that they assumed that China still had some authority over Tibet. The British therefore tried to secure Chinese permission to establish trade relations with Tibet. However, the British found that the Chinese had no power to compel the Tibetans to comply. The British were ultimately forced to invade Tibet in order to compel Tibetan compliance with the trade agreements that the British had secured from the Chinese in regard to Tibet.

The British realized that China exercised no actual authority over Tibet. Nevertheless, the British needed to recognize some vague Chinese authority for several reasons. First was that recognition of Chinese authority over Tibet was British policy as well as the policy of several other countries, including the United States and several European countries. All of these countries had economic interests in China and had negotiated certain economic privileges that they were interested in being applied to as large an area as possible. These countries were therefore very willing to recognize all Chinese claims to sovereignty over the remnants of the Manchu empire, despite the lack of any Chinese control there at the current time. Another reason that the British needed to recognize a vague Chinese authority, or suzerainty, over Tibet was because the British were unable and unwilling to assume political control over Tibet themselves or to include Tibet in the British Empire. Despite their inability to control Tibet, the British wanted to keep other imperial powers out, particularly Russia. They hoped to do so by recognition of a nominal degree of Chinese authority over Tibet. The British assumed that China was too weak to ever achieve actual administrative authority over Tibet.

Despite British assumptions of Chinese weakness, the British invasion of Tibet in 1904 aroused the Chinese to reassert their authority there. The Chinese invaded eastern Tibet in 1905 and by 1910 had reached Lhasa, forcing the Dalai Lama to flee to India. Only the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1912 prevented the Chinese from establishing their authority over Tibet at that time. After 1912 Tibet declared its independence and the British attempted to secure from China recognition of Tibetan autonomy under a degree of Chinese authority that the British defined as suzerainty. However, the Chinese never recognized Tibetan autonomy and they never agreed to limit their authority over Tibet to what the British defined as suzerainty.

From 1912 until 1950, Richardson says, Tibet enjoyed actual independence from China. Nevertheless, the British continued to recognize only Tibetan autonomy under Chinese suzerainty. The Tibetan Government had been willing to acknowledge a certain relationship with China compatible with the traditional relations between China and Tibet

known as Cho-Yon, or the spiritual relationship between Dalai Lamas and Chinese emperors. Tibet was willing to acknowledge this relationship so long as China acknowledged Tibet's autonomy. But the Chinese were unwilling to recognize Tibet's autonomy; therefore, the Tibetans refused to acknowledge any Chinese authority over Tibet, or what the British defined as suzerainty. Because the Chinese would not agree to acknowledge Tibetan autonomy in an agreement with the British, the British unilaterally recognized Tibetan autonomy under Chinese suzerainty. Britain declared that it would deal directly with Tibet as if it were an autonomous state. However, the result of British policy was that China never recognized Tibetan autonomy, while the British did recognize Chinese suzerainty over Tibet.

Richardson admits that Britain actually treated Tibet not as if it were under Chinese suzerainty but as if it were independent, without, however, ever officially acknowledging Tibetan independence. Richardson says that this British policy of never recognizing Tibetan independence, when Tibet was independent in fact, had left Tibet in a precarious position upon the British departure from India in 1947. Independent India was also left with an undefined border with Tibet because the border alignment had been negotiated between Britain and Tibet in 1914 without Chinese involvement.

At the end of his report Richardson also has a discussion about the history and political status of Kham. Richardson says that the traditional border between China and Tibet was established in both Kham and Amdo during the Tibetan Empire period. The population within this area of eastern Tibet is entirely Tibetan, although of many different tribes. The area was traditionally independent of both Chinese and Tibetan control, although there was a nominal allegiance to Lhasa. Actual Tibetan political control had not been exercised over all of eastern Tibet since the Tibetan Empire period. The only semblance of administrative control from central Tibet over eastern Tibet was exercised by the large monastic sects, whose central monasteries were all in central Tibet. Political divisions of Tibet that separated eastern Tibet from central Tibet were made by the Mongol and Manchu empires, of both of which Tibet was a part. Neither the Mongols nor the Manchu had exercised much political authority in eastern Tibet, and the Chinese had also exercised very little authority there.

