Landlocked Laos could play a huge role in future negotiations between ASEAN and China on a South China Sea code of conduct, potentially tipping the scales for Beijing, but close ties with its northern neighbor do not mean that Vientiane is acting as a proxy to block negotiations, analysts told Radio Free Asia.
As the leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, concluded their summit in Manila this week, the bloc again failed to finalize the code of conduct, or COC – an agreement that would seek to prevent confrontations in the sea which is claimed in its entirety by China and in part by Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei and Malaysia.
The COC has been in negotiations for decades, and hammering out the agreement during this week’s meeting was a priority for the bloc’s current chair, the Philippines, a country with an exclusive economic zone, or EEZ, that significantly overlaps the territory claimed by China within its nine-dash line. Philippines foreign minister Ma. Theresa Lazaro on Nov. 15 told reporters that about 80% of a draft of the code had been completed.
But the agreement will have to wait until at least next year, when the next ASEAN meeting will be held in Singapore.

Laos as an ASEAN member state wields significant influence despite not having any claims in the South China Sea, as the bloc operates on a consensus system. Vientiane’s deepening economic and military ties with China could make it sympathetic to Beijing’s foreign policy goals, Joseph Kristanto, a research analyst at Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, told RFA.
“For China, having a sympathetic voice within ASEAN could therefore be useful, particularly in shaping the language and provisions of the eventual agreement, rather than necessarily obstructing the negotiations outright,” he said.
Influence does not mean control
Kristanto said Laos could influence ASEAN’s collective position by objecting to clauses supported by claimant countries, but he cautioned against treating that capacity, or its growing relationship with China, as proof that it was exercising influence at Beijing’s direction.
“While its growing economic and military ties with China could give Beijing considerable influence, I’d say that currently there is insufficient evidence to conclude that Vientiane is deliberately obstructing the COC negotiations on Beijing’s behalf,” he said.
Laos also has interests that could limit its alignment with China, particularly its longstanding political and security relationship with Vietnam and its standing within ASEAN, Kristanto added.
Although the bloc’s charter establishes consultation and consensus as its basic decision-making principle, it also allows the ASEAN summit to decide how a specific decision can be made when consensus fails. Additionally, disagreements over sensitive issues can complicate a common position.
Still, if in future negotiations China were to push for a less binding code and faced resistance, Laos could oppose ASEAN decisions or joint statements to help reshape the agreement, Enrico Cau, a Taipei-based independent security researcher, told RFA.
“Much like Cambodia, Laos seems to be closely aligned to China,” said Cau.
He explained that Chinese investment and expanding security ties support a relationship that also serves the interests of Lao and Cambodian leaders: alignment with Beijing could help sustain their governments and support development without requiring democratic reforms.
Cau therefore saw little reason to expect either country to make a fundamental shift away from supporting China within ASEAN. His assessment pointed to potential influence over future decisions, rather than identifying a specific Lao intervention in the current negotiations.
A different regional climate
Comparisons with Cambodia draw on the breakdown of an ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting in Phnom Penh in 2012. The meeting ended without a joint communiqué for the first time in the bloc’s history after disagreements over South China Sea language. Manila accused Cambodia, then the chair, of opposing references to Beijing taking control of Scarborough Shoal, a maritime feature within the Philippines’ EEZ.
Cambodia at that time described it as a “bilateral dispute” rather than a multilateral issue involving the whole of ASEAN.
Phnom Penh continued to veto drafts of the communiqué that included mentions of the shoal, Manila refused to sign off on versions that excluded it, and the meeting concluded in disagreement.
The following year, the Philippines took the issue to an international arbitral tribunal in The Hague, which issued a ruling in 2016 that invalidated Beijing’s claims based on the nine-dash line. China has rejected the ruling and continues to control the shoal.
Although Cambodia blocked an ASEAN communiqué that would have criticized China in 2012, the bloc is less likely to criticize China these days, Chong Ja Ian, a political scientist at the National University of Singapore and non-resident scholar at Carnegie China, told RFA.
“Laos could take a blocking role but the context is somewhat different,” he said. “There is less appetite across ASEAN for criticizing Beijing today.”

Unpredictability in the U.S. alongside China’s ability and willingness to exert pressure on ASEAN has made the bloc’s governments less willing to openly differ with Beijing, with the Philippines a notable exception, Chong said.
While most of the ASEAN member states have publicly stated their commitments to a substantive code of conduct, Chong questioned whether this was in fact the case. Some might wish to appear cooperative while remaining lukewarm about an agreement whose obligations and enforcement were unclear, he said.
That uncertainty could complicate efforts to distinguish Chinese influence through Laos from wider disagreements within ASEAN itself, according to Chong.
Both Washington and Beijing have in the past made efforts to secure Lao support for their respective Southeast Asia policy goals. During Laos’s ASEAN chairmanship in 2016, then-U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry visited Vientiane and emphasized ASEAN unity and maritime rights. Months later, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi publicly claimed support from Laos, Cambodia and Brunei for resolving maritime disputes through talks among directly concerned countries.
Symbolism vs. substance
For future South China Sea negotiations, the analysts said that Laos’s role must also be judged against what an eventual code would achieve.
Chong said a largely declaratory agreement would likely have limited effects on China’s behavior at sea, meaning Laos’s actions might make less difference than the underlying weaknesses of the document. Cau argued that an initial agreement could still provide a foundation for improvements over time.
Kristanto said the central question was whether Laos could influence the substance of the eventual agreement, rather than simply delay its completion.
“After all, concluding a COC and concluding an effective COC are two different things, particularly when contentious issues such as its legal status, geographical scope, and implementation remain unresolved.”
Edited by Eugene Whong.

