jË-¼¤-Å-¾ºÛ-ŸÛ-ºIÛG-GÛ-ÆÛh-‚ãÅ- h‚Ûm-»ÛG
2005.09.22
DHARAMSALA'S APPEASEMENT POLICY The Kashag of the Tibetan Government in Exile, based in Dharamsala, India, has sent an appeal to Tibetans and Tibet supporters in the USA and Canada, asking them to not embarrass Chinese President, Hu Jintao, by demonstrating against him during his scheduled visit to the US and Canada. In the event, Hu Jintao's visit was postponed due to the hurricane in the United States. Nevertheless, Dharamsala's policy of not embarrassing Chinese leaders during their foreign visits has aroused much controversy and resistance among Tibetans and their supporters. Dharamsala's policy is based upon the belief that the current contacts between Chinese and Tibetan representatives can be transformed into dialogue and then negotiations if a conducive atmosphere for such dialogue is created and maintained. What Dharamsala means by a conducive atmosphere for dialogue is that Chinese leaders should not be embarrassed by Tibetan demonstrations or any other anti-Chinese activities. The Kashag specified that it did not mean to prohibit nonviolent activities by Tibetans in exile, only violent activities, among which the Kashag included demonstrations, which are potentially violent in nature, or any other activities that will cause embarrassment to the Chinese nation and people. The Kashag statement said that a policy of pursuing an autonomous status within China through negotiations had been adopted democratically by the Tibetan people both within and outside Tibet. It said that talks with Chinese officials had reached a critical stage; therefore, it was necessary for all Tibetans to support the talks and not hinder them. The Kashag said that it had previously appealed for the creation of a conducive atmosphere for talks, to which most Tibetans and Tibetan supporters had responded positively. However, the Kashag said that it was necessary to make an urgent appeal to all Tibetans and Tibet Support Groups to refrain from any activities, including staging of protest demonstrations, which might cause embarrassment to Hu Jintao during his visit to the US and Canada. It said that China had recently shown a positive attitude towards talks. Therefore, if the Tibetan people could demonstrate a good attitude it would have a positive effect upon future negotiations. Conversely if Tibetans cause embarrassment to Hu Jintao, it would certainly have a negative impact on the process of negotiations. The Kashag statement said that Tibetans and their supporters could still work on other political, social, educational and economic activities, which do not hamper the environment for negotiations. These include improving the environment for negotiations, creating awareness about the truth of the Tibetan struggle amongst the world community, in particular the Chinese people, and soliciting support from the governments, parliaments, political organizations and the general public wherever one lives. It said that anyone who is genuinely concerned about the Tibetan people and is conscious of his or her responsibilities could work for the cause of Tibet without going against the principle of non-violence. The Kashag statement said that it was clear that protests that cause embarrassment to a few Chinese leaders, and the short publicity gained from it, will not at all help the Tibetan cause and would hinder the progress of the ongoing Sino-Tibetan dialogue. Instead of demonstrations and protests the Kashag suggested that Tibetans should follow the advice of the Tibetan protective deities and high lamas who have emphasized the importance of enhancing the collective merit of the Tibetan people by means of merit earning activities such as supporting pujas in monasteries. The Kashag quoted Hu Jintao saying that China should not attempt to forcibly change the identity of nationalities. The Kashag statement primarily reflects the views of the Kalon Tripa, Samdhong Rinpoche. And they reflect his archaic, religious mentality. To think that the problem in Sino-Tibetan relations is the lack of Tibetan merit, rather than a lack of merit on the part of the Chinese, is a particularly archaic religious idea. The Chinese are unlikely to be moved by Tibetan prayers that China will negotiate with them. The claim that Tibetans both inside Tibet and in exile have democratically chosen autonomy within China is open to challenge. The hope that China will negotiate if Tibetans cease all demonstrations is probably forlorn. In their official statements Chinese spokespersons have indicated that what they mean by the Dalai Lama's splittist activities, which they demand he give up before any negotiations are possible, includes all his international activities and even the very existence of the Tibetan Government in Exile. Even then, China has said that it will talk to the Dalai Lama only about his personal status, not about any issue of Tibet, which China denies even exists. In addition, at this time it appears that China is not at all interested in a return of the Dalai Lama, preferring to await his demise, after which China will name its own Dalai Lama. Despite the Kashag's and Samdhong Rinpoche's belief that China will be led to negotiations if Tibetans refrain from demonstrations, it is precisely such activities that have forced them to pay any attention to the Tibet issue at all. It may be assumed that it is only because they are embarrassed by the Tibet issue that China has been willing to talk with Tibetan exile representatives. And it may be logically presumed that China's primary goal in such talks is to lessen its embarrassment and to convince its foreign critics that it is open to discussions about Tibet. It is demonstrations and other embarrassments for China and its officials that have forced them to talk about Tibet, not the absence of such embarrassments. It is not logical to assume that China will be moved to dialogue or negotiate about Tibet in the absence of any pressure from the Tibetan and international community. China wishes the Tibetan issue would go away without China having to do anything in Tibet. It is therefore foolhardy for the Tibetan side to facilitate the Chinese goal by voluntarily abandoning the only leverage it has with China. 09/09/05
Çtï¾-¸Ûm-qºÛ-zôh-GmÅ-¤DÅ-hzP-GÛ-¾ï-±mü
- ‚¤Å-q-wÞm-±ô^-ˆÛ-ÈôP-;ôP-mP-GÛ-ºiÛ-¾mü
- zôh-MºÛ-IôÅ-¤ô¾-zhïm-»Ûm-m¤-»P-m-fzÅ-WâÅ-ŸÛG-»Ûm-m¤ü
- M-mG-GÛ-Zïm-±zÅü
- Í-¼ÛºÛ-IôÅ-±ô^-mÅ-M-mG-GŸÝP-GÛÅ-zôh-ˆÛ-Mã-hPôÅ-@Ý-Eï¼-‚Å-q¼-hrh-ŸÛz-GmP-Mãü
- M-¤Û-ƒôÅ-‚ô¾-zÅ-ÍôÅF¼ô-¾Û-»ºÛ-mP-M-¤Û-Åô-q-»ôh-Ç+ô¼-Gž-Çeôm-‚Å-qü
- zôh-GmÅ-¤DÅ-hzP-¶-¼ïm-ŤÛf-»ÛÅ-z¯¤Å-qºÛ-ÍÛ¸-¼»Û¾-ÍïqŇÛm-HÛ-¤Û-±ïºÛ-¾ô-MãÅü
- M-mG-GÛÅ-Çtï¾-zºÛ-¤Û-¼ÛGÅ-Å-DôPÅ-¼P-BôP-Ç+ô¼-HÛ-hïz-Mz-Á-h;¼-qôü