In 1860, when the Khampa state of Nyarong attacked the neighboring states of Hor and Derge, a Tibetan army was sent from Lhasa to restore peace. This was done with the approval of the Manchu government in Beijing. After this, most of the area of Kham was under the administration of the Tibetan government in Lhasa. In 1905 Kham was invaded from Sichuan by a Chinese official of Sichuan province, Chao Erh-feng, who by 1908 had conquered all of the states of Kham. Chao proclaimed that all of Kham should become a Chinese province to be known as Sikang. In 1910 Chao's troops reached Lhasa, causing the Dalai Lama to flee to India. In 1912 the Manchu Qing dynasty was overthrown, Chinese troops were expelled from Tibet, and the Dalai Lama declared Tibetan independence. The Chinese plan to incorporate eastern Tibet into a Chinese province was thus delayed. The Chinese republican government once again tried to establish Sikang, declaring it a province in 1939, despite the fact that China exercised no actual control over the area.

In 1914, at the Simla Conference, the British attempted to establish a border between China and Tibet. Central Tibet was to enjoy its traditional autonomy from China, while eastern Tibet was to come under a loose form of Chinese control. The Chinese, however, refused to ratify any agreement about Tibet's status. The Tibetan Government therefore denied any degree of Chinese control over Tibet and reasserted its authority in eastern Tibet. The Tibetan Government regained control over much of Kham with the assistance of the British, who provided arms and ammunition to the Tibetans. During this time China and Tibet exercised varying degrees of control over Kham, with the Tibetans often prevailing militarily because of the weapons that they had been provided by the British. Amdo came under the control of the Hui, who had established the province of Qinghai that was loosely connected to the Chinese central government. Relations between Tibetans and the Hui in Qinghai were fairly good, although Ma Pufeng, the governor of Qinghai, exacted a ransom from Tibet before he would allow the Fourteenth Dalai Lama to be taken to Lhasa.

Richardson writes that the easiest entry to Tibet from China was by way of the northern route through Qinghai. There were few Tibetans there and little to impede a Chinese army seeking to invade central Tibet. Kham posed more obstacles, both due to the terrain, which was more difficult than that to the north, and because the population was more warlike. However, the Khampas were politically disorganized. They disliked control by either Lhasa or China, which prevented their uniting with Lhasa against the Chinese. In answer to whether the Khampas would prefer Chinese or Tibetan rule, Richardson says that they would prefer neither. They would rather be left alone. The Chinese had never succeeded in controlling the Khampas. Even Chao Erh-feng had only loosely controlled Kham, despite the brutality of his attempts to subdue the Khampas. Chao had attempted to colonize Kham with Chinese settlers, which had been only partially successful in a few areas such as Batang that were suitable for agriculture.

Richardson also has a discussion about Tibet's relations with Nepal. Tibetan relations with Nepal go back until the time before recorded history. The first major recorded event in official relations between Tibet and Nepal was the marriage between the Tibetan king, Songtsen Gampo, and the Nepalese princess Brikuti, known to Tibetans as Belsa, in the early seventh century. This marriage took place during the exile of a Nepalese king, Narendradeva, in Tibet, suggesting that Belsa was a relative, perhaps the daughter, of Narendradeva and that this was an official marriage alliance between Nepal and Tibet. Narendradeva was restored to the throne of Nepal with Tibetan assistance, which illustrates the close relationship between Nepal and Tibet at that time. The Nepalese princess and Nepalese artisans played a large role in Tibet, particularly in the importation of Buddhist religion and art and the building of the Jokhang temple. Nepal competed with China for influence in Tibet during the Tibetan Empire period, with Nepal playing a greater role in artistic and religious influences. Nepal was also, from that time until the Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1950, Tibet's largest trading partner.

The conquest of Nepal by the Hindu Gurkhas in 1769 diminished the religious connection between Nepal and Tibet and began a time of Nepalese invasions of Tibet. In 1792 the Gurkhas invaded Tibet in order to loot the reputedly rich monasteries of Tibet,

and the Gurkhas robbed Tashilhunpo of much of its wealth. This invasion was responded to by Tibetans assisted by the Manchu rulers of China. A Tibetan and Manchu army invaded Nepal and reached almost to Kathmandu, where it imposed a treaty upon Nepal. This treaty was between the Manchu government of China and Nepal. After this invasion the Manchu claimed that Nepal was subject to China, and they claimed increased authority over the affairs of Tibet. In 1854 the Gurkhas again invaded Tibet, on the pretext that some Nepalese subjects had been mistreated in Lhasa. This time the Manchu did not respond, having lost much of their influence over Tibetan affairs, and the Tibetans had to contend with the Gurkhas on their own. The Gurkhas managed to impose a treaty upon Tibet giving Nepalese subjects special privileges in Tibet. This treaty was made between Nepal and Tibet without any involvement on the part of China.

