With China's growing global clout and Russia's continuing aggression in Ukraine, Europe and Asia are emerging as key players in supporting the U.S.'s global strategy to defend the rule of law. As the geopolitical chessboard gets more complicated, with North Korea sending 1 million artillery shells to Russia since August, Europe is finding itself increasingly invested in its role and stakes in Asia. Ramon Parcheco Pardo, KF-VUB Korea Chair at the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS) of the VUB Brussels School of Governance, has called out for the importance of cooperation between the two regions for global security. Pacheco Pardo, who is also the head of the department of European & international Studies at King's College London, and participated in track 1.5 and 2 dialogues with South Korea, North Korea, China, Japan and the U.S., spoke with Radio Free Asia in Seoul about the growing needs of security collaboration between Europe and Asia.
Q: What’s the sentiment among the European powers towards this shift in geological dynamics in this part of the world [Northeast Asia] and how does the European factor come into play now?
A: Things are moving quite quickly in Europe because almost everything these days is trending in terms of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and how this affects not only Europe, but the rest of the world. I think this is very much seen as confirmation that we are in an ideological war or competition where there’s a division with Russia, China, North Korea, and perhaps Iran on one side, and South Korea, Japan, the U.S., Europe, Canada, Australia, on the other side.
I think it’s [European perspective] also framed in terms of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which can give China ideas about Taiwan. And therefore, this means that there's going to be, again, more cooperation between China, Russia and North Korea. And then the democracies in the region, Taiwan obviously, but also South Korea, Japan, the U.S. with its alliance with the latter two, will have to work together. So it’s not an ideal state from a European perspective, but that’s the way it is.
Q: When did you think the shift occurred in terms of how Europe looks at this region and how it becomes more connected to them and that the stakes are getting bigger for them?
A: I think there were two, three concurrent events that affected. One of them is the NATO London Summit in 2019, [when] they mentioned China for the first time. The U.S. was pushing more of the Indo-Pacific angle, and Europe launched the Indo-Pacific strategy. The European Union, and some countries, like France, for example, launched its own Indo-Pacific strategy.
Secondly, it’s China’s behavior – its crackdown on Hong Kong, the opacity in the early stages of the pandemic, the Xinjiang issue as well. All these things happened more or less at the same time, where on the one side it was more European, and on the other more of a Chinese development.
The third factor was the deterioration in relations between the EU and China, particularly after the Chinese government imposed sanctions on European parliamentarians.
Q: Apart from the change in the sentiments, Europe, especially Germany, has huge investments in China. So how much of that is a deterrent to what Europe can do and how far it can go in terms of aligning with this part of the world [Northeast Asia]?
A: That’s a very valid question. Europe was the first to say – let’s talk about derisking because decoupling is not going to happen and pushed for that, including at the G7 summit in Hiroshima. Therefore, the focus has shifted to derisking in critical realms such as technology, supply chains, and even health products especially highlighted during the pandemic when Europe was exposed to its reliance on Chinese health products such as masks. In fact, many European companies realized that it was difficult to develop biotech products without Chinese involvement. Essentially, the idea here is not not to stop all trading or investments with China, but rather identifying and minimizing risks, particularly in sectors where dependence on China is exposed.
And the other component is the European Chamber of Commerce in China and many Europeans have for a long time been complaining of the lack of reciprocity from China in openness to investment. That Europe was very open, but China was not. And that was a fair argument. That also means that without talking about decoupling, there’s more willingness in Europe to reciprocate now and say, well, if China doesn’t allow investment, then why should we allow open Chinese investment? In some sectors, yes. But in some other sectors, we have an investment screening mechanism, we should stop Chinese investment. And we shouldn't allow it. So I don’t think that it is an impediment, but we shouldn’t overestimate the willingness of European firms and governments to say, okay, let’s not depend on China.
Q: Given all these moving factors,what can be done and achieved in terms of protecting the security and interests of most parties involved?
