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2005.07.28
SINO-TIBETAN DIALOGUE: TALKS OR TACTICS? Tibetan envoys of the Dalai Lama recently met with Chinese officials of the United Front Work Department at the Chinese Embassy in Berne, Switzerland. The meeting was described by the Tibetan side as the first session of the fourth round of their talks with the Chinese Government. The Chinese side described the talks in less formal terms, saying only that some Chinese officials concerned with Tibetan issues had met with some Tibetans living abroad, some of whom were close to the Dalai Lama. The Chinese Foreign Ministry reiterated its policy that real talks could begin only when the Dalai Lama gave up his separatist activities and acknowledged both Tibet and Taiwan as inalienable Chinese territory. Only then, the Chinese spokesperson said, could talks begin and only concerning the Dalai Lama's personal situation. While the Tibetan side tried to give as much substance to the contacts as possible, the Chinese side played down the significance. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson described the United Front officials who met with the Tibetans as being in Switzerland on a study tour, not specifically to meet with the Tibetan representatives. The spokesperson also said that Chinese officials routinely make arrangements for Tibetans residing abroad in regard to making visits to Tibet to see relatives or to make commercial investments. The spokesperson implied that the Dalai Lama and other Tibetans in exile could return to Tibet but only if they became patriotic to China, a reference to China's demand that Tibetans can return but only if they give up all separatist activities and pledge loyalty to China. What China might mean by separatist activities is open to different interpretations. The Dalai Lama and his government in exile seem to think that they have satisfied that requirement by abandoning the Tibetan claim to independence and accepting that Tibet is part of China. China, however, may mean something more. This is indicated by a statement by the Foreign Ministry spokesperson that the Dalai Lama must give up his Tibet independence advocacy both verbally and in practical action. What the Chinese side presumably means is that the Dalai Lama should cease all his international activities, all of which the Chinese see as in some way being based upon a Tibetan claim to be something less than an integral and inalienable part of China. Perhaps they even mean that the Tibetan Government in exile should cease to exist. Only then, after all China's demands are satisfied, the Chinese will talk to the Dalai Lama not about the Tibet issue, an issue they deny even exists, but only about the Dalai Lama's personal status and situation. Despite China's downplaying of the most recent contacts and the reiteration of its uncompromising conditions, the latest round of talks was greeted with something akin to jubilation in Dharamsala and even in Washington, DC. The Dalai Lama issued a statement saying that Sino-Tibetan dialogue had now become an established practice. Samdhong Rinpoche said that China had finally realized that the Dalai Lama was the solution to the Tibet issue, not the problem, and that he thought the Tibet issue would be resolved during the current Dalai Lama's lifetime. The head of the Tibetan delegation and the Dalai Lama's Special Envoy, Lodi Gyari, said that his Chinese counterpart had acknowledged that the contacts had become an established practice. However, he criticized the Chinese side for having made no move toward actual talks on the Tibet issue. The US State Department said that it was encouraging that the dialogue was continuing. The US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, on a visit to China, told Chinese leaders that they should engage in dialogue with the Dalai Lama who, she said, was not a threat to China. According to Lodi Gyari, the Chinese official sought to encourage the Tibetan side to continue the dialogue process despite the lack of any apparent progress. The Chinese official said that the Tibetans should not be pessimistic about the differences between the two sides and that it was possible to narrow those differences through more meetings and exchange of views. This ostensible expression of sincerity on the part of the Chinese official might be regarded by the hopeful as encouraging but it might be seen by the more skeptical as revealing China's true strategy. If China's only purpose in holding talks with Tibetans were to reduce the international criticism about Tibet without making any concessions and to delay until the current Dalai Lama passes from the scene, then this would be the way to do it. Dharamsala has called for the creation of a conducive atmosphere for dialogue, by which it means a lessening of criticism of China. The US and other countries also find it convenient to encourage Sino-Tibetan dialogue in the hopes that the issue will fade away and not spoil their relations with China. And China has used this same strategy in its human rights dialogues with other countries. To avoid criticism by international organizations and at the United Nations, China established bilateral human rights dialogues with its more prominent critics. However, these dialogues have resulted in little or no improvement in China's human rights practices while they have provided a convenient cover for international commercial relations with China. China's strategy in regard to Tibet may be suspected to be the same strategy that it is following in the human rights dialogue. China can diminish international criticism about Tibet by pretending to dialogue, while it is waiting for the demise of the Dalai Lama, after which it will name its own Dalai Lama. What China apparently hopes to achieve by its contacts with Tibetan representatives is the elimination of the international Tibetan political issue. Even China's promise to negotiate with the Dalai Lama after he has given up his separatist activities or to allow him to return to China is open to suspicion. Despite The US Secretary of State's assurances, the Dalai Lama is indeed a threat to China. He represents Tibetan national identity, an identity that is an inherent threat to China's national unity. 07/15/05
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