The Gurkha invasions of Tibet embittered relations between the two countries. Tibetans resented the special privileges given to Nepalese traders in Lhasa and disputes often broke out. These traders were often half Tibetan and half Newari, known in Tibetan as Katsara. The Newari were the original inhabitants of Nepal and were artisans and traders. The Katsara held both Nepalese and Tibetan citizenship, but in disputes with Tibetans they claimed Nepalese citizenship, which made them immune from prosecution. Nepalese relations with Tibet were so poor that the Nepalese offered support to the British in their invasion of Tibet in 1904. The Nepalese representative in Lhasa later acted as a mediator in negotiations between the British and the Tibetans. The rise of British Indian influence in Tibet in the first half of the twentieth century reduced the influence of the Nepalese.

The Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1950 eliminated the influence of both India and Nepal in Tibet, and trade between Tibet and India and between Tibet and Nepal was gradually cut off. Some Nepalese subjects in Tibet were allowed to return to Nepal. The Nepalese were threatened by Chinese claims that Nepal was still subject to China.

The Chinese invasion of Tibet cut Tibet off from its most important cultural and commercial relationships in India and Nepal. India was the source of the Tibetan written language and the ultimate source of the Tibetan religion. The Buddhism that reached Tibet came from Nepalese, central Asian, and Chinese influences, all of which originated in India. Tibetan Buddhist art shows Nepalese, central Asian, and Chinese influences. Nepal was the closest country to Tibet and the easiest to reach. Cultural and commercial relations with Nepal were thus the most important for Tibet. Tibetan relations with India were also very important, while those with China were less so.

China, however, was determined that Tibet should become a part of China. Therefore, relations with India and Nepal had to be terminated and replaced by relations with China. Tibet suffered much economic distress when commercial relations with Nepal and India were cut off. The damage done by the termination of cultural relations with India and Nepal was even greater, and the largely beneficial cultural relations between Tibet and Indian and Nepal were replaced by the almost entirely destructive relations with China.

## *The State of Tibet*

Hugh Richardson left Tibet in September 1950 just before the Chinese invasion. In March 1951, after the invasion but before the signing of the 17-Point Agreement, he gave a speech in which he described the situation in Tibet when he left it and what had happened since that time. Richardson began with a brief description of the nature of the Tibetan political system.

Richardson said that the Tibetan political system had hardly changed since the rule of the Dalai Lamas was established in the seventeenth century. This system embodied Tibetan political ideas going back to the empire period of the seventh to ninth centuries. In the current system the Dalai Lama was the absolute ruler in all matters both spiritual and political. The monastic system also played a large role in Tibetan society and politics. The monasteries, particularly those around Lhasa, were established as a support for the Dalai Lama and the political system of rule by the Gelugpa sect. However, they had become a conservative and self-interested force that prevented the introduction of any new ideas into Tibet. The monasteries, along with an aristocracy, were also the biggest landowners in Tibet and were thus also the main beneficiaries of the serf system. This system bound the serfs to the landowner and was thus subject to abuses. However, Richardson says that ordinary Tibetans showed few signs of being repressed. They enthusiastically participated in the financial support of the monastic system and were in other respects apparently fairly self-sufficient and happy.

Richardson says that the Tibetan people supported their religious and political systems. However there were some who realized the weakness of the Tibetan system but were powerless to make any changes. Such was the nature of the political system that no internal force could change it except a Dalai Lama himself. The Thirteenth Dalai Lama did indeed attempt to make some changes, but even he was restrained by the conservative power of the monasteries.

The Tibetan political and religious system, Richardson said, could survive only in isolation. Such isolation had been provided in the recent past by the weakness of China. With the rising power of China, however, Tibet stood practically defenseless. In the first half of the twentieth century Tibet had come to rely on the British to protect Tibet's independence against the Chinese. After the death of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama in 1933, Tibet was ruled by regents until 1950 when the Fourteenth Dalai Lama took over governmental authority. During the period of rule by regents, Tibet managed to maintain its independence from China. However Tibet needed to establish some international recognition of its independence during this time, but failed to do so. When it became apparent that the Communists might prevail in the Chinese civil war, Tibet did make some attempts to establish diplomatic relations with other countries. However, these came too late. When the Communists took power in China in 1949, Tibet expelled all Chinese from Tibet out of fear that some of them might claim to be Communist Chinese representatives in Tibet.