A: Well, I think that there is a willingness to move towards more resilient supply chains, clearly, even if it’s more expensive. Because obviously if you don’t produce in China – we change components – it’s going to be more expensive. But I think there is a willingness now among European governments, even European firms, to be honest, to say: okay, we’ll have to pay more if we invest in Korea, for example, which is something that more and more European companies are doing. In the past, they may have looked at China, and they’re saving, like pharmaceutical firms, for example. Now, they say, let’s look at South Korea. Yes, it’s more expensive, but it’s safer. And we have no political problems with Korea.
There is that willingness to do so – not only look at the bottom line and not only look at where you can produce more cheaply. From an economic perspective, it would be [looked at] more rationally, and which countries can you work with on a sustainable basis, and you’re going to have no problems, and they’re open – as open to you as you are. This change in thinking means cooperation with South Korea, Taiwan, Japan and Australia, Canada, which are higher cost locations, compared to China, but also are seen as safer from a geopolitical point of view. Maybe Taiwan a bit less.
Q: In terms of defense, what could be done? How can the cooperation play out?
A: We have the perfect example of Korean firms, and Australians as well, sending weapons to NATO members. You see this with defensive military capabilities being sent directly to Ukraine also by Japan and previously by Taiwan as well. Now looking at the future, you see this willingness for arms companies to operate with each other. And you see it with Poland and South Korea, for example, you see with the U.K. and Italy plus Japan.
Beyond this, we also see it [cooperation] in cybersecurity. Let’s have joint tabletop exercises with exchange intelligence. Let’s exchange information, our experiences as well. In maritime security, you see joint military exercises or joint exercises between the navies of European countries and Asian navies together with the U.S. So you see this willingness to actually cooperate in a very practical way, not only rhetorically.
Q: Do you expect this to pick up pace? Will it accelerate?
A: I think so, because first of all, when Europe looks at the Indo-Pacific region or the Asian countries, they realize they have to cooperate with countries in the region. This is something that Europe cannot do by itself, and it needs to work with partners in the region. When there’s security threats in Europe, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and of course the cybersecurity matters, it’s more willing to reach out to countries which Europe feels comfortable with.
I think there’s going to be an uptake in this. Another key reason, of course, is that resources are limited. All countries have monetary constraints, both in Asia and in Europe as well. So there’s this realization that you can save money by working together with others. And that matters because Europe is still recovering from the pandemic, as well as the Eurozone soaring prices. And that left a big hole in the budgets of many countries.
Q: Why are South Korea and Japan important partners to European countries when it comes to security?
A: I would say there are three reasons. The first one is that they’re countries with capabilities, and that matters. With other countries, you don’t really cooperate with them, you actually help them, because they don’t have the capabilities and they ask for help. You can actually have a partnership that you give and take, so it’s not only a one way street.
Secondly, the interests are similar – no real differences, no real problems in terms of what your goals are [for South Korea and Japan], where what you are trying to achieve is very similar to Europe. And the third reason is really, values. Many Europeans feel there is this ideological divide competition, even warfare like cyberwar. And again, with Korean, Japan, there are no problems. Democracy is market economies, rule of law. It’s part of the fabric of these countries. So you’re not going to have the tensions that you will have with other countries because the human rights standards may be different or they may not be democracies, as in some cases.
Q: What are some of the domains that European countries can work with their Asian partners?
A: In terms of areas, cyber is a big one. I would say number one, probably today, because it's kind of related to many of these interference operations that take place in the cyber domain. Development of new technologies, weapons technologies, but also the use of technologies. The technologies that you use in the development of advanced weapon systems, for example, in conductors, batteries, and all these different types of products that are necessary.
Maritime security – you see more willingness from the Europeans to go to the South China Sea, to the Taiwan Strait, as well. You see this cooperation as well in the Indian Ocean, and transcended the Pacific Ocean. And of course now that economics has become tied to security. Even NATO talks about economic security as an area for cooperation. So the agenda itself is quite broad.
Q: Is institutionalization needed to further facilitate the cooperation between the two regions?
A: The Nato-Asia Pacific partners, the AP4, format has been launched, and that includes South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. So clearly that’s a format that many Europeans feel that we should be using. So there’s that component that we should consider to strengthen security and economic cooperation.
Edited by Mike Firn and Taejun Kang.