When the Chinese Communists announced that they intended to liberate Tibet, the Tibetan Government sent missions to India, Britain, and the United States to seek help. However, Tibet was inexperienced in diplomacy; the missions were not even allowed to travel to those countries because Tibet had not previously established diplomatic relations with them. At the same time, the Chinese Communists had been claiming that they intended to liberate Tibet from British and American imperialists. The British and Americans, therefore, were intent upon demonstrating that they had no interests in Tibet.

When Richardson left Lhasa in September 1950 the Chinese Communists were indicating that they might be able to reach some agreement with Tibet that would maintain something like the traditional relationship between China and Tibet. The Chinese said at that time that they had no intention of invading Tibet. However, at the same time they were making preparations to invade Tibet and they did so in October. The Tibetan reaction was to install the Dalai Lama as head of government and in December to remove him and much of the government to Yatung on the border with India. This was the situation when Richardson was speaking. Tibetan delegates had been summoned by the Chinese to Beijing to negotiate. Richardson said that the hope was that Tibet might be able to negotiate some compromise that would allow it retain its cultural and political systems. Richardson hoped that the Chinese would decide not to militarily occupy Tibet, since to do so would arouse Tibetan resistance and perhaps provoke the Dalai Lama to seek exile in India.

#### *Feudal Tibet under Chinese Occupation*

In 1952 Richardson wrote a paper about the situation in Tibet in the first year of the Chinese occupation. He wrote that the Chinese had partially invaded Tibet and then called for negotiations in order to persuade Tibet to surrender. The subsequent agreement between China and Tibet allowed the Chinese to enter Tibet without further fighting. The agreement gave China control of Tibet's sovereignty while promising the preservation of Tibet's internal government, culture, and religion. However, Richardson said that the agreement reduced Tibet from an independent country to a colony of China. He wondered how long the Tibetan political system and culture would survive once independence had been lost.

Richardson said that Tibet had responded to the Chinese invasion with a combination of resistance and conciliation. When the resistance put up by the Tibetan Army was crushed by the Chinese, Tibet had to resort to conciliation. The result was that China was able to call their invasion of Tibet a peaceful liberation and Tibet was able to preserve, at least temporarily, its social and political systems. Richardson feared that the Chinese Communists would impose an isolation upon Tibet that would prevent any information about Tibet reaching the outside except that provided by propagandists in Beijing. In the meantime, the preservation of the Tibetan political system allowed the Chinese to establish their control over Tibet with the cooperation of the Tibetan Government.

Richardson said that before the Chinese invasion, Tibet had friendly political relations with India and not very friendly relations with China. Most Tibetan commercial

relations were with India. Richardson wrote that one of the first changes in Tibet was that it had been cut off from India. Indian political influence had been replaced by that of the Chinese. China had also replaced India in commercial relations. The Tibetan wool trade with India had been cut off partly because the Americans stopped buying Tibetan wool after Tibet had become part of China since the United States had a prohibition on trade with communist countries. China had quickly bought up Tibetan wool in order to transfer the trade to China.

One bit of information that had come out of Tibet was that the Panchen Lama had returned. The previous Panchen Lama had been exiled in China since 1924 and he had been supported by the Chinese Kuomintang government. He died at Jyekundo in 1937. The present reincarnation had been recognized by the Chinese Communists, who had forced the Tibetan Government to also recognize him as one of the preconditions for the 17-Point Agreement. The Chinese were attempting to exploit the Panchen Lama to divide Tibet politically. However, Richardson said that they would be able to do this only to a limited extent since the Dalai Lama's prestige and political authority was much greater than that of the Panchen.

Another bit of news that had escaped Tibet was that the presence of a large number of Chinese troops in Tibet had caused a food shortage. Poor Tibetans, those whom the Chinese most wanted to cultivate, were the most affected. Many Tibetans, including the prime minister, Lukhang, called for the Chinese to leave. However, since the Tibetan Government was forced to cooperate with the Chinese, it had to suppress Tibetan resistance to the Chinese presence. The Dalai Lama was forced to dismiss Prime Minister Lukhang. Richardson wrote that the Chinese could use the authority of the Tibetan Government to prevent any Tibetan resistance so long as the Chinese were careful in Tibet. He said that the one thing that would cause the Tibetans to revolt would be if their religion were attacked. The Chinese had promised to respect Tibetan Buddhism and to make no changes in the monastic system. However, Richardson thought that the militantly anti-religious Chinese Communists would eventually be unable to resist attacking Tibetan religion.

Richardson said that there was a belief among many people that the reason that communism had taken hold over the minds of the Chinese was because they had no religious belief. The Tibetans, on the other hand, had a strong religious belief and were likely to resist communism. The Tibetans were likely to tolerate the Chinese occupation of Tibet so long as their government and the Dalai Lama told them to do so. However, he said that the Chinese were not well-liked by the Tibetans and he doubted that Tibetan resistance could be prevented for long. What the Chinese had managed to gain by their compromise with the Tibetan Government was that they had gained time to strengthen their position in Tibet. The Chinese had been busily building roads into Tibet so that they could support their troops and move more troops into Tibet to put down any resistance.

### *Tibet Past and Present*

In 1962 Richardson wrote a paper about the situation in Tibet after the 1959 revolt and the flight of the Dalai Lama and many Tibetan refugees to India. He said that after the Chinese invaded and occupied Tibet they kept up a constant campaign of interference in and subversion of all Tibetan customs and religion and every expression of Tibetan nationality. The Tibetan revolt was the culmination of Tibetan resentment against Chinese interference in their lives. The Chinese blamed the revolt on the Tibetan upper class, but Richardson says that the revolt was actually an act of the common people. The upper classes did not want an open revolt because they had the most to lose. Richardson said that it was the Chinese who benefited most from the revolt since they were able to eliminate the Tibetan Government, the monasteries, and all other resistance to their attempts to control and transform Tibet.

Richardson met many Tibetan refugees in India shortly after the 1959 revolt. They told him that the Chinese had confiscated all the property of most of the aristocracy and of anyone who had supported the revolt. Monasteries that had in any way supported the rebels were closed. The Chinese tried to control all movement of people in Tibet in order to prevent any more escaping to India. However, many were able to escape, although many more were prevented or were killed or arrested in the attempt to escape. The Chinese also confiscated the property of many of the Tibetan middle class or those who had even a small amount of property. Monasteries also had all of their property confiscated. The wealth of the monasteries in precious metals and religious objects was confiscated by the Chinese and taken away to China. Less valuable objects like clay statues, thangkhas, religious texts, and wood blocks for printing texts were burned or destroyed. The Chinese tried to claim that those Tibetans who escaped to India were only the aristocrats or others who had exploited ordinary Tibetans, but Richardson says that this was not true. Those who had escaped were the most ordinary Tibetans. He said that Chinese excuses were typical of those made by a country that tries to take over another country.

Richardson said that the Chinese were trying to say that they were bringing progress to a backward country that had been characterized by the most cruel and oppressive feudalism. However, Richardson said that this description of Tibet was nothing like what he himself had experienced during his 14 years' residence there. He said that Tibetan life was harsh but not cruel and oppressive. There was more social harmony in Tibet and more material security than was the case at the same time in India. It was ironic, he said, that the immediate result of complete Chinese control over Tibet after the revolt was that Tibetans were subjected to the famine that the Chinese had caused by their own mistaken policies. Tibet had always been self-sufficient in food, but now the Tibetans starved while the Chinese ate their food.

Richardson said that the Chinese Communist doctrine as well as their policies as already applied in Tibet indicated that they would have no tolerance for the cultural traditions or cultural autonomy of national minorities. The Chinese had already eradicated much of what was typical of Tibetan traditional life. Tibetan religious life had been repressed and their monasteries emptied. Tibetans were placed on starvation rations because their own food was confiscated by the Chinese. Tibetans were forced to do long

hours of labor and then to attend endless indoctrination sessions. He said that there was no religious freedom, no freedom of trade or movement, and, of course, no political freedom.

Richardson said that he thought that the only hope for the survival of Tibetan culture was in exile. At that time, in 1962, there were already 70,000 Tibetan refugees in India and more were still arriving. The Indian Government was making some effort to permanently settle the Tibetans in refugee camps around India. Most of the Tibetans were in poor condition but they retained their typically strong spirits. They had already established some hospitals and schools for their children. Some Tibetans had been settled in other countries. Richardson said that the Tibetans were very adaptable people and were already learning about their new lives in exile and making the most of their refugee condition. Some lamas were teaching foreign scholars about Buddhism. Richardson thought that the Tibetans would soon become self-sufficient in exile much as they were in Tibet and that they would not be a burden to their host country, India. Although he did not say so explicitly, Richardson did not foresee that the Tibetans would return to their homeland any time